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We have long taken the view that jurisprudence is a discipline that ought to 
develop into a yet to be delineated science of regulation. Were our proposal 
to address the fundamental issues of a modern science of regulation to find 
favour, (legal) norms would of course continue to be the subject of atten-
tion, but not the primary one: the focus would shi to ‘rules.’ This is the 
concern of Lorraine Daston, a permanent fellow at the Berlin Institute for 
Advanced Study, in a research project for the academic year 2015/2016 
examining “Rules: The Prehistory of an Indispensable and Impossible 
Genre.” She explains: “Rules – in the form of everything from traffic regu-
lations and government directives to etiquette manuals and parliamentary 
procedures – structure almost every human interaction. … Drawing upon 
diverse genres – astronomical tables, traffic regulations, law codes, game 
manuals, handbooks of parliamentary procedures, cookbooks – I would like 
to reconstruct the history of the premodern rule as both a concept and a 
practice in order to better understand our own modern ambivalence about 
rules.” (Daston 2015, pp. 28 f.)
Our lens is not as wide as that of Lorraine Daston: our focus covers 
neither cookbooks nor astronomical tables, although it does include rules 
of the game and the law of thieves. This exploration of the universe of the 
rules governing human and institutional behaviour – the ‘World of Rules’1 – 
is a middle-range venture. We investigate the multitude of normative orders, 
the plurality of norm producers and norm enforcement regimes. We shall 
not eschew the question, always hovering in the background, of what all this 
means for the concept of law.
We embark on the project in the conviction that the world of law needs 
to be resurveyed. Old certainties reflected in the equation law = state are out 
of true: the state and the law are gradually decoupling from one another. 
1 By now (autumn 2017), because of our beneficial readings of Ralf Seinecke’s fruitful 
ventures on “The Law of Legal Pluralism” (“Das Recht des Rechtspluralismus”, 2015), 
we would have chosen a slightly differing title for our opus: “The Worlds of Rules”. Add-
ing this “s” visibly acknowledges a plurality of legal worlds.
Preface XIII
The pace of this process has differed from one field of regulation to another. 
If this is indeed the case, simply attaching a conservatory to the classical 
mansion of law with its reception rooms statute, ordinance, and bye-law will 
not suffice. Far more imperative is to replace the old house of law by a new 
edifice in which all regulatory regimes involved in exercising control find 
their place, whatever name they go by: standard, code of conduct, and so 
forth. A television series on the subject could perhaps bear the title ‘House of 
Rules.’ To avoid inapt associations, we prefer to describe our necessarily 
ambitious project as ‘Measuring the World of Rules,’ in the hope that the 
reader will forgive any cartographic imprecisions in this first attempt. 
This enterprise has benefited greatly from the stimulating intellectual 
ambience at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, where I 
had the privilege of spending two months as fellow in 2014 and again in 
2015. But this book has developed not only in dialogue with the history of 
law; it is my hope that the reflections and proposals it offers will also prove 
useful to this discipline. Such hopes are perhaps not quite unfounded: such 
cross-disciplinarily minded (legal) historians as Stefan Esders and Christoph 
Lundgreen have expressed gratifying appreciation of the governance perspec-
tive I have repeatedly brought into play.2 This is reason enough for me to 
continue my exchanges with legal history. 
Pranzo (Trentino) and Charlottenburg, spring 2015
2 Esders 2015; Lundgreen 2014.
XIV Preface
Chapter One
Measuring the Universe of Regulation: 
Necessity and Procedure
A. Introduction: Everything that can be Measured and How
To put the reader in the mood for our project, we start with three variants of 
measurement before explaining our approach in detail. Since ‘Measuring the 
World’ naturally calls to mind the bestselling novel by Daniel Kehlmann 
(2005), we begin with Alexander von Humboldt. 
I. With Daniel Kehlmann in the Footsteps of
Alexander von Humboldt
Alexander von Humboldt’s indefatigable peregrinations in the cause of the 
natural sciences, above all in South and Central America, have become 
rooted in the collective German, indeed European memory. Delving there 
could unearth the following cherished image: 
Alexander von Humboldt was famous in all of Europe for an expedition to the 
tropics he had led twenty-five years earlier. He had been in New Spain, New Gran-
ada, New Barcelona, New Andalusia, and the United States; he had discovered the 
natural canal that connects the Orinoco and the Amazon; he had climbed the 
highest mountain in the known world; he had collected thousands of plants and 
hundreds of animals, some living, the majority dead; he had talked to parrots, 
disinterred corpses, measured every river, every mountain, and every lake in his 
path, had crawled into burrows and had tasted more berries and climbed more 
trees than anyone could begin to imagine (Kehlmann 2005, p. 19. Transl. Carol 
Brown Janeway).
Humboldt had the reputation of possessing an indomitable scientific curi-
osity, which seemed a little over the top to his travelling companion Bon-
pland; when Humboldt wanted to measure a hill encountered on their road 
to Madrid – before the expedition proper had begun – Bonpland inquired 
whether this was really necessary and whether they would not get to Madrid 
a lot quicker if they made straight there: 
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Humboldt thought. No, he said, he was sorry. A hill whose height remained un-
known was an insult to the intelligence and made him uneasy. Without continually 
establishing one’s own position, how could one move forward? A riddle, no matter 
how small, could not be le by the side of the road (Kehlmann, 2005, p 42. Transl. 
Carol Brown Janeway).
Thus much on the scientific exploration of the world exemplified by Hum-
boldt’s famous ascension of Chimborazo (see the stunning picture book by 
Böhme and Tesmar 2001).
Thus much on scientific curiosity, to which the author of this book also 
lays claim. But now the reader must accept a leap of several centuries to 
consider a a way of measuring things that is practically omnipresent and 
which on closer examination has something imperialistic about it. 
II. Global Governance by Indicators or Measuring the World
as a Problem of Power and Method
States are coming increasingly under observation and their performance is 
not only analysed and evaluated from every conceivable angle; the results of 
this institutionalized observation (see Schuppert 2010) are then recorded in 
“rankings.” The indicators used and the evaluation results obtained with 
their aid are communicated worldwide; there is no escaping them even in 
the remotest corners of the globe. Although such classification does not hold 
direct sway over the world, its consequences can be considerable – see only 
the might of the rating agencies.
Governance by Indicators (2012) edited by Kevin A. Davis, Angelika Fisher, 
Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry offers a wealth of information 
and material on the subject – under an extremely pertinent subtitle: Global 
Power through Quantification and Rankings. This is exactly our present con-
cern: the measurement of the world as a problem of power and method. 
In the following overview Franz Nuschler (2009, p. 42 f.) gives us a good 
idea of who is involved and how in this “business of rating and ranking”:
2 Chapter One
Overview of International Index Constructions
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1. Status index on the develop-
ment of democracy and the 
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2. Management index on the 
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performance by 17 criteria and 
52 indicators
Country reports and 
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experts; comparison by 
regional experts; calcu-





support of a 
scientifi c BTI 
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The real problem with this “governance by indicators,” apart from the West-
ern bias rightly criticized by Davis et al. (as compared, for instance, to the Mo 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance), is its weak spot: method. Nuscheler 
cautiously comments as follows:1
The methods used by such measurements and index constructions differ widely. 
They are mainly based on country reports by experts, who for their part examine 
and evaluate the data collected by international organizations in their specific areas 
of operation. It is then a methodological problem whose solution requires more 
than mastery of statistical tools to select the right indicators for constructing an 
index and ranking countries. How performance parameters are to be weighted 
must also be decided, such as economic growth, which the World Bank stresses 
in governance indicators; the status of freedom of the press and opinion, strongly 
weighted by Freedom House (Washington, D.C.); or the level of development of the 
market economy, emphasized in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
Apart from objective indicators and those that – depending on the quality of the 
data – can be quantitatively measured, there are many that are based on subjective 
perception and assessment. A prime example is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
which draws on how the local business community appraises corrupt practices in 
government and administration, and which is used by many other indices. Even 
when such subjective assessments are cross-checked against multiple expert reports, 
as in the multi-stage BTI process, the allegedly ‘objectivized’ results of the various 
indices can differ considerably. It is therefore advisable to compare not only the data 
produced by country rankings but also the underlying indicators and data process-
ing methods (Nuscheler 2009, 32 f. Transl. R.B.).
In using governance indicators, caution is advisable for two main reasons: 
first, they reduce complexity in a questionable manner while suggesting 
quantitatively grounded rationality for the evaluations made on the basis 
of them; second, the selection and weighting of such indicators is grounded 
explicitly or implicitly in a given political philosophy, which is thus propa-
gated in Trojan guise.
As far as the trend towards simplification and the suggestion of rationality 
backed by data are concerned, we fully share the reservations of Kevin A. 
Davis et al.:
Simplification, or reductionism, is central to the appeal (and probably the impact) 
of indicators. They are oen numerical representations of complex phenomena 
intended to render them more simple and comparable with other complex phe-
nomena that have also been represented numerically. Indicators are typically aimed at 
1 Highlighting in quotes is always by myself and only in exceptional cases by the author. 
G.F.S.
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policy makers and are intended to be convenient, easy to understand, and easy to use. Yet, 
the transformation of particularistic knowledge into numerical representations that 
are readily comparable strips meaning and context from the phenomenon. In this 
numerical form, such knowledge carries a distinctive authority that shis configu-
rations and uses of power and counterpower. This transformation reflects, but also 
contributes to, changes in decisionmaking structures and processes. 
Indicators also oen present the world in black and white, with few ambiguous 
intermediate shades. They take flawed and incomplete data that may have been 
collected for other purposes, and merge them together to produce an apparently 
coherent and complete picture. Wendy Espeland and Mitchell Stevens identify this 
as a potential consequence of what March and Simon refer to as uncertainty absorp-
tion, which ‘takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence, and the 
inferences instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated’ ... As Espeland and 
Stevens describe this process, ‘Raw’ information typically is collected and compiled 
by workers near the bottom of organizational hierarchies; but as it is manipulated, 
parsed, and moved upward, it is transformed so as to make it accessible and ame-
nable for those near the top, who make the big decision. This ‘editing’ removes 
assumptions, discretion and ambiguity, a process that results in ‘uncertainty absorp-
tion’: information appears more robust than it actually is ... The premises behind the 
numbers disappear, with the consequence that decisions seem more obvious than 
they might otherwise have been (Davis et al. 2012, p. 76 f.).
Still more dubious in our view is the subcutaneous conveyance of certain 
political points of view immanent in the standard-setting function of gover-
nance indicators.
Indicators set standards. The standard against which performance is to be measured is 
oen suggested by the name of the indicator – corruption, protection of human 
rights, respect for the rule of law, and so on. To the extent that an indicator is used to 
evaluate performance against one standard rather than another, the use of that 
indicator embodies a theoretical claim about the appropriate standards for evaluat-
ing actors’ conduct. Indicators oen have embedded within them, or are placehold-
ers for, a much further-reaching theory – which some might call an ideology – of 
what a good society is, or how governance should ideally be conducted to achieve 
the best possible approximation of a good society or a good policy. At a minimum 
they are produced as, or used as, markers for larger policy ideas. They may measure 
‘success’ directly along this axis, or they may measure what, from the standpoint of 
the theory or policy idea, are pathologies or problems to be overcome. More fre-
quently they address simply some measurable elements within a wider scenario 
envisaged by the theory or policy idea. Oen the theory or policy idea is not spelled 
out at all in the indicator but remains implicit (Davis et al. 2012, p. 77).
We find this example of global governance by indicators extremely instruc-
tive: it shows that measuring cannot be reduced to a technical dimension 
but has a clear power component, an aspect we shall be coming back to.
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III. Measuring the World as an Applied Case of Governance 
By and Through Knowledge
With this third set of examples, we are – almost imperceptibly – approaching 
our topic of “measuring the diversity of law”; two examples will show how 
important, indeed indispensable it is for “governance of and through knowl-
edge” to have not only a reliable cadastral system at one’s disposal but also a 
“mental map of legal phenomena” (Twining 2009, p. 117) that provides infor-
mation about the law that is being applied.
1. Knowledge and Early-Modern State Building: The Need for 
Knowledge about Country and People
A number of ingredients are needed to govern a country effectively (see 
Schuppert 1994). The most important (apart from symbolic investiture with 
crown and sceptre) are a constant flow of revenue to the state – the modern 
state as a fiscal state, a viable administration, and well-qualified administra-
tive staff – the modern state as an administrative state. But another key 
governance resource is knowledge (see Schuppert 2008a): for this reason, 
the emerging early modern state is extremely eager to learn, as the contrib-
utors to Das Wissen des Staates (The Knowledge of the State, eds. Peter Collin 
and Thomas Horstmann, 2004) demonstrate in many ways. The knowledge 
the state needs includes dependable, always available knowledge about the 
country and the people in it; aer all, as Karin Gottschalk stresses in her 
informative article “Wissen über Land und Leute. Administrative Praktiken 
und Staatsbildungsprozesse im 18. Jahrhundert” (“Knowledge about Coun-
try and People. Administrative Practices and State Building Processes in the 
18th Century”) this is indispensable governance knowledge for recruiting 
soldiers and collecting taxes efficiently: 
The efforts of the early modern state to ‘inventory’ its territory were grounded firstly 
in the need for basic information on the population in connection with the estab-
lishment of standing armies (conscription). Similarly, the desire to collect regular 
taxes more effectively prompted the procurement of comprehensive and up-to-date 
information on the economic circumstance of subjects. The growing pretensions of 
the central state to power also encouraged the gathering of information and com-
munication with subjects. In connection with tax collection and the claims to power 
of the authorities, the state initiated ‘major projects’ to generate and structure 
knowledge inspired not least by aspects of power legitimation (Gottschalk 2004, 
150. Transl. R.B.).
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But this indispensable governance knowledge also included knowing about 
the “living law” (Ehrlich 1989) practised in the sovereign territory of the 
state; on this subject, too, Karin Gottschalk has interesting things to report 
about Hesse-Kassel, for instance:
The example of Hesse-Kassel shows how the systematic documentation, storage, and 
provision of local information and administrative knowledge intensified in the first 
half of the eighteenth century. But civil servants had difficulties routinizing such 
procedures and subjects and local officials were reluctant to cooperate. Neither 
aspect was limited to this principality. Michaela Hohkamp, for instance, shows that 
for the Further Austrian bailiwick Triberg, the newly appointed bailiff placed very 
considerable value on the availability of official documentary knowledge. Con-
fronted by subjects demanding the retention of old customs of government on which 
there was no or little written information, he was obliged to obtain exact knowledge 
about government matters. He had to choose between interrogating local govern-
ment officials and siing through old official records. The latter proved so arduous 
and time consuming that, in an effort to gain independence from local officials, the 
bailiff set out to make the records of his predecessor more accessible. He requested 
the government to assume most of the costs for establishing a records office on the 
grounds that this was more in the interests of the authorities rather than of the 
subjects. Whereupon the government paid for a archivist, who was sent to Triberg 
for thirty days to set up the office. ... Assured access to written knowledge was of 
great interest for the powers that be: ‘Written law made the authorities independent of 
cooperation – not always forthcoming – on the part of subjects, and enabled the bailiff to 
establish regular administrative practices, hitherto constantly at risk with the fre-
quent rotation of officials (Gottschalk 2004, pp. 163 f. Transl. R.B.).
2. Scientific Colonialism: The Constitutive Link between Knowledge 
and Power for Colonial Governance
Colonialism studies take it for granted that the gathering and utilisation of 
local knowledge were among the necessary functional conditions for colo-
nial rule (Cohn 1996). This constitutive link – according to Sebastian Con-
rad, writing about the German and Japanese colonial regimes – has estab-
lished the concept of scientific colonialism in the literature.
Characteristic of government in the colonial area was the close link between the 
practices of rule and geographical, legal, linguistic, and ethnological knowledge, ... 
which played a major role in the allocation of powers and responsibilities. In the 
case of German and Japanese colonialism – where the scholarly literature has adop-
ted the concept of scientific colonialism – the close link between rule and knowl-
edge was part and parcel of a modern colonial policy. The establishment of colonial 
knowledge served to guide the action of the colonial administration while setting 
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the boundaries between state power and ‘traditional’ authorities (Conrad 2007, 
pp. 134 f. Transl. R.B.).
Writing about the types of knowledge relevant for governance and the actors 
who collected and archived it, notably representatives of missionary ethnog-
raphy (Bade 1982), Conrad has this to say:
The underlying knowledge was concerned with surveying the territory and record-
ing its geography, taking ethnographic stock of the population, with medical and 
‘racial’ classification, cultural patterns, and legal customs. Various actors were respon-
sible for collecting the knowledge pertinent to the exercise of power. The roles of 
scholars, translators, and mediators could differ greatly – some were under way in a 
private capacity, most with government support, and some explicitly on behalf of 
the state. Apart from those who went to Africa to conduct field studies, there were 
also the anthropologists, doctors, and craniologists who remained in Germany and 
who participated in the work of ordering, classifying, and differentiating (Conrad 
2007, p. 139. Transl. R.B.).
For a colonial empire like that of Germany, which – in contrast to the 
Japanese model – made do with very sparse personnel in the colonies, it 
was essential to come to an arrangement with local governance actors and to 
use their governance capacity for the purposes of German colonial rule. This 
local governance competence consisted above all in an authority based on 
knowledge and tradition, which also enabled it to operate as actor in a 
local conflict culture and settle disputes in accordance with local legal rules. 
For this reason, making sure about so-called “indigenous” or “native” law 
and delegating judicial powers to local dignitaries were among the most 
important pillars of colonial rule. Conrad:
This ... knowledge about native societies was important for a policy of limited 
delegation of governmental powers. One of the major areas of this knowledge-based 
policy of divide and rule was the ascertainment of traditional legal customs. From 
about the turn of the century, German jurists and legal ethnologists began to 
examine and record local customary law. The reasons behind this were first the 
self-appointed task of contributing to the ‘advance’ of legal customs and thus to 
fulfil the promises of the civilisational mission. At the same time, however, native 
law was the basis on which the dual legal system characteristic of German colonial 
practice was established. Colonial governance was hence marked by the cession of 
colonial legal powers in the administration of justice. Civil law cases involving 
native parties would be heard on behalf of the colonial government by chiefs (local 
power holders); and since the basis for the administration of justice was not written 
down, local ‘scholars’ (such as the so-called wali in East Africa) were called in as 
additional authorities ... (Conrad 2007, p. 141. Transl. R.B.).
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But the local knowledge required for the exercise of scientific colonialism was 
not only geographical, legal, and administrative knowledge. What was also 
needed was profound cultural knowledge; in her fascinating book The Secret 
War, Eva Horn plausibly explains this state of affairs, taking the example of 
the literary classic Kim by Rudyard Kipling:
As Thomas Richards notes, Kipling’s novel depicts in singular clarity a transforma-
tion of imperialism from the reliance on ethnocide, enslavement, or unfettered 
exploitation, that is, from the direct use of violence, to the skilled management 
of information – and of intelligence, for that matter. ... However, colonial intelli-
gence as the accumulation of knowledge pertaining to the control of colonial 
territory is already encumbered by problems of communication and interpretation. 
Hence there is an urgent need for multilingual agents familiar with the many 
cultural codes, laws, and taboos of an extremely heterogeneous society such as India. 
In other words, the political and military reconnaissance of colonial space involves 
more than scouting and spying missions to explore the terrain and eavesdrop on the 
enemy; it also requires cultural fluency and social acumen. In short, it depends on 
‘local knowledge.’ As the British had been forced to learn during the Indian uprising 
of 1857, they could not secure their rule if they disregarded local codes and customs. 
The uprising, known as the Indian Rebellion or Mutiny of 1857, was an armed 
insurrection of Bengali and Indian soldiers triggered by reports of cultural insensi-
tivity triggered by reports of cultural insensitivity: rumors began to circulate that the 
cartridges of the newly introduced Enfield Rifled Musket had been greased with 
either lard or tallow, which was unacceptable to Muslim or Hindu soldiers, respec-
tively. Throughout 1857 the revolt spread across central and northern India and 
ultimately put an end to the rule of the East India Company; from now on India 
was to be administered by the British government. (Eva Horn, 2013, p. 136. Transl. 
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young).
IV. Our Task of Measurement
Against the backdrop of these three examples of measuring, our own project 
is relatively easy to explain:
* What we want to avoid at all cost is to be suspected of measurement
imperialism. It is not a matter of taking our own legal system as a
yardstick or even – which we have always felt to be extremely foolish
– to talk about exporting law under the motto “made in Germany”
(Bundesministerium der Justiz 2011). Our concern is rather to explore
the diversity of normative orders without attaching judgemental labels
to them from the outset. Our project is hence analytic in nature, a
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procedure we have explained in detail and on several occasions for 
applying the governance approach as an analytical tool (cf. Schuppert 
2011a; 2011d). That is the first point to be made clear.
* Since we are concerned with the diversity of normative orders, this 
necessarily precludes limiting our investigation to state-made law. In 
the world of rules, state law doubtless plays a key role, but no more 
than that. We adopt the general jurisprudence approach pursued by 
William Twining (2009) and Brian Z. Tamanaha (2012), who, like us, 
see the world of law through a wide-angle lens; to elucidate our way of 
seeing things, we quote a passage from Tamanaha in which – as 
throughout his essay (2012) – he confronts Twining’s position with 
that of Scott Shapiro (2011), who by ‘law’ understands above all ‘state 
law’:
A general jurisprudence with genuinely global reach, Twining argues, must recog-
nize the multiplicity of forms and manifestations of law that actually exist around 
the world today. Twining thus brings within his purview not just state law – here-
tofore the almost exclusive focus of analytical jurisprudents – but also global law, 
international law, transnational law, regional law, communal and inter-communal 
law, sub-state law, and non-state law. Going beyond the law of the US (which 
Shapiro addresses) and the UK, Twining raises the law of the EU, lex mercatoria, 
Gypsy law, the unofficial law in favela’s (urban slums), Islamic law, various forms of 
customary law, and much more (Tamanaha 2012, p. 10).
In fact, in examining the world of law we find it impossible to ignore, 
for example, tribal customary law – in Sub-Saharan Africa some eighty 
per cent of all disputes are heard before customary courts (see Kötter et 
al. 2015 for more detail on non-state justice institutions) – or to dis-
regard religious law, which is becoming more and more important 
(see Schuppert forthcoming). This does not mean avoiding the ques-
tion of “what counts as law”; in chapter five we shall be advancing 
proposals of our own on how to define what law is.
* Choosing a wide-angle lens to take in the broadest possible range of 
rules governing conduct necessarily implies an interdisciplinary ap-
proach, for which we are well prepared. The perspective we adopt is 
thus not a purely juristic one, for experience shows that such an 
approach almost automatically frightens off social scientists and almost 
severs communication between disciplines.
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Werner Menski (2012) may well exaggerate a little, but is essentially 
right to accuse both jurists and social scientists of responsibility for the 
lack of communication between the disciplines; he exhorts jurists as 
follows:
Firstly, law as a discipline and activity oen wants to be perceived as something 
separate from other human concepts and forms of business. Somehow, lawyers 
perceive themselves as a special caste and feel it would detract from the authority 
of law if it was polluted by social or religious matter. William Twining [...] has 
eloquently shown how law was put in a black box and tends to be segregated, 
ignoring that real life always contains what Santos [...] calls ‘interlegality’, links 
between different kinds of law. Lawyers, however, love to dismiss ‘dirty words’ like 
pluralism and diversity and then of course miss key messages about the ubiquitous 
nature of law [...] and fail to spot ‘living law’ right in front of them (Menski 2012, 
p. 77).
But Menski also admonishes social scientists:
Secondly, and probably more damaging, many social scientists are desperately trying 
to keep lawyers out of their allotments or cabbage patches. ... One has to wonder 
why. Do they simply not trust lawyers, who tend to be sharks? Or is there more to 
this than sharp tongues (or should I say teeth) and fear of professional domination? 
It does appear that the post-Enlightenment methodology of division of law and 
culture, and specifically of law and religion, still blinds scholar today, blocking a full 
view of the inherent connectedness of law and life (Menski 2012, p. 77).
We can leave open the ‘question of guilt’ Menski raises, but it does 
show what automatisms oen shape relations between disciplines.
In our view, collaboration in exploring the world of rules is the task of 
all disciplines that, from whatever perspective, take an interest in the 
function and workings of law (in the broader sense) – and they are 
necessarily legion.
We naturally cannot even begin to cover this broad range and can only 
seek in our fashion to build bridges between disciplines. To this end, we 
turn again to the concept of governance, which has meanwhile been 
largely accepted in the scientific community as a bridging concept (see 
Schuppert 2005a; 2011d), particularly at the interface between juris-
prudence and social science; the governance perspective will accord-
ingly accompany us faithfully throughout the book.
There is broad consensus that governance always has to do with given 
governance collectives (Zürn 2008) and with the regulatory structures 
that shape these collectives (Mayntz 2005, Franzius 2006). This is only a 
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short step away from two sociological perspectives to which we have 
felt particularly committed in working on this book; first the group 
sociology perspective, which plays a major role in chapters two and 
five, and the legal sociology perspective, which is to be found through-
out the book and which, by the nature of the issue – and this would 
have pleased Max Weber – moves us to advocate the development of a 
sociology of regulation; but we shall be coming back to this at a later 
stage.
* This brings us closer to another perspective we hold to be very impor-
tant, and which we could call a sociology of knowledge perspective. It is 
concerned – as we well know from governance studies – with the 
regulatory knowledge indispensable for the design and change of regu-
latory structures (see Schuppert 2008c), but also with the reflective knowl-
edge addressed by the Science Council in its report on the perspectives 
of jurisprudence in Germany (2012), whose importance the Council 
describes as follows:
The task of jurisprudence is to reflect on the specific quality of law as a central 
control medium of society alongside others such as the market, politics, morality, 
and religion. Since antiquity, respect for the law has been held a fundamental 
condition for a good and just order. This indicates that with the help of science, 
reflective knowledge constantly available to society is handed down and discursively 
developed. This also given the law a corrective function vis-à-vis the market, politics, 
morality, and religion. Jurisprudence participates in the discourse on the guiding 
principles of society, for instance in relation to justice, liberty, human dignity, and 
solidarity. It assumes this task not exclusively but in a specific manner that is shaped 
by the claim of law to validity and to the associated assertion of its generally binding 
force (Wissenschasrat 2012, p. 33. Transl. R.B.).
Let us linger for a moment over so-called regulatory knowledge and the 
interesting question of how it is distributed in state and society. Char-
acteristic of the knowledge society is that an increasing number of actors 
dispose of an increasing fund of wide-ranging knowledge and – on this 
basis – can confront state plans and measures with their own knowl-
edge: “The knowledge society is producing a fast growing number of 
well-informed actors” (Stehr 2009, p. 287. Transl. R.B.), and “since 
clearly defined solutions based on scientific knowledge are less and 
less possible and this is generally recognized, the number of individu-
als and groups who can mobilise scientific arguments for their purpo-
ses, i. e., for their different interests, is growing” (Stehr 2009, p. 284. 
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Transl. R.B.). On the other hand, the capacity of the state or other 
major social institutions to control let alone monopolize access to 
knowledge as a resource is declining: the more new forms of knowl-
edge develop and the more diverse the modes of producing knowledge 
become, the more difficult it is for the state to steer, let alone effectively 
control the pluralisation and diffusion of knowledge (see Stehr 2003 
on this control and regulation aspect). We must go a step farther and 
consider the dangers that can arise from the apparent increase in the 
state’s dependence on supplies of non-state knowledge. Andreas 
Voßkuhle sees a particular danger in the neglect of the state’s stock 
of knowledge:
Knowledge is power. This is all the more true for the state, whose power declines as 
its own stock of knowledge and experience shrinks. Although recourse to private 
expertise may cushion this development, it also accelerates the process because the 
need to maintain and optimize the internal organization of knowledge by the state 
is all too easily lost sight of. However, if state and private knowledge is to be 
productively coupled, the state must necessarily still have sufficient knowledge to 
contribute. Otherwise it loses every possibility to steer, control, and correct; only a 
well-informed state can assume effective responsibility as guarantor of the common 
good (Voßkuhle 2005, pp. 454 f. Transl. R.B.).
These considerations, too, suggest that a state-centric perspective is to be 
regarded with marked reservations; and this brings us to the next 
point, the key question of why the terrain of the law needs to be 
resurveyed. But first we turn to a final aspect relevant to the project. 
The task of measuring the World of Rules would fall short if limited 
to describing and systematising developments that have come to an 
end. The ‘surveyor’ must also have a feeling for emerging develop-
ments and see himself as contributing to jurisprudential innovation 
research (see Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider 1998) and thus, as called 
for by the Wissenschasrat (German Science Council) (2012, p. 9), as 
playing “an active role in the making and formation of law”; to give a 
minor example, Helmut Philipp Auston discusses in a recent article 
the increasingly important role of megacities, especially as governance 
actors in global climate protection regimes (Aust 2013; see also Preuß 
2013 on the role of megacities as political arenas). He asks whether we 
are “on our way to a law of the global city”: if we understand urban 
metropolises as global players that play a responsible role in certain 
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governance regimes, this poses hitherto unanswered challenges for the 
legal order, in particular for international law – challenges that Aust 
describes as follows:
Also on the basis of a more open understanding of what constitutes an actor, ... the 
question arises of where the line is to be drawn between law and non-law in 
international relations. It would be asking too much of legal categories to automati-
cally attribute legal relevance to all the normative statements and expectations of 
actors. The formation of categories in international law must take into account that 
not all action by the state and other public authorities is equally amenable to 
‘legalization’ or judicialization. In international law, jurisprudence therefore has 
to develop categories for the phenomena described here that permit meaningful 
boundaries to be drawn between law and non-law. Sources of law theory and, in 
particular, its classical manifestation in Art 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice can provide no more than a pointer. In the light of the phenomena 
mentioned, a first criterion for drawing a useful dividing line could be the ‘imi-
tation’ of legal action. If ‘new actors’ use a language that recalls traditional legally 
relevant forms of action, it could be assumed that such action is intended to achieve 
more than merely meeting politico-moral obligations. However, the presumed will 
of the actors involved can be only one factor. In particular a connection with 
institutions that are acknowledged to act through law such as the European Com-
mission or the World Bank can provide further indications of legal relevance. Aer 
all, taking action by public means requires justification: as soon as questions of 
distributive justice arise, jurisprudence is called upon to address the cooperation 
phenomena described. This would, of course, be all the more to the point if the 
rights of individuals were to be affected by such cross-border cooperation between 
cities and communities (Aust 2013, p. 702. Transl. R.B.).
Aer this brief excursus on a jurisprudence open to development, we now 
turn to the question of the need to measure the world of law anew. 
B. The Need to Measure the World of Law Anew
The need to remeasure the world of law is not only asserted with growing 
frequency; it has become something of a commonplace among those who 
busy themselves with the law as a realm of communication. The fragility of 
the law = state equation is noted mostly in the light of the development of 
regulatory systems at the global level. However, at the national level and 
below there are also regulatory arrangements not set up by the state, and 
which we shall be considering in depth in the course of this book. We shall 
start, however, with a look at how the law = state equation is called into 
question by phenomena of supranational rule-making. 
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In an oen quoted report, the Wissenschasrat has proved a particularly 
committed advocate of re-conceptualizing jurisprudence: “The internation-
alisation and Europeanization of law, above all by opening up closed national 
legal systems, calls for ... a method that reflects on and critical integrates 
international perspectives” (Wissenschasrat 2012, 29. Transl. R.B.). This 
points to the arch-enemy of an internationally connective jurisprudence: 
the fixation on the closed block of national law, which – as Patrick Glenn 
puts it (2013) – functions as an “element of closure” obstructing the overdue 
development of the nation-state into the “cosmopolitan state.” We need to 
take another look at the law = state or, as the case may be, state = law
equation.
I. Law = State / State = Law: A Seemingly Stable Marriage Heading 
for Divorce
Two examples show the formative power of this dominant law = state equa-
tion. We take the first from the 1971 article by Peter Baduras on “Law, 
Theory of Law, Philosophy of Law” in the Fischer Dictionary of Law 
(Fischer-Lexikon ‘Recht’). We start, however, with the introduction to the 
dictionary, which begins thus:
The legal system is the backbone of our society. Morality, custom, and convention 
having lost their efficacy to a lack of binding commitment in the private sphere, the 
mechanisms of social control and supervision, which keep our highly industrialised 
civilization running, all take the form of law. The paragraphs that, according to an 
old cliché of cultural critique, symbolize antiquated remoteness from reality in fact 
guide the individual and the whole in the form of binding rules of conduct more 
effectively than ever. This will continue to be so in the future. All the new findings of 
the empirical social sciences and all political demands to adapt our society to rapidly 
changing living conditions can effectively shape society only if transposed into law 
(Badura 1971, p. 7. Transl. R.B.). 
These pretensions of the state to control and shape society by means of law are also 
what Peter Badura is addressing when he describes the functional logic of the 
modern state as follows: 
The means of power by which the absolutist principality managed to stabilize its 
internal sovereignty and which constitute the particularity of its mode of govern-
ment are a civil service designed as a tool of the princely will staffed by personnel 
(‘civil servants’) recruited and promoted on the basis of merit and not on that of 
class membership, and a standing army based not on feudal allegiance but on 
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conscription and recruitment (‘miles perpetuus’). But the decisive social technique 
by which feudal society is transformed into an absolutist society of subjects (Unter-
tanengesellscha) is the power of the state to make law. Legislative power, the com-
prehensive competence of the state to make new law, enables it to influence all aspects 
of society and societal processes according to its will. The state and its law-making 
competence established through superior force are the essential tools by which post-
medieval society managed to attain its new goals and impose its interests, preparing 
the way for bourgeois society. Legitimated by sovereignty and the law-making 
monopoly derived therefrom, the state as the political organization of modern 
society replaced the medieval double rule of temporal and spiritual power; the legal 
order of the state replaced the medieval double order of temporal and spiritual law, 
and the anarchy of particular and regional sources of law was gradually overcome. 
Bourgeois economic society established a uniformly valid, reliable legal order guar-
anteed by the state (Badura 1971, p. 120. Transl. R.B.).
Even forty years later, nothing has changed in this basic stance and the 
validity of the law = state formula is unswervingly maintained. In his address 
to the public session of the Göttingen Academy of Sciences on the 29 May 
2008 entitled “Where does law come from?” Christian Starck had this to say 
under the heading “Are Law and the State Identical?”:
When the law is seen as embodied in positive law [Gesetzen], the answer seems easy. 
Such law is made by the state as legislator. Law is thus given by the state. This also 
applies for local government bye-laws, which in one way or another are authorized 
by the state. If in asking about the origin of law we turn to the concept of positive 
law, i. e., the search for the law in statutory law, this is an expression of the modern 
statutorification of the law. ... 
Hans Kelsen overstated this modern view of law by more or less equating law with 
the state. The state not only makes law but conceptually is itself a system of legal 
norms. If the state is a system of norms, it can only be an order of positive law, 
because the parallel validity of any other would have to be excluded” (Starck 2009, 
p. 87 f. Transl. R.B.).
Despite the existence of European law and international law, this changes 
nothing:
Consideration of European law and international law has not changed the answer to 
the question of where law comes from. Law comes from the state either directly 
through state lawmaking or through treaties concluded with other states, or indi-
rectly through the top-down empowerment of entities within the state or bottom-
up empowerment of supranational entities. The connection between the law and 
the state is – as we have seen – statist in the sense that the state is the creator of all 
law (Starck 2009, p. 88. Transl. R.B.).
Even the fact that private persons could, within the framework of the private 
autonomy conceded to them, make law by contractual means only margin-
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ally limits the dominance of law made by the state, since – as Starck himself 
puts it in footnote 12 – such contracts are “statutorily tamed” under the 
state’s responsibility as guarantor of the entire legal system.
We leave it to Thomas Duve to portray the state-centricity of legal thought – 
which finds expression even in the design of legal training – from the “long” 
nineteenth century to the present day; the point of departure is a process that 
can be described as the statization of the legal system: 
‘The law’ was equated with ‘state law’; jurisprudence was accordingly concerned 
with the state and its law: positive law made by the institutions of the nation-state. 
The same is true of the administration of justice: a state monopoly in and the 
progressive ‘statization’ of the administration of justice was sought, whether on the 
federal or centralist principle. ... It is this national tradition and the disciplinary self-
conception based upon it that have shaped jurisprudence to this day – in Germany 
itself, in many parts of Europe, and to a lesser extent in other parts of the world, too, 
which have adopted this model. The codifications of the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries have remained the most visible expression of what some observers 
have called ‘juridical absolutism’, a notion of law and jurisprudence closely associated 
with the nation-state – despite certain trends towards ‘decodification’ of the cher-
ished monuments to these efforts to nationalize and centralize law and justice (Duve 
2013b, p. 4. Transl. R.B.). 
Precisely because of this far-reaching agreement among legal scientists, we 
find it interesting to place the formula
                                         law = state
under renewed scrutiny and to examine more closely the two constitutive 
elements ‘law’ and ‘state’ – in the expectation that each will display a marked 
dynamic of its own, increasingly reducing the law = state equation as a static 
world formula to absurdity. We now consider this idea in greater detail.
II. Law = State : A Formula with Two Extremely Dynamic 
Constitutive Elements
When discussing the state nowadays, ‘changes in statehood’ is a topic sure to 
crop up; we have ourselves participated in this discourse on change with 
commitment and pleasure and cannot resist quoting at least the first three 
sentences of our contribution:
There is now almost no escaping talk about change in statehood, not even by the 
admittedly somewhat old-fashioned method of emigrating to far-flung regions of 
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the world. Hardly disembarked, the emigrant is – as the May 2007 number of ‘Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte’ notes – confronted by “new forms of statehood” and/or 
so-called spaces of limited statehood that pose particular governance problems. 
Wherever one looks, the ‘adaptability of the state’ is taken for granted; the scenarios 
draed by the numerous writers on change range from taking leave of the state to 
attempting its ‘re-enthronement’ (Schuppert 2008c, p. 325. Transl. R.B.).
We shall not go into this semantics at this point; the interested reader is 
referred to Philipp Genschel and Bernhard Zangl (2008) “Metamorphosen 
des Staates – Vom Herrschasmonopolisten zum Herrschasmanager” 
(Metamorphoses of the State – From Power Monopolist to Power Manager) 
and to the article by Arther Benz in Voßkuhle et al. 2013, Verabschiedung und 
Wiederentdeckung des Staates im Spannungsfeld der Disziplinen (Taking Leave of 
and Rediscovering the State from Discipline to Discipline).
Whenever law is spoken or written about, the endogenous dynamics of legal 
systems are almost certain to be stressed: we turn once again to our favourite 
witness, the Wissenschasrat, which in the report mentioned above on the 
“Perspectives for Jurisprudence in Germany” convincingly argues that:
It is the task of jurisprudence to investigate the prerequisites, validity conditions, and 
effect of this key societal control medium [law] under the changing conditions of 
modern societalization. The law is always confronted not only by external change 
but also by that constantly generated by the legal system itself. It is therefore 
characterized by both external and internal dynamics. At the present time, interna-
tionalization and Europeanization are changing law. European law pervades and 
(partially) changes national law. Meanwhile not only national constitutional, 
administrative, and economic law is affected but also such fields as the law of 
obligations, family law, the law of succession, and criminal law. The Europeaniza-
tion of law and the rulings of the European courts that apply it have given rise to a 
new dynamic, which in unprecedented fashion challenges existing norm hierarchies 
and raises questions about the making and application of law in all areas. This 
meeting of sovereign state powers and international legal circles and non-state 
systems of norms also leads to the pluralization of legal orders. The legal space still 
shaped by the state is being changed by the private organizations assuming regu-
latory tasks (the rules and regulations of associations such as the German Standards 
Institute DIN, the TÜV safety standards authorities, the German Football Associa-
tion DFB, or the terms and conditions of so-called social networks on the Internet) 
and by existing and new, non-state ordering systems with strong binding force (for 
instance religious communities) (Wissenschasrat 2012, p. 26 f. Transl. R.B.).
If this is the case, then – as Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem recently put it (2013) – 
not only are “far-reaching alterations to the house of the law” needed: the law 
must be acknowledged to be a permanent construction site. If the state and the 
law are continuously changing, only a processual perspective on the two 
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components of the law = state equation is appropriate. As far as the state is 
concerned, we have indeed taken a step in this direction, suggesting that in 
theory of the state terms we should speak of the “state as process” (Schuppert 
2010). We can now take a consequent second step and propose treating the 
“law as process.” If we view the state and the law as processes, it is soon evident 
that the two are informed by the same dynamics.
For one thing, there is a striking correspondence between the examples 
offered: the same key concepts are to be found with respect to the state and 
with regard to law, namely Europeanization, transnationalization, privatiza-
tion, informalization, etc. This is hardly surprising when we consider that 
modern statehood is a statehood shaped by law, in which – as the introduc-
tion to the law dictionary remarks – policy can gain the power to shape 
society only by being transposed into legal norms. To this extent, changes 
affecting the state and those affecting law necessarily go hand in hand.
But closer inspection soon reveals that the key concepts mentioned can 
mean quite different things for the state and for the law. The privatization of 
governmental functions – for instance in the field of rail transport and the 
postal service – is not the same as privatizing the law; and transnationalizing 
state activities – for example in environmental policy – is not the same as 
developing transnational law; the informalization of state control – for 
instance in information and persuasion programmes – is also different from 
the informalization of law in the sense of expanding classical legal sources 
theory. On closer inspection, all three examples show processes of the gradual 
destatization of law or – as Frank Schorkopf has recently put it (2014) – the 
dejuridification of law [Entrechtlichung des Rechts], and thus the driing apart 
of the two component elements of the world formula law = state. We see this 
as the really interesting observation, which gives us occasion to embark on a 
somewhat longer excursus on the coupling and decoupling of state and law. 
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C. The Coupling and Decoupling of State and Law
as Manifestations of Change in Statehood
I. Statization and Destatization of Law?
Change in statehood can be described – as Philipp Genschel and Bernhard 
Zangl have done – as a process of the statization and destatization of power. 
Writing about the “metamorphoses of the state,” they posit a swing of the 
pendulum from the statization of power – which they rightly understand to 
include not only instrumental statization through the monopolization of 
decision-making power by the state but also legitimatory statization, i. e., 
the appropriation of resources to legitimate state power – back towards the 
destatization of political power, beginning in the second half of the twentieth 
century and gaining momentum since the 1970s: “The progressive statization 
of power ... has been overlaid at the latest since the 1970s by the contrary 
development towards destatization. ... The monopoly of the state on power is 
eroding” (Genschel and Zangl 2008, p. 440. Translation R.B.).
If there is anything to this thesis, the swing of the pendulum from stati-
zation to destatization would also have affected one of the pillars of modern 
power – the law: it is not by chance that in the struggle for key monopolies, 
the early modern state also secured for itself the monopoly on making and 
enforcing the law. Hence, the statization of the law must presumably have 
been followed by the contrary process, the destatization of law, giving reason 
to lay the long dominant statist concept of law to rest in the hallowed ground 
of legal history. 
And there are indeed weighty voices that have diagnosed such destatiza-
tion – consequent upon two characteristic processes of modern statehood: 
globalization and the growth in the importance of private actors, notably in law 
production (see the contribution in Schuppert 2006 on the increasing impor-
tance of non-state actors). Under the heading “The Destatization of Law and 
New Actors” (“Entstaatlichung des Rechts und neue Akteure”) in a program-
matic article on the “Legal Order in a Global World” (“Rechtliche Ordnung 
in einer globalen Welt”), Ulrich Sieber remarks that:
The changes we have described in normative control systems have already shown 
that the ‘destatization’ of law is taking place primarily at two levels: in the field of 
classical sovereign regulation in external relations between nation-states, regional or 
global arrangements develop owing to political control by international and supra-
national institutions. This ‘de-nation-statization’ [‘Entnationalstaatlichung’] in regula-
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tory arrangements under public law and in the public interest are supplemented in 
both the internal and external relations of nation-states by an increase in law-making by 
private actors, which create transnational arrangements in many fragmented areas. 
However, unlike the norms of international institutions, this private regulation does 
not develop through the political processes of top-down political management but 
through bottom-up societal processes; they are based no longer on the sovereign 
law-making of the territorially organized national community but on membership 
in personal associations, on the contractual acceptance of standardized rules and 
negotiatory processes. This blurs the classical dividing line between private law and 
public law and transitions between law and other normative orders (Sieber 2010, 
p. 169. Transl. R.B.).
Although we have ourselves long advised looking beyond state law-making 
activities to take in the full range of the world of rules, and are convinced of 
the need for a science of regulation in keeping with the times (we shall be 
coming back to this), our confidence in the destatization concept is hesitant, 
since it oversimplifies the proliferating pluralization of norm producers taking 
place before our eyes. We prefer to join Christoph Möllers in speaking of the 
gradual decoupling of state and law (Möllers 2001), and thus of a multi-stage 
process – varying from one area of law to another and from one subject 
matter to the next – which needs to be described in scaling terms. One such 
instance of staging semantics is to be found in studies on global governance. 
One of the leading theoreticians in this field – Michael Zürn – proposes an 
oen cited tripartite classification of governance beyond the nation-state 
(Zürn 1998):
* governance by government
* governance with government and
* governance without government.
The point of reference is thus the state and its government; from this starting 
point – according to Zürn and, following him, the majority of authors on 
the subject – the three modes of governance can plausibly be distinguished. 
A review of this example suggests the advisability of marking differences in 
the intensity of relations in the hitherto so closely woven web of relations 
between the state and the law by distinguishing between 
* law by the state
* law with the state, and
* law without the state.
The first of these corresponds to the traditional state = law equation, whereas 
types two and three form constellations in which the state is no longer the 
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sole maker and enforcer of law. This procedure permits us to identify and 
examine variations of decoupling between state and the law; we shall be doing 
so in what follows, and propose four groups of cases.
II. Four Variations of Decoupling State and Law
In this section we present four constellations of gradual decoupling of state 
and law. Whereas law-making by private organizations within a state frame-
work order is a sub-case of the second type in the schema – law-making with 
the state – the following constellations are variants of the third type, rule-
setting without the state. 
To avoid an over-hasty answer to the qualifying question “law or not law?” 
we shall be generally be speaking of “regulatory structures” when we are not 
concerned solely with ordering structures established by the state (see Schup-
pert 2005b). Given the hotchpotch of state and non-state rule-setters, such a 
generic term is indispensable as the point of departure for our investigation. 
To make sure of what is meant, we turn briefly to Hans-Heinrich Trute, 
Doris Kühlers and Arne Pilniok for help in defining the term:
The term regulatory structures refers not only, for example, to the systematic link 
between different sets of rules but also to the institutional arrangement concretised 
in relation to specific tasks by which the collaboration of different actors is coordi-
nated. This recognizes any intrinsic logic pursued by the actors involved, which, 
although shaped by the institutional arrangement, does not determine the action 
taken. It should thus also be stressed that actors can be subject not only to legal 
requirements but also to other social coordination mechanisms that influence their 
action. Whether these mechanisms are normatively relevant is another matter, 
which has to be settled in the concrete, task-related context. Addressing regulatory 
structures thus brings a shi in perspective, supplementing the traditional focus of 
administrative jurisprudence on the single action at the meso-level, ... (Trute et al. 
2008, p. 177. Transl. R.B.).
1. Regulatory Structures in the Shadow of the State: 
State Law as a Framework Legal Order
The first example of not purely state regulatory structures is a prime example 
of the role of the state as frame-setter, whereas the second example is concerned 
with the enforcement dimension of law.
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a) Regulated Self-Regulation: The Example of Collective 
Bargaining Autonomy
Norm production by industrial coalitions – the system of collective bargain-
ing autonomy – is generally considered a perfect example of regulated self-
regulation (see the articles in: Berg et al. 2001) and thus of a governance 
regime in which the state legal order – be it in the form of state legislation or 
of rulings by the Federal Labour Court – operates as a framework order. Since 
we can assume that the institution of collective bargaining is known, we can 
limit ourselves at this point to lending an ear to the words of Gerd Bender at 
a workshop on the 2 February 2013 at the Max Planck Institute for European 
Legal History in Frankfurt, who rightly describes the functional logic of the 
“governance regime of collective bargaining” as follows:
It is negotiating systems as such that in the course of history have increasingly taken 
centre stage in good governance – ‘learning social systems’ which have to be ‘nur-
tured’ and ‘controlled.’ Regulated self-regulation or, to put it more generally, ‘more 
complex recombinations of autonomous self-organization and societally binding 
contextual guidelines’: this is the only way, according to Willke and all the other 
Third Way authors, to keep the big societal risk reasonably under control – the risk 
of society dissolving into free-floating functional systems. In its search for a viable 
control mechanism, regulation theory put its hopes in the link between non-state 
norm production and state procedural law as a mighty deus ex machina, particularly 
since, as in the case of collective bargaining autonomy, control in the form of state 
labour law could be combined at a second level with neo-corporatist negotiation 
mechanisms. What is called for here is not the prescriptive state with its substantive 
employment protection legislation but the indirect, procedural regulation of the col-
lective bargaining system. In Teubner’s words, this is a legal order that ‘influences the 
internal organization of collective bargaining associations, makes their legal recog-
nition dependent on certain structural prerequisites, draws up procedural norms for 
the negotiation system and for conducting disputes about expanding or restricting 
the powers of collective actors ...’ From this point of view, collective bargaining 
autonomy provides ‘the historical paradigm’ against which similar developments in 
other fields can be measured. The freedom of collective bargaining therefore appears to be 
a crucial component in the modernisation of legal structures, which in the complex 
course of the twentieth century links the legal system with the idea of control 
and that of the expanded state (Bender 2013. Transl. R.B.).
From this point of view, the framework-like containment of norm produc-
tion by the parties to collective agreements is indeed a perfect example for 
the intelligent coupling of societal self-regulation and state framework set-
ting.
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b) The Interlocking of Different Jurisdictional Communities and Jurisdictional 
Cultures: The Example of African Non-State Justice Institutions
In our sub-project ‘On the Role of Law and the Rule of Law in Spaces of 
Limited Statehood’ in the Special Research Unit 700 devoted to Governance 
in Spaces of Limited Statehood, we also addressed the problem of the rela-
tionship between non-state justice institutions (NSJIs) and state law, because in 
spaces of limited statehood the state regularly has no monopoly on law-
making and law enforcement, resulting in a plurality of legal norms and 
the associated enforcement regimes (see Kötter und Schuppert 2009). This 
raises the question of the relation between the various orders, above all of the 
coupling of non-state traditional and/or religious systems of norms and the state 
legal system. Important normative bridges are rules on the recognition of 
non-state systems of norms and their enforcement institutions in the state 
legal order (Kötter 2012).
In countries like South Africa and Ethiopia, where state courts function 
well only to a limited degree, we find very different but complex arrangements 
by which local and mostly non-state decision-making centres are integrated in the 
state order. These arrangements contain a wide variety of provisions: 
(1) On the jurisdiction of NSJIs
(2) On the procedures they are required to follow and on substantive deci-
sion-making criteria such as basic rights under constitutional law
(3) On the relationship between non-state institutions and state courts and 
their integration into the state judicial system, for instance by providing 
for appeal to state courts.
The validity and enforceability of legal regulation through the relationship 
between NSJIs and the state legal order depend in turn very much on the 
general effectiveness of state law in the given fields. To the extent that state 
law is generally ignored and /or complied with, and is thus not a component 
part of the non-state legal discourse (Teubner 1991/92), it cannot be expected 
that, for example, the judges of a customary or sharia court will respect 
corresponding guidelines for their procedures or rulings. Another effect 
manifests itself: nowadays the legitimacy of traditional authorities in their 
communities is based, sometimes quite considerably, on the circumstance 
that state law recognises them and vests special powers – and the associated 
political power – in them (Weeks 2011). NSTIs are thus not necessarily 
powerful only where state law cannot impose itself. They can also be pro-
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moted and legitimated by state law. In our typology they can therefore be 
classified under rule enforcement without the state as well as under rule 
enforcement with the state. 
2. Rule-Making In Lieu Of The State: Filling the Regulatory Gap
To illustrate this interesting case of decoupling between law and the state, we 
have chosen the example of standard terms of contract:
Not only technical dimensions can be standardized such as paper formats 
and the size of screws – a pioneering standardization story lovingly re-
counted by Miloš Vec (Vec 2006): terms of contract can also be standardized.
In the business of standardizing contracts – as told by Tilmann Röder in 
his compendious study of the trigger function of the San Francisco Earth-
quake (Röder 2006), a severe blow for the insurance industry – two main 
sectors played a groundbreaking role, namely insurance and transport. Not 
only to maximize profits but also to optimize risk distribution and retain 
control over policies, British insurance companies concluded all individual 
contracts on the basis of identical terms; the transport sector followed suit.
Röder identifies two main reasons for the rapid spread of standard con-
tract terms: the need for standardization in sectors strongly integrated in the 
global economy, and the lack of legislative regulation, which produced a regu-
latory gap economic actors had to fill:
Special standard contracts, standard clauses, or contract forms for international 
business activities developed for a number of reasons. Basically, interest in standard-
izing the basis for contracts grew in proportion to the integration of the sector concerned 
in the world economy. As at the national level, businesses sought to obtain interna-
tional standardization of their contractual basis when state regulation was lacking or 
considered unsuitable or obsolete. ... 
The less states regulated the law of individual sectors, the more strongly non-state 
regulation of business and legal transactions spread. Thus the shipping agreements 
fob and cif, easy to handle telegraphically, governed international shipping. For 
more comprehensive agreements, overseas traders used their standard form con-
tracts. They were used particularly widely in trade with staple commodities such 
as cereals, fodder, rubber, coffee, and sugar. Warehousing at the transhipment 
centres of world trade also operated on the firm basis of internationally recognized 
endorsable warehouse receipts. Marine and inland shipping used standard form 
contracts and bills of lading, the standardization of which was pursued by their 
sectoral organizations and the major shipping companies. These examples cover 
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some of the most important standardization phenomena at the level of international 
business transactions (Röder 2006, p. 321 f. Transl. R.B.).
Perusal of the functions of standardization for contract terms identified by 
Röder, leaves no doubt that standardization is rule-setting:
* the power function (asymmetrically distributed influence on the content of 
contract terms)
* the communication and compatibility function
* the legal security function, and
* the gap-filling and further development function,
Röder notes:
It was novel in many regards. Thus the decision on the content of the contract was 
kept separate from the conclusion of concrete provisions. Standard clauses and 
contracts were draed in advance without reference to concrete transactions as 
the uniform legal basis for large numbers of future contracts. Their formation hence 
recalls legislative processes rather than contractual practices in industry. ... Standardized 
contractual elements perform essentially different functions from those of individ-
ual agreements between two contracting parties. Their purposes are in-house ration-
alization, the exercise of economic power, the systematic displacement of state regulation; 
and they provided room for permanently updating law. Only on the basis of standard 
form contracts could the more and more complex cooperation, investment, and 
exchange relations be handled that developed in doing business (Röder 2006, 
p. 319 f. Translation R.B.).
Standard clauses and contracts steer the behaviour of market players, who 
are guided by them and rely on them; what is agreed under them is regarded 
as the authoritative regulatory regime, which substitutes for, further develops, 
or even circumvents existing statutory law. It is therefore rule-making and a 
novel structure of norm formation.
3. Regulatory Structures beyond the State: Globalized Ordering 
Structures and their Regulatory Regimes
The processes referred to as destatization (Entstaatlichung: see Allmendinger 
2003) or societal and political denationalization (Denationalisierung: see Beish-
eim et al. 1999) do not – how could it be otherwise? – spare the ordering 
factor law, as we can see in transnational governance structures: the national 
lawmakers of the territorial states that continue to structure the order of 
the world come up against the limits of their regulatory capabilities, leaving 
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certain areas legally unregulated; a phenomenon that we have called the 
regulatory gap.
Although these areas beyond national statehood may be ‘lawless’ they 
are not ‘orderless’: the now current terms ‘transnational governance’ 
(Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006) and ‘global governance’ (compact sum-
mary in Zürn 2005) rightly call attention to the fact that, in these trans-
national areas beyond national statehood, ordering structures – and that 
automatically also means regulatory structures – have developed that can-
not be adequately measured against the yardstick of a state-centric concept 
of law. In what follows we shall be looking at three areas that are global-
ized ‘by their very nature,’ so to speak, to examine the particularities and 
commonalities of the regulatory structures to be found there. The first is 
the Internet.
a) www – Regulatory Structures of a Deterritorialized Entity
The Internet is a goldmine for normative and governance theory; to take a 
closer look at its nature from the regulation studies perspective, we turn to 
one of the best authorities on regulatory problems in public communica-
tion, Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem:
Since the operation of the Internet and its social networks depends on rules even 
where sovereign regulation does not apply, the Internet provides a very instructive 
example for the pluralization of rules and law and for the co-existence of law and 
non-law. In their practical validity, ‘non-law’ rules also form part of the regulatory 
structures essential to the Internet and ‘communicate’ with the other part, sovereign 
law. 
The Internet, as well as Web 2.0 social networks, operate largely (but not solely) 
within the framework of rules made solely by private institutions. There are also 
many examples of private so law. This does largely without state engagement, 
but is to some extent modelled on state law and sometimes depends on the state 
for support in enforcement. Some rules of this sort – for instance the ICANN 
rules for domain name allocation – have been subsumed under the terms lex 
informatica or lex digitalis. Whether such and other non-sovereign rules are to have validity 
‘as law’ is a matter for legal theory or definitional convention. Since such rules do not 
come into being in an unlegislated area, to classify them as ‘non-law’ should not 
be misunderstood as overlooking their significance in the framework of the legal 
order. Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that state law is also indispensable 
in the field of the Internet, so that a relationship of mutual influence can and has 
developed between state and non-state norms (Hoffmann-Riem 2012, 531 f. Transl. 
R.B.).
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These interesting findings show that the gradual decoupling between state 
and law also raises questions for legal theory, which we shall be looking at in 
detail in chapter four.
b) IOC – Regulatory Structures in Internationalized Sport
Sport cries out for internationality. We want to know not only who is the 
best in Germany but who can say that of themselves in Europe – or better 
still – in the world. There are therefore incessant international competitions, 
crowned by the Olympic Games – with or without wrestling.
This being so, sport is organized internationally, and – as Nils Ipsen 
explains – in the form of a hierarchically structured pyramid:
The associational system can best be described as a strictly hierarchical pyramid. The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) stands at the apex of the pyramid and 
holds the exclusive rights to the Olympic Games (Rule 7 of the Olympic Charter) 
– a right that was never seriously challenged. As a result the IOC holds a monopoly 
at the highest level of competitive sports.
Within the Olympic movement, the one-association principle applies. This means that 
there can be only one top international organization for each kind of sport and only 
one National Olympic Committee (NOC) for each nation (Rule 29 of the Olympic 
Charter). This principle also applies at lower levels; the top international organiza-
tion also recognizes only one national association. This gives rise to a hierarchical 
pyramid within competitive sport with the IOC at its apex, the international sports 
associations below it, followed by national organizations, then any regional sports 
associations, and finally sports clubs, and at the bottom the individual athlete.
This pyramidal structure enables the same rules – set by the umbrella organizations – 
to be applied internationally to achieve the essential comparability of performance. 
According to Rule 23 of the Olympic Charter, any sports association that contra-
venes the Olympic principles or the World Anti-Doping Agency’s Doping Code 
(and thus fails to recognize them) runs the risk of exclusion from the Olympic 
Games. The respective rules of competition thus apply universally. (Ipsen 2009, 
p. 131 f. Transl. R.B. with reference to Gunnar Folke Schuppert, “Law Without a 
State? A ‘New Interplay’ Between State and Nonstate Actors in Governance by Rule 
Making.” In Thomas Risse, ed. Governance Without a State. Policies and Politics in 
Areas of Limited Statehood, Columbia University Press 2011).
At the national level – for instance in Germany – there is controversy about 
whether the legally binding effect for each individual athlete is to be con-
strued as falling under the law of contract or under the law relating to corporate 
bodies (see Adolphsen 2012), and whether the de facto monopoly of the 
associations arising from the one-association principle does not impose a 
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duty of protection and control on the state (see Vieweg 1990). For their part, 
the international sports associations clearly do not care less. Klaus Vieweg:
International sports associations naturally do not determine what legal status their 
rules, sanctions, and other decisions will have in a particular state. This is not 
surprising, for most such associations seal themselves off from the law of the state, 
largely ignoring its very existence. They are satisfied with their de facto autonomy in 
setting and applying rules, which are imposed not only on their national member 
associations but also on clubs, athletes, and officials, as well as on external persons. 
From their point of view, setting and applying norms amounts to making and 
enforcing law (Vieweg 1990, p. 122. Transl. R.B.).
c) ISO – Global Standards for Globalized Markets
Like the regulatory structures of the Internet, standards (see Brunsson and 
Jacobsson 2002) are a species of rule making extremely interesting from a 
legal point of view; at any rate, there is not lack of literature on the subject. 
Oliver Lepsius, an author well versed in matters of method, for example, sees 
them in felt proximity to law: 
Standard setting is generally the outcome of a purposive, organized and procedurally 
structured norm-setting process. The function of standards is instrumental normativ-
ization limited with a defined purpose to a given subject matter. It is precisely these 
formal qualities in standard-setting that are probably responsible for the felt proximity 
to law (Lepsius 2007, 347 f. Transl. R.B.).
According to Lepsius with reference to Hans-Christian Röhl (2007), stand-
ards are therefore entities “of graduated binding force with de facto binding 
effect.”
Harm Schepel (2005) argues in similar vein in his copious book on 
product standards and their role in the integration of markets. Schepel, 
too, stresses that the setting of international standards has much in common 
with “normal law production”:
* Standards have a clearly identifiable author (standard setting organization)
* They are produced in an organized and procedurally structured process
* Standard setters generally have regulatory authority recognized by the 
circles involved, based above all on the expertise and representativeness of 
the standard-setting body
* Standards themselves are published in an appropriate manner and are 
publicly accessible to all and sundry, and
* They are constantly monitored and adapted to changing circumstances.
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These characteristics can also be formulated as normative demands made of 
rule-making through standardisation (see Schuppert 2012); and this is done 
in practice, in the form of explicit rules for standard setting, so-called ‘stand-
ardization standards,’ which are laid down by all major standard-setters such 
as the International Standardization Organization (ISO) or the Deutsches 
Institut für Normung (DIN – German Institute for Standardization) (see 
Schuppert 2011). 
Since standard setting is thus norm setting in a procedurally structured 
process, it is no surprise when Schepel notes that “standardization looks a lot 
like lawmaking” (Schepel 2005).
These insights, too, point to the questions that the gradual decoupling 
between state and law poses for legal theory, which we shall be looking into 
in chapter four.
4. “Law” Without the State: The Example of the Lex Mercatoria
The lex mercatoria is regarded by many as the prime example of non-state 
transnational law. One of the leading proponents of this view is Gralf-Peter 
Callies, who has presented this – as he puts it – “post-statist approach: state 
versus self-made law” (Calliess 2006) on a number of occasions. He suggests 
defining transnational law as follows:
Transnational law is the third category of autonomous legal system beyond the 
traditional categories of state, national and international law. Transnational law is 
made and developed through the lawmaking forces of a global civil society: (1) it is based 
on (a) general legal principles, and (b) their condensation and confirmation in civil 
society practice, (2) its application, interpretation, and development is the task of – 
at least primarily – private providers of alternative arbitration mechanisms, and (3) its 
coercive nature is based on the organization and implementation of socio-economic 
sanctions under law. Finally, (4) transnational law is codified – if at all – in the form 
of catalogues of general principles and rules, standardized pro forma contracts and 
codes of conduct drawn up by private standardization institutions (Calliess 2004, 
p. 244. Transl. R.B.).
The main applied case of such civil society law production is, he claims, the 
“new” (in contrast to its medieval predecessor) lex mercatoria (NLM) as 
manifested, for example, in the “UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts,” the “Principles of European Contract Law” of the 
so-called Lando-Kommission and the so-called “CENTRAL List” (repro-
duced in Ipsen 2009, p. 261 f.) of the “Center for Transnational Law.” 
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Whether there really is such a new lex mercatoria, whose content consists 
essentially of general principles and general clauses inherent in state-made 
law (this is the Ipsen’s (2009) main point of criticism) is highly disputed – see 
the brilliant and entertaining article by Karsten Schmidt (2007). This is 
not the place to resolve this controversy, but we cannot deny our scepti-
cism. Be that as it may, we are interested in another point Karsten Schmidt 
makes.
He does not deny that there is such a thing as codification work by 
various non-state institutions to give shape to a globalized commercial 
law, applied and made principally by private arbitration tribunals; but he 
does diagnose that its normative quality is lower than that of state-made law:
The importance of the lex mercatoria alongside state-made law is decided by the 
‘normative quality’ of the lex mercatoria. This is not meant in the sense of ‘normative 
qualification,’ for the lex mercatoria can generate legal norms. What is meant is 
‘normative quality’ in the sense of competition in quality between sophisticated 
state regulatory regimes and homespun law. This is where the deficits of the lex 
mercatoria – in particular its incomplete, also substantively fragmentary nature – 
make themselves felt. The lex mercatoria is a basis for legal decisions almost only in 
business, but here it can come to bear by virtue of material reference or as mere 
commercial usage. For the rest, a contract referring to the lex mercatoria or other-
wise subject to it has also to be situated in a comprehensive legal order, 
– be it comprehensive global common law,
– or national law to be determined under international private law (Schmidt 2007, 
p. 175. Transl. R.B.).
This unideological position allows the discussion of principle on lex merca-
toria to sail in calmer waters; we can live with it. Nor do we fail to acknowl-
edge that the development of transnational norms in commercial law is an 
ambitious scientific project (see Jansen 2010; Jansen and Michaels 2008), but 
we cannot see it as a sui generis legal regime established purely by civil 
society.
In a mini-excursis at this point, and with the focus on international 
economic law – much more concrete than the lex mercatoria – we shi 
our our perspective to speak not of lower normative quality but of different 
normative structure. In this field Christian Tietje has identified two main 
structural characteristics of transnational legal processes (Tietje 2002) that merit 
our attention.
* The first he calls the deterritorialization of law:
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The exclusiveness of the territorial reference of law may have been valid from an 
historical point of view, but it no longer reflects reality in fields such as transnational 
economic law. ... It must be acknowledged that there is a complex web of territorial 
and deterritorialized structures of law. This is particularly the case for the law produc-
tion process and the actors involved in it. The ... examples from international 
financial law show this clearly: there are numerous actors engaged in elaborating 
norms at the national, supranational, and international levels. However, these 
norms can gain binding force only if applied in existing and largely territorially 
grounded legal systems. The national legal system accordingly retains its importance 
but is no longer the centre of legal order. It is necessarily one element in the network 
structures mentioned, but not the starting point (Tietje 2002, p. 416. Transl. R.B.).
* Another noteworthy process identified by Tietje is the progressive blur-
ring of the boundary between binding and non-binding norms: 
A further structural characteristic of transnational economic law is that the distinc-
tion between the legally binding and the legally non-binding, hitherto self-evident 
in juridical thinking, can now scarcely be upheld. To this extent, transnational 
economic law is a ‘mix of non-binding, semi-binding, and binding programmes 
of tasks marked in practical application by a high degree of informality and intrans-
parency’. ... 
The blurring of boundaries between legally binding and non-binding control instru-
ments is accompanied by recognition that the circle of those exercising control 
under transnational economic law has grown considerably. In national and interna-
tional legal systems, this function is no longer incumbent solely on the state. Inter-
mediary institutions and subjects of private law increasingly perform tasks affecting 
the whole of society (Tietje 2002, p. 417. Transl. R.B.).
5. Interim Appraisal
The four groups of cases reveal a veritable patchwork. Apart from “posited” 
state-made law, there are many types of non-law regulation “which look a lot 
like law” such as accounting standards and entire fields characterized by a 
mixture of binding and non-binding standards of conduct. The state is oen 
or usually involved in some way or other, even in the lex mercatoria, where it 
is an indispensable partner in the enforcement of arbitral awards; its role is 
frequently only one of care, as the following overview presented by Klaus-
Dieter Wolf shows (Wolf 2012, pp. 194 f.):
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Variants of state fostering of private self-regulation in the transnational arena
Role of 
the state
Forms of cooperation  /
infl uence
Conduct Examples from the fi eld of 
economic self-regulation




‘Responsible care’ initiative by 
the chemical industry for com-
pliance with environmental and 
labour law standards
B) Reactive
+ Implicit recognition Flanking 
support
Adoption by executive order of 
FSC standards for public pro-
curement 
+ + Explicit recognition of 





Wolfsberg Principles of the 
banking sector to combat money 
laundering
Adoption of food safety standards 
of the originally private ‘Codex 
Alimentarius’ of the food indus-
try in agreement with the FAO 
and WHO
+ + + Prevention / invalida-
tion of private standard 
setting to protect basic 





EU legislation on carbon dioxide 
emissions of motor vehicles
Kimberley Process
C) Proactive
+ Initiation Invitation UN Global Compact




Benchmarking Self-regulation of carbon emis-
sions by the European Automo-
bile Manufacturers’ Association
‘Performance standards’ for social 
and ecological sustainability of 
the International Finance Corpo-
ration (IFC)





DIN / ISO 26000
+ = Authoritative quality of eff ects
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It always has to do with gradation, whether the extent of state intervention is 
concerned or the intensity of the shadow cast by the state, the felt proximity 
to law, or whatever. This suggests the methodological consequence of oper-
ating neither with a statist concept of law to the exclusion of all others, nor 
with a pluralistic concept of law that declares almost everything to be ‘law’ 
but of thinking rather in terms of transitions, placing various normative 
orders on a conceptual continuum between the poles of law and non-law. 
We shall be going into this in detail in chapter five.
But we still have a long way to go. The next step is to consider how to deal 
with the notion of a gradual destatization, dejuridification of law, or the loss 
of state sovereignty over it. What is clearly needed is a perspective able to 
replace the hitherto predominant state-centricity by freeing the relationship 
between law and the state from the law = state equation, opening our eyes to 
the broad expanse of the world of normative orderings. It would be both 
useful and satisfying if we managed to conceptualize this long overdue shi 
in perspective; since we have yet to find such a ‘liberating’ concept, we shall 
content ourselves in the following section with introducing four key con-
cepts that are, in our view, substantively and methodologically pertinent to 
achieving this shi in perspective.
D. Four Key Concepts of a Non-State-Centric Perspective on Law
I. The Function of Key Concepts
When reflecting on key concepts in this context, it is well worthwhile to 
consider how Andreas Voßkuhle (2001) describes their function, because it is 
our hope that the concepts we propose can do what Voßkuhle expects of 
them, namely to “give direction to thought”:
The function of key concepts is to make general ideas of ordering fertile for given 
argumentational contexts by concentrating, structuring and rendering comprehen-
sible a mass of information and thoughts in a repository term. While reducing 
complexity they also serve as a platform for inspiration by releasing forces of asso-
ciation, giving a hold to ideas still in the making, bringing various perspectives 
together, and offering guidance for the future. In this sense they resemble ‘theo-
ries’ ... – but the format is smaller and the proposition at first glance more simplistic. 
Key concepts are therefore particularly dependent on concretisation; they supply no 
answers but give direction to thought (Voßkuhle 2001, p. 198. Transl. R.B.).
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With other authors who have had something to say about key concepts (Baer 
2004; Schoch 2008) we can describe them as concepts that: 
* open new paths to thought – the opening up function
* mark new developments – the marking function, and
* enable interdisciplinary dialogue – the bridging function.
With the four concepts we propose, we can perhaps start to do justice to this 
demanding functional programme.
But before considering them in detail, we shall cast a glance at the Max 
Planck Institute for European Legal History in Frankfurt, which has engaged 
in a research programme addressing four key concepts. Thomas Duve – man-
aging director of the institute – describes them: 
1. The first is “legal spaces,” which is apparently not easy to define: 
They may – as in the case of the Spanish monarchy, for example – be bound to 
imperial regions. But they may also – as in the case of Canon Law and the normative 
thought of moral theological provenance in early modern period – extend across 
political borders. No less complex are legal spaces which did not form because of 
imperial interconnection, but through a specific, oen coincidental or temporary 
exchange – for example in the field of certain trading networks which generate rules 
for the traffic of goods, or of discourse communities which are observable in Europe in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century, between southern European and Latin Amer-
ican countries or in other regions. It should be a particularly important task for legal 
history research to reflect on this formation of legal spaces connected with increas-
ingly intensive communication processes, investigate different area concepts and make 
them productive for legal history (Duve 2013a, p. 21).
We shall be coming back to this important communicative dimension. 
2. The second key concept is “multinormativity”: 
A second starting point is that we need critical reflection on the concept of ‘law’ that 
we are employing in order to structure our analysis. As mentioned above, it is quite 
useless to compare legal traditions taking our own past’s concepts and applying 
them to other areas, leading us to the conclusion that outside world is different. 
We need ‘transcultural’ analytical concepts of normativity. ‘Multinormativity’ could serve 
as an appropriate term for these attempts of understanding law in the environment of other 
modes of normativity not structured by our idea of law (Duve 2013a, p. 21).
This is also one of our four key concepts, which we shall be going into in 
detail.
3. The third key concept goes by the name of “cultural translation.” Since 
this is complex matter, the explanation is somewhat lengthy: 
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For legal history in the early modern and modern period, the concepts discussed 
under the heading of Cultural translation could be especially helpful. Even if one 
might be mistrusting the fashionable discourses promoting these perspectives, and 
even if one does not wish to regard all cultural production directly as a translation 
problem, it should be evident that, due to the linguistic constitution of our subject 
‘normativity’, a professional approach is indispensable which takes the findings of 
linguistic and cultural studies seriously. This approach must even play a central role 
where the investigation of transcultural contexts is concerned. Looking at lawmak-
ing, judging, or writing law books as a mode of translation (independently from the 
fact whether there is a translation from one language into the other, or whether it is 
just a translation by the person who is acting within the same language system) 
compels us to pay special attention to social practices, to knowledge and the con-
crete conditions of these translation processes. The analysis necessarily leads to the 
pragmatic and, above all, institutional contexts as well as to the mediality in which 
‘law’ as a system of meaning is materialized. Thus, to focus on law as translation 
helps us to counterbalance the historical priority given to the ‘object’ of reception 
and to the ‘sender’. Furthermore it replaces this sender-centrism by privileging the 
local conditions in the ‘receiving’ culture, i. e. the conditions of recreation of poten-
tially global juridical knowledge under local conditions (‘globalizations’). And it 
forces us to open our analysis to those methods that have been developed in cultural 
anthropology, linguistics, cultural studies and social sciences to understand the 
pragmatic contexts of human modes of producing meaningful symbols. (Duve 
2013a, p. 22).
4. The fourth and last key concept is “conflict resolution”: 
There are many good reasons for this: First, we would try to counterbalance the 
longstanding privileging of normative options, always tending to forget their selec-
tion in practice. Second, we would try to counterbalance the longstanding privileg-
ing of learned law, and be more aware of commonplace legal knowledge, trying to 
understand how categories of learned law formed the minds, ideas, concepts and 
practices, but look on them through the eyes of practice. Third, different procedures 
of conflict resolution oen produce sources reaching far into everyday local life and 
provide us with the opportunity to observe the available normative options and 
their activation. Looking at conflicts thereby gives us the opportunity of discovering 
the living law and at the same time draws our attention to extra-legal framings, 
especially important for the formation of law, to the accumulated knowledge of 
the communication community, their implicit understandings, i. e. to many factors 
that have been identified as crucial elements for an analysis of law in sociological 
and legal anthropology, or in culturally sensitive legal theory (Duve 2013a, p. 22 f.).
Aer this instructive look at the key Frankfurt topics, we shall now present 
‘our’ four key concepts at length, which – as the attentive reader will soon 
notice – overlap to some extent with the research areas of the Max Planck 
Institute.
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II. The Four Key Concepts in Detail
The first of our four concepts is almost identical with the second of the Max 
Planck Institute, with which it shares the name ‘multinormativity.’
1. Multinormativity as a Key Concept
No-one will deny that we live in a society characterised by normative plural-
ity; we have already mentioned this under the heading “gradual decoupling 
of state and law.” The next chapter treats the plurality of normative orderings 
at length. 
It should therefore suffice to call a legal historian to the witness box, 
whose testimony will also demonstrate that normative plurality is by no 
means a new phenomenon. The remarks made by Miloš Vec on “Multi-
normativity in the History of Law” (2009) in his address to the Berlin-Bran-
denburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities are inspiring and his exam-
ples convincing.
* The first is so-called ceremonial norms:
Ceremonial norms ... have been discussed as a normative category in their own right 
beyond law and morality. This innovative idea can be attributed above all to Christian 
Thomasius, who knew how important questions of correct dress were to his con-
temporaries and how significant the norms of external appearance were for the 
perception of all content in science, society, and politics. In his secular theory of 
natural law, Thomasius developed a theory of decorum, which adequately reflected 
many contemporary aspects: the need for a society stratified in terms of estates for 
stabilisation; the desire of the individual for difference – and the incessant historical 
mutability of these outward signs, in brief: fashion. As such, these signs were 
arbitrary and to this extent were not to be overestimated in their concrete expres-
sion; on the other hand, the existence of a sign system contributed to ordering 
society. At times societal tolerance towards both specific principles and towards 
deviations from the norm was called for rather than adherence to the strict letter 
of the law. Details were settled by police ordinances, rules of public order and 
administration [‘Policey’ or ‘Policeyordnung’]. If the norms of decorum operated 
through a division of labour between law and morality, they managed to pacify 
society, an achievement highly appreciated at a time when memories of the conflicts 
that had raged in the seventeenth century were still very much alive. Ceremonial 
theory thus came to complement a general normative theory very typical of the period (Vec 
2009, pp. 160 f. Transl. R.B.). 
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* The second example is the hunger of the emerging industrial society for 
rules, which Vec explains as follows:
Many challenges presented themselves from the very outset of the industrialization 
process: international trade and communication had to be coordinated, the risks 
and opportunities of industrialization – only to mention boiler explosions, machine 
accidents, and the dangers of the mysterious, invisible, silent and odourless elec-
tricity – called for a new regulatory framework. The fight against crime was revo-
lutionized by new scientific and technical methods of investigation, which led to 
modern forensics. Inventors and enterprises wanted patent protection; urbanisation 
required new forms of public services, transnational companies sought to protect 
themselves against risks and draed standard forms with which they presented their 
customers.
The actor was thus not only the state, and not only statutory law was made. The 
modern age gave rise to a new normative pluralism, for instance in the form of technical 
rules. There had been technical rules and standards long before the nineteenth 
century, but the need for them now became urgent with the advent of industrial 
mass production. Without a high measure of uniformity, such production would 
hardly have been possible; but the content and procedures of standardisation still 
had to be developed – at that time there were still no central standards institute like 
the DIN, let alone any international body. 
[Illustration aer Vec 2009, p. 163]
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There was accordingly a plurality of norm-making actors. Even in the nineteenth century 
there was an international community with established institutions ...  Here, too, indus-
trialization played a crucial role. It gave international law new topics and perspec-
tives. Instead of negotiating about war and peace, economic and technical matters 
now had to be dealt with. Telegraphy, weights and measures, postal services, and 
freight traffic confronted international law and its attendant science with new tasks. 
Where industry and transport concentrated, a regulatory framework was needed, 
particularly at the international level. Rule-making at the international level and 
the intensification of exchanges were thus closely interrelated and gave birth to an 
international community (Vec 2009, p. 162 f. Transl. R.B.).
Miloš Vec’s concluding remarks apply fully to our key concept of normative 
plurality:
What do the two seemingly quite disparate topic areas have in common? Three 
points in conclusion:
First, our examples show that we do justice to neither the pre-modern age nor to the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries if we operate with too narrow concepts such as 
constitution, law, and state. Everywhere in history we come across conceptions of 
statehood that cannot be accommodated by the limited repertoire of forms handed 
down by the history of law – be it the major fields of societal rule-making in the 
nineteenth century or the pre-modern orderings of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
Second, we see that basic research in law, as I conceive of it, can break new ground 
particularly if as a discipline it devotes itself to integrating law into society. It gains 
from cooperation with other disciplines and from careful attention to detail.
Third, we see how the normativity of law competes and cooperates with other 
normativities: this goes far beyond the – in my view overestimated – dichotomy 
between law and morality. Laws interact with social rules, such as precepts of 
courtesy or principles of politics. Legal norms coexist with technical standards 
and religious imperatives. There are oen no rules for settling conflicts with binding 
force between the bodies of norms.
Relations between these forms are as complex and variable as the heterogeneous 
societies that have produced them. This is to some degree apparent from the two 
examples from pre-modernity and industrial modernity. Further research into the 
question presents an interesting challenge in the age of globalisation, which is 
characterized by so many pluralisms and transfers. This challenge, allow me to say 
in conclusion, can be summed up in one word: multinormativity (Vec 2009, p. 165. 
Transl. R.B.).
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2. The Key Concept Governance
On the lookout for concepts permitting a view of the world of rules that 
does not centre on the state, ‘governance’ comes to mind for two reasons: 
the concept (which we shall be defining shortly with reference to what 
we have published elsewhere, Schuppert 2011a, p. 32 f.) relativizes the 
state, and offers us the notion of regulatory structures, which deliberately 
leaves open a question that is always looming in the background: ‘law or 
not law?’
a) Governance as a Concept Relativizing The State
In political science, the temptation has always been great to eliminate ‘the 
state’ – a term generally used as an abbreviation for hierarchical, govern-
mental authority – if not in open battle then at least semantically. But ‘state’ 
having apparently escaped unscathed from all such attempts at semantic 
disregard – one need only recall the replacement of the concept by that of 
‘political system’ – the governance concept seems to offer a second oppor-
tunity: it arrives, so to speak, ‘state-free,’ as if the state had disappeared in a 
semantic coup – by sleight of hand – from the scene, thenceforth dominated if 
not commanded by the governance concept. But things are not as simple as 
that.
Even though ‘state’ is not entirely eliminated by such a semantic coup, 
there is perhaps a more subtle way to tailor the governance concept more 
closely to trim away what one does not like about ‘state.’ For the substance 
of the state in the governance approach diminishes the more narrowly the 
underlying concept of governance is defined. If we reduce governance to 
only non-hierarchical forms – keeping the hierarchy = state equation always 
in mind – governance clearly seeks a perspective other than that of the state; this 
deliberate selectivity of the governance viewpoint could – to quote Arthur 
Benz – “be justified by the fact that it allows us to better understand special 
forms of politics, of collective action in modern society than do, for instance, 
the concepts of state or system of government” (Benz 2004, p. 20. Transl. 
R.B.). An understanding of governance in this narrower sense as a counter-
concept to hierarchical control nevertheless does not do away with the state 
as an actor in governance; but it is then ‘only’ one among others, integrated 
not in hierarchical regulatory structures but in structures designed for coop-
eration with non-state actors.
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The following comparison of the state-focused concept of government with a 
governance approach that tends to be shy of the state clearly shows the differ-
ences between the two concepts in relation to the state (Benz 2004, p. 21):
But the more subtle approach of paring down the state by narrowing the concept
is also unlikely to succeed; there is meanwhile something in the way of 
consensus in governance research that a broader governance concept is pref-
erable (see, among others, Zürn 2008) that would embrace the entire range 
of governance forms. Our full approval must therefore go to Renate 
Mayntz’s definition of governance as “the totality of all coexisting forms 
of collective regulation of societal matters from institutionalised civil-society 
self-regulation and various forms of collaboration between state and private 
actors to the sovereign action of state actors” (Mayntz 2005, p. 13. Transl. 
R.B.). It should be added that it would indeed be a difficult to understand 
simplification of the governance concept to ignore the most successful 
Government and Governance
Government
State vs. market or society
Governance
State, market, and networks as complementary 
forms of control
Polity • Focus on the state
• Majoritarian democracy and 
hierarchy as the most important 
institutions
• Institutional structure linking the 
elements of hierarchy, negotiation systems, 
and competition mechanisms
Politics • Competition between parties 
for power and between interest 
groups for infl uence
• Confl ict management through 
decisions of the competent state 
institutions and enforcement of 
state decisions
• Confl icts between governing / leading and 
governed / aff ected actors
• Control and coordination in the context 
of institutional rule systems
• Negotiations between state and / or societal 
actors
• Adaptation of institutional rule systems
Policy • Legislation (commands and 
prohibitions)
• Distribution of public services
• Autonomization (in networks and 
communities), compromises, exchanges
• Coproduction of collective goods
• Network management
• Institutional policy (management of 
institutional change)
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governance structure in history: the organizational principle of hierarchy 
and the institution of bureaucracy.
In other words, the governance approach is a concept that relativizes the state 
but does not ignore it, and playing the state and governance off against one 
another would therefore not be very helpful. But the governance concept 
broadens the perspective – and for this reason is rightly so successful – and 
avoids the danger of tunnel vision inherent in all state-centricity.
In the knowledge of what the governance concept offers, we now cast a 
brief look at regulatory structures, a key concept we have also addressed 
elsewhere (Schuppert 2011d). 
b) Governance In and Through Regulatory Structures
The central concept in governance is regulatory structures; it is used in both 
legal science and the social sciences and can therefore throw a bridge 
between the discourses of these two disciplines. At the heart of the concept 
are not single legal provisions or questions of good law-making. Regulatory 
structures are rather to be seen as task-related institutional arrangements 
embracing the authorities, criteria, forms, and tools most important for 
regulating a given matter, so that the concept provides an analytic frame-
work for addressing interactional, substitutional, and complementary rela-
tions between criteria for action, actors, and tools. 
The meteoric career of the bridging concept regulatory structures owes 
much to three factors:
* First, it directs attention to the whole control context within which a 
function is performed in that the regulatory structures perspective does 
not operate in terms of boxes and demarcations but overcomes such 
differentiation, for instance between state and non-state actors, private 
and public law, formal and informal. Particularly important is its focus 
on the functional connection between the differences in action ration-
alities (and legal regimens) between state and private actors for attain-
ing control goals in the given policy areas. Regulatory structures are 
also coordination structures and therefore eminently suitable for 
organizing and institutionalizing collaboration between state and pri-
vate action competence – one of the key functions of the modern 
administrative state.
42 Chapter One
* Second, the regulatory structures perspective sharpens perception of 
the interplay between societal self-regulation and state control, for 
processes political science has called “the new interplay between the 
state, business, and civil society.” Thus regulatory structures not only 
coordinate; they also couple the different action logics of state and 
non-state actors by creating structures within which the state regulates 
and supervises private service delivery in the public interest (regulatory 
responsibility), while providing a framework for setting free and chan-
nelling the self-regulatory potential of the economy and civil society 
(‘regulated self-regulation’).
* This brings us, third, to the crucial circumstance that the regulatory 
structure perspective has established itself in the recent debate on 
changes in statehood. In this discussion, as the catchword ‘regulated 
self-regulation,’ control concept of the ‘ensuring state,’ has shown, the 
governance and regulatory structures of a given type of state or con-
ception of the state (for example: the interventionist state, the preven-
tion state, the ensuring state) are particularly under scrutiny.
Having clarified the concept of regulatory structures, it is now time to take a 
somewhat more fundamental step and present our concept of a science of 
regulation.
3. The Key Concept ‘Science of Regulation’ 
(Regelungswissenscha)
If we have been right so far, we need to go one step further conceptually. 
If multinormativity is normal in every society ordered by rules, and if reg-
ulatory structures – whether legally binding or not, whether in the form of 
laws or of internalized social norms – affect behaviour, enabling and/or 
constraining actors’ conduct, a wide-angle lens is needed to capture the diver-
sity and interplay of the norms that control behaviour. This wide-angle lens 
is the science of regulation, which – overcoming the fixation on positive state-
made law – addresses the control of behaviour through rules of all sorts, 
which neither means doing away with ‘law’ in the sense of ‘binding norms’ 
backed by sanctions nor obviating the question of how we wish to define 
law. But this is only the second step; our first concern – in the methodo-
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logical sense of a sociology of regulation avant la lettre – is to describe and 
analyse the processes of making, applying, and enforcing rules.
This being the case, it is perhaps not surprising that in a study on the 
sociology of lawmaking we find first reflections on expanding the theory of 
legislation (or ‘legisprudence’) into a theory of lawmaking in a broader 
sense; Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz convincingly remarks:
A growing number of problems have been posed by the need to take account of the 
multitude of legal sources and levels of regulation in interaction. The point of 
departure must be ‘regulatory structure’ in the sense of all regulatory authorities 
and regulatory tools important for the regulation of a subject matter and a public 
function. Traditionally, the empirical sociology of legislation is oriented on the 
genesis of single laws, norms, or legal institutions. The differentiation of law into 
an abundance of complementary or mutually compensating rules, regulatory 
authorities, and regulatory instruments, requires careful attention to be paid to 
the mutual impact of and interaction between the levels of state regulation from 
European lawmaking to the materialization of the law in statutes or administrative 
provisions, as well as the connections between state and private lawmaking. Simple 
causal notions about the consequences of single norms in parliamentary legislation 
in the sense of linear effects of given normative imperatives miss the mark. The 
sociology of law and legal dogmatics had addressed the growth of complexity from 
an early date with concepts such as ‘reflexive law’ or ‘context control.’ For a theory 
of lawmaking that takes a pragmatic (prescriptive) view of legislation, it follows that 
a theory of legislation oriented on parliamentary legislation needs to extend the 
ambit of its inquiry to a theory of lawmaking in a broad sense of the term; a sociology of 
parliamentary legislation alone can provide only subcomplex answers to norm-set-
ting problems in the modern state. For example, the now widespread practice in 
environmental law of norm-setting voluntary undertakings needs to be examined 
with respect to social selectivity in the influence of the interests and interest groups 
involved, and with respect to the controllability and sanctionability of such under-
takings (Schulze-Fielitz 2000, pp. 170 f. Transl. R.B.).
A year later we made a programmatic contribution to the debate by suggest-
ing that jurisprudence should be understood as a science of regulation 
(Schuppert 2001) and, some time later ventured to publish a book on fun-
damental questions of a modern science of regulation (Grundfragen einer moder-
nen Regelungswissenscha, Schuppert 2011c). Not only do we still consider 
this concept to be right and to point the way forward as indicated by the 
above reflections on the function of key concepts. We see our approach 
confirmed in two ways:
(1) First, a number of authors arguing from wide ranging perspectives 
think along similar lines. Apart from Claudio Franzius, who, writing about 
the function of regulatory structures, has explicitly pointed out that they are 
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“open to non-state and non-law forms of regulation” (Franzius 2006, p. 205), 
we should mention our colleague of many years, Wolfgang Hoffmann-
Riem, whom we call to the witness stand not once but twice:
Writing about openness to innovation and responsibility for innovation 
through law (“Innovationsoffenheit und Innovationsverantwortung durch 
Recht,” 2006), he lists ten points for innovative re-orientation of which we 
shall take the five that give particularly clear expression to the transformation 
of jurisprudence from a science of interpretation into a ‘problem-solving 
oriented science of regulation’. The five points are as follows:
* Keeping historical developments in mind, it is also important to conceive of the 
law as the boundary to state action; but it is also a commission to shape and 
optimize within the bounds of the legally permissible; the law is accordingly to 
be established primarily as a normative means of ensuring the quality of action deter-
mined by law.
* To better capture the action and effect aspect of law, new administrative juris-
prudence also understands itself as a science of control. However, it does not embrace 
any particular control theory. With pragmatic intent it adopts a normatively ori-
ented concept of control, addressing the contribution of law to producing norma-
tively desirable consequences and avoiding normatively undesirable ones.
* Forms of action, modes of control, and regulatory strategies in law are multi-
plying. Imperative law (also Ordnungsrecht or regulatory law), oen the focus of 
attention and operating with commands and prohibitions, is supplemented by, for 
instance, ‘enabling law’ (freisetzendes Recht) which is particularly incentive oriented.
* At the same time, jurisprudential analysis turns away from its concentration on 
the more hierarchical fulfilment of functions to take greater account of decentral-
ized, more or less autonomous performance and actor networking. Particular atten-
tion is paid to problem solving through societal self-regulation, for which, however, 
the law sets a framework, provides structures (e. g., the market), and draws up rules 
of the game (regulated self-regulation).
* Doubts about the strict distinguishability of law from non-law and insight into 
the dovetailing of legal-normative and social-normative orientations change percep-
tions of legally recognized criteria for action. More intensive account is taken of 
administrative action directed only by the law, but also of administrative action that 
is marked by a non-law prescriptive orientation. Although ‘so goals’ such as effective-
ness, efficiency, acceptability, and implementability are also anchored in the legal 
system, they are not limited to the legal dimension. In their broad conception they 
are important for socially acceptable control (Hoffmann-Riem 2006, p. 263 f. Transl. 
R.B.).
These reflections by Hoffmann-Riem also bring us away from the notion of 
law as an ensemble of imperative precepts, broadening our view to include 
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the many modes of legal action, the diversity of regulatory strategies, and the 
mixture of law and non-law regulatory structures. All this calls for system-
atized attention from a science of regulation still to be developed. 
Hoffmann-Riem’s second contribution is about “alterations to the house 
of the law in the light of changes in statehood” (“Umbauten im Hause des 
Rechts angesichts des Wandels von Staatlichkeit,” Hoffmann-Riem 2013). 
The author addresses “our science of regulation” under the heading “sources 
of law.” He shares our view that sources of law and rule-makers have prolif-
erated:
The present day is marked by a vast proliferation of sources of law on various levels, 
such as in national law, in the European multi-level system, and in transnational and 
international legal relations. This multiplication of sources also point to a prolifer-
ation of rule-setters, namely those operating in national law (such as legislature, 
administration, local authorities, the states, and the federation) and in the European 
field (such as the EU Commission and European Parliament), as well as various 
actors in the transnational and international sphere (such as the WTO and the 
World Bank). There are sovereign rule-setters and those legitimated by sovereign 
authorities; but there are also purely private ones. Characteristic is also the multi-
plication of types of source – in the performance of public-sector functions, for 
instance through the use of public-law, private-law and hybrid norms, and through 
recourse to formal and informal rules. This means that the interfaces between 
formal and informal rules and, where necessary, the interchangeability between 
them need to be taken into account (Hoffmann-Riem 2013, p. 355. Transl. R.B.).
In view of this diversity – he continues – differences in the “degrees of hard-
ness” of law can be drawn:
Characteristic are also the different ‘degrees of hardness’ of law, which become 
apparent when one examines standards, rules of conduct, guidelines, or recommen-
dations as to whether they are recognized as law, whether they are to be classified as 
hard law or so law, or whether they are merely de facto rules. The different degrees 
of hardness can be determined particularly in terms of the concepts ‘binding’ and 
‘backed by sanctions’ and classified on the basis of the following combinations:
* legally binding and backed by sanctions;
* legally binding, but not backed by sanctions in the legal system, even though 
possibly subject to de facto sanctions;
* not legally binding, but de facto binding because backed by de facto sanctions (for 
instance, the risk of losing future business relations or ostracism in the community);
* not legally binding and also not backed de facto sanctions (Hoffmann-Riem 2013, 
p. 355. Transl. R.B.).
But then comes the third step, the unavoidable and critical question of what 
is to count as ‘law’:
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Particularly interesting is the question of what raises a rule – in the sense of an 
abstract-general principle of conduct – to the rank of ‘law’: to be a law, must the 
rule-setter to be a sovereign authority or is it enough if, as for example in the field of 
standard setting, private institutions draw up codes of conduct and other such rules 
to govern behaviour? How important is the power to impose sanctions, again 
depending on whether imposed by sovereign authorities wielding special instru-
ments of sovereign law enforcement or whether factually effective sanctions suffice? 
All this brings us to the particularly topical discussion, to which GFS has oen 
contributed, on ‘so law’. If so law is to be included in the remit of legal science 
or recognized as the functional equivalent of state law, does it need to be ‘har-
dened’? Do private standards have to be incorporated into the legal system and so 
forth? ... Clearly, the storehouses of the world of rules abound with open questions. 
Among them is whether, given the wide range of rules and the location of some of 
them in the marginal zones of law, jurisprudence can still handle this taxonomic 
diversity or even whether the autonomy of law and legal science is not at risk 
(Hoffmann-Riem 2013, pp. 356 f. Transl. R.B.).
We, too, cannot and do not wish to elude this critical question and have a 
suggestion to make on how this qualification problem can be dealt with.
(2) Furthermore, we would be understood by a variety of so-called general 
jurisprudence, represented notably by Brian Z. Tamanaha in his book A Gen-
eral Jurisprudence of Law and Society (2001) and by William Twining in what 
has now become a standard work General Jurisprudence. Understanding Law 
from a Global Perspective (2009). For a better understanding of the sort of 
general jurisprudence we consider right, we need to distinguish it from a 
variety that Tamanaha in his essay “What is Jurisprudence?” (2012) describes 
as “essentialistic”, because it seeks to make statements about the true “nature 
of law” that claim validity everywhere in the world and regardless of cultural 
differences between legal systems; a cogent example is furnished by Scott 
Shapiro (2011). Tamanaha describes his position as follows:
To supplement his intuition about law, Shapiro assembles a list of truisms about 
law. Truisms, he says, ‘are not merely true, but self-evidently so.’ These truths are ‘so 
unobjectionable that they hardly need mentioning.’ Among his proffered truisms, 
Shapiro asserts that all legal systems have judges who interpret the law, all legal 
systems have mechanisms to change the law, legal authority is conferred by legal 
rules, some laws impose obligations, in every legal system some person or institution 
has supreme authority to make certain laws, there are right answers to some legal 
questions, and so forth. His truisms are obviously taken from the common institu-
tional arrangement of contemporary Western state legal systems (Tamanaha 2012, p. 8).
Quite different – and preferable, according to Tamanaha – is the non-essen-
tialistic approach adopted by a second type of general jurisprudence: 
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The second type of general jurisprudence does not focus on a theory of the nature of 
law [...] but rather on constructing a theoretical framework that addresses various 
manifestations of law around the globe. It brings within its compass state law, 
international law, transnational law, religious law, human rights law, customary 
law, and other instantiations of law. William Twining’s recent book, General Juris-
prudence, is an example of this version.
These two types of general jurisprudence both claim to be about law in general, as 
H. L. A. Hart put it, ‘in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal system or 
legal culture.’ (Work that focuses on a particular legal system is local, particular, or 
parochial jurisprudence.) But they mean this in quite different senses. The first type 
claims to produce essential truths about law that apply across the universe, for all 
times and places and all legal systems, existent and non-existent; while the second 
type claims to bring within its purview forms of law around the globe as they 
actually exist (Tamanaha 2012, p. 2 f.).
This position could be our own; in the following comparison between 
Shapiro and Twining, we would opt for the latter without reservation:
The second difference relates to the status of Twining’s formulation of law. While 
Shapiro claims to have produced eternal truths about the nature of law, Twining 
assumes a more modest stance: Although it takes the form of a definition per genus et 
differentiam, this is not “Twining’s conception (or definition) of law.” I use different 
conceptions of law for different purposes in other contexts. Here the purpose is to provide 
some conceptual tools for viewing law from a global perspective, first in respect of 
constructing a broad overview or mental map of legal phenomena and, second, for 
describing, interpreting, analyzing, explaining, and comparing legal phenomena 
(Tamanaha 2012, p. 12).
Now it is time to present our last key concept.
4. The Key Concept “Law as Communication”
Norms, especially statutes, are ‘enacted’ and then ‘promulgated’ – in Ger-
many in the Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt). Lawyers tend to speak 
of the lawgiver as a special actor, who aer weighing up the pros and cons, 
makes a decision in the public interest; every law student in an examination 
required to consider the constitutionality, and that means above all the 
proportionality, of the resulting legislation, asks first of all about the purpose 
of the law, in other words about what the lawgiver had wanted to achieve 
with this legislation. Now, every observer of the political process knows very 
well that the lawgiver as a political decision-making authority that knows 
what it wants and considers what needs to be considered and sovereignly 
enacts the resulting legislation does not exist in political reality. Legislating is 
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a political process that involves many actors that exert influence on the 
draing of the law to be adopted. They include not only the ministerial 
bureaucracy that prepares the legislation but also non-state actors such as 
organized interests, which, through their associations formally participate in 
the legislative process under the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal 
Ministries (GGO). The web of relationships between the various actors – 
whether formal or informal – can be captured by describing legislation as 
a network-like decision-making structure (Beyme 1997), a network whose 
participants communicate intensively and incessantly with one another. The 
realization, which we owe in particular to Klaus von Beyme, that legislation 
involves a networked communication structure, incites us to take a some-
what closer look, focusing from the communication perspective on the 
production, application, and enforcement of law. 
a) The Communicative Production of Law 
Two examples will demonstrate that the production of law (as we shall be 
seeing in chapter 3) can and must be seen as a communicative process: local 
lawmaking and common law. 
(1) Local law production is an obvious example to choose, because from a 
historical point of view law has always been above all local law and was 
‘caesarized’ or nationalised only in the course of centralization processes, a 
fact that, given our tradition of thinking in terms of the nation-state, is all 
too easily lost sight of. In his far-reaching study From European Legal History 
to a Legal History of Europe from A Global History Perspective (Von der euro-
päischen Rechtsgeschichte zur einer Rechtsgeschichte Europas in globalhistorischer 
Perspektive), Thomas Duve has this to say about local law production about 
the “Empirical Concept of Law and the Prioritization of the Local”: 
If we take the empirical concept of law as our point of departure – anything else is 
even epistemologically impossible – ... ‘law’ is not a somehow given ordering; this 
may exist or not, but, like historical concepts of law, it is of importance only as an 
element in the thinking of actors. The subject matter of analysis by legal historians 
can be only the communication among those involved about what is to be seen as 
right or not. The object of our historical observation, ‘law’, thus consists more 
precisely but nevertheless in deliberately vague formulation, in regulatory patterns, 
‘whose claim to binding force is more or less recognized, which are more or less 
competently put into effect in legal institutional contexts, and with which one has 
to live within the framework of the contingencies of the social world.’ Legal history 
is therefore, to quote Michael Stolleis, a ‘succession of linguistically documented 
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states of consciousness of a communication community of those who are involved 
in the law and constitution’ – a definition that helps overcome the dichotomy of 
thought and action, and ultimately that of institution and person (Duve 2012, p. 50. 
Transl. R.B.).
(2) As far as the concept of common law is concerned, this imposes itself, 
because this is a legal regime that cannot be captured by the formula 
‘ordered, adjudged and decreed’ familiar to every lawyer, but which has 
come into being step by step in the process of applying the law.
In this connection, we find it particularly instructive how the develop-
ment of common law since the thirteenth century is described in the Ency-
clopaedia Britannica.
As the legal profession grew, the more experienced barristers were admitted to the 
dignity of serjeant-at-law and later banded together with the judges, who were 
appointed from their ranks, at Serjeants’ Inns in London. There, burning legal 
problems were informally discussed, and guidance was given to all concerning the 
decisions of actual or likely cases. The four Inns of Court (Gray’s Inn, Lincoln’s Inn, 
Inner Temple, and Middle Temple) evolved from the residential halls of junior 
barristers to become the bodies officially recognized as having the right to admit 
persons to the bar. Education consisted of attending court, participating in simulated 
legal disputes (moots), and attending lectures (readings) given by senior lawyers 
(Encyclopedia Britannica 2014).
Since it was a matter of learning how to argue in court, legal training 
required accounts of the debates on the formulation by judge and counsel 
on the points in issue, compiled in so-called ‘Year Books’.
Bar students therefore had to make notes in court of actual legal arguments in order to 
keep abreast of current law practices. These notes varied widely in quality, depending 
on the ability of the notetaker and the regularity of his attendance, and starting in 
about 1280 they seem to have been copied and circulated. In the 16th century they 
began to be printed and arranged by regnal year, coming to be referred to as the Year 
Books.
The Year Book reports were usually written in highly abbreviated law French. They 
did not always distinguish between the judges and barristers and oen simply 
referred to them by name. The actual judgment also was oen omitted, the interest 
centering rather upon the arguments presented by barristers in court. Although pre-
vious decisions were not generally binding, great attention was paid to them, and it 
appears that the judges and barristers referred to earlier Year Books in preparing 
their cases. Thus, case law became the typical form of English common law (Ency-
clopedia Britannica 2014).
Law was learned not from legal codes but by learning to argue and plead and 
in so doing to take similar cases as point of reference; in Günter Hager’s 
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treatment of “Legal Methods in Europe” he describes the roots of the system 
of precedents characteristic of the common law as follows: 
Following precedent is inseparably bound up with the invention of printing. It was 
only thanks to printing that preceding decisions were available at all. The Year 
Books, the first of which appeared in the late thirteenth century, had a decisive 
influence on how precedent was handled. They contained accounts of proceedings 
in the court of common pleas. They served initially to learn the technique of pleading. 
Indirectly the revealed the law as practiced. Reference to preceding cases was rare 
but where it occurred it carried weight. However, a precedent was not binding. The 
law of nature and justice stood above everything else. ... Step by step the law reports 
improved. And the intellectual climate changed. Printing had not only created the 
actual possibility of drawing on precedent. With it rationalism arose. Printing and 
the Enlightenment go together. The application of the law became scientific and text-
related. To a growing degree, parties and judges took reference to decided cases. 
Precedents were cited as authorities (Hager 2009, p. 87. Transl. R.B.). 
b) Interpretation of the Law as a Communication Process
That law generally has to be interpreted is a truism and that special authority 
is vested in those who interpret it is shown not only by the example of the 
Federal Constitutional Court; this link between the authority of texts and 
the authority of the interpreters of texts is particularly evident in the field of 
divine, revealed law that holds for eternity and cannot – like constitutions – 
be amended by a qualified majority to adapt it to new societal realities. To 
anchor religious, especially divine law ‘in time’ is, as many historical exam-
ples have shown, generally the task of a functionally differentiated caste of 
interpreters with a carefully cultivated claim to authority. A prime example 
is the rabbi, who plays such a key role in Jewish law; we will take a brief look 
at their methods of decision making.
(1) Discursivity as a Method for Making Decisions: The Role of the Rabbis
As Ronen Reichman of the Heidelberg Institute of Jewish Studies explains, 
Jewish religious law is not, like German law, dominated by deductive rea-
soning, that is to say the deductive derivation of a finding through subsump-
tion of the given case under a statutory definition, but by an abductive mode 
of thinking, which involves searching for the case that can be assumed to 
reflect the circumstances under which the old established norm arose (Reich-
man 2006); this procedure for applying the law is a discursive one, which 
Reichman describes as follows: 
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The discursive honouring of claims to validity that comes to bear in Talmudic legal 
hermeneutics as demonstrated by abductive argumentation combines with the 
plausible idea advanced by discourse theory that the discursive exchange of arguments
on a legal question to be decided is the condition for the possibility of their being 
right. In a legal culture that is devoted to the normative establishment of the truth, 
legal-cultural and institutional support for discursivity at the academic level of 
developing the law and in the practical application of the law is crucially important.
In their thinking, rabbis have cultivated a dialectical style taking the form of a 
regulated discussion with clearly defined question and answer roles, a special form 
of discourse, namely an appraising discourse, an examinative dialogue. Their literary 
oeuvre offers the best testimony of what finds expression above all in the Babylonian 
Talmud, a work in which subtle legal discussions were, so to speak, recorded in 
compact form as dialectical thesis statements (Reichman 2013, pp. 145 f. Transl. 
R.B.).
This still sounds relatively abstract; the following passage becomes progres-
sively clearer with each sentence: 
For the rabbis the interpretation and development of the law go hand in hand – 
and they are aware of this. The rabbis are fully aware that the legally differentiated 
meaning of biblical precepts is not determined by their being fixed in writing in 
the sense that all the scribes had to do was to discover this meaning. Their task is 
rather to elaborate this meaning. Rabbis express this idea as follows: ‘When God, 
praise be to Him, gave Israel the Torah, it was given to them like wheat for them to make 
flour thereof and like flax to make raiment thereof ’ ... Only in discourse does the normative 
content of the traditional precepts unfold. Only in the rabbinical workshop is the 
raiment made by human hand. The interpretation of the laws takes place in this 
workshop. This involves essentially the culture of debate and the associated ac-
knowledgement of diverging interpretations, expressed in the words: ‘These (words) 
and those (words) are words of the living God’ (bEr 13b). A legal culture that discloses 
its premises in this fashion commits itself to a rational legal ethos that places 
the communicative reason of the discursive procedure at its centre (Reichman 2013, 
pp. 146 f. Transl. R.B.).
Even if this example appears at first glance to be very particular, it never-
theless addresses a key point for every interpretation of law.
(2) Legal Communication as the Communication of Method 
That for every scientific discipline the very elementary issue of methodology 
has a communicative dimension has rightly been stressed by the Science 
Council commenting on the prospects for jurisprudence in Germany:
The method of the dogmatic disciplines is directed towards rationality in knowledge 
of the law and correctness in application of the law. Especially because of its relation 
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to application, the juridical interpretation method is not identical with the text 
interpretation of other disciplines, for example literary studies. Legal dogmatics as 
the conceptual-systematic processing of the law creates a common communication 
space for science and practice (Wissenschasrat 2012, p. 31. Transl. R.B.).
In a paper presented at the VDStRL Conference on 5 October 2014 in 
Düsseldorf, Andreas von Arnauld argued in quite similar vein; he, too, 
stressed that the search for the “right method” takes place in the discourse 
of the interpreter community:
Method is not merely a toolbox but a social practice. As such it cannot be isolated 
from the actors and institutions through which and in which it is ‘applied’. It 
constitutes itself in discursive processes of a (not quite) ‘open society of interpreters 
of the law and constitution.’ The content and tenets of a methodology are there-
fore generally not decreed; they need the approbation of legal science and legal 
practice. Legal methodology gains stability as collective, shared knowledge derived 
from practical experience and generalizable propositions. As a body of secondary 
rules – of rules on the application of rules – the method is legitimated by the 
expertise of discourse participants and the stabilizing reasonableness of practice 
anchored in tradition and origins. Nevertheless: methodology is not the firm bul-
wark it may sometimes appear to be. It owes its ultimately consensual-pragmatic 
basis to the fact that its rules can be changed ‘as we go along’ (Arnauld 2015, 
pp. 72 f. Transl. R.B.).
c) Communicative Law Enforcement
That norms cannot be imposed simply by sovereign authorities issuing 
directives to be enforced by compulsion is particularly apparent in the field 
of informal administrative action (overview in Schuppert 2000, pp. 236 ff.), 
which plays a key role in law enforcement (Bohne 1988). The example 
usually cited is environmental protection, which oen involves the enforce-
ability of environmental provisions vis-à-vis private sector operators; instead 
of engaging in lengthy legal action, it is oen easier to settle matters by 
mutual agreement (see Schulze-Fielitz 1992) by means of consultation 
between state authorities and the private companies that may be concerned 
not only with avoiding particular obligations but also with warding off
pending ordinances and the like. One of the leading authorities on such 
informal administrative practices, Eberhard Bohne, has developed a typology 
of such agreements, which we wish to present in brief (the question marks 
indicate that the typology is not exhaustive and may extend to further infor-
mal governmental and administrative practices; Transl. Roland Römhildt): 
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This brings to an end the presentation of our four key concepts of a non-
state-centric perspective on law. Before continuing with an overview of the 
chapters to come and the promised foray into the diversity of normative 
orderings, we shall take brief stock.
E. On Reflection
The aim of this introductory chapter has been to explain to the reader what 
induced us to undertake this book project and what we hope to achieve 
with it.
The point of departure was the finding – which we shall be dealing with 
in chapter two – that we live in a world of plural normative orderings and 
the this normative universe has yet to be adequately explored. The first step is 
therefore, as the subtitle indicates, to survey it thoroughly, to measure the 
terrain. This measurement, a preliminary stage in a prospective sociology of 
regulation, requires survey markers if we are not to lose our bearings in the 
vast expanses of the normative taiga. One, if not the central marker is the 
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constant equation law = state ought to be laid to rest in the vaults of legal 
history. A compass not oriented on the state is therefore needed. 
An obvious way to overcome the deep-seated state-centricity of our think-
ing is to speak in future of normative plurality instead of legal pluralism, thus 
taking adequate account of this plurality. Although this would be a step in 
the right direction, it would mean stopping halfway. What is therefore need-
ed is a conceptual framework for our thinking about the plurality of norma-
tive orderings and the consequences for law and legal science. The elements 
in such a conceptual framework that we propose are four key concepts:
* multinormativity
* governance
* science of regulation
* law as communication.
Equipped with these four key concepts, we will, hopefully, not only make 
progress in our surveying but also produce plausible results. The four con-
cepts are not to be understood as tailor-made keys that now unlock all doors 
with ease but rather as a focus of orientation for our reflection on the world 
of rules; to be always kept in mind and if need be brought up to date. 
Thus equipped, we shall now set to work on the real task. 
As far as the sequence of chapters is concerned, we follow – unbeknown to 
us at the time of writing this book – in the footsteps of the Science Council, 
who in their report on the prospects of jurisprudence in Germany had called 
research to shi its focus to gaining “a better understanding of novel forms 
of law, the processes of law formation, and types of law enforcement” 
(Wissenschasrat 2012, p. 37. Transl. R.B.). Precisely this is our theme: chap-
ters two and three address processes of law formation and the novel forms of 
law they produce; chapter four tackles the plurality of law enforcement re-
gimes, and chapter five the redefinition of the concept of law also demanded 
by the Science Council. The sixth and final chapter looks, at least briefly, 
at the function of law – which the Science Council stresses – to actualize 
guiding principles, such as justice. But now to the individual chapters.
Chapter two offers a first exploration of the world of rules. And to avoid 
losing our way in the vastnesses of the terrain, our exploration needs a 
compass for guidance: in this chapter the compass is group sociology and 
governance theory. Our starting point is that governance collectives, fre-
quently in the group form, generally act as regulatory communities; that 
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is to say, they give themselves rules to gain internal stability and mark 
themselves off externally. These governance collectives can be of various 
origin, ranging from professions such as the Prussian officer corps to ethni-
cally defined tribal communities and religious communities such as the 
Catholic Church and Islam, which had played an important role on the 
world stage long before term ‘globalization’ was coined; gangs of thieves 
also have governance structures, that is to say, rules that have to be obeyed, 
even if only in sharing out the booty. Because of this close connection 
between community formation and rule-making, we have preceded the 
second chapter by a section entitled “Housed in Belongingness,” which 
examines the need of collective human enterprises for regulation from the 
perspective of a range of disciplines. 
In chapter three we take a close look at the present “vast proliferation of 
sources of law ... and rule-makers” noted by Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem 
(Hoffmann-Riem 2013, p. 355. Transl. R.B.). We shall be dealing with other 
sorts of law, above all novel ones, than in chapter one. We will discover that 
there is, for example, a world of standards in the world of rules, and explore 
what it means if we distinguish between different ‘degrees of hardness’ in 
law and how hard law relates to so law.
And the perspective taken in this third chapter also differs from that 
prevailing in chapter two. Whereas chapter two deals with governance col-
lectives in the sense of regulatory communities, chapter three is concerned 
with actors and institutions that could possibly satisfy the seemingly insa-
tiable hunger of a socially differentiated, division-of-labour, economically 
liberal, and increasingly globalized society for regulation. Good examples 
are industrial society’s ‘hunger for norms’ and the steady demand for regu-
lation of a transnational economic society. We can hence speak of a supply 
side and a demand side in ‘law production.’
In chapter four, we once again shi our perspective. This time we 
address not law as a product but the enforcement dimension of every 
normative ordering. And closer examination reveals a multitude of what 
we call norm enforcement regimes; they range from the enforcement of 
law by state judicial authorities to governance by reputation and compliance 
regimes and the sanctioning effect of social contempt (political correctness). 
An important aspect is also the relationship between legal protection by the 
state and non-state justice institutions like customary courts in many parts of 
Africa and Asia.
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Chapter five discusses the problem of what the multiplicity of normative 
orderings, the proliferation of rule-makers, and the plurality of norm 
enforcement regimes actually mean for the concept of law. Are the multi-
plying non-state sets of norms also law, but of another type and origin? 
Do they “lodge” in the “grey zones” of law (concept in Hoffmann-Riem 
2013) or are they law “only” in a sociological sense? As we learn from the 
rich literature on legal pluralism, we appear to face the not very helpful 
alternative between declaring state law alone to be law – perhaps tolerating 
other sources of law such as custom and religion – and defining everything 
as law that “looks like law and functions like law.” We hold this either-or to 
be insurmountable and suggest operating with a continuum or sliding scale 
approach, enabling us to locate norms on a scale ranging from ‘law’ to ‘non-
law’. This is done on the basis of a criteria catalogue we have developed and 
which can in our view be useful in reshaping the concept of law.
In the final chapter we set out in search of justice. Once again we can turn 
to the Science Council report, which identifies three functions of law, 
namely conflict management, behaviour control, and the actualization of 
guiding principles such as justice, freedom, human dignity, and solidarity: 
In modern basic rights democracies, law performs a supportive, stabilizing, and 
above all structuring function in the societal change of guiding principles. Today, 
law has the task of safeguarding an order that serves to realize claims to justice in a 
democratic constitutional state, the greatest possible, legally regulated freedom, 
human dignity, and humane solidarity (Wissenschasrat 2012, p. 26. Transl. R.B.). 
In our quest for justice – coming back to chapter two – we have identified 
governance collectives not only as regulatory communities but also as com-
munities of justice, which differ one from the other in their specific notions 
of justice (participant justice, recognition justice, compensation, even retri-
bution). There is therefore not only a multitude of normative orderings and 
norm producers and a considerable variety of norm enforcement regimes, 
but also a plurality of notions about justice: this closes the circle, so to speak, 
and it will be the task of a jurisprudence fit for the future to deal adequately 
with these pluralities.
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Chapter Two
The Plurality of Normative Orders. 
An Exploration
A. Every Group Gives Itself Rules: A Group-Sociological Perspective
In what follows, we call all groups that give themselves rules regulatory 
collectives. They include groups and associations of persons, as well as organ-
izationally consolidated institutions with regulatory regimes specific to the 
group, association, or institution, and which the collective has either given 
itself or which goes back to a norm-giver recognized by it. A look at some 
such regulatory collectives from the perspective of group sociology will show 
us what lies behind this abstract definition.
I. Examples of Group-Specific Rule-Setting
An ideal introduction to this subject matter is offered by Uwe Schimank in 
Hans Joas’s sociology textbook (Schimank 2003). Schimank transports us 
into the world of William Golding’s novel Lord of the Flies (2008), which 
tells of a group of schoolboys stranded on an uninhabited tropical island 
aer a plane crash who have to learn to deal with the situation: 
A place carrying a group of six to twelve-year-old English schoolboys has crashed. 
All the adults are been killed. When it comes to establishing order and thinking about 
being saved, the boys are on their own. Not everything works out as they initially 
hoped. ...
Aer the crash, the first to emerge from the jungle are a fat intellectual boy by the 
name of Piggy, who has had too sheltered an upbringing, and a blond, athletic boy 
called Ralph. Piggy suggests to Ralph that they summon the other survivors by 
blowing on a large conch. In their torn school uniforms, the little boys find their 
way through the jungle to the beach. These boys do not yet constitute a social group. 
At the outset, they are simply a mass of individuals who happen to be in the same 
place at the same time – like passers-by in the street or passengers on a bus. But the 
boys soon become a group by interacting; they develop an informal structure, agree on 
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norms as guidelines for their behaviour, and develop a we-sentiment (Schimank 2003, 
p. 201. Transl. R.B.).
For this process of group formation – and this is the important point – 
rule-making by those involved is crucial. Schimank:
To begin with, the boys in Lord of the Flies form a harmonious group, which adopts 
the norms familiar from school and the adult world. At one of the first meetings, 
Ralph admonishes the others:
... “We can’t have everybody talking at once. We’ll have to have ‘Hands up’ 
like at school. ... Then I’ll give him the conch.”
“Conch?”
“That’s what this shell’s called. I’ll give the conch to the next person to speak. 
He can hold it when he’s speaking.” ...
Jack was on his feet.
“We’ll have rules!” he cried excitedly. “Lots of rules!” ... 
The boys agree on rules on where the signal fire is to be set up and who is to maintain 
it, how food and water are to be gathered, and so forth. The acceptance of such 
common norms contributes to the internal cohesion of a group. The norms stipulate 
how members of the group are to behave and work for group goals. If a group 
has norms, it can exert pressure on its members to conform (Schimank 2003, 
p. 203 f. Transl. R.B.). 
But this is not the end of the story; the boys experience a power 
struggle as a group-dynamic process between the rule-conscious Ralph 
and the more violence-oriented Jack, who finally gets the upper hand 
and thus destroys the pre-existing rule-based order: 
Consensus and conformity rapidly collapse. Jack, who had been given responsibility 
for the fire, entices the fire guards away from their task to help him hunt wild pigs. 
The boys also begin to neglect the construction of their huts and the collection of 
food and drinking water. Soon their ordered lives are without goal or plan. Jack 
asserts himself more and more in his aggressive and tyrannical manner. Rule-based 
conformity and consensus give way to control by violence. In a scene that marks this 
transition, Jack calls the group rule into question that only the person holding the 
conch can speak: 
Piggy had settled himself in a space between two rocks, and sat with the 
conch on his knees. ...
“I got the conch,” said Piggy indignantly. 
“You let me speak!”
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“The conch doesn’t count on top of the mountain,” said Jack, “so you shut 
up.” ...
“I got the conch –”
Jack turned fiercely. “You shut up!”
This threat of violence does not fail to have an effect, because Jack is physically 
stronger than the others. He later consolidates his rule by destroying the conch – 
and thus the last vestige of authority that Ralph still had. Without the conch as symbol 
of group consensus and the common norms, power passes to the spears and stones (Schi-
mank 2003, p. 204. Transl. R.B.).
* The second example is from the book by Heinrich Popitz (1992) on 
phenomena of power; Popitz presents three cases of power formation with-
in a group, namely power formation processes on a ship, in a prison 
camp, and in a reformatory, thus all – as Harmut Esser stresses – “total 
institutions with no exit option” (Esser 2000, p. 309. Transl. R.B.). 
Popitz is concerned with power formation processes within a group, i. e., 
with how the power of the few over the many can be adequately 
explained. We are interested less in power formation than, more gen-
erally, in the aspect of order formation and what Popitz calls the ordering 
value of order; but let us turn first to the example of the reformatory:
The story could be taken from the literature of cadet novels or from a film about 
reformatories. In this institution, a group of 14 to 15 year-old boys, who were to be 
resocialized, had been granted relative independence in reliance on the blessings of 
autonomy and the healing powers of comradely education. Organizationally and 
spatially, the group was separated off from the rest of institution. At the point in 
time that interests us, a centre of power had developed among the thirteen boys, 
which issued directives. This centre comprised four boys. One of the four, the ‘boss’ 
had the last word in cases of doubt. A second group of three boys serves as reserves 
and where necessary as task force. The remaining six were ordered around at will 
and exploited (Popitz 1992, p. 216. Transl. R.B.).
The exploited six boys had to surrender a portion of their bread ration, 
do the most unpleasant chores, and serve as scapegoats: 
If one of them rebelled, punishments were imposed – e. g., his blanket was con-
fiscated – and in serious cases the task force took immediate action, and in extreme 
cases of open and repeated insubordination, punishment was deferred to night-time 
and all the others were forced to take part (Popitz 1992, p. 217. Transl. R.B.).
What is interesting about the whole thing is that aer a certain time, 
the oppressed subgroup came to accept the prevailing power and 
ordering structures as the “coexistence constitution”: 
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It is possible – as we know from experience – that the six boys who surrendered their 
bread ration, did nasty chores, and were used as scapegoats came in time to accept
precisely this order, this distribution of rights and duties as a binding constitution of 
coexistence; that they not only bowed to it but served it; that they not only feared the 
norms of this order but internalized them; that they did their duty not only from 
supine habit but willingly and obediently ... (Popitz 1992, p. 221. Transl. R.B.).
The explanation Heinrich Popitz offers for this unjust group constitution
is an effect that – with reference to the familiar concept of legal cer-
tainty (see von Arnauld 2006) – he calls order certainty; under the 
heading “the ordering value of order as basic legitimacy” he comments:
The power system of our reformatory group will be recognized if over a longer span 
of time it offers order, or more precisely, if duration and order gain fundamental 
importance in the formation of consciousness. In this context, this means that order 
offers primarily certainty of order. Participants are certain of order if they have the 
secure knowledge of what they and other may and must do; if they can develop 
certainty that everyone involved will really behave with some degree of reliability as 
expected; if they can rely on contraventions being punished as a rule; if they can 
foresee what they have to do to gain advantages, to win recognition. In a word, one 
must know where one is. Certainty of order in this sense can clearly also develop under 
a despotic regime. It is wonderfully compatible with oppression and exploitation. 
The credit of strong, omnipresent power centres usually depends precisely on their 
having established and maintained order (Popitz 1992, p. 223. Transl. R.B.).
* We owe our third example to the developmental sociologist Dieter 
Neubert, who has identified what he calls “islands of order” in spaces 
of limited statehood such as crisis areas in Africa (Neubert 2009, 
p. 35ff.). Such “islands of order” are, for instance, large, relatively 
permanent refugee camps managed by the UNHCR, which means in 
simple terms that the UN refugee agency safeguards “public order” in 
these camps in “co-production” with the refugees themselves, and for 
this purpose draws up the necessary rules. Neubert:
Humanitarian aid and refugee organisations oen are active in areas of weak state 
presence or where the state is actually absent. Usually, they come in when the state is 
no longer able to take care of its citizens, displaced persons or refugees. Especially in 
the case of displaced persons and refugees, aid organisations set up special camps. 
Usually, they need permission from the government, but aid organisations run the 
camps by themselves. In most cases, the camps are used for months at least – 
sometimes, however, for years. Refugee camps and sometimes also camps for inter-
nally displaced persons are under the authority of the UNHCR (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees). The UNHCR regulates life government-like in the 
camps. This includes all questions of security, jurisdiction, political functions includ-
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ing setting the rules for self-representation of the inhabitants, and service provision like 
the care for basic needs (food, water, housing, medical treatment, sanitation, schools 
etc.). Functions of service delivery may partly or completely be delegated to NGOs. 
With these functions UNCHR and its co-operating partners gain far-reaching author-
ity, which makes them the main standard setters in these camps. In many cases, aid 
organisations put some participatory structures in place for representation of 
camp-dwellers. These spokespeople may or may not be elected. However, aid organ-
isations have space for taking their own decisions and for making their rules. 
(Neubert 2009, p. 47).
The refugee organization, as organizer and “operator” of the given 
camp necessarily become an authoritative non-state rulemaker:
Under these circumstances aid organisations acquire a quasi-state function. This is not 
intended and it puts an extra burden on their work. But their ability to provide for 
basic needs, the need to organise the day-to-day life in the camp and the need to 
decide who gets support under what conditions, put them in this powerful position. 
... aid organisations establish a new order, which includes a set of norms and regulations. 
The norms themselves draw from human rights regulations and from practical 
needs and experience (Neubert 2009, p. 47).
In sum, it can therefore be said that widely differing social groups develop 
internal systems of rules that determine how members of the group live 
together and how the group behaves towards the outside world. It appears 
to be natural for people to give themselves a normative order in collabora-
tion with others and then largely to submit to this order. In what follows, 
we shall be looking at this propensity of humans for making and accepting 
rules. 
II. Encased in Belongingness:
Normative Orders and Group Membership
Under this heading (“Im Gehäuse der Zugehörigkeit”) borrowed from the 
book by Agathe Bienfait (2006), we first explore the extent to which social 
groups provided such “encasement,” whose architecture and statics generally 
including a normative order that provides group members with guidance 
while marking the group off from other, competing groups. In the course of 
this book, we will oen be coming across this crucial double function of every 
group order – internal consolidation, external differentiation – not least in the 
key chapter on governance collectives as communities of justice. 
In the course of this chapter it will become clear why in every social 
community more or less spontaneous norms and systems of norms arise, 
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why they are natural to homo sapiens, and what functions they perform in 
the life of society. If we remember that every community necessarily needs a 
system of regulation, it is evident why in a society with different levels of 
communal relationships or community formation there must always be a 
plurality of normative orders. We now turn to this question.
1. The Evolutionary Biology Perspective 
or the Social Conquest of Earth
In “The Social Conquest of Earth” (2012), the famous evolutionary biologist 
and ant expert Edward Osborn Wilson has described this process in a both 
fascinating and plausible manner. The social conquest of Earth can be seen – 
which is why this book so impressed us – as a process of group selection: the 
vital point of reference for evolution is not the individual or kin, but the 
social group.
To see social groups as the decisive entities in the evolution of mankind is 
particularly plausible if it can be shown that group formation brings advan-
tages. Wilson posits that the evolution of homo sapiens from nomad to sed-
entary hunter and gatherer made group work and social intelligence decisive 
evolutionary advantages:
Carnivores at campsites are forced to behave in ways not needed by wanderers in the 
field. They must divide labor: some forage and hunt, others guard the campsite and 
young. They must share food, both vegetable and animal, in ways that are acceptable 
to all. Otherwise, the bods that bind them will weaken. Further, the group members 
inevitably compete with one another, for status of a larger share of food, for access 
to an available mate, and for a comfortable sleeping place. All of these pressures 
confer an advantage on those able to read the intention of others, grow in the ability 
to gain trust and alliance, and manage rivals. Social intelligence was therefore always 
at a high premium. A sharp sense of empathy can make a huge difference, and with 
it an ability to manipulate, to gain cooperation, and to deceive. To put the matter as 
simply as possible, it pays to be socially smart. Without doubt, a group of smart 
prehumans could defeat and displace a group of dumb, ignorant prehumans, as true 
then as it is today for armies, corporations, and football teams (Wilson 2012, p. 43 f.).
But if this is the case, Wilson’s thesis that the crucial driving force in the 
evolution of humanity must be group selection is not surprising:
What was the driving force that led to the threshold of complex culture? It appears 
to have been group selection. A group with members who could read intentions and 
cooperate among themselves while predicting the actions of competing groups, 
would have an enormous advantage over others less gied. There was undoubtedly 
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competition among group members, leading to natural selection of traits that gave 
advantage of one individual over another. But more important for a species entering 
new environments and competing with powerful rivals were unity and cooperation 
within the group. Morality, conformity, religious fervor, and fighting ability com-
bined with imagination and memory to produce the winner (Wilson 2012, p. 224).
Wilson’s argument culminates – which brings us to the topic of “emergence 
of normative orders” – in the thesis that group selection tends to favour the 
development of morality and altruistic behaviour:
The dilemma of good and evil was created by multilevel selection, in which indi-
vidual selection and group selection act together on the same individual but largely 
in opposition to each other. Individual selection is the result of competition for 
survival and reproduction among members of the same group. It shapes instincts 
in each member that are fundamentally selfish with reference to other members. In 
contrast, group selection consists of competition between societies, through both 
direct conflict and differential competence in exploiting the environment. Group 
selection shapes instinct that tend to make individuals altruistic toward one another 
(but not toward members of other groups). ...
Individual selection, defined precisely, is the differential longevity and fertility of 
individuals in competition with other members of the group. Group selection is 
differential longevity and lifetime fertility of those genes that prescribe traits of 
interaction among members of the group, having arisen during competition with 
other groups. ...
Authentic altruism in based on a biological instinct for the common good of the 
tribe, put in place by group election, wherein groups of altruists in prehistoric time 
prevailed over groups on individuals in selfish disarray. Our species is not Homo 
oeconomicus (Wilson, 2012, p. 241ff.).
2. Morality and Honour:
Guarantees for Compliance with Norms
If codes of conduct are internalized by group members, this ensures com-
pliance even in extreme situations. External incentives to cooperate like 
social recognition or the threat of punishment in the event of violation – 
can fail if it is a matter of life or death or no social control is possible. The 
individual feels moral rules and notions of honour, in contrast, to be uncon-
ditional commands, which can be contravened only at the cost of conflict 
with one’s own self-image. 
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* One example of effective internalization of moral precepts is military 
honour, which now as in early human history ensures defence of one’s 
own group. Writing of modern times, Kwame Anthony Appiah 
remarks: 
Consider the code of military honor. It calls on people as soldiers (or as marines, or 
officers, ... there is a variety of relevant identities) and, of course, we now know, as 
Americans or Englishmen or Pakistanis; and while soldiers may feel shame or pride 
when their regiment or their platoon does badly or well, fundamentally it matters to 
them that they themselves should follow the military’s code of honor.
It is worth asking why it is that honor is needed here. We could, aer all, use the law 
all by itself to guide our armies; military discipline makes easy use of all sorts of 
punishments. And mercenaries can be motivated by money. So, why aren’t these 
ordinary forms of social regulation – the market and the law – enough to manage an 
army, as they are enough to manage, say, such other state functions as the main-
tenance of the highways? Well, first of all, both these other forms of regulation 
require surveillance. If we are to be able to pay you your bonus or punish your for 
your offenses, someone has to be able to find out what you have done. But when the 
battle is hardest, everything is obscured by the fog of war. If the aim of a soldier were 
just to get his bonus or escape the brig, he would have no incentive to behave well 
at the very moment when we most require it. Of course, we could devote large 
amounts of expensive effort to this sort of surveillance – we could equip each soldier 
with a device that monitored his every act – but that would have psychological and 
moral costs as well as significant financial ones. By contrast, honor, which is 
grounded in the individual soldier’s own sense of honor (and that of his or her 
peers), can be effective without extensive surveillance; and, unlike a system of law or 
a market contract, anyone who is around and belongs to the honor world will be an 
effective enforcer of it, so that the cost of enforcement of honor is actually quite low, 
and ... we won’t have to worry about guarding its guardians (Appiah 2010, p. 192 f.).
* Even if community norms are internalized in the form of moral pre-
cepts, they nevertheless have to hold their own every time against the 
selfishness also innate in human nature. Which drive wins depends 
entirely on the given situation, as Bruno S. Frey, David A. Savage, 
Sascha L. Schmidt, and Benno Torgler have shown in an impressive 
study of the behaviour of people in maritime disasters. As reference 
cases they take the sinking of the Titanic and the torpedoing of the 
Lusitania in 1915 (Frey et al. 2011). From the perspective of behav-
ioural economics, they look at the role physical strength and financial 
power on the one hand and social norms on the other played for 
survival. The two disasters display many similarities, but also a decisive 
difference:
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... The circumstances and conditions under which the last voyage of the Titanic and 
that of the Lusitania took place have much in common. Both ships were crossing 
the Atlantic and their passengers represented a cross-section of the population of 
Western and Central Europe and the United States. The passengers of both ships 
were divided into three classes – from multimillionaire to penniless emigrant. 
Further, there were too few lifeboats on both ships. Since the disasters took place 
within the span of three years, the behaviour of passengers and crews on the two 
ships can be regarded as products of the same social norms and values. ...
The available data point to only one fundamental difference between the two ship-
ping disasters: whereas the Lusitania sank within only eighteen minutes, the Titanic 
took 2 hours and 40 minutes from hitting the iceberg to disappearing beneath the 
waves (Frey et al. 2011, p. 240 f. Transl. R.B.).
The conclusion is obvious. Whereas the fast sinking of the Lusitania 
enabled the strongest to impose their will – under the motto “survival 
of the fittest” – things were “more civilized” during the long death of 
the Titanic:
This assessment is to be found particularly in reports on the Titanic disaster. There 
are no accounts of scenes in which passengers fought with brute force over the few 
places in the lifeboats. Instead, there reports of husbands staying aboard while 
putting their wives and children in the lifeboats, and of musicians giving a last 
serenade to those condemned to die (Frey et al. 2011, p. 243. Transl. R.B.).
In search of an explanation for the differences in the course of the two 
sinkings, the authors stress that in the case of the Titanic a social norm 
quite clearly came into play, namely ‘women and children first,’ a norm 
that is nowhere legally binding but to which the male passengers of 
the Titanic were nevertheless committed.
A key social norm under life and death conditions is that women and children are to be 
saved first. Interestingly, no international maritime law requires that women and 
children be rescued first. Humanitarian agencies oen evacuate “vulnerable” and 
“innocent” civilians, such as women, children, and elderly people first. The Geneva 
Convention provides special protection and evacuation priority for pregnant wom-
en and mothers of young children (Carpenter, 2003) (Frey et al. 2011, p. 244. Transl. 
R.B.).
But that this social norm came to bear at all on the Titanic was quite 
obviously due to the longer time the ship took to sink compared to the 
Lusitania, which enabled people to overcome their short-run flight 
impulse in favour of an internalized behaviour pattern of chivalrous 
manliness.
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Comparing the empirical findings on the two sinkings, it appears that the chance of 
survival was overall equal on the two ships, but depended on different factors. 
Whereas on the Titanic social norms, such as “women and children first” held sway, 
physical strength dominated on the Lusitania. A plausible explanation for this big 
difference is likely to be found to the markedly different time the two ships took to 
sink. ...
In life-or-death situations it can be assumed that instinctive behaviour initially 
determines how people act. In such situations people react with an impulse for 
self-preservation, ... which triggers an immediate impulse to fight or flee. This phase 
can last some minutes ... As soon as it has exhausted itself, individual behaviour 
changes for reasons of self-knowledge and complex social interactions ... This context 
could explain the differences in people’s behaviour on the Titanic and the Lusitania. 
The relative slow sinking of the Titanic afforded a certain cooling-down phase. 
Through the much greater span of time, social norms like “women and children 
first” became more important for human behaviour on board. Unlike on the Lusi-
tania, the people who dominated on board the Titanic owing to their physical 
strength apparently renounced some of their competitive advantage. This appears 
to be especially true for men, who activated a protective mechanism particularly for 
women... (Frey et al. 2011, p. 248. Transl. R.B.).
Aer this example of human behaviour in an extreme situation such as 
the sinking of a ship presented by representatives of behavioural eco-
nomics, we turn again to the community-forming efficacy of codes of 
honour, a phenomenon we shall be addressing repeatedly in the course 
of this book. 
* Duels enjoyed a boom in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
They were fought by members of the upper social classes to settle 
questions of honour. Kwame Anthony Appiah in “The Honor Code. 
How Moral Revolutions Happen” (2010) looks at the duel through the 
eyes of moral psychology. At the outset, he raises the question of why 
he is interested in the subject of honour at all; the answer is pertinent 
to our discussion:
I have spent a good deal of my scholarly life trying to get my fellow philosophers to 
recognize both the theoretical and the practical importance of things that they may 
have taken too little notice of: race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality, nationality 
and religion ... all of the rich social identities with which we make our lives. Honor, 
as it turns out, is another crucial topic modern moral philosophy has neglected. And 
one reason why it is crucial is that like our social identities, it connects our lives 
together. Attending to honor, too, like noticing the importance of our social iden-
tities, can help us both to treat others as we should and to make the best of our own 
lives (Appiah 2010, p. xv).
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A common concept of honour therefore enables societal groups to 
create community and mark themselves off from others. As a code 
for men of honour, the duel hence also served to distinguish one’s 
own social stratum from others. This is also demonstrated by the 
decline of duelling, which set in precisely when it could no longer 
perform this distinguishing function. Appiah cites Francis Bacon as 
prophet of this decline:
Francis Bacon anticipated the mechanism of the duel’s demise, when the modern 
duel was just beginning, in his address to the court in “Charge Touching Duels”: 
“I should think (my Lords) that men of birth and quality will leave the practice, 
when it begins to ... come so low as to barber-surgeons and butchers, and such base 
mechanical persons”. A duel was an affair of honor. It depended on the existence of a 
powerful class whose members could establish their status by getting away with a 
practice contrary to law that others could not. It was a further sign of the diminish-
ing status of that class when, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, duels 
began to take place more frequently between people who, if they were gentlemen 
at all, were so by virtue of their membership in the professions or their success in 
trade. Once “base mechanical” persons could contemplate engaging in it, the duel’s 
capacity to bring distinction was exhausted (Appiah 2010, p. 46).
This shows that a normative order can vanish if it has lost its social function. 
Because the upper stratum of society could no longer distinguish itself from 
the masses by duelling, it dropped the practice. Becoming consequently less 
interesting for the remaining population, duelling from the mid-nineteenth 
century went increasingly out of fashion.
3. The Theory of Society Perspective:
Or How Much Community Does Humanity Need?
As long ago as 1997, we had explored the “place of the organized person in 
democracy theory” in an article entitled “Associative Democracy” (“Assozia-
tive Demokratie”, Schuppert 1997). The underlying assumption was that the 
human being has an associational gene – constitutionally protected (Art. 9 of 
the Basic Law: “All Germans have the right to form associations, partnerships 
and corporations”) – which Alexis de Tocqueville in “Democracy in America” 
identified as typically American:
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associa-
tions. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all 
take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, 
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general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to 
give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to 
diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they found 
hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster 
some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society. Wher-
ever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or a 
man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association 
(Tocqueville 1963, p. 129).
And the “inventors” of the concept “political culture” – Gabriel A. Almond 
and Sidney Verba – even go so far as to declare that associations are the elixir 
of life for the democratic state: “The existence of voluntary association in-
creases the democratic potential of society” (Almond and Verba 1965, p. 262).
Larger societies are accordingly interwoven with a multitude of diverse, 
mainly voluntary associations that connect individuals in specific fields. 
Beyond the state there is therefore a civil society structured by more or less 
binding associations of people, which Jürgen Habermas has described as the 
“associative society.”
... its institutional core comprises those nongovernmental and non-economic con-
nections and voluntary associations that anchor the communication structures of 
the public sphere in the society component of the lifeworld. Civil society is com-
posed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and 
movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life 
spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. 
The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes 
problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of 
organized public spheres (Habermas 1996, p. 366 f.).
As we have shown, these social communities integrate and differentiate 
themselves externally by developing their own normative systems. In his 
review of communitarian theories of society, Michael Haus notes:
[Communities are] contexts of interaction in which comparatively close-knit 
mutual obligations can be entered into between members. Communities provide 
common practices, symbols, and norms for this purpose. They also represent, as it 
were, the historical outcome of entering into such mutual obligations. 
Communities as forums or arenas for the interpretation of shared commitments. 
Moral obligations have to be articulated and interpreted in dialogue. On the one 
hand, communities as viable organizations can effectively articulate moral convic-
tions; on the other moral demands can usually not be interpreted in isolation from 
the communal practices within which they have been generated. But even if the 
moral principles of the community transcend its own boundaries (e. g., with regard 
to the universality of human dignity), communities are the forums in which uni-
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versalistic learning processes are set in motion, for instance where encounters with 
other communities are translated into a coherent language of morality (Haus 2003, 
p. 109. Transl. R.B.).
Also in modern societies, social groups are hence the places where common 
norms and moral convictions are produced and practised. And since societies 
as associative societies are also regulatory collectivities, they produce many 
parallel normative orders. 
III. Group Sociology: An Interim Review
We have seen how closely group formation and rule-making are related. The 
existence of social relations within a group of people is the condition for rule 
systems to develop. Social groups themselves arise only where people com-
municate with one another. Uwe Schimank identifies four key properties of 
a social group, noting that “individuals who do no communicate with one 
another ... form an amorphous mass, not social groups” (2003, p. 201 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
He sees communicative relations between group members as making the 
second property of social groups possible: the development of specific roles for 
members. This aspect is important for us because the assumption of several 
roles by a single person is generally also associated with membership in several 
normative orders, a matter we shall be examining later; Schimank comments:
Second, structured interactions between group members are characteristic of a social 
group. Individuals in a group do not interact haphazardly or indiscriminately. Each 
individual typically has a certain status and assumes a certain role. These status positions 
and roles are not created officially as happens in formal organizations. They usually 
develop informally and are renegotiated if the individuals concerned rethink their 
situation and enter into social interaction. Nevertheless, relations in a group are 
structured in some way or another (Schimank 2003, p. 201 f. Transl. R.B.).
Particularly important is the third property of social groups, namely rule-
making. Schimank:
Third, agreement on common norms, goals, and values is essential for a social group. 
An aggregation of individuals with conflicting goals hardly constitutes a group. 
When the surviving boys [in Lord of the Flies, G. F. S.] first recognize how necessary 
rules are and how important rescue is for them, they are more of a group than 
later when this consensus crumbles away. The norms, goals, and values of a group do 
not need to be explicitly formulated; they oen apply tacitly, or are held to be self-
evident. Nevertheless, even tacit agreements can strongly bind groups together 
(Schimank 2003, p. 202. Transl. R.B.).
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What such systems of norms contain and how they can arise is explored by 
Dieter Neubert, whom we have already quoted, this time in an article that 
sets somewhat other accents, addressing above all the link between social order 
and rule-making (Neubert 2012). He defines social order, stressing the crucial 
importance of rules:
A social order organizes how a larger group of people live together over a longer 
period. A social order:
– Sets norms and values that establish permitted and prohibited behaviour and 
hence lay down the rules for life in the community
– Contains rules about disposition over and exchange of material goods
– Includes notions of authority and willingness to comply
– As well as rules and institutions for settling conflicts
– Claims validity for a given social and/or physical space
– And implies temporal stability with a certain framework (Neubert 2012, p. 535. 
Transl. R.B.).
Neubert goes on to look at types of rule-making, of which he identifies three:
There is a spectrum of different ways to formulate and establish important rules for 
social life, which in simple terms can be reduced to three:
– Rules can first be made in the form of codified laws. Such laws can made either in 
formal procedures with reference to rule-of-law notions, or they can be imposed 
arbitrarily by powerful actors.
– Rules can, second, be made without fixed codification: they can be formulated 
either arbitrarily by powerful actors or be the outcome of negotiations.
– Third, rules can be made indirectly and informally through action. One example 
is the use of violence by merchants of violence, terrorists, rebels, or political activists. 
Repeated attacks and the use of violence can fundamentally change the perception 
and evaluation of violence. Especially if those responsible for aggression are neither 
prosecuted nor punished, a culture of violence can develop in which brutality is 
commonplace (Neubert 2012, p. 535. Transl. R.B.).
He gives a broad, open definition of order:
This concept of order is defined in deliberately open terms and not in relation to nor-
mative content, type of rule-making, or legitimacy. It allows from different forms of 
generating order and does not require immediate measurement and assessment of an 
order on the basis of normative prerequisites. An order is effective when powerfully 
enforced and/or when there is consensus about compliance with it that is also 
implemented, or when action within the social group is actually guided by it.
In the first place, effective orders offer the possibility of belonging and thus of 
recognition; further, they create spaces of predictability, as Georg Elwert calls them 
... Spaces of predictability make planned action possible because the reactions to and 
consequences of action become predictable. This provides the certainty that permits 
normal everyday life (Neubert 2012, p. 535 f. Transl. R.B.).
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IV. The Science of Regulation: An Aside
So far, we have said little about law or norms and a great deal about rules. We 
have always focused on order formation and conflict resolution through and in 
accordance with rules. The advantage is that the qualifying question – whether 
we are dealing with “real law” or less binding social norms – can be le 
unanswered at this stage while account can be taken of the obvious existence 
of various normative orders, from the informal code of conduct of a group 
to legally binding or law-like statutes. This suggests it is wise to eschew 
premature categorization and to opt for a broad analytical approach, the 
“wide-angle lens” proposed in the introductory chapter; furthermore, we 
have suggested calling this broad approach the science of regulation (Schup-
pert 2011c) to enable us to explore parallels and differences between norma-
tive orders. We feel that the results of our explorations so far bear out this 
choice of approach.
It is also clear that every individual, who plays many roles – citizen, 
Christian, doctor, and so forth – belongs to a number of ordering or regu-
latory collectives. We thus have to do with what Andreas Anter (2004) calls a 
“plurality of orders.” To explain this plurality problem he looks at the duel and 
what Max Weber has to say about it:
What does the plurality of order mean for Max Weber? For him the problem was 
particularly important because ‘action by the individual can subjectively very well 
be meaningfully oriented on several orders, which in terms of conventional ways 
of thinking are contradictory but can nevertheless ‘apply’ empirically side by side.’ 
This is the core of the problem. Weber illustrates this case with the duel. While the 
legal system in force forbids duelling, it is nevertheless demanded by certain conventions in 
society. By engaging in a duel, the individual orients his action according to those 
conventional orders. But, by concealing this action, he orients it towards the ‘orders 
instituted by the laws.’ In this case, therefore, the practical effects of the two orders 
are different. The two orders are extremely dissimilar: the commands of the state on the 
one hand and the demands of honour on the other. Weber was speaking from his own 
experience. What he describes in sober language was for him a vitally important 
matter that affected him personally, for he had repeatedly and demonstratively 
declared himself in favour of duelling (Anter 2004, p. 89. Transl. R.B.).
At this point, the example of Weber is also interesting, because it shows the 
collision of two normative orders: “posited” or enacted state law and the 
informal rules of conduct of a certain social class. It is therefore not a 
question of a simple “plurality of orders” but a considerable range of rules 
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completely different in nature. On this account, too, the science of regula-
tion approach seems to us to be appropriate.
V. What We Understand by Normative Orders
Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther (Forst and Günther 2011a) are a consider-
able help. Their introductory chapter “The Formation of Normative Order-
ings. The Idea of an Interdisciplinary Research Programme” provides useful 
exposition of the the notion of normative order (Forst and Günther 2011b). 
They identify three core elements:
* As we have shown in chapter one, normative orders are justificatory 
systems, i. e., they require justification to legitimate existing or new 
governance structures. Forst and Günther:
By general definition, ‘norms’ are practical grounds for action that claim binding 
force and oblige their addressees to adopt theses grounds as motives for action. To be 
subject to ‘normativity’ is, as it were, to be captive without chains – an intelligible 
phenomenon of considering oneself bound by grounds for behaving in a certain 
manner. ... unlike natural law determinants or unconscious behavioural pro-
grammes, normativity is a conscious mechanism of generalized behaviour control 
that relies on – however motivated – recognition and acceptance by others. The 
degree of ‘consciousness’ is to be variously defined. Normativity differs from coer-
cion or violence as compulsion directly impacting people in violation of their 
autonomy. Precisely because norms cannot in some way or other take hold of people 
and directly control their behaviour but have to rely on a process of adoption and 
reflection, they are oen combined with the latent or explicit threat of coercion and 
violence in the event of failure to comply. The fear of sanctions can hence become an 
additional, perhaps decisive motive for adopting a ground for action. However, 
norms differ from mere arbitrary compulsion through the threat of coercion (con-
sider the famous question asked by, among others, St. Augustine and H. L. A. Hart 
about what distinguishes a legal system from a gang of thieves) in that they derive 
their binding force from a justification – be it authorization by the persons or institutions 
who declare a norm to be binding, be it discursive procedures or identity-forming traditions 
and conventions of a certain way of life (Forst and Günther 2011b, p. 16. Transl. R.B.).
* As Forst and Günther aptly put it, the vehicle of justificatory legitima-
tion is the justificatory narrative, a concept we have met with in the 
introductory chapter, but which, because of its key importance, will 
once again be introduced at this point.
For the most part, norms and their justification are embedded in narratives, in 
accounts, actions, or rituals shaped by history and local factors and determined by 
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the experiential spaces and expectation horizons of those involved, which make the 
justificatory grounds or a normative ordering appear to be fact, a state of affairs whose 
existence one accepts and does not question. Through such narratives, normative order 
are so closely interwoven with the life world of the people involved, with the section 
of knowledge about the objective, subjective, and social world that can be publicly 
addressed, that their constructive nature, their determination by discursively con-
testable grounds is hardly perceived. Explicitly addressing the claim to validity then 
appears to call into question a whole way of life with the risk of a collective loss of identity
(Forst und Günther 2011b, p. 18. Transl. R.B.).
In what follows, we will oen come across such justificatory narratives; 
already in the coming section we consider, among other things, the code 
of honour of the military profession and the various narratives justifying it. 
Since we shall be looking at the normative order of religious communities, 
however, we will consider the central concept of the revelation narrative at 
this point. Forst and Günter:
Normative orders framed in narratives – especially those that are religious in nature
(divine rights versus natural rights, etc.), that go back to political achievements like 
revolutions or victories (e. g., in wars of liberation), or to the processing of past 
collective injustice (e. g., crimes against humanity in the twentieth century) – have 
particularly strong binding force and authority; they gain historical dignity, as well as 
emotional identificatory force. In extreme instances they generate notions of his-
torical mission; they create bonds through historical reference to successful projects 
or to future projects. ‘Big’ legitimation narratives – with Lyotard we could speak of 
‘metanarratives’ – call, for example, on religious truths. However, such truths, as 
modern conflicts about what rights God has given individuals – are themselves the 
subject of considerable conflict (Forst and Günther 2011b, p. 19. Transl. R.B.).
* The third core element is the insight that normative orders are not 
identical with legal orders but can and generally do consist of a web of 
norms of various sorts and origins:
Finally, normative orders consist not of certain types of norm alone, such as legal norms. As 
an explicit and conscious mechanism of generalized behaviour control and coordi-
nation, normativity is to be found in many different fields of a societal practice that 
can be described overall as justification – for orienting individual ways of life and for 
the interpersonal regulation of action conflicts, for the nomos of a community 
defined by its collective identity, and for conflicts requiring global regulation, for 
religious ritual, and for procedures of political opinion and will formation. We 
speak of normative order not least because it is always a matter of a web of legal, 
economic, moral, ethical and pragmatic, cultural, religious, and world-interpretative norms
(or values), as well as social conventions, negotiated compromises, and habitualized 
ways of life. In some areas, this web is relatively dense (as in human rights); in others 
it tends to be more loosely woven, full of holes, or torn, and therefore prone to 
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developing further ‘norm-producing’ dynamics. This brings us to the central com-
municative, practical-performative aspect of norms and values: produced and nego-
tiated, practised and consolidated in acts of communication, they are also commu-
nicatively negated and revoked (Forst and Günther 2011b, p. 20. Transl. R.B.).
This core element finds our full agreement; the insight that normative order 
is not to be equated with legal order had induced the author and Matthias 
Kötter to write not of legal pluralism but of normative plurality that requires 
ordering (Kötter and Schuppert 2009).
Having now obtained a certain idea of what normative orders are, we 
shall take a closer look at a select few. We do not aspire to encyclopaedic 
exhaustiveness and wish also to avoid putting too much strain on the “usual 
suspects.” Instead, we have chosen examples that we consider both interest-
ing and instructive.
B. Governance Collectives and their Normative Orders – A Foray
I. Regulatory Collectives as Governance Collectives
As we have seen, social groups give themselves normative orders to regulate 
their internal affairs and to mark themselves off externally. As producers of 
regulatory regimes, they are hence regulatory collectives and hence gover-
nance collectives. By Renate Mayntz’s (2005) “success definition,” governance 
is the “the totality of all coexisting forms of collective regulation of societal 
matters, from institutionalized civil-society self-regulation and various forms 
of collaboration between state and private actors to the sovereign action of 
state actors (Transl. R.B.).” Groups structured through normative orders are 
accordingly always governance collectives, as well.
In exploring normative orders, it is therefore advisable to classify them in 
terms of underlying governance collective. The first and obvious step is to 
adopt two main constitutive criteria: a territory defining the collective and 
an association of persons comprising it. We begin with a brief look at the 
territorial collective.
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II. Normative Orders of Territorial Governance Collectives
1. Different Forms of Territorial Governance Collectives
The most important instance of the territorially defined governance collec-
tive is still the state. State authority is territorial authority and therefore both 
spatially grounded and spatially bounded. The subdivisions of the state, such 
as municipalities, regions, and provinces or states are also territorially 
defined, as are associations of states – see the Schengen area – however they 
may be defined in detail under constitutional law.
When territorial governance collectives are discussed, however, typical-
ized territories are generally concerned, and governance problems regularly 
arising in certain types of territory are addressed. This is, for example, what is 
meant when talking about “local governance,” “metropolitan governance,” 
“regional governance,” and also “European governance” (see, e. g., Benz 2004; 
2007). The territorial frame of reference of these governance categories is 
somewhat relativized linguistically by the well-established reference to gov-
ernance levels – from “local” to “global” – and by the fact that the European 
governance space (the EU) is treated and analysed above all from the per-
spective of “multi-level governance.”
But our concern at this point is not the territorial levels of governance 
and their normative orders but “early cities” with their interesting combi-
nation of territorial and personal elements. 
2. The Normative Ordering of Urban Communal Relationships: 
Urban Law
a) The City as a Community of Law
We begin our tour around the vast range of governance collectives and their 
normative orders with a look at law of cities, governance collectives with an 
interesting particularity. Many towns and cities – like those that arose in the 
Baltic Sea region in the heyday of the Hanseatic League – are founded cities, 
that is to say, they are not just villages that grew but urban communities that 
were intentionally established, that constituted themselves as communities of 
law. Harold J. Berman:
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The new European cities and towns of the eleventh and twelh centuries were also 
legal associations, in the sense that each was held together by a common urban legal 
consciousness and by distinctive urban legal institutions. In fact, it was by a legal act, 
usually the granting of a charter, that most of the European cities and towns came 
into being; they did not simply emerge but were founded. Moreover, the charter would 
almost invariably establish the basic “liberties” of citizens, usually including sub-
stantial rights of self-government. Of course, the legal character of the new Euro-
pean cities and towns was closely associated with their religious character. The 
charters were confirmed by religious oaths, and the oaths, which were renewed 
with successive installations of officers, included, above all, vows to uphold the 
municipal laws (Berman 1983, p. 362).
Harold J. Berman sees in this common urban legal consciousness the factor 
that makes the European city what it is:
Without urban consciousness and a system of urban law, it is hard to imagine 
European cities and towns coming into existence at all. But even if they had – that 
is, even if large, densely populated centers of commerce and industry could some-
how have been formed in the West without a foundation in urban law – perhaps 
they would have been, like the ancient Roman cities, merely administrative and 
military outposts of some central authority (or authorities), or else, like Islamic 
cities, merely an autonomous, integrated urban community life, or perhaps like 
something else; but they would not have been cities in the modern Western sense. 
They would not have had the self-conscious corporate unity and the capacity for 
organic development that have given the Western city its unique character (Berman 
1983, p. 363).
If we note that many cities and towns were newly founded or were settle-
ments raised to the status of city, and thus represented a form of communal 
relationship by which they constituted themselves above all as communities 
of law, it is no surprise that, in describing the main characteristics of urban 
law, Berman stresses its communitarian nature:
Of primary importance in the system of urban law was its communitarian character. 
Urban law was the law of a close-knit, integrated community – one that was oen called, 
in fact a “commune.” The community, in turn, was based on a covenant, either express or 
implied. Many cities and towns were founded by a solemn collective oath, or series 
of oaths, made by the entire citizenry to adhere to a charter that had been publicly 
read aloud to them. The charter was, in one sense, a social contract; it must, indeed, 
have been one of the principal historical sources from which the modern contract 
theory of government emerged. The urban charters were not, of course, contracts in 
the modern sense of a bargained exchange between two parties whereby each agrees 
to perform discrete acts during a given period of time. Acceptance of the urban charter
was rather an avowal of consent to a permanent relationship. Like the feudal con-
tract of vassalage or the marriage contract, it was an agreement to enter into a status, 
that is, into a relationship whose terms were fixed by law and could not be altered by 
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the will of the parties. In the case of the founding of a city or town, however, the 
status that was formed was that of a corporation (universitas), under the prevailing 
Romano-canonical theory that a corporation is a body of people sharing common 
legal functions and acting as a legal entity. In one sense, therefore, the promulgation 
and acceptance of the urban charter was not a contract at all but a kind of sacrament; it 
both symbolized and effectuated the formation of the community and the establish-
ment of the community’s law (Berman 1983, p. 393.).
b) The Plurality of Urban Legal Systems:
An Expression of the Plurality of Law
Particularly important is a second aspect, the multiplicity of sometimes 
competing urban law systems, which were “exported” for the founding of 
new cities and towns. There was therefore not only a plurality of urban law 
systems but also a plurality of secular, partly overlapping jurisdictions; here, too, 
we call Berman into the witness box:
The secular character of urban law was reflected in the fact that every city had its own 
variation of urban law and, further, that urban law was only one of several varieties of 
secular law, including royal law, feudal law, manorial law, and mercantile law. The 
coexistence of various types of secular law was inherent in its secular character. No 
one system of secular law claimed to embrace the whole of the secular jurisdiction. 
Each was a particular local system, governing one part of the life of those subject to its 
jurisdiction. This, too, distinguishes the law of the European cities of the eleventh 
and twelh centuries and thereaer from the law of the cities of ancient Greece and 
imperial Rome. The Greek city was the sole polity to which its citizens owed 
allegiance, and its law was the sole law by which they were bound. The Roman city 
did not have a law of its own; the Roman citizen was governed solely by the Roman 
law, the non-citizen solely by the ius gentium, the law of nations. The unique 
feature of the law of Western Christendom was that the individual person lived under 
a plurality of legal systems, each of which governed one of the overlapping subcom-
munities of which he was a member (Berman 1983, p. 395).
III. Normative Orders of Personal Governance Collectives
The personal governance collective is not the nation, inseparably associated 
with the territorially defined nation state, but a non-state association of persons, 
which can be extremely “power-intensive.” With reference to the criteria for 
securing membership in such associations of persons, three types of such non-
state governance collective and normative order can identified for a start: 
ethnic, religious, and occupational.
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1. Ethnic Governance Collectives and their Normative Orders:
The Example of Tribal Law
Ethnic governance collectives continue to play an important role – notably 
as regulatory collectives – with their own arbitration procedures particularly 
in developing and newly industrialized countries in Africa, Central and 
South America, and Asia. The law of so-called indigenous peoples has 
attracted the attention of legal ethnologists, legal anthropologists, and of 
legal sociologists, who have conducted intensive research under the heading 
of “legal pluralism” (Benda-Beckmann 1994), a term whose career has been 
commented on by Klaus F. Röhl and Hans-Christian Röhl:
Legal sociologists know all about the Nuers and the Trobrianders, the Kapauku 
Papuans and the Hopi Indians. Even before the Second World War, anthropologists 
had begun to describe the law of simple tribal societies. Initially they were interested 
in how social order develops and survives without centralized state power. Aer the 
Second World War, researchers swarmed out everywhere to examine what remained 
of traditional tribal societies. They focused particularly on the post-colonial states in 
Africa and Asia. They produced many accounts of traditional law that had more or 
less survived the centralization efforts of the colonial powers. These accounts were – 
understandably – fired by anti-colonial enthusiasm. The interaction between tradi-
tional law and state law was explored above all as a power relation (Röhl and Röhl 
2008, p. 208. Transl. R.B.).
The present author has so far mainly taken an interest in the phenomenon of 
“normative plurality” as a problem pertaining in spaces of limited statehood 
(see Kötter and Schuppert 2009), notably in the relationship between ethnically 
based governance collectives and the governance collective of the territorial state, 
a relationship can cause great tensions in two regards: first, where the area 
settled by a tribe – such as the Pashtuns – extends across several states 
(Pakistan, Afghanistan); second, a much more frequent case, where different 
ethnic groups compete within the territory of a single state for power and 
above all for resources (the state as booty). This raises the question of which 
governance collective is really crucial: the tribe with its traditional gover-
nance structures or the modern state with its “institutional offerings.” There 
is evidence that traditional governance structures are ahead, especially with a 
traditional and well-established conflict culture.
* Under the heading “How Respondents See the State,” Jan Köhler and 
Christoph Zürcher (2008), reporting on the roles of different gover-
nance actors in Afghanistan and how they are perceived by the pop-
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ulation, discuss the use made of various institutional facilities for dis-
pute resolution:
Respondents also judged the capacity of the state to resolve conflicts as very low. When 
asked what institutions they would turn to first in the event of a conflict over 
natural resources, most respondents said they would turn to the elders or the village 
shura (the traditional village council). Only two per cent would take the problem 
first to the district authorities. None of the respondents would first approach gov-
ernment authorities at the provincial level (Köhler and Zürcher 2008, p. 10. Transl. 
R.B.).
The findings of Judith Yilma Mengesha for Ethiopia are in similar vein. For 
conflict resolution the institutional framework consists of three elements: 
the arbitrators provided for in the 1960 Civil Code, the so-called social courts 
set up in the course of land reform in 1975, and the traditional council of 
elders, which, however, is not a permanent institution: its members are 
chosen as mediators by the parties for each dispute. This traditional form 
of arbitration clearly enjoys a high level of trust, which is perhaps plausible 
when one considers how this council of elders (šəmagəlle) operates. Judith 
Mengesha reports:
The methods and techniques of questioning and mediating have remained largely 
unchanged to this day; in sessions that can last months, the parties and their rep-
resentatives (for example, the father) and their friends and relatives are questioned 
individually and separately. The šəmagəlle does not seek a merely technical settle-
ment for the given conflict. The aim of the proceedings is rather to discover the real 
causes of the dispute. Only thus, it is asserted, can a lasting solution be found. The 
meetings with parties and šəmagəlle offer a platform where hitherto unspoken and 
latent conflicts can be settled. These sessions – at times almost psycho-analytical in 
character – do not therefore necessarily end with a decision. Reconciling the feuding 
spouses or families is already considered a success. For, as many interviews intimate, 
the šəmagəlle is above all interested in upholding social order and peace in the community
(Mengesha 2008, p. 82 f. Transl. R.B.).
a) The Tense Relationship between Local and State Orders:
The Example of Sub-Saharan Africa
Like the rest of the world, Africa is divided into territorial states, which 
formally are all modern constitutional states governed by the rule of law: 
In most of the 54 African countries, the state exists not only formally but is also the 
determining factor in politics, society, and the economy to which the other actors 
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have to relate. However, the reach of the state order within the territory of the state 
varies strongly from one country to the next (Neubert 2012, p. 536. Transl. R.B.).
Although the African world of states, too, has, with the concurrence of 
much of the population, increasingly come to regard the modern political 
model of the plural democratic liberal constitutional state as appropriate for the 
national political order (Afrobarometer 2006, 2009), political reality – as 
Dieter Neubert (2012) explains – is a great deal more complex. In many 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, political and societal reality is marked by coex-
istence and overlap between state and local orders. The weight of local orders in 
rural areas, in particular, should not be underestimated. Neubert describes 
the coexistence of the two social orders:
These local orders are just as much part of African reality as the notion of the 
territorial state and the liberal civil-society order, and are by no means mere folkloric 
vestiges of a fading local culture ... Local orders and the modern state can exist side by 
side. They oen act in more or less separate spheres and address different social and 
oen physical spaces, such as those on the periphery of states or in disintegrating 
states.
Much more interesting are cases in which these social and physical spaces overlap. 
This is true of towns and cities and of regions where the state is minimally present. 
Here actors oen move simultaneously or sequentially in different orders. Local orders are 
also sometimes supported by the state, or representatives of the local order gain 
importance as mediators with the state (Neubert 2012, p. 538. Transl. R.B.).
In the autumn of 2011 the present author had an opportunity to gauge the 
accuracy of this description at a conference organized by the Social Science 
Research Center Berlin on “Decision-Making on Pluralist Normative 
Ground” with representatives of local jurisdictions from Pakistan, Ethiopia, 
South Sudan, and South Africa. A member of the South African delegation 
reported on his life in two different worlds. During the week he taught 
South African law at a university and in this capacity belonged to the world 
of the state; and at the weekend as chief in his home village he was an 
institution of the local order, that is to say an institution of local law and 
local arbitration. This simultaneity of life in two worlds and two normative orders
was extremely impressive. But to return to local orders and local law.
aa) The Function of Local Orders
In ascertaining the function of local orders, two aspects present themselves 
whose acquaintance we have made in a somewhat different connection.
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The first is the certainty of order, a concept we have been introduced to by 
Andreas Anter (2004) and Heinrich Popitz (1992). As Neubert puts it, local 
orders convey “assessable certainty”:
Where local orders exist and are not overly threatened, they offer certainty for the 
organization of everyday life. They also offer oen precarious but assessable certainty. 
Social certainty / security is provided through arrangements for mutual aid in the 
framework of so-called “traditional solidarity.” For the vast majority of the African 
population, this is a key element in securing their survival. Closely associated with 
these local political structures are local defence communities of young warriors, who 
protect the group and are accountable to the elders or the chief. In violent local and 
regional conflicts, these are the fighters involved (Neubert 2012, p. 537 f. Transl. 
R.B.).
We are even more familiar with the second aspect: the local order functions 
as group order, and group membership is the decisive, also legally decisive 
factor. Dieter Neubert:
Neo-traditional local orders root the individual in a descent group and are based on 
the sentiment of firm, immutable belongingness. They are grounded in supposedly 
eternal “traditional” values. Rights and duties derive only from group membership, 
and the focus is on the well-being of the group. As a member of the group, the 
individual enjoys its protection, embedded in a system of normatively and spiritu-
ally secured “traditional solidarity” and bears responsibility for the group ... Local 
orders are personalized and differentiate in adjudication in terms of role and status, 
of the parties and their importance for the group. Their aim is therefore not equality. 
Further, the rules adapt to meet changing power relations ...
Participation in decision making takes place in accordance with these values either 
in the framework of a system of aristocratic chiefs or of the gerontocracy of male 
elders. In both cases, access to positions of leadership are possible only for a specific 
group, while others are excluded by birth. The resources labour and land are group 
resources, over which the given decision-makers can dispose to a considerable extent. 
As group resources they are not freely negotiable but are subject to social control in 
the absence of a market. In acephalous gerontocracies, capital accumulation is 
strongly limited by distribution constraints, but possible in the framework of chief-
tancy systems, although there, too, it is subject to certain social obligations regard-
ing the use of resources (Neubert 2012, p. 539. Transl. R.B.).
bb) Land Use Rights: A Key Subject of Regulation under Traditional Local Law
If, as Neubert describes, land is understood as a group resource, it is obvious 
that the right to use it must be a key subject of regulation for local group law 
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and that conflicts will arise if ethnic groups compete for this resource. Dieter 
Neubert:
Quarrels about land use rights are particularly prone to end in violent and oen 
bloody conflict. Contradictions between local order and new liberal order intensify 
in some of these disputes. The violent conflicts following elections in Kenya (2007/
08) were only partly a protest against the manipulation of election results ... Espe-
cially in the rural regions of the Ri Valley, where violence claimed many victims, 
the form of land law was also at stake. The local order postulates a concept of 
autochthony under which local resources belong exclusively to the people from 
the region. This micro-nationalism evokes the traditional rights of the local indig-
enous population. It finds political expression in a micro-federalism, which, in 
radical interpretation, grants the regions not only political self-determination but 
also seeks to secure control over “their” resources for the local indigenous population. 
Extended inmigration into the Kenyan Ri Valley (notably by Kikuyu) challenged 
the land rights legitimized by tradition of the population (largely Kalenjin), who 
regarded themselves as the autochthonous population. In the elections in late 2007, 
large ethnic blocs faced one another. The Kalenjin supported the opposition, where-
as many of the inmigrants, notably the Kikuyu, were seen as supporters of the 
government. Because of the high level of inmigration, autochthonous opposition 
candidates risked defeat at the polls. To prevent this, inmigrants were expelled on a 
massive scale prior to the elections with an estimated 600 dead and 50,000 expellees. 
The intention was both to resolve the land question and ensure electoral victory. 
When, contrary to expectations, the opposition failed to win and doubts arose about 
the legality of the results, the conflicts between the “autochthonous” and “allochtho-
nous” population escalated under the banner of protest against electoral fraud. This 
shows that these notions of social order have direct political consequences. They cause 
concrete legal claims for a group that are incompatible with modern liberal law and 
which are grounded in individualistic notions of state and economic citizenship 
(Neubert 2012, p. 540. Transl. R.B.).
b) From Legal Pluralism to Judicial Pluralism
We have seen in the course of our reflections not only that normative plural-
ity exists but also that it is the normal state of affairs. Important with regard 
to the dispute-resolution function of law and its enforceability is to consider 
whether there is also a plurality of justice systems or – in Anglo-Saxon 
parlance – of judicial pluralism. And, indeed, there is.
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aa) The Importance of Non-state, Traditional / Informal Jurisdiction
Before addressing the importance of non-state arbitration, a brief remark on 
terminology is necessary. We turn to the informative report of the Penal 
Reform Project on “Access to justice in sub-Saharan Africa”:
The term traditional justice systems is used in this publication to refer to non-state 
justice systems which have existed, although not without change, since pre-colonial 
times and are generally found in rural areas. The term informal justice systems refers 
to any non-state justice system. The phrase traditional and informal justice systems, 
therefore, should be understood as meaning traditional and other informal justice 
systems. There is no satisfactory generic term to describe non-traditional informal 
justice systems. Such systems include what are referred to in this publication as 
popular justice forums and alternative dispute resolution forums run by nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs).“ (Penal Reform International 2000, p. 11).
In what follows, we address not the new phenomena of popular justice forums
and alternative dispute resolution forums but traditional justice systems as the 
main instance and core of what is now understood by “informal justice.”
As far as the importance of these traditional dispute-resolution mecha-
nisms is concerned, which oen go be the name of customary justice, they are 
not a folkloric, marginal phenomenon: in sub-Saharan Africa, above all in 
rural areas, this system of justice predominates. In their report on “Custom-
ary Law and Policy Reform,” Leila Chirayath, Caroline Sage and Michael 
Woolcock note that:
In many developing countries, customary systems operating outside of the state regime 
are oen the dominant form of regulation and dispute resolution, covering up to 90% of 
the population in parts of Africa. In Sierra Leone, for example, approximately 85% 
of the population falls under the jurisdiction of customary law, defined under the 
Constitution as ‘the rules of law which, by custom, are applicable to particular 
communities in Sierra Leone’. Customary tenure covers 75% of land in most Afri-
can countries, affecting 90% of land transactions in countries like Mozambique and 
Ghana. Further, customary justice differs depending on the locality and local tradi-
tions, as well as the political history of a particular country or region. Ethiopia 
officially recognizes over 100 distinct ‘nations, nationalities, or peoples’ and more 
than 75 languages spoken within its territorial borders, although many more exist 
without official recognition. In many of these countries, systems of justice seem to 
operate almost completely independently of the official state system.“ (Chirayath et al. 
2005, p. 3).
Interestingly, this independent role of traditional justice continues to exist 
even when – as under some recent constitutions – it is explicitly recognized 
and thus given the “blessing of the state”:
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Some states have tried to integrate traditional systems into wider legal and regula-
tory frameworks, oen with little success. For example, the Constitution of Ethiopia 
permits the adjudication of personal and family matters by religious or customary 
laws and South Africa’s 1996 democratic constitution explicitly recognizes custom-
ary law. Many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa have also made attempts to 
recognize customary tenure and customary marriage arrangements within their 
state laws. Efforts to recognize customary land rights have been made in countries 
in other regions as well, such as Latin America and South East Asia. It is important 
to note, however, that in countries where customary systems are formally recog-
nized, in practice these systems generally continue to operate independently of the state 
system (and/or in uneasy tensions with prevailing religious legal traditions) (Chir-
ayath et al. 2005, p. 3).
But the great importance of customary justice lies not only in its traditional 
roots in rural sub-Saharan Africa organized in terms of tribal membership 
but also in the factual barriers to accessing state justice. The “Penal Reform 
Report”:
Most proceedings are subject to considerable delays at all stages, mainly as a result of the 
sheer number of cases being processed through a limited number of courts.
For most of the population living in rural areas the distance to the nearest court may 
be immense.
The justice administered by the state seldom involves restorative or compensatory awards 
or sentences. In this it is oen out of step with the expectations of people whose view 
of justice is based on traditional justice models.
The law and procedure practised in formal courts are both unfamiliar and complicated
from the perspective of most citizens (Penal Reform International 2000, p. 6).
In somewhat more general terms, one could say that the relatively under-
staffed state justice system was simply not “suitable” for meeting the dispute 
resolution needs of rural village communities rooted in tradition.
The vast majority of Africans continue to live in rural villages where access to the 
formal state justice system is extremely limited.
The type of justice offered by the formal courts may be inappropriate for the resolution 
of disputes between people living in rural villages or urban settlements where the 
breaking of individual social relationships can cause conflict within the community 
and affect economic co-operation on which the community depends.
State justice systems in most African countries operate with an extremely limited 
infrastructure which does not have the resources to deal with minor disputes in 
settlements or villages (Penal Reform International 2000, p. 1).
But it is not only the access to justice issue that casts a positive light on the role 
of customary justice, and which, among other things, brought the “World 
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Bank Justice for the Poor Programme” onto the scene; it is also the impor-
tant role that traditional dispute resolution mechanisms can play in societies 
ravaged by decades of violence This is the thought and hope behind the 
“Non-State Justice-Project” of the United States Institute for Peace, on whose 
website we read under the heading “The Role of Non-State Justice Systems 
in Fostering the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies”:
This project aims to provide guidance to international and national policymakers on 
the potential role of customary justice systems in post-conflict environments. The project is 
examining such issues as the potential allocation of jurisdiction between formal and 
customary systems of justice, approaches to adapting customary practices that may 
contravene international human rights standards, possible limits and problems in 
the use of customary justice mechanisms, ramifications for the distribution of polit-
ical and economic power, and the facilitation of dialogue and information-sharing 
between formal and informal systems (United States Institute for Peace).
Having established the importance – notably from the perspective of our 
general topic “sedimentations of normative orders” – not only examining 
normative plurality but also of keeping the enforcement dimension of judi-
cial pluralism in mind, we shall conclude this section by reviewing the main 
features of formal and informal justice.
bb) Formal and Informal Justice Compared
The report of the Penal Reform Project sets out the characteristics of tradi-
tions justice systems as follows:
Salient features of traditional justice systems:
– the problem is viewed as that of the whole community or group;
– an emphasis on reconciliation and restoring social harmony;
– traditional arbitrators are appointed from within the community on the basis of 
status or lineage;
– a high degree of public participation;
– customary law is merely one factor considered in reaching a compromise;
– the rules of evidence and procedures are flexible;
– there is no professional legal representation;
– the process is voluntary and the decision is based on agreement;
– an emphasis on restorative penalties;
– enforcement of decisions secured through social pressure;
– the decision is confirmed through rituals aiming at reintegration;
– like cases need not be treated alike (Penal Reform International 2000, p. 22).
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2. Religiously Defined Governance Collectives: 
Divine Law and Ecclesiastical Law
With reference to Max Weber’s systematics of religion (see Riesebrodt 2001), 
religiously defined governance collectives can be defined as religious com-
munal relationships (Vergemeinschaungen) with a degree of organization-
al consolidation whose members accept a common faith and an internal 
ordering of their communal life as binding. In this sociological sense, the 
following three forms of religious sociation can be identified: community 
cults, churches, and sects.
* As far as community cults are concerned, we can, with Max Weber, re-
gard them as the first sociologically relevant type of religious commu-
nal relationship; in his treatment of Weber’s systematics of religion, 
Martin Riesebrodt explains: 
There are community cults ... at various levels of social aggregation, which then also 
determine the degree of religious specialization, whether, for example, the father of 
the house or a priest performs the sacrifice. Community cults address solely the 
social collective, but are not concerned with “warding off or eliminating evil that 
affects the individual.” This is the job of sorcerers ... (Riesebrodt 2001, p. 106. Transl. 
R.B.). 
Weber describes the priest as follows: 
It is more correct for our purpose, in order to do justice to the diverse and mixed 
manifestations of this phenomenon, to set up as the crucial feature of the priesthood 
the specialization of a particular group of persons in the continuous operation of a 
cultic enterprise, permanently associated with particular norms, places and time, 
and related to specific social groups (Weber 1978, p. 426). 
* Max Weber conceptualizes the communal relationship “church” in par-
allel to the state as an institutional ruling organization (anstaltlicher 
Herrschasverband). Both state and church are “authoritarian compul-
sory organizations,” which are not joined voluntarily like an association 
but which one is generally born into and of which one is a compulsory 
member. Although “church” is in many regards similar to a communal 
cult, as Riesebrodt explains (Riesebrodt 2001, p. 112) – it is set apart by 
a number of additional criteria, which Weber describes in his account 
of the transition from hierocratic organization to church:
Four features characterize the emergence of a church out of a hierocracy: 1. the rise 
of a professional priesthood removed from the “world,” with salaries, promotions, 
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professional duties, and a distinctive way of life; 2. claims to universal domination; 
that means, hierocracy must at least have overcome household, sib and tribal ties, 
and of a church in the full sense of the word we speak only when ethnic and 
national barriers have been eliminated, hence aer the levelling of all non-religious 
distinctions; 3. dogma and rites (Kultus) must have been rationalized, recorded in 
holy scriptures, provided with commentaries, and turned into objects of a systematic 
education, as distinct from mere training in technical skills; 4. all of these features 
must occur in some kind of compulsory organization. For the decisive fact is the 
separation of charisma from the person and its linkage with the institution and, partic-
ularly, with the office ... (Weber 1978, p. 1164).
* Whereas Max Weber conceives of “church” in analogy to the state, he 
sees “sects” as analogous to associations: “A sect – if it is to be concep-
tually distinguished from a ‘church’ – is not, like the latter, a compul-
sory organization but a community of religiously qualified persons, it 
is the the community of all those called to salvation and only of these” 
(quoted from Riesebrodt 2001, p. 113). Riesebrodt (ibid.) points out 
that a sect is not simply any religious community with a small mem-
bership or which is persecuted by state or church. The concept includes 
the self-conception of members as an exclusive community of religiously 
qualified persons. Decisive for cultural development is also the agency 
of sect religiousness, how goals of salvation and how to attain it are 
defined, and how the conduct of life is directed. Sectarianism can take 
many paths. 
Having gained an approximate idea of what religious governance collectives 
are, we now consider them in more detail as regulatory collectives.
a) The Existence of Divine Law
aa) Islamic Law as Divine Law
In his concise and informative presentation of Islam, Heinz Halm begins by 
asking who and what a Muslim is; the answer is unequivocal: 
What all Muslims have in common is the belief in one God and His revelation 
through a prophet, Mohammed (Muhammad); this revelation is laid down in a 
book the Koran (Qur’an or Quran). Thus, a Muslim is someone who recognizes the 
Koran as the revelation of the one and only God (Halm 2007, p. 7. Transl. R.B.).
On the five pillars of Islam, he adds:
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The five basic duties of Islam are described as its “pillars” (arkan ā-Islam; also arkan 
al-din, “pillars of religion”). The first pillar, (shahādah) is the profession of faith 
“There is no god but God and Muhammad is his prophet.” With this two-part 
declaration, the Muslim professes to absolute monotheism and the prophetic mis-
sion of Muhammad; at the same time, the Koran is recognized as the word of God 
revealed to Muhammad (Halm 2007, p. 60. Transl. R.B.).
But this key text, the Koran, is not only a document of faith but also the 
central legal document and the central source of law of Islamic law. Its partic-
ularity is that religious and legal content are inseparably interwoven; Mathias 
Rohe:
The first and foremost source of law is indisputably the Koran (Qur’an, the book 
to be frequently recited). It commands and teaches justice on its own terms and 
permits sure decisions. The Koran is far more than a “legal code”; most of it presents 
not legal norms but statements about God and his prophets, articles of faith, com-
mands and prohibitions, didactic narratives, explanations of the world, statements 
and instructions on historical events and persons from the time of Muhammed, as 
much more. Some 500 verses are purported to be directly legal in content. They 
include the large number of religious ritual obligations (ibādāt), whereas only a 
few dozen verses contain civil and criminal law provisions. But legal questions are 
also answered indirectly through recourse to statements non-legal in substance, such 
as the question whether analogical inference is permitted (Rohe 2009, p. 48. Transl. 
R.B.).
The not only central but absolutely dominant role of revealed divine law in 
the form of the Koran, and in the so-called Sunna (see Rohe 2009, p. 52ff.) is 
particularly apparent in the precedence given revealed divine law over law 
enacted by the state in the constitutions of most Islamic states.
In January 2010 the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law 
and International Law presented a material collection entitled On the Rela-
tion between Islamic Law and Constitutional Law in Selected Countries. We 
quote the following regulations from Iran as an instructive example:
Article 1
The form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic, endorsed by the 
people of Iran on the basis of their longstanding belief in the sovereignty of truth 
and Qur’ānic justice, in the referendum of [March 29-30, 1979], through the affir-
mative vote of majority of 98.2% of eligible voters, held aer the victorious Islamic 
Revolution led by the eminent marji’ al-taqlīd, Āyatullāh al-’Uzmā Imam Khu-
maynī. 
Article 2
The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in: 
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1. The One God (as stated in the phrase “There is no god except Allah”), His exclusive 
sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His com-
mands; 
...
4. The justice of God in creation and legislation; 
...
Article 4 
All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and 
other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies 
absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws 
and regulations, and the fuqahā’ of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter. 
Article 12
The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja’farî school [in usul al-Din 
and fiqh], and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic schools, 
including the Hanafî, Shāfi’I, Mālikî, Hanbalî, and Zaydî, are to be accorded full 
respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in 
performing their religious rites. These schools enjoy official status in matters pertaining 
to religious education, affairs and personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance and 
wills) and related litigation in courts of law. In regions of the country where 
Muslims following any one of these schools of fiqh constitute the majority, local 
regulations, within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in 
accordance with the respective school of fiqh, without infringing upon the rights of 
the followers of other schools. 
Article 77
International treaties, protocols, contracts and agreements must be approved by the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly.
Article 167
The judge is bound to endeavour to judge each case on the basis of the codified law. 
In case of the absence of any such law, he has to deliver his judgement on the basis 
of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatāwā. ...
Article 170
Judges of courts are obliged to refrain from executing statutes and regulations of the 
government that are in conflict with the laws or the norms of Islam, [...]
Article 177.6
The content of the Articles of the Constitution related to the Islamic character of the 
political system; the basis of all the rules and regulations according to Islamic 
criteria; the religious footing; the objectives of Islamic Republic of Iran; the dem-
ocratic character of the government; the wilāyat al-’amr; the Imamate of Ummah; 
and the administration of the affairs of the country based on national referenda, 
official religion of Iran [Islam] and the school [Twelver Ja’fari] are unalterable.
What is interesting here, too, is less the precedence rule as such than two 
Iranian particularities: first that Article 12 addresses the problem of normative 
The Plurality of Normative Orders. An Exploration 93
plurality, namely the relationship between the different schools of law and their 
specific jurisprudence, and second the mention of the role of the Guardian 
Council, which from an institutional theory point of view would certainly 
have deserved a section of its own.
bb) Jewish Law as Divine Law
The religious, divine character of Jewish law cannot be overlooked; it derives 
directly and impressively from the history of the Jewish people and the 
repeated threats to their identity. We quote from the prize-winning thesis 
of Justus von Daniels on “Religious Law as an Object of Reference. Jewish 
Law in a Jurisprudential Comparison.” He first addresses the covenant 
between God and the people of Israel concluded on Mount Sinai, a central 
founding myth of the Jewish faith:
The covenant between the people and their God established the cultural and religious 
identity of Judaism. It is the point of departure for a religious community that defines 
their relationship with their God essentially through scripture and it is the climax of 
the divine manifestation: God reveals himself to the people of Israel and lays down 
the conditions on the religion and the relationship between God and Israel fully and 
finally.
The act of concluding the covenant itself has a genuinely political dimension, since 
this act established an order of the Jewish people. The covenant provided the founda-
tion stone for the societal organization of the Jewish people. The content of the covenant, in 
turn, is substantially legal in character in the form of commands. For the most part they 
are rules of conduct, starting with the Ten Commandments imposed on the com-
munity by the covenant. The institutional underpinning of the court is prominently 
described in detail. One of the main tasks of Moses aer delivering the Tables of the 
Law was to serve as supreme judge of the Jews. The religious scholars of Judaism – 
the Rabbis – were and remain judges and jurists, who over the centuries have con-
ducted written discussions about the correct interpretation of divine revelation, 
above all of the rules laid down there. These interpretations constitute the major 
part of what is now referred to as Jewish law, Halacha. This law, embedded in the 
typical legal institution of the court, accordingly plays a key role in the identity of 
Judaism, which is thus to be understood as a religious community that manifests itself 
through laws. In this system, the separation of law and morality made in modern 
legal orders is not allowed for structurally; the two are closely linked and together 
form a sort of moral order for Jewry (Daniels 2009, p. 1 f. Transl. R.B.).
The second passage from Daniels’ thesis comes under the heading “Specific 
structural characteristics of Jewish law”:
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Jewish law is a religious legal system in whose principles the members of the Jewish 
people believe. This has far-reaching consequences for the justification, systemics, 
and binding force of this system.
Religious law is of divine origin; in the case of Judaism it is even constitutive of the religion 
itself. The original act of the Jewish religion lies in the revelation of God on Mount 
Sinai to the Israelites. The rules this revelation contained for the basis for Jewish law, 
and theonomy and the eternity intrinsic to divinity are thus the cornerstones of this 
law. Oral law, which forms the basis of the Mishnah, the Talmud, and the subse-
quent commentaries, is also viewed dogmatically as divine. Owing to the central role 
that the law plays for identity formation, the religion is therefore a legal religion, that is to 
say, a religion in which law plays a decisive role in determining the relationship with 
God. For its part, the law is fundamentally religious, since it rests on purely tran-
scendental foundations (Daniels 2009, p. 27 f. Transl. R.B.).
cc) The Christian Distinction between Ius Divinum and Ius Humanum
The distinction between divine and human law is not unknown to Christian 
theology, and the great Church Fathers always stressed and insisted that ius 
divinum was the measure; in Über göttliche und menschliche Gesetze (On Divine 
and Human Laws), Friedrich Wilhelm Graf has this to say:
For the great traditions of a Christian natural law rooted in God’s creative will, not 
only biblical texts but also the understanding of the lex divina developed by the 
Stoics was definitive, which had shaped the jurisprudence of the Romans since the 
first century B.C. God’s law was given precedence over the ius humanum as an all-
embracing moral and legal definitional framework, which formed the binding basis 
for all laws made by men, their normative criterion. Church fathers such as Tertullian, 
Cyprian, Lactantius, and, most prominently Augustine introduced the Stoic distinc-
tion between ius divinum and ius humanum into theology. Leges humanae, laws 
enacted by men, were the concern only of secular authority; their binding force was 
therefore limited and relative. Laws made by men could easily be questioned and 
changed by men. If only to enhance their validity, all leges humanae (positivae) needed 
to be grounded in divine law. In the post-Constantinian period, Christian theologians 
therefore constantly asserted that ius humanum was injustice if not in conformity 
with ius divinum. However, this made severe conflicts between theologians and 
jurists, ecclesiastical and secular authorities inevitable. For who has the right to 
decide if a human law is in accordance with divine law? How, by what procedures 
can the order of the polity be assessed for conformity to divine law? (Graf 2006, 
p. 25 f. Transl. R.B.).
Nevertheless – if we are not mistaken – ius divinum has never played as im-
portant a role in Christianity as it has in Islam and Judaism, and no separate 
body of law has developed comparable to the Koran or the Thora. As we see 
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it, this is because – unlike in “churchless” Islam and Judaism – legal matters 
of divine origin found a home in canonic law and therefore lost the attribute 
of independence; and because the papacy managed to secure for itself the 
competence to interpret and develop ius divinum. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf:
Thomas Aquinas, praised by Pope Benedict XVI in his address in front of Cologne 
Cathedral in August 2005 as the “greatest theologian of the Occident,” declared in 
“Summa de theologia” that no secular authority, solely the supreme church authority, 
that is to say the pope in Rome is entitled to determine the norms of divine law on 
the basis of Holy Scripture and Church tradition. Thomas, canonized in 1323 and in 
1567 elevated to the rank of Doctor of the Church, ushered in a new age: to this day 
the Roman Catholic Church defends the triple claim that it has access to revealed 
knowledge of the norms of divine law, that this eternal law engraved in the heart of 
every reasoning creature is universal in application, and that only the occupant of 
the Holy See has binding authority to interpret these norms (Graf 2006, p. 28. 
Transl. R.B.).
b) Canon Law as an Autonomous Normative Order
We shall not be devoting this section to in-depth discussion of canon law, 
the basis of its validity, and what it has in common with state law and what 
distinguishes it from that law (see Robbers 1994; Dreier 1997). We shall 
rather be looking briefly at Catholic canon law in the form of the Corpus 
Juris Canonici (later: Codex Juris Canonici) as an example of a global, non-state 
normative order, because this body of law is not a mere construction of legal 
theory but a historically effective non-state legal regime. 
aa) Everything Began with Gratian of Bologna
Catholic canon law, which had enjoyed undisputed validity for centuries, is 
a slowly growing body of law on whose origins and development every 
textbook on canon law and church legal history will provide a reliable 
account (for a particularly useful overview see Wall and Muckel 2009, 
p. 92ff.; Link 2010). A few pointers on the genesis and content of classical 
canon law will therefore suffice.
The Corpus Juris Canonici (Corp JC) is the title given the vast compen-
dium of canon law comprising single bodies of law from the period 1140 to 
1325. The earliest and largest of such compendiums was the so-called Decre-
tum Gratiani of 1140, which was a “private collection of legal texts of the 
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preceding millennium, systematized in text-book manner by scholastic 
methods” (Link 2010, p. 97. Transl. R.B.). This Decretum Gratiani is gener-
ally considered to mark the beginning of a systematic Catholic canon law 
and the concomitant canonical jurisprudence. Christoph Link sums up the 
ground-breaking importance of the Decretum Gratiani:
The Decretum Gratiani was never officially installed by the pope as a legal code, but 
its was diffused and gained authority throughout Europe. It was only on this basis 
that a separate canonical jurisprudence (canonistics) – developed alongside the 
legistics dealing with Roman law, which had regained the attention of occidental 
scholars in the 11th century. From then on, the two currents shaped legal doctrine 
and legal practice. Thus canonistics, too, made an equal contribution to the scientification 
of law (Link 2010, p. 38. Transl. R.B.).
The second milestone to be mentioned is the collection of laws that goes by 
the name of Liber Extra, which was compiled at the behest of Pope Gre-
gory IX (1227–1241), and which constituted the first codification of prevail-
ing canon law; Christoph Link:
The Liber Extra was published with the papal bull “Rex pacifus” in 1234 – as then 
usual by distribution to the universities – together with the instruction to use it and 
no other collection in court and class. Decretals not included were thus set aside. 
This had two highly significant consequences: first, the idea of codification of a field of 
law, i. e., the compilation of legal material in a code to the exclusion of all other 
rules and the ensuing claim of the lawgiver to set new law in the place of the old. What 
was later to be described as an essential characteristic of the “modern state,” its 
activity – its competence – to adapt to new situations as they arise by overriding 
and invalidating prevailing law by making new law was a power claimed by the 
popes, who no longer felt bound by the laws of their predecessors. The Liber Extra is 
therefore an important milestone in the development of European law (Link 2010, p. 39. 
Transl. R.B.).
The term Corpus Juris Canonici matching the Roman law Corpus Juris Civilis
had become established as long ago as the 13th century. It become official 
with the edition of 1582:
This was based on the editorial work of a papal commission of cardinals and canon-
ists set up in 1566, the Correctores Romani. Their job was not only to harmonize 
differing versions of the texts handed down by also to adapt them to a changing 
understanding of law (Link 2010, p. 41. Transl. R.B.).
This Corpus Juris Canonici prevailed in the worldwide Roman Catholic 
Church until 1981, to be replaced in 1983 by the Codex Juris Canonici.
The Plurality of Normative Orders. An Exploration 97
bb) The Legal Dualism of Roman and Canon Law: 
Characteristic of European Legal History
Legal historians largely agree that the co-existence of secular, Roman-law 
civil law and Catholic canon law can be described as characteristic of Euro-
pean legal history. In an article on the influence of canon law on European 
legal culture, Peter Landau remarks:
The development of Europe into a political unit with shared law, summarized 
under the heading “European law” once again raises the question for legal historians 
of whether European legal culture displays particularities that distinguish it from, 
for example, the Islamic legal culture of East Asian legal cultures. One such partic-
ularity is certainly the existence of two legal systems in occidental Europe from the 12th 
century, which complemented one another but whose origins and validity derived from 
different lawmaking authorities: secular civil law and canon law. Canon law was not 
subordinated to secular law as the law of a special polity within the state, nor was its 
validity based on an act of recognition by a supreme secular authority. Its legitimacy 
derived from the Catholic Church’s undisputed authority. The fact of this double legal 
order is a characteristic of our European history that we call to mind all too seldom 
(Landau 1991, p. 39. Transl. R.B.).
We have seen that the existence of plural legal orders generally means the 
existence of plural justice systems. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
co-existence of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction is also part of the her-
itage of European legal history. Hans Liermann, writing about canon law as 
the basis of European legal thought, therefore rightly stresses this duality as a 
specificity of European legal development:
In addition to the fundamental principles we have hitherto been considering, our 
shared European legal thought owes a number of achievements to canon law that 
are more technical in nature. 
They include the – now so self-evident – operation of the law with a number of co-
existing legal orders and jurisdictions: criminal and civil law, and now highly devel-
oped constitutional and administrative law. Since the Christianization of Europe, 
there have been two co-existing legal orders: canon law and secular state law. Since 
then there have been coexisting justice systems: ecclesiastical and secular. This raises 
a complicated legal problem. Even in the High Middle Ages, it had been considered 
in depth. Philipp de Beaumanoir already distinguished between the exclusive com-
petence of ecclesiastical and secular courts and the possible simultaneous compe-
tence of the two systems. He discussed the question of the secular judge being 
bound by the decisions of the ecclesiastical judge. He knew interlocutory judge-
ments from the domain of the other jurisdiction and sought to weaken their res 
judicata effect (Liermann 1957, p. 44. Transl. R.B.).
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The important thing is that secular Roman law and canon law are two, equal 
legal orders; canon law was indisputably law – ius – as Thomas Duve explains:
[Canon law] is as old as the Church itself, which in the Catholic view is constituted 
as a church of law, since the doctrine of salvation and legal precepts, obedience to 
the faith and to the law are inseparably linked. Nor, at any rate for more than two 
thousand years, was its legal character ever called into question. It was ius, had the 
means of enforcement at its disposal, and from the High Middle Ages at the latest 
possessed a differentiated theory of legal sources – a period when a text-oriented 
European jurisprudence began to emerge in which the exercise of authority (potes-
tas iurisdictionis) and the exercise of the power conferred by holy orders (potestas 
ordinis) begin to separate in the Church. It is no accident that the term “ius posi-
tivum” comes from the canonistic tradition (Duve 2011, p. 154. Transl. R.B.).
cc) The Pioneering Role of the Church in Institutions and Legal Culture
There is no disputing that the institution of the Church with its emphasis on 
hierarchy and office had a lead in institutionalization over the secular polit-
ical authority (Weber 1980, p. 615), anticipating and in its institutional 
culture providing a model for modern statehood. Horst Dreier sums up 
the situation under the heading “Church as a hierarchical organization with 
a system of offices”:
In the High Middle Ages, the Church with its hierarchical, bureaucratic structure, 
its nature as an institution, its system of offices, and the concomitant ethos of 
objective performance of duty of an organization that exercises power and authority 
anticipates now self-evident elements of modern statehood ... For Max Weber, the 
Church was the very first institution in the legal sense.
An essential “institutional precondition” for such an institutional organization was the 
notion of office. The authority to exercise power “is attached to offices and functions 
and is not the personal right of the individual exercising this power” (Böckenförde 
1986, p. 114.), as had been the case under aristocratic rule in the Middle Ages. Our 
modern concept of state-made rule, by contrast, is both functional and abstract: we 
see the office as such as not tied to a particular person and regard the persons holding 
and exercising the office as in principle interchangeable without any change in 
personnel endangering the system of offices as such. In the organization of the 
Church in the High Middle Ages, the ecclesiastical office, officium ecclesiasticum, 
was conceived of in precisely these terms and was thus constituted a pillar of the 
bureacratic hierarchical structure of the Church. (Dreier 2001, p. 145 f. Transl. R.B.).
In his oen cited History of State Authority (Geschichte der Staatsgewalt), Wolf-
gang Reinhard writes of the model provided by the organization of the 
Church for the development of the modern state:
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The fact that the Latin Church became above all a church of law ..., that it realized 
itself as a hierarchical ruling organization, distinguished it from all other religions, 
including Orthodox Christianity. ... but the Roman Church of law had a lead on the 
emerging states not only in theory but also in institutional practice. In the Middle 
Ages, the papal claim to the plenitude of power in both spiritual and temporal 
affairs (plenitudo potestatis), centralism, administrative apparatus, and the tax sys-
tem made it a model for the modern state (Reinhard 1999, p. 261. Transl. R.B.).
This being so, it is hardly surprising that not only the organizational archi-
tecture of the Church but also its law – Church of law – served as a model.
We call Peter Landau to the witness box. He has addressed the model 
function of canon law on more than one occasion (1991; 1996). Writing 
about the influence of canon law on European legal culture, he notes that:
It is not so much single legal notions or legal institutions that canon law has presented 
to temporal law for emulation. The whole canon law of the Middle Ages, at the latest 
since 1234 with Pope Gregory IX’s famous Liber Extra code, provided a fully devel-
oped legal system as a model for the modern secular world. It was of course pri-
marily Roman law whose reception or renaissance in Continental Europe formed 
the basis for modern legal orders, especially in civil law, and to some extent in 
public law, as well. Alongside Roman law, handed down to the 12th century 
essentially as a closed text corpus, there was now in canon law a second text corpus, 
the Corpus Iuris Canonici, which was constantly supplemented and changed during 
the 12th and 13th centuries in close but by no means fully recorded interaction 
between adjudication, legislation, and scholarly interpretation, as well as in general-
izing concept formation. Canon law is, for example, in the poor law, for medieval 
society throughout Europe the first legal order in history in which the now self-evident 
factors of law development – legislation, adjudication, and jurisprudence – become reality 
... The Corpus Iuris Canonici like the Corpus Iuris Civilis was received throughout 
Europe. It is in so far correct to speak of the European reception of canon law ... but 
the Corpus Iuris Canonici, unlike the Corpus Iuris Civilis was not compiled – from 
complementary collections of laws – until the High Middle Ages. It gave Medieval 
Europe its first experience of legal certainty on the basis of positive law (Landau 1991, 
p. 41 f. Transl. R.B.).
dd) Interim Conclusion: Canon Law as a Global Normative Order 
in the Shadow of Weak Statehood
The title of the essay by Thomas Duve (2011, p. 147), addresses two impor-
tant aspects: the global character of canon law and its claim to global validity 
and the relationship between “strong Church” and “weak statehood.”
* Hans Liermann offers a plausible argument on the claim of canon law to 
global validity: 
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... Not only German and French legal sources of the High Middle Ages interlock 
with canon law and can be understood and appreciated only in connection with it. 
When Europe began to turn Christian with the conversion of the Germanic and 
later Slav peoples, a broad current of legal thinking influenced by Christianity and 
the Church – canon law in the broadest sense – began to spread throughout the 
continent. It ignored boundaries between nations and states. Christianity as a uni-
versal religion would logically also have to produce universal legal thinking.
It is the Christian concept of God that produced this supranational effect. The great 
Jewish prophets had dared to express the powerful religious thought that the God of 
Israel was the God of all peoples. They had thus transformed the Jewish henotheism 
contained by national boundaries into universal monotheism. This universal mono-
theism was adopted and spread by Christianity. It became the cause of universal 
legal thinking. Given the close link between law and religion that was a matter of course 
in early, not yet secularized periods of legal history, legal thinking based on a universal 
notion of God can essentially have no bounds (Liermann 1957, p. 38. Transl. R.B.).
* For Thomas Duve, the special quality of the global normative order of 
canon law is that this legal regime developed its impressive effective-
ness “in the shadow of early modern (weak) statehood:”
Were there non-state “global systems” in the past, as well, that established “their own 
legal structures” as we see happening today? – There were indeed, and the focus of 
this article is a historically significant case of non-state, global law: the law of the 
Catholic Church, out of which, at a given moment in history, the mid-sixteenth 
century, a normative order developed – in a process some have called the first global-
ization or “mundialization” – in the shadow of early modern (weak) statehood. It was 
institutionally grounded, but reproduced not least through internalized personal 
obligation with discursive-theoretical and symbolic-ritual underpinning. For a lim-
ited period of time, this normative order was almost global not only in theory but 
also in fact: to the extent that one can speak at all of control efficiency in early 
modern normative orders, it controlled the behaviour and behavioural expectations 
of millions of people in many parts of the world from Mexico to Munich and 
Manila. The span of the Spanish monarchy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the 
soteriological approach and claim to universality of this normative order lent it 
global dimensions (Duve 2011, p. 148. Transl. R.B.).
Aer this somewhat fundamental overview of the normative orders of reli-
gious governance collectives, we turn to a third type of governance collec-
tive: occupations.
3. Occupational Governance Collectives and their Normative Orders
There are innumerable examples of occupation-specific normative orders 
and their oen rigid enforcement. We shall concentrate on three examples 
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that make a particularly useful contribution to the general topic of gover-
nance collectives and their normative orders.
a) Non-State Self-Regulation in Micro-Societies or Governance by Reputation: 
The Example of Diamond Merchants in New York
Over the past decade, American jurists (see Richman 2004) have been dis-
cussing “private ordering,” examining the functional conditions of private nor-
mative systems in groups of social actors. A number of detailed case studies 
describe how such private normative orders have developed and – the litmus 
test – how they are enforced. Good examples of the private ordering liter-
ature (see overview in Ipsen 2009) are the regulatory regimes of Jewish 
diamond merchants in New York state law operating in lieu of state law 
(Richman 2006), of the American cotton trade on the Memphis Cotton 
Exchange (Bernstein 2001), and dispute resolution among farmers in Shasta 
County (Ellickson 1991). The focus of these studies is thus not global or 
transnational but local and occupation-specific.
For our purposes it will suffice to consider a particularly instructive case. 
It is that of Jewish diamond merchants in the New York Diamond Dealers 
Club (DDC), who trade in accordance with rules they set themselves under 
the aegis of the Club, which provides regular information about the business 
practices of its members, thus influencing their reputation and – in the event 
of repeated and significant loss of reputation – threatening them with expul-
sion. Barak D. Richman writes of “reputation-based enforcement” (Richman 
2004, p. 2328) of the self-given rules, what can be called governance by repu-
tation. To put it simply, such a mode of governance presupposes two things: a 
functioning exchange of information about the business practices of certain 
people (mostly merchants) and the existence of a social group or a social net-
work for which the reputation of its members is important; we shall call 
such social groups reputation communities.
As far as the exchange of information is concerned, Nils Ipsen has this to 
say in his work on private normative orders as transnational law (Ipsen 2009):
First of all, the passing on of information and the publicizing of the reputation of 
the individual has to be ensured. This can happen informally in very small groups, 
such as among neighbouring ranchers in Shasta County. Larger groups, by contrast, 
generally need special institutions that offer this service. The New York Diamond 
Dealers Club (DDC), within which the larger part of diamond dealing in the world 
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takes place, offers not only a secure trading centre but serves as a trade association. 
The DDC accordingly sets the rules for the diamond trade and offers a compulsory 
private arbitration system. In various ways it also assumes the task of exchanging 
information about the reputation of individual dealers to ensure conformity with its 
own arbitral decisions. 
First, a common trading centre facilitates the exchange of information. In addition, 
photographs of visitors and newcomers to the exchange are exhibited in the trading 
hall with indications as to their reputation and personal credentials. Similarly, in a 
form that recalls the notorious “wanted” posters from the “Wild West,” pictures are 
put on display of those who have failed to pay their debts. For every dealer it is 
therefore relatively easy to find out about the reputation of a potential trading partner.
Things are similar in the American cotton trade. This takes place essentially at the 
Memphis Cotton Exchange (MCE). For historical reasons, members of the MCE 
traditionally have their offices on one street in Memphis, so that here, too, a com-
mon trading centre facilitates information exchanges (Ipsen 2009, p. 53 f. Transl. 
R.B.).
With respect to the existence of a social network – which we have called a 
reputation community – it can concern an occupational group with highly 
developed professional ethic standards or, as in the case of the Jewish dia-
mond merchants, a religious community; the community of Jewish diamond 
dealers in New York apparently exercises reputation-based rule enforcement in 
this sense, not only towards diamond merchants but also towards diamond 
workers – whom Richman calls “diamond-studded paupers” – who are in 
constant temptation to steal diamonds. Ipsen:
Things are different for the workers. Because of their low wages and the ease of the 
– owing to the informal contracts – the incentive to break agreements is extraordi-
narily high. Moreover, the ultra-Orthodox Jews neither want to stay in the business 
permanently nor do they wish to bequeath it to their descendants. Their ideal is to 
commit their lives to Thora study. This could theoretically be made possible by 
breaking rules. However, as ultra-Orthodox Jews, they are also particularly commit-
ted to their religious community. Flight would entail abandoning this community. 
Furthermore, the community places great value on its members engaging in desir-
able behaviour. Failure to do so is sanctioned by a sort of religious arbitration 
tribunal presided over by a rabbi. In the case of the diamond trade, this bond is 
so strong that these rabbinical courts can be applied to directly by diamond dealers. 
Failure to comply with contractual obligations can be sanctioned by the denial of 
religious honours, temporary exclusion from community celebrations, and in 
extreme cases excommunication. Compliance with the secular rules is enforced through 
entwinement with the rules of the religious community. This means that breaking the 
rules has such far-reaching repercussions for the individual member that it is 
unlikely despite the great incentive to do so. In Richman’s view, this support 
through a social network makes the private normative order more effective that 
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the state legal system. It offers a decisive competitive advantage and thus a main 
reason for the high proportion of Jewish diamond merchants (Ipsen 2009, p. 56 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
The private ordering literature comes to the general conclusion that, in a 
functioning non-state normative system, normative order and network deter-
mine one another: 
While the social network ensures compliance with the normative order, the exis-
tence of a normative order ensures that conflicts can be resolved without a third 
party (the state) having to intervene that might resolve it only inadequately and 
therefore endanger the existence of the social network (Ipsen 2009, p. 58. Transl. 
R.B.).
If this is the case – and the argument is more than plausible – it raises the 
question of how such private regulatory regimes come into being; they do not 
appear out of the blue but, so to speak, require the right humus to bring 
forth norms. Ipsen points to the article by Amitai Aviram (Aviram 2003) on 
this subject, who convincingly shows that private normative systems do not 
form “spontaneously,” ex nihilo, as it were; they build on the institutional 
infrastructure of an existing social or religious network – he cites the Pax dei
movement and the Hanseatic League. He explains how this combination of 
social / religious network and “governance by reputation” operates:
The evolutionary process that results in a private legal system has two stages. First, a 
network creating a centralized bonding mechanism would form (most likely, not as 
an end of its own, but as a side effect of some other function the network serves). 
Then, at stage two, the network would undertake regulating behavior, using its 
enforcement ability. The most ubiquitous example of a network that facilitates cen-
tralized bonding is a social network. Social networks use reputation bonds. I argued 
earlier that reputation bonds are ineffective when individuals expect the network to 
fail. Many social networks, however, continue to exist over long periods of time – 
one’s neighbors, for example, will continue to affect one’s social life indefinitely (this 
subsection will explain, below, why social networks may spontaneously form, while 
regulating networks tend to fail if they form spontaneously). By gossiping about each 
other within the social network, and by reacting to the gossip according to common 
norms, the social network can align most members’ responses to any member’s 
deviant behavior. When members of the same social circle are also part of another 
network that attempts to regulate behavior, they will care for their reputations, for 
while the regulating network cannot in itself harm them, the negative reputation 
they build will carry on to the social network, and there the centralized bonding 
mechanism will punish them. There is no need for two separate networks, however 
– one to regulate and the other to punish deviance. If there is demand for certain 
regulation and networks are the efficient providers, existing networks that enable 
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centralized bonding – such as social networks, religious groups, etc. – will evolve to 
provide the required regulation (Aviram 2003, p. 20).
Aviram posits that such social and / or religious networks initially – in their 
early stage, so to speak – only perform functions with low enforcement costs, 
but that the question of costs becomes less important as enforcement mech-
anisms become more powerful. When regulation is necessary, he concludes, 
existing networks develop the capacity to provide it. However, the condition 
for the emergence of such private normative orders is always that a network-
like, homogeneous group exists, a close-knit and like-minded community.
These groups of social actors show that the coming into being of non-
state normative systems generally presupposes the existence of social or 
religious networks that are enabled by this institutional infrastructure to 
effectively influence the behaviour of their members through reputation-
based rule enforcement.
b) From the Strict Regime of the Guilds to Sectoral Codes of Conduct
aa) Professions as Private Government
Guilds have been regarded as prime examples of professional private govern-
ment. Like occupations as a whole, they have been the subject of a great deal 
of research (Schmitt 1966; Mayer-Tasch 1971). This is particularly interesting 
from two points of view.
The first is economic; from this perspective, guilds were above all organ-
izations for regulating competition in the interest of a group by which mandatory 
membership prevented unwanted competition. Marek Schmidt has this to 
say about competition regulation by occupational organizations:
The traditional Medieval associations connected with the exercise of cras, trades, or 
other occupations were the guilds. They developed in the urban economies of the 
12th century. The mandatory membership enforced by the authorities and suprare-
gional market sharing agreements with other officially recognized guilds gave them 
a market dominating position in the economic life of the 15th century. The growing 
protection of guilds against external competition made enforcement of the guilds’ pur-
pose – the avoidance and regulation of economic conflicts of interests among guild 
members – the chief concern of guild regimes. In the course of time, the guilds 
degenerated into service institutions for master families. More and more frequently, 
conditions for attaining the title of master that had nothing to do with performance 
were set that were safeguarded by mandatory membership (Schmidt 1993, p. 23. Transl. 
R.B.).
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The second perspective, which the present author had explored in his habil-
itation thesis (Schuppert 1981) is that of administration science. It throws 
light on professions, especially in the form of guilds, in their function as 
potential administrative units (ibid., p. 100 f.).
In a society based on the division of labour, professions are available as 
socially prestructured units – be it in the form of estates, of self-governing 
corporations, or of members of an economic council or a second chamber, 
to serve as elements of state organization. Occupational associations appear to 
be something in the way of “administrative units in reserve,” which the state 
can use when need be to “discipline” areas of society. This phenomenon can 
be explained if we consider the specific functions of associations of people 
engaged in a particular occupation.
In Men and their Work, Hughes defines the criteria that go to constitute an 
occupation:
An occupation consists, in part, of a successful claim of some people to a licence to 
carry out certain activities which others may not, and to do so in exchange for money, 
goods or services. Those who have such licence will, if they have any sense of self-
consciousness and solidarity, also claim a mandate to define what is proper conduct 
of others toward the matters concerned with their work (Hughes 1958, p. 78).
And it can indeed be regarded as characteristic of every occupation that it 
seeks first to regulate or at least regulate access to the occupation itself, and 
second to formulate professional standards, and third to have the compe-
tence to sanction non-compliance with occupational discipline. J. A. C. Grant 
(Grant 1942) and Priscilla De Lancy in The Licensing of Professions in West 
Virginia (De Lancy 1938) address efforts to influence recruitment to occupa-
tions, also as regards possible forms of organization.
Apart from protection against unqualified competition and outsiders 
unwilling to comply with professional norms, one of the most important 
reasons for guild-type tendencies is the relationship between the profession 
and its clients. In occupations with necessarily higher qualifications, the so-
called “liberal professions,” the clients of lawyers or physicians can make no 
judgement of their own about the quality of the service offered. If the 
occupation does not wish to have its professional standards dictated to it 
by clients or the legislature as a lay assembly, it must itself attempt at the 
highest possible level to enforce them. Hughes:
They do not want the client to make an individual judgment about the competence 
of practitioners or about the quality of work done for him. The interaction between 
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professional and client is such that the professionals strive to keep all serious judg-
ments of competence within the circle of recognized colleagues. A licensing system 
adds the support of the state to some mechanism established by the profession itself 
for this purpose. It is as if competence became an attribute of the profession as a 
whole, rather than of individuals as such (Hughes 1958, p. 141).
In this fashion, the social control the community of professionals exercises over 
its members presents itself as a method to avoid control by laymen. Failure 
in disciplining its members would not only bring a loss of prestige in society 
but also evoke the risk of losing its freedom.
In sum, a tendency to guild formation is inherent in the occupational 
association. Goode (1957) therefore calls the profession or occupation “a 
community within the community” with an intensity of regulation that 
can be described as the exercise of private government. Key rightly describes 
the tendency of occupational associations to acquire quasi-official authority 
as “one of the recurring patterns of political behavior” (Key 1942).
Despite justified reservations about alleged universal tendencies, we can 
speak of a structurally determined tendency of occupational associations 
to acquire half-governmental status or at least recognition by the state. 
H. S. Harris describes this tendency and the implied swing from private to 
public government as follows:
In any case, the natural tendency of the associations that are formed in this way is to 
seek to be accepted as public agencies, and be endowed with public authority. All such 
groups, in striving to maintain or restore the threatened equilibrium, seek to legis-
late for the sphere of human activity with which they are concerned. To the extent to 
which they are able to do this and obtain the backing of the public authority for 
what they do, they lose their private character. If, for example, the publicly enforced 
condition of working at a certain occupation in a given society is that one must join 
the trade union or professional society, meeting the standards that it sets for entry, 
and accepting the disciplinary code of behavior that it lays down for its members it 
appears to me that that aspect of life is not any longer privately, but publicity 
organized (Harris 1969, p. 51 f.).
bb) Self-Regulation through Codes of Conduct: 
The Example of the International Financial Community
So-called codes of conduct (for an overview see Schuppert 2011c) are a form of 
self-regulation adopted above all by transnational corporations (TNCs) and 
certain sectors, a voluntary commitment to guiding principles for their 
entrepreneurial activities. To this extent, we can speak of a specific form of 
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good practice standards. Their almost epidemic proliferation since the 1990s is 
the result of increasing economic globalization accompanied by the triumph 
of the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The interaction 
between these two factors has been described by Rhys Jenkins in a program-
matic paper for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Develop-
ment (April 2001):
The 1990s saw a proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and an increased empha-
sis on corporate responsibility. These emerged in the aermath of a period that saw 
a major shi in the economic role of the state, and in policies toward transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and foreign direct investment. Whereas in the 1970s many 
national governments had sought to regulate the activities of TNCs, the 1980s 
was a decade of deregulation and increased efforts to attract foreign investment. 
A similar trend occurred at the international level, where efforts at regulation had 
been unsuccessful. 
It is in this context that the recent wave of voluntary codes of conduct must be 
situated. US companies began introducing such codes in the early 1990s, and the 
practice spread to Europe in the mid-1990s. Voluntary codes of conduct range from 
vague declarations of business principles applicable to international operations, to 
more substantive efforts at self-regulation. They tend to focus on the impact of TNCs 
in two main areas: social conditions and the environment. A variety of stakeholders, 
including international trade union organizations, development and environmental 
NGOs and the corporate sector itself have played a role in the elaboration of codes 
of conduct for international business (Jenkins 2001, p. iii).
However, our concern at this point is not the general phenomenon of codes 
of conduct but their function as what we shall call “so normative ordering” 
for a specific community with its own regulatory requirements. The com-
munity addressed in the next two examples is not an ethnic, religious, or 
class community but one with blurred contours, which Steffen Augsberg in 
his fascinating study of lawmaking between state and society describes as a 
“real or fictive international financial community” (Augsberg 2003, p. 279). 
The two examples selected are the following:
(1) The Takeover Code
It could be argued that the Takeover Code is an unsuitable example because 
it became legally largely obsolete with the coming into force of the Securities 
Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG) on 1 January 2002. But the contrary 
is the case, because precisely the “fate” of this code is interesting and partic-
ularly illuminating.
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Augsberg recounts the background and aim of the Takeover Code:
The Takeover Code contains rules of conduct for bidder and target companies in the 
context of public company acquisitions. In the original version it dates from 1995, 
when it replaced the guidelines of the Exchange Expert Commission. The model for 
the new arrangements was the 1968 British City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
The regulatory aim of the Takeover Code is to protect investors (especially by 
establishing transparency and equal opportunities) and to ensure and support a 
functioning market. In an economic system exposed to growing global interdepend-
ence, in which national regulation is increasingly oriented on the expectations of the 
real or fictive international “financial community,” the Takeover Code can be seen as 
an attempt to introduce international standards on a voluntary basis in Germany, too, in 
order to enhance the reputation of Germany as a financial centre (Augsberg 2003, 
p. 279. Transl. R.B.).
It is interesting what Augsberg has to say about the qualifications of the 
active norm-setting body; he notes that prevailing opinion sees the Exchange 
Expert Commission as a purely private organization, while calling this point-
blank assignment to the private-informal sector into question, since the 
commission is something of a “mongrel”:
The code was drawn up by the Exchange Expert Commission, an institution 
attached to but part of the Federal Ministry of Finance, whose job it is to advise 
the Federal Government on legal matters concerning the capital and the stock 
markets. The lack of any reference to the Federal Government or the Federal Min-
istry of Finance stands in the way of classifying the code as informal administrative 
recommendation from government and ministry; every announcement or report on 
the Takeover Code names only the Exchange Expert Commission as author. It is 
therefore the general and apparently undisputed view that the Takeover Code is 
grounded exclusively in private law. In contrast, it should be remembered that 
membership in the Commission depends on nomination by the Federal Ministry 
of Finance. In its function, the Exchange Expert Commission resembles the expert 
bodies in what Weber called “collegial” administration. It does not act on its own 
initiative but “on request” from the Federal Government. Although in the absence 
of any corresponding legal basis it does not exercise the powers of a public authority, 
its eminent position call for investing the informal level with greater legitimacy and 
also rules to be set on organization (especially membership) and procedures (Augs-
berg 2003, p. 280. Transl. R.B.).
Be that as it may, this hybrid norm-setting body issued the Takeover Code, 
which, as we have seen, was superseded by the Securities Acquisition and 
Takeover Act, since the Federal Government considered it suitable and right 
to have the pending EU Directive transposed not into an informal code but 
into statute law, which, however, largely incorporated the provisions of the 
code. The adoption of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act thus 
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illustrates “a normative regulatory technique by which the preexisting self-regu-
latory mechanisms are appropriated by the state and transposed into statute law” 
(Augsberg 2003, p. 289. Transl. R.B.); Augsberg concludes:
The example of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act demonstrates the dis-
placement of private self-regulatory norms by state law. But it was only experience with 
the Takeover Code that made it possible to draw up such a complex piece of 
legislation in a relatively short space of time. Its formulation shows in turn that 
the appropriation of this regulatory domain by the state is not complete: interaction 
and communication with the affected parties is still sought. It was sought to retain 
the advantages of self-regulation, namely flexibility and practicability, at any rate to 
some degree. Private norm-setting, if it is replaced by regulatory law, is not necessarily 
to be regarded as having failed, for it continues to have a substantive and procedural 
impact in the provisions of the law (Augsberg 2003, p. 292. Transl. R.B.).
(2) Code of Honour for Financial Analysts
The second example is the fate of the Code of Honour for Financial Analysts. 
Having initially seen no need to take action in this field, the Federal Govern-
ment changed its mind in late 1999 aer reproaches that financial analysts 
had contributed to the rapid losses in the “New Market” through careless 
conduct. Augsberg reports that, on the initiative of the Federal Minister of 
Finance, Professors von Rosen and Gerke were commissioned to examine 
the extent to which the activities of financial analysts, in particular, could be 
regulated by means of a code of conduct. A questionnaire sent to the organ-
izations and enterprises affected provided the basis of the dra of a so-called 
“Code for Investor-Friendly Capital Market Communication” that included oth-
er information intermediaries over and beyond financial analysts.
This code of honour – which we will not be looking at in greater detail 
here – was not very successful to the extent that the Federal Government 
considered this self-regulation inadequate (unlike the Corporate Governance 
Code) and held statutory regulation to be necessary. It therefore decided only 
to incorporate certain provisions of the dra code in the Fourth Financial 
Market Promotion Act, taking up the urgent proposal of the Exchange Experts 
Commission and, above all, the German Association of Financial Analysts 
and Asset Managers (DVFA) to put the conduct requirements for analysts on 
a firm statutory basis. The draing of a code of honour for financial analysts 
was hence not in vain, since the lawgiver drew on this preliminary work and 
could proceed on this basis. Augsberg:
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Moreover, the dra code is not to be regretted as a waste of time and effort. There is 
no doubt that it contributed much to regulating a matter from both a substantive 
point of view and a structural standpoint as regards the norm-setting mechanism. 
Also to the extent that the lawmakers rejected the – contestable – arguments of von 
Rosen and Gerke, the valuable insight was gained that the adoption of new arrange-
ments must be preceded by analysis of alternative regulatory models (Augsberg 
2003, p. 315. Transl. R.B.).
(3) Interim Conclusion
There are two things we can learn from these two examples:
First, the development of behavioural norms does not necessarily require 
a stable and closed governance collective such as guilds with mandatory 
membership or the Prussian officer corps. There are also communities within 
communities with open boundaries peopled by typical actors such as the 
financial community mentioned above with its investors, banks, and rating 
agencies, or the scientific community that – like the key “German Research 
Foundation” – have given themselves behavioural rules for “good science.”
Second, these examples show that rules are made not only as either state 
legislation or as non-state, private self-regulation; oen it is clearly a matter 
of a norm-setting process on a division-of-labour basis, in which the non-state 
regulatory task is to design acceptable, professionally informed regulatory models, 
which the legislator can completely or partly adopt if needed and politically 
opportune. We can therefore speak of the coproduction of law, and thus of an 
essential aspect of statehood.
c) Mercantile Law: The Development of Commercial Law 
as a Body of Law in its own Right
aa) The Merchant Class as Governance and Regulatory Collective
If the thesis underlying this chapter is correct that governance collectives 
generally seek to establish a regulatory regime for organization-sociological 
reasons, and that governance collectives are therefore always also regulatory 
collectives, we should be on the lookout for a governance collective corre-
sponding to the commercial law regulatory regime. And there is indeed such 
an entity, which we shall call the merchant class, a collective that began to 
develop in the 11th century and which rapidly took shape with the so-called 
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“commercial revolution.” In Law and Revolution, Harold J. Berman writes: 
“The rise of a merchant class was a necessary precondition for the develop-
ment of the new mercantile law” (Berman 1983, p. 334). But, he continues: 
“There is also a danger of viewing the law always as a consequence of social 
and economic change and never as a constituent part of such change, and in 
that sense a cause of it” (Berman 1983, p. 336). We have every reason to 
agree, having learned from our exploration of the history of globalization as 
the history of governance (Schuppert 2014) that the commercial revolution 
would not have taken place if the legal preconditions for non-cash payments 
had not been established. But this is not the only reason to quote the 
following passage: it also evokes the enabling function of law, which in our 
view has oen been wantonly neglected (on the providing function of law 
see Schuppert 1993):
In fact, the new jurisprudence of the late eleventh and twelh centuries provided a 
framework for institutionalizing and systematizing commercial relations in accord-
ance with new concepts of order and justice. Without such new legal devices as 
negotiable bills of exchange and limited liability partnerships, without the reform of 
the antiquated commercial customs of the past, without mercantile courts and 
mercantile legislation, other social and economic pressures for change would have 
found no outlet. Thus the commercial revolution helped to produce commercial 
law, but commercial law also helped to produce the commercial revolution (Ber-
man 1991, p. 336).
The merchant class itself played a major role in the development of an 
autonomous body of commercial law: 
It is characteristic of the time ... that the initial development of mercantile law was 
le largely ... to the merchants themselves, who organized international fairs and 
markets, formed mercantile courts, and established mercantile offices in the new 
urban communities that were springing up throughout western Europe (Berman 
1983, p. 340).
Since in the course of this chapter we have learned that when considering 
law we must always keep the enforcement dimension in mind, we ought to 
cast a brief glance at the mercantile courts Berman mentions. Under the 
heading Participatory Adjudication: Commercial Courts, he has this to say:
Market and fair courts, like seignorial and manorial courts, were nonprofessional 
community tribunals; the judges were elected by the merchants of market or fair 
from among their numbers. Guild courts were also nonprofessional tribunals, usu-
ally consisting simply of the head of the guild or his representative, but oen he 
chose two or three merchant members of the guild to sit as assessors in mercantile 
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cases. Occasionally, a professional jurist would sit with the merchant assessors. Pro-
fessional notaries oen acted as clerks to take care of legal formalities. Urban mer-
cantile courts, too, oen consisted of merchants elected by their fellows. A law of 
Milan of 1154 authorized the election of “consuls of merchants” to sit on commercial 
cases, and this system of merchant consular courts spread to many Italian cities. It 
permitted foreign merchants to choose judges from among their own fellow citi-
zens. The courts of the merchant consuls in the city republics of northern Italy 
gradually extended their jurisdiction over all mercantile cases within the city. Other 
European cities adopted the Italian institution of the merchant consul or else devel-
oped similar institutions for adjudication of commercial cases by merchant judges. In 
some countries, royal authority was asserted over merchant guilds and over town 
markets and fairs, but even then the law merchant continued, in general, to be 
administered by merchant judges (Berman 1983, p. 346).
The following remarks by Berman sum up this section on “the merchant 
class as governance and regulatory collective”: 
The law merchant, then, governed a special class of people (merchants) in special places 
(fairs, markets, and seaports); and it also governed mercantile relations in cities and 
towns. It was distinct from ecclesiastical, feudal, manorial, urban, and royal law, 
although it had especially close connections with urban law and ecclesiastical law (Ber-
man 1983, p. 341).
The close links between mercantile and ecclesiastical law, which might sur-
prise some readers, are easy to explain: mercantile law is always also con-
cerned with what is allowed – fair price – and what is not allowed – profi-
teering and usury. For this, so to speak, mercantile ethic, there has for 
centuries been a much cited and striking image: the “honest merchant.”
bb) The Honest Merchant: The Efficacy of a Narrative Steeped in Tradition
In our investigation of long-distance merchants as pioneers of globalization 
history and the Hanseatic League as a particularly interesting example of a 
powerful governance and regulatory collective (see Schuppert 2014, p. 36ff.), 
we have learned how important adherence to the principles of the honest 
merchant have always been.
But the appeal of the narrative of the honest merchant invites us to 
examine the close connection between two normative orders – commercial law 
and ecclesiastical law – orders of quite different origin but which in this 
respect pursue similar regulatory goals. Under the heading “Canon Law and 
Moral Theology in the 16th Century,” Thomas Duve writes about the link 
between moral theology and mercantile law:
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A few years aer the conclusion of the Council of Trent, a number of works 
appeared in the Spanish monarchy that could be described as popular, late-scholastic 
contract law literature – texts addressing merchants and traders, instructing them on 
the principles of contract law. There had, of course, already been such moral theo-
logical treatises on contract law in the late Middle Ages. But then a considerable 
number were published and rapidly diffused outside Europe, too. Probably the best 
known of theses works were the Tratos y contratos de mercaderes (1569, from the 
second edition: Summa de tratos y contratos) by Tomás de Mercado, the Arte de los 
contractos von Bartolomé Frías de Albornoz (1573), and the Tratado utilísmo de 
todos los contratos von Francisco García (1583) (Duve 2011, p. 160. Transl. R.B.).
Since the law merchant and canon law were two autonomous legal orders, 
conflicts could not be excluded. Harold J. Berman remarks:
The mercantile community had its own law, the lex mercatoria, just as the church 
had its own law, the jus canonicum. The merchants were, of course, members of the 
church and hence subject to the canon law, but they were also members of the 
mercantile community and hence subject to the law merchant. When the two bodies 
of law conflicted, it might not be clear which of the two should prevail. Both might 
be right. Only time could mediate the conflict (Berman, 1983, p. 346).
cc) The Universality of Commercial Law: Lex Mercatoria 
as Transnational Law?
Trade, particularly long-distance trade, necessarily operating across borders, 
demanded a legal regime that was not limited by territorial boundaries and 
prevailed everywhere where trade took place. Commercial law is therefore 
one of the most promising candidates for a law with a claim to universal 
validity. Berman shows that this was also accepted from the 15th century 
onwards:
The universal character of the law merchant, both in its formative period and 
thereaer, has been stressed by all who have written about it. In 1473 the Chancellor 
of England declared that alien merchants who came before him for relief would 
have their suits determined “by the law of nature in chancery ... which is called by 
some the law merchant, which is the law universal of the world.” In the first English 
book (1622) on the law merchant, Consuetudo vel lex mercatoria, or the Ancient Law 
Merchant, the author, Gerard Malynes, stated: “I have entitled the book according to 
the ancient name of Lex Mercatoria ... because it is customary law approved by the 
authority of all kingdoms and commonweals, and not a law established by the 
sovereignty of any prince.” And Blackstone wrote in the mid-eighteenth century: 
“The affairs of commerce are regulated by the law of their own called the Law 
Merchant or Lex Mercatoria, which all nations agree in and take notice of, and it 
is particularly held to be part of the law of England which decides the causes of 
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merchants by the general rules which obtain in all commercial matters relating to 
domestic trade, as for instance, in the drawing, the acceptance, and the transfer of 
Bills of Exchange” (Berman 1983, p. 342).
But the law merchant was regarded as transnational law not only in the early 
stages; present-day legal theory regards the new lex mercatoria taking up the 
medieval heritage as an excellent example not only of transnational law but 
also of non-state law generated by civil society (see Schuppert 2011c with 
further references). One of the most prominent scholars of this school, 
Gralf-Peter Calliess, describes this transnational law as follows:
Transnational law is the third category of autonomous legal system beyond the 
traditional categories of state, national and international law. Transnational law is 
made and developed through the lawmaking forces of a global civil society: (1) it is based 
on (a) general legal principles, and (b) their condensation and confirmation in civil 
society practice, (2) its application, interpretation, and development is the task of – 
at least primarily – private providers of alternative arbitration mechanisms, and (3) its 
coercive nature is based on the organization and implementation of socio-economic 
sanctions under law. Finally, (4) transnational law is codified – if at all – in the form 
of catalogues of general principles and rules, standardized pro forma contracts and 
codes of conduct drawn up by private norm-setting institutions (Calliess 2004, p. 244. 
Transl. R.B.).
We shall leave it at that for the moment; in chapter five we will be address-
ing the concept of law in detail.
4. Personal Governance Collectives and their Constitutive Concepts 
of Honour
a) The Obligation to Duel and the Officer’s Honour:
The Narrative of a Specific Concept of Honour in the Officers Corps
The phenomenon of the duel and its significance in the military-minded 
society of the nineteenth century is the subject of Men of Honor by Ute 
Frevert (1995), a veritable treasure trove for research on governance collec-
tives as regulatory collectives and on specific normative orders that can come 
into conflict with the legal order of the state. It yields astounding and 
impressive insights.
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aa) The Meaning and Function of Duelling
We begin with remarks by Ute Frevert on the importance and function of 
duelling and its entrenchment in the concept of honour cultivated by the 
noble officer corps by the bourgeois reserve officer model. The first thing that 
strikes one – and this is a phenomenon we have already met with in William 
Golding’s Lord of the Flies and in Popitz’s examples of the development of 
power structures in various “total institutions” – is that duelling is a practice 
that is grounded not only in societal coercion. It had the full and inner 
support of the officer corps and the higher civil service. Ute Frevert:
[D]uelling is a phenomenon with two faces whose relationship with each other is 
singularly strained. On the one hand, there emerges a social convention to which, in 
certain social institutions and circles, absolute obedience is the compulsory order of 
the day. On the other, a form of behaviour and a social custom become apparent 
which are not wholly subsumed under such extraneous rules and codes of conduct, 
and which therefore can only be explained to a limited degree in terms of categories 
such as social power and class relations.
It is this dimension of individual motives and social significance that is seriously difficult 
for us to comprehend in the closing stages of the twentieth century. The fact that 
men fought duels because refusal would have entailed forfeiting their status as 
officers or senior civil servants remains readily comprehensible to modern minds. 
However, a century on, the fact that in the same breath they spoke of courage and 
masculinity, of personality preservation and the individualist spirit, and of anti-
materialism and honour, carries an unfamiliar and peculiar ring. It is completely 
beyond the capacity of modern society to image that which nineteenth-century 
advocates of duelling referred to as the ‘idealist aspect’ of the duel of honour 
(Frevert 1995, p. 2).
Duelling was not a harmless quirk of people with an overblown notion of 
honour but a widespread social practice, which led to “social dramas” of the 
sort oen described in literature – see Fontane’s Effi Briest. But it is not these 
individual consequences that make the duel and military honour interesting 
but its function as a mirror of a special relationship between state and society and 
its inherent explosive force endangering the state’s monopoly of force and 
lawmaking:
Proceeding from the assumption that both the practice of duelling – as the scenic 
climax of a ‘social drama’ – and its contemporary image were a reflection of central 
structural principles of German society in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies focuses attention on the special functions which duelling performed for the way of 
life and differentiation strategies of the aristocracy and the middle class. However, by 
provoking vehement inner resistance and outward criticism, it also provides an 
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opportunity to discover cleavages and fault lines in the internal relations and exter-
nal contacts of these classes. Not least, the history of the duel can throw new light 
on the much-discussed relationship between the state and society. Since the private 
duel of honour called into question the state monopoly of force, the reactions of public 
authorities, courts and jurists give interesting insight into fundamental controversies 
about the legitimacy and constitutional characteristics of civil law and the motives and 
limitations to state claims to regulatory authority (Frevert 1995, p. 7, passage from 
original not included in translation. Transl. R.B.). 
bb) The Officers Corps as the Corporate Agent of a Normative Order
This calling into question could come only from an efficacious non-state 
governance collective, such as the officer corps:
In socio-historical terms, the fact that the army was a powerful bastion of duelling 
and an institution in which it enjoyed the special support of the authorities has far-
reaching implications, especially in view of the prominent role played by the military 
in state and society during the nineteenth century. Particularly in Prussia, and to a lesser 
extent in Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg, the army was a state within a state; under 
direct royal command and possessing its own jurisdiction, it set itself firmly apart 
from civilian society. However, at the same time, the army permeated civilian life in 
a multitude of ways and on an extremely large scale, a process to which the phrase 
‘social militarization’ is usually applied (Frevert 1995, p. 36).
Ute Frevert shows the great extent to which the code of honour of the officer 
corps operated as a corporative normative order, citing the words of the 
Prussian General von Müffling: “It is imperative that the world should realize 
that honour means everything to him [the warrior], and danger nothing ...”, 
thus explaining what this world really was – the microcosm of a privileged class:
In this case, the ‘world’ corresponded to the peers of duellists who took great care to 
ensure that no officer should breach their code of conduct, which was oriented 
towards the possession of honour and the demonstration of courage. By definition, 
the honour of officers was class honour which was defined, standardized and monitored on 
a corporative basis. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Georg Simmel, who, 
like Max Weber, considered that honour was a means of class socialization but who, 
in contrast to Weber, laid greater emphasis on the link between individual and class 
honour, made an observation that was particularly applicable to the honour of 
officers. According to Simmel, alongside morality and the law, honour was a central 
medium of social survival which was utilized by those ‘special groups’ which occu-
pied a position midway between society and the individual. Whereas the law con-
stituted the ‘survival form’ of society, and morality that of the individual, honour 
represented a class phenomenon which was all the more in evidence the greater the 
cohesion of the class in question. The purpose of honour was to stabilize ‘the cohesion, 
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standing, regularity and furtherance of the life processes’ of a social group, and to 
isolate it from other ‘groups’ or classes (Frevert 1995, p. 47).
That the closed officer corps provides such a prime example of a governance 
collective with a normative order of its own is shown by the following 
passage, notably by the assertion by the Prussian General von Borstell that 
the military code of honour was a “perfect means of bonding and cautioning”:
The best proof of the appropriateness of this sociological categorization was fur-
nished by the officer corps, whose social isolation provided optimum conditions for 
the development of a special, corporatively standardized and individually practised 
code of honour. In 1821, the Prussian general Karl Heinrich Ludwig von Borstell 
asserted that honour assumed the role of a ‘coalescent and prognosticatory medium’ 
which was in a position to maintain the unity and purity [of the officer class] and 
[its] standing among the educated and uneducated sections of all social classes’ 
better than any disciplinary regulations. If, on the one hand, honour created cor-
porative equality among officers irrespective of length of service or rank, then on the 
other, it safeguarded the internal homogeneity of the officer class, who established 
honour as a binding principle of life. As such, honour functioned both as a criterion for 
distinguishing officers from outsiders, and as a special distinguishing feature of the 
officer corps, whose honour was so highly prized that it seemed well worth the risk 
of incurring physical injury (Frevert 1995, p. 48).
A societal practice like duelling clearly needs a strict justificatory narrative, 
because of the associated danger of triggering social drama and conflict with 
the state legal system and its ban on duelling. 
cc) The Justificatory Narrative of a Specific Military Honour
Many have contributed to the great narrative of the special position of the 
officer and the consequent special concept of honour, i. e., one that deviates 
from that of general civilian society. A particularly prominent voice was that 
of Prince Wilhelm, the later Prussian king and German emperor Wilhelm I, 
who – according to Ute Frevert – commented on the subject in 1846:
[W]hen the amendment to the criminal law on personal affronts was under dis-
cussion in the Prussian Council of State, the disputatious prince had argued more 
along political than along professional lines. In a minority vote, he spoke in favour 
of retaining the existing provisions, in accordance with which, affronts to officers were 
punished more severely than affronts to civilians. Aer all, so the prince argued, among 
the officer class, honour, and for this very reason, an affront, assumed a completely 
different character and a completely different significance from among other estates 
... For officers, class honour and honourableness were the primary requirements, the 
primary and most important prerequisites of their profession. In this sense, an affront 
118 Chapter Two
to an officer, which constituted an attack upon his essential qualifications, indeed, 
upon his very existence, was a particularly grave rime which was all the more 
deserving of severe punishment; the legislator, in other words, the Prussian state, 
should therefore afford preferential consideration to the maintenance and encour-
agement of the honourableness of the officer class, to who it largely owed it author-
ity. The interest of the state in the honour of the officer class, which, given that the 
honourableness of the officer class constitutes the foundation of their security and 
existence, is not applicable to the same extent in the case of any other estate, would 
appear to be a sufficiently cogent reason for treating affronts to officers differently 
from affronts to other persons (Frevert 1995, pp. 39–40).
This sort of argument was apparently widespread. But if the officer’s concept 
of honour was so exalted, it was only logical to expect the officer to disregard 
civil law and feel himself committed primarily to the corporate professional 
order. This situation of conflicting norms was also clearly seen, and given the 
justificatory narrative of the special honour of the officer, there could be no 
doubt about how this conflict was to be resolved. Ute Frevert cites Chief of 
the Admiralty von Caprivi:
In a directive issued to the naval officer corps in 1888, the Chief of the Admiralty, 
Count Leo von Caprivi, who had also been a member of the revision commission in 
1872, expressed his opinion on duelling constraints in even more forthright terms. 
The future Imperial Chancellor dismissed out of hand the glaring contradiction which 
obtained between the legal ban on duelling and the military convention of duelling on the 
grounds that although recent legislation had ordained the prosecution of duelling 
offences, ‘this did not necessitate any change in the conduct of officers in the face of 
affronts and conflicts because it continues to remain essential that officers should be 
compelled to satisfy the requirement of class ethics, even in the face of the threat of 
incurring punishment under common law for so doing. Wherever the honour of 
individual officers and that of the officer class are at stake, it is not permissible that 
the punishment required by law should have any bearing on the matter’ (Frevert 
1995, pp. 62–63).
This position met with approval in the most exalted circles, even though in 
the light of advancing societal and political democratization it was coming 
under increasing pressure. Ute Frevert plausible explains this in terms of a 
purposive political strategy to establish that the real foundation of the Prus-
sian state was the special status of its military and their loyalty:
The fact that this conflict of objectives in the Kaiserreich was apparently insoluble is 
a further indication of the virtually supraconstitutional and extralegal status of the 
military, who were defended and shielded against all forms of criticism by their 
supreme commander. In not only tolerating and protecting, but also authoritatively 
insisting upon, duelling as a class duty of officers, the Kaiser disregarded the laws of 
the land; although the provisions on duelling contained in the Criminal Code of the 
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German Reich of 1873 also formally applied to officers, they were not accepted as 
binding behavioural guidelines. In 1896, the quasi-official Militär-Wochenblatt 
commented: ‘Our conduct as officers is presecribed to us by orders and regulations, 
and by the established ethics and traditions of our class. Those are our laws, our source 
of authority. In the event that this should bring us into conflict with the laws of the 
Reich, then we are prepared to bear the consequences’ ... 
The fact that the Kaiser and the military authorities clove to this protection in the 
face of massive public and growing parliamentary criticism is an indication of the 
serious intent of their challenge. Indeed, there are good grounds for assuming that 
the duelling constraint imposed upon officers by the authorities was intended as a political 
signal, the purpose of which was to underline the exceptional position of the military 
and their special allegiance to the supreme authority of the state. The fact that the 
decree on duelling of 1843 was repealed immediately following the foundation of 
the Reich and superseded by a far more lax arrangement and the fact that, in practice, 
the duelling constraint increased considerably in intensity aer the 1870s are indi-
cations of the state’s interest in emphasizing the exclusive and privileged role of the 
officer corps and in shielding it against civil equalization (Frevert 1995, pp. 68–69).
dd) The Normative Order of the Officers Corps as Reflected in Popular Manuals
In view of the elusive concept of honour and the far-reaching “social mili-
tarization” of Prussia, it is no surprise that someone had the idea of writing 
down and publishing the rules to be obeyed in matters of honour. Ute 
Frevert reports on the success of the resulting guides and manuals:
However, it was not only the superior officers and more experienced comrades of 
reserve officers who informed them as to the precise rules and regulations of the 
military codes of honour and duelling but also ... guides and handbooks ... The first 
German reference work on the subject of ‘conventional duelling customs’ (Die 
konventionellen Gebräuche beim Zweikampf) was published in 1882 in the military 
journal for reserve and Landwehr officers. Twelve months later, due to the fact that it 
had aroused ‘universal interest in the army,’ it was published as a book. It contained 
the rules which were to be observed during duels, which hitherto had been passed 
on by word of mouth, and according to the author, who was a regular officer of 
fairly advanced years, it was a reaction to the lack of such oral tradition among 
officers of reserve status. Although it stated that far from summarizing any ‘officially 
approved rules’, its intended purpose was merely to convey traditions, it rapidly 
attained recognition in the officer corps as a semi-official handbook which explained to 
officers the universally valid behavioural expectations which they were obliged to 
fulfil in cases of conflicts of honour ...
The high sales figures for such handbooks gives some indications of how wide-
spread a demand there was for advice of this nature: by 1911, there had been seven 
editions of Die konventionellen Gebräuche beim Zweikampf. It would seem that they 
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fulfilled a general need for guidance. It had been assumed from the outset that there 
was such a need, particularly among reserve officers, but it probably also existed 
among their regular comrades, increasing numbers of whom were of middle-class 
origin and thus, without any ‘innate theory of duelling’ at their disposal (Frevert 
1995, pp. 79–81).
According to Ute Frevert, however, this codification of the officer corps code 
of conduct initiates the process of undermining its effectiveness. We bring 
this section to a close with this interesting thesis of the erosion of the unques-
tioned validity of an internalized code of honour through its written documenta-
tion. 
However, the written codification of the duelling regulations not only met the need 
for information on the part of middle-class (reserve) officers and furthered the 
efforts of the military authorities to achieve the effective integration of social neo-
phytes; it also provided a boost to the formal institutionalization of duelling, which 
was transformed from a tradition transmitted by word of mouth, passed down from 
father to son and circulated among fellow officers, into a convention which it was 
possible to study and absorb. However, like the definition and formalization of 
military honour, this regulatory enshrinement of duelling issued in a precarious 
ambivalence: while, on the one hand, its objective was the immortalization of a 
collective behavioural pattern, on the other hand, it laid these regulations and behav-
ioural forms wide open to abuse. The moment a tradition becomes enshrined in 
writing and is given a clearly defined and codified framework, it forfeits it unim-
pugned validity and can assume the appearance of an artificial product, the stabiliza-
tion of which requires the employment of external means (Frevert 1995, p. 81).
b) Do Gangs of Thieves have Normative Orders?
The Example of “Thieves in the Law”
At first glance, it might seem strange to put this question seriously, for how 
could robbers and thieves – oen characterized as “lawless” – have a norma-
tive and hence deontological order, which would surely have to address the 
common good? But this is putting things the wrong way round – for three 
cogent reasons:
First, the fact that people who regularly and deliberately break (state) law 
does not (contrary to what the question of what distinguishes a gang of 
thieves from a legal system suggests) mean that the same people cannot 
agree on an order valid within their group. As the phenomenon of “thieves 
in the law” shows, this can by no means be excluded.
Second, we know from oen cited politologists, sociologists, and econom-
ic historians that it is not easy to draw a clear dividing line between gangs of 
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thieves and states, the latter of which are generally considered to have legal 
systems. Citing various example, Charles Tilly (1986) has shown how gangs 
of thieves can mutate into states, and the economic historian Frederick Lane 
(1958) has describe early modern governments as force-using enterprises that 
produce and sell the provision of protection as a special service. The monop-
oly of the means of force and the protection racket economy thus constitute an 
essential aspect of state-building in Europe.
Third, we call to mind the methodological approach common to gover-
nance theory and the sociology of law of first analysing the actual gover-
nance structures and the law actually practised before going on to normative 
assessment.
Having said this, we should now examine without prejudice whether 
thieves, robbers, and bandits develop an order binding on their group and 
ensure compliance with it. 
A good example of the “lawless” submitting to strict normative orders are 
the so-called “thieves in the law,” wory w sakone. 
This species of organized crime in Russia had hitherto escaped our notice. 
Only examination of the “gang of thieves” problem brought it to our atten-
tion, and we have learned a great deal about it from the literature (especially 
Roth 2000a; Volkov 2001; Osterloh 2004). From the perspective of gover-
nance collectives and their normative orders, “thieves in the law” are quite 
fascinating. Luckily, the literature consulted is not only very informed but 
also very serious, so that the following, oen astounding information is not 
the product of clichés about the Russian mafia or racist prejudice.
We need first of all clarify what “thieves in the law” actually are. Kay 
Osterloh – a social education worker at the Nuremberg drug aid centre with 
numerous Russian clients, also from Nuremberg prison – describes the 
phenomenon as follows:
The origin of the “thieves in the law” movement is largely unknown. Some histor-
ians place it in the second half of the nineteenth century. Others believe it emerged 
during the turmoil of the October Revolution. It is a sort of secret society, a self-
organization of criminals, which drew up its own constitution. “Some criminologists 
consider it to be unique of its kind, with no analogy in the criminal society of other 
countries” ... Its members are not only classical thieves as defined by the penal code 
but also various sorts of “crooks” and criminals, so to speak the “aristocracy” of 
crime who in their statutes had given themselves a sort of law of their own under 
which the concept “thief” advanced to a “honorific title” to be gained only through 
particular “achievements.” The granting of this title was watched over by a “thieves 
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assembly,” the “s’chodka,” which also sat as a sort of arbitral tribunal in the event of 
conflicts. The “thieves law” was the only binding body of rules in accordance with 
which every “vor” (“thief”) had to live and act. The law of the land was regarded as 
hostile and simply ignored ... (Osterloh 2004, p. 2. Transl. R.B.).
Paul Erich Roth adds:
It cannot be established exactly when and in which camp a group of “thieves in the 
law” first formed. It was probably in the late 1920s. The process of organization in 
the innumerable GULAG camps extended well into the 1930s. In 1930 there were 
1.7 million prisoners in the camps of the NKWD, and in those of the OGPU some 
100,000.
The “blatnye”,1 which later took on the name “thieves in the law,” was composed of 
members of two groups of convicts. First there were the predominantly “socially 
dangerous elements” from among the “Žigany,” and second “socially-related ele-
ments,” mostly thieves and robbers, who called themselves “urki” or “urkagany.” 
The “Žigany” opposed the regime for ideological reasons. In the power struggle 
between the two groups, the “Urky” were victorious. Political motives were rele-
gated to the background: a thief should steal and not concern himself with politics. 
In the early 1930s, the law of thieves was drawn up; the “crowning” as thief was 
the precondition for membership in the “Thieves in the Law” (Roth 2000a, p. 725. 
Transl. R.B.).
It is not new that power structures and rules reflecting them develop in 
prisons and prison camps (see Popitz 1992). But what is remarkable about 
the “Thieves in the Law” are four key characteristics that are of great interest 
from the point of view of governance collectives and their normative orders.
aa) The Law of Thieves
The Law of Thieves itself does not exist as a semi-official written text; like all 
codes of honour, it is an informal set of rules. Nevertheless, it can be approx-
imately reconstructed. Kay Osterloh has done so (with reference to a 1997 
book by Alain Lallemand on the Russian Mafia):
1. The thief must abandon his biological family (mother, father, siblings). The crim-
inal community is his sole family.
2. A thief must not found a family of his own (have no wife and children).
3. A thief must not engage in work and must live only from the proceeds of his 
criminal activities.
1 In thieves’ cant, “blat” meant acquaintance, relations, which one used illegally.
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4. A thief must give other thieves moral and material support from the common purse 
or the obschtschak [illegal solidarity fund].
5. A thief may pass on information about accomplices and their whereabouts only 
in strict confidentiality.
6. If a thief comes under investigation, the other thief must “cover” him and enable 
him to flee.
7. If a dispute arises within a gang or between thieves, a meeting must be arranged 
to settle it.
8. Should this become necessary, a thief must attend the meeting to judge another 
thief if his conduct of life or behaviour occasions criticism.
9. The punishment pronounced against the thief at this meeting must be carried out.
10. A thief must have a command of thieves’ cant.
11. A thief must play cards only if he has enough money to pay any debts.
12. A thief must instruct novices in his “art.”
13. A thief must always have a “boy” or schestjorka in his service.
14. A thief may drink alcohol only as long has he keeps a clear head.
15. Under no circumstances may a thief have anything to do with the authorities; a 
thief takes no part in the life of society; a thief must not belong to any social 
associations.
16. A thief must accept no weapon from the state and must not serve in the army.
17. A thief must “honour” every promise he gives to another thief ...
This “law” lays no claim to absolute validity; it is rather the sole formulated version 
to be found in the relevant literature. The rules were also constantly adapted to meet 
new realities and requirements, and proved to be highly flexible.
As we shall see, this code, although dating back to the 1920s, has had an enormous 
normative impact to this day (Osterloh 2004, p. 3. Transl. R.B.).
Two things about this thieves’ law should be particularly stressed. First – 
essential for any sort of normative order – an established and observed 
procedure for conflict resolution, and second the existence of a common purse
from which each thief receives not only a share but which also provides 
support for members in prison (Volkov 2001, p. 178).
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bb) The Thieves’ Organization as Ordering Factor
In the course of this chapter we have repeatedly come across the concept of 
certainty of order. We have seen that one of the essential functions of a group’s 
set of rules is to provide a specific order – whether just or unjust. Kay 
Osterloh confirms this in comments about the organization of “thieves in 
the law” as an ordering factor:
The “thieves’ organization” soon became an ordering factor through its strict organ-
ization and unscrupulousness. In the camp (Russian “zona”) the guards ruled during 
the day and at night the “vory” held sway. De facto, there was therefore a sort of 
tolerated double society. The “thieves” were systematically deployed as a parallel 
“law enforcement agency” in the camp. This served first to further humiliate and 
terrorize political prisoners and second to produce a camp elite that could be 
correspondingly functionalized by the camp administration ... In “The World 
Turned Upside Down” the archaeologist Lew Klejn ... describes his own painful 
experience in the “zona” in the 1980s. Despite hesitant destalinization aer the 20th 
Party Congress in 1956, things in the camps had not essentially changed. As soon as 
it became dark and the officers had le the block, those who were the real masters 
raised their heads. But their silent presence was also to be felt during the day. 
Nothing happened without a glance to check back with them. Such a secret master 
and ruler of a work troop was elected at night at a meeting of influential crooks ... 
(Osterloh 2004, p. 4. Transl. R.B.).
If this was the internal functional logic of the camp, it is not surprising if the 
governance structure of such camps is described as a caste system: 
The “glavvor” (“head thief”) or the “avtorität” was elected for the whole of his term 
of imprisonment. His power was inviolable. The internal power system was based on a 
caste system:
1. “Thieves” did not work and exercised almost unlimited power.
2. “Servants” assisted the “thieves” and were their “enforcers.”
3. The so-called “swine” were the “parias” of the camp. A swine could be recognize 
by his stoop, the way he ducked his head, cast his eyes down, a certain timidity, 
skinniness, and bruises ... The “swine caste” included homosexuals, sex offenders, 
and what would now be described as “wimps” or “wusses.” 
The camp administration acted as if it knew nothing about this caste structure. In 
reality, however, it was well informed and accepted the caste order by taking it into 
account in appointments to such positions as brigadier, and elder, thus validating 
the system, since such “positions” would otherwise be meaningless. In the camp it 
was unthinkable for a crook to stand to attention before a servant or, worse still, 
before a swine or that a swine be given command over a crook. And there was 
nothing funny about it at all ... Lew Klejn comes to the conclusion that “everything 
was like an echo: violence was followed by violence, hierarchy by hierarchy, system 
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by system! ...” As we shall see, this bitter formula is still highly relevant in German 
society ... (Osterloh 2004, p. 4 f. Transl. R.B.).
cc) The Crucial Importance of Group Membership and Group Solidarity
We have seen that group norms have the function of stabilizing the group 
internally and setting it off externally, as well as strengthening group iden-
tity. Kay Osterloh identifies a number of group values in this sense:
The decisive values of the group are:
– Loyalty to the group internally and externally
– Solidarity; sharing is the order of the day in the group (e. g., alcohol and drugs)
– Discretion externally (e. g., towards police and justice)
– Sanctioning of rule-breaking (if need be, corporal punishment)
– Betrayal is the worst violation
Loyalty to the group can go so far that in the event of suspicions or accusations 
being raised, responsibility is accepted even if another member of the group is 
actually guilty of the deed (Osterloh 2004, p. 10 f. Transl. R.B.).
It is interesting what Osterloh, looking at the example of young group 
members, has to say about the relationship between group norms as “endog-
enous norms” with “exogenous norms” valid outside the group:
For young people the group is the crucial factor. Its norms and values, along with the 
hierarchy in the group, determine their behaviour. The rules and norms of the 
“outside world” or society take second place. This loyalty to the group can at times 
take on irrational qualities. A colleague from Stuttgart reported of his experience 
with a group of Russian-speaking young people in a youth welfare centre. One of 
the young people constantly broke all the rules in force. In consultation with the 
colleagues involved, it was finally decided to remove the delinquent youth from the 
leisure group. Aer his expulsion, the group thanked the staff for the decision and 
asked why they had taken so long to make it. The staff were astonished at this 
comment and asked in turn why the group had not taken action themselves, since 
they had clearly been aware that the young delinquent would only damage the 
reputation of the group as a whole. The answer was even more astonishing in its 
logic for the social workers. The young man had long been felt by the young people 
themselves to be a disruptive factor for the group with his constant breaking of the 
centre rules, but he had not broken any group rules. He therefore had to be tol-
erated until the people in charge came to a decision. Deviation from the group code 
would have been very rapidly and discretely sanctioned by the young people themselves.
The report shows clearly the different normative systems and their value hierarchy 
for the young people (Osterloh 2004, p. 10. Transl. R.B.).
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The vital importance of the group within organized crime in Russia is con-
firmed by Vadim Volkov in “Violent Entrepreneurs in Post-Communist Rus-
sia” (2001), where he recounts that these violent entrepreneurs consist of 
smaller groups, which had originally formed as homeland groups, sport 
groups, or the like, to later become active in matters of “protection” and 
“violent enforcement.” The following passage gives us a brief glance at the 
world of group crime in St. Petersburg:
Many groups have gradually lost their original direct connection with some obscure 
suburb, sport club, ethnicity or the founding leader. Actually, the meaning of the 
criminal group’s name is its practical usage. In the practice of violent entrepreneurship such 
names are used as trade marks. The license to use the trade mark practically means the 
right to introduce oneself as “working with” such-and-such criminal group or with 
avtoritet X. Such a license is supplied to a brigade or an individual member by the 
avtoritet, the leader of the group, normally aer the candidates have been tested in 
action. ...
The name of the group has a specific function in the practice of violent entrepre-
neurship: it guarantees the “quality” of protection and enforcement services and 
refers to the particular kind of reputation that is built from the known precedents of 
successful application of violence and “question-solving.” ...
The reputation of enforcement partner, embodied in the name of the group or its 
leader, is crucial for the aversion of possible cheats in business and acts of violence, 
since it carries the message of unavoidable retaliation. The license to use the name to 
conduct violent entrepreneurship, i. e. to act as commercial enforcement partner, 
presupposes an informal contract between the leader and the unit (the brigade) that 
acts in his name. The contract includes the obligation to pay into the common fund 
and to follow certain rules. The group that has no license from one of the established 
avtoritet will have little success in its business and will either be exterminated or sent 
to prison with the help of police. The latter will be glad to use the occasion to its 
own advantage to report a successful operation against organized crime (Volkov 
2001, p. 15. Transl. R.B.).
dd) The “Thief in the Law” as an Exemplary Narrative
Obviously, crime structures in Russia have much changed since the 1920s 
and 1930s, and the “thieves in the law” no longer exist as such:
The transformation of the “socialist” system into a capitalist market economy and 
civil democracy began already with Glasnost and Perestroika, and increased in pace 
with the demise of the Soviet Union. With the new freedoms of a not clearly defined 
“democracy,” and above all radical economic changes, an era began of unprece-
dented personal enrichment. The political and economic elite of the country showed 
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the way. While combine directors had already treated “public property” as their 
own, i. e., to line their own pockets, this attitude logically continued in the course 
of unguided or uncontrolled privatization. So-called “oligarchs” controlled politics 
with their financial power, and public funds were unscrupulously embezzled or 
diverted. Criminal circles, too, used the confusion of the times to reorganize. The 
classical organization “Thieves in the Law” experienced various internal struggles. 
For example the so-called “modernizers” split away. New organizations and associ-
ations developed apace, which were no longer willing to obey such a strict and 
obsolete regime. Today so-called “organized crime” or the “Russian mafia” is a very 
complex structure and cannot be simply described as monolithic ... (Osterloh 2004, 
p. 7 f. Transl. R.B.).
However, these changes are not our subject of discussion. But precisely in 
view of these changes and the time that has past since Stalin, it is striking 
that the “Thieves in the Law” are still a model. Kay Osterloh:
All our clients without exception knew about the “Thieves in the Law.” Uncritical 
and with a strongly romanticized view, they adopted clichés about this movement. 
It was always better to have a sense of honour as “vor,” as “thief,” than to be a “dumb 
Russian from Kazakhstan.” As a rule, this has nothing to do with the actual “thieves,” 
let alone the so-called “Russian mafia.” They “act out” the pattern. 
Very few of our clients had already had contact in their countries of origin with any 
forms of “organized crime.” They mostly gleaned their knowledge from the tales of 
their elders (collective knowledge), films (e. g., “Brat” I/II or “Bumer”), videos, 
books, and the Russian press. To be a “gangster” or “bandit” is seen as cool, an 
attitude to be found in other subcultures, too. The bandit songs from the camp 
period thus provide a “soundtrack” for immigrant youth. They sing of honour, of 
“real” men and life on the fringes of society. In answer to critical questions, our 
clients willingly describe this way of life as the “real” life (Osterloh 2004, p. 9. Transl. 
R.B.).
This model function is so effective that in German prisons where delin-
quents originating from Russia are held, the Russian caste system of the prison 
camps is copied and practised:
The practices of the “thieves” that have been learned or adopted in idealized form 
are used here. Many young people have the impression that on crossing the prison 
threshold a Russian “prison chip” has been implanted in them. The whole pro-
gramme from their “home” plays out. There are regional differences. Depending 
on the inmates of the particular prison, the old rules or warmed-over versions of 
them apply or new ones are invented. In some prisons the inmates call themselves 
“thief.” 
The caste system of the earlier prison camps with similarly practised (in various 
forms and at various levels of radicality). Here they find what they had lost there [in 
freedom] (or what they could not hope to gain there): recognition and respect. They 
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discover that there is a milieu in which the qualities they have in abundance are held 
in high esteem, whereas qualities they lack are superfluous ... One of my clients, for 
instance, shaved his head immediately aer being imprisoned (as is usual in Russian 
prisons and camps, albeit involuntarily). On a finger he had the symbol for “young 
first offender” tattooed, and “decorated” his knee with two eight-pointed stars 
(which means: I will never kneel before the cops). No-one had forced him to do 
so. He had, so to speak, prepared for his new life in prison. For him, life behind bars, 
in the “zona” was only a different but known way of life with the concomitant, inevitable 
rules (Osterloh 2004, p. 11. Transl. R.B.).
IV. Community-Forming Normative Orders
We have seen that groups and social associations give themselves rules and 
manage to enforce compliance with them. This development of rules serves 
to stabilize the group as such, promotes its cohesion, and establishes a cor-
porate identity. To this extent, the development of a group normative order 
is always community-forming, so that the above heading could be read as 
unspecific. But what is meant is that there are a number of close-knit com-
munities that constitute themselves as communities precisely through their own 
regulatory regime, thus marking themselves off from other communities. Prime 
examples of this are the medieval orders and monasteries, which not only 
developed their own regulatory regimes (Schwaiger and Heim 2004), e. g. 
the Rule of St. Benedict, but are distinguished and named precisely on the 
basis of each monastic “rule” (see the collection of major monastic rules in 
Balthasar 1994).
We shall restrict ourselves to examining two examples of norm-formation 
processes and their institutionalisation:
1. The Normativity of Exemplary Patterns of Behaviour
in the Institutional Structures of Medieval Monastic Life
a) The Normative Force of Exemplary Narrative
The Dresden Collaborative Research Centre 537 “Institutionality and His-
toricity,” which took an institutional analysis approach, investigated the 
genesis and establishment of medieval mendicant orders. A 1999 publication 
(Melville und Oberste 1999) examines how order-specific normative systems 
are developed and enforced. The following questions are addressed:
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* To what specific guiding concepts were the early mendicant orders com-
mitted?
* What paths were available to internalize and propagate such ideas?
* How did the original ideals and the allocation of social functions con-
solidate into the organizational structures of the orders?
Thomas Füser points to the importance of the exemplum as a medium, 
showing how this form of exemplary narrative, inviting emulation, can be 
understood as a way to develop a normative order specific to a community 
(Füser 1999, p. 27ff.). These exempla (for an overview of research see Schen-
da 1969) are of course concerned first with the exemplum Christi and second 
with the exempla sanctorum, that is to say, the numerous medieval lives of the 
saints, but also with the so-called “everyman” exempla, which represent the 
category of the unknown hero or nameless witness to the action of God in 
history. We are interested less in these exempla as such than in the function of 
exemplary narrative in developing and enforcing normative patterns of behaviour.
As far as the function of exempla in developing and concretizing the norma-
tive ordering of a religious order is concerned, Füser has this to say:
All exempla sanctorum formulate exemplary patterns of behaviour and present 
them for emulation. They are at the same time explanation and explication of 
prevailing guiding ideas and normative systems. Hagiography and historiography 
cannot be kept apart; the description of the life of the mendicant saint is always an 
exposition of the particular order’s own history. This is especially the case in the early 
phase of tradition formation in both of the orders under study [Franciscans and 
Dominicans]. Apart from stylizing personal models, the vision reports convey a 
specific order identity that aims to distinguish the religious order in question from 
competing concepts of the religious life. A number of exampla also serve quite 
concretely to convey, explain, and display monastic norms. These exempla, which 
mostly show monks in borderline situations and norm conflicts, are of the greatest 
importance for underpinning the internal normative system of the monastery (Füser 
1999, p. 57. Transl. R.B.).
As for the enforcement dimension, Popitz has shown how important both the 
threat of sanctions and the internalization of the normative order is. Thomas 
Füser on the community form of the order:
To produce such a meaningful order, social discipline, imposed in the medieval 
monasteries and orders in a close-knot network of social control through elaborate 
supervision and sanctioning mechanisms, does not suffice; individual self-discipline 
has to be produced through the internalization of norms and introspection, hence 
self-control. “Internal controls” develop above all through the “socialization of the 
individual into institutions.” However, the legitimation of the institution required 
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constant legitimation of the behavioural demands on the individual by consistently 
relating these demands to the prevailing guiding ideas accepted by all members 
of the institution. Only then does social control enter into the motivation of actors: 
a process of internalizing normative guidelines culminating in “willed conformity.” 
These observations are consistent with the findings of Günther Schmelzer ..., who 
has subjected Catholic religious order communities to social-scientific scrutiny: “As 
religious groups and in keeping with their tradition, orders aim to influence their 
members, not in the first place by the threats of sanctions but by establishing and 
stabilizing their understanding of values and meaning, i. e., by formalizing behav-
ioural expectations and need structures.”
Given the tasks medieval religious orders need to perform to safeguard their exis-
tence, the importance of the exempla for these institutions in mediating between 
abstract norms and the concrete life led by their members is obvious. Exempla played 
a vital role in the subject formation of members of an institution by passing on 
knowledge and procedures. They performed a crucial institutional task, namely to 
establish permanence by stabilizing patterns of behaviour, and to safeguard it 
despite the dynamics to which human orderings are fundamentally subject (Füser 
1999, p. 57 f. Transl. R.B.).
b) Exempla Collections: A Method for Strengthening Group Identity
The collection and centralized archiving of exempla promoted by the leader-
ship of the religious orders had not only the function of individualizing the 
behavioural requirements and provide “training programmes” for “self-anal-
ysis and self-control,” but also to justify and consolidate what we would now 
call “corporate identity.” Thomas Füser:
The traditionary function of the exemplum, to store the experience of orders, is their 
second main function. Apart from stabilizing ordering patterns, their decisive insti-
tutional contribution to stability was to elaborate an internal narrative that, as group 
identity (“we-identity,” “corporate identity,” collective consciousness) could also be 
used for external legitimation and the self-affirmation of the order. The use of 
exempla within the order also provided “ideological justification of the facts.” Evi-
dence for the legitimacy of the religious objectives of the order also guided the 
“means of coercion and control” used in it, and the more or less absolute claim to 
subject all aspects of its members lives to precise, detailed, and authoritative norms 
(Füser 1999, p. 101. Transl. R.B.).
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2. The Basel Mission: A Community Caught in the Net of its Norms
a) Mission as Exported Pietism
The Evangelical Missionary Society in Basel was founded in 1815 in the 
wake of a surge of piety in European Protestantism, a parallel international 
missionary movement, and a specific local development, which Thoralf 
Klein describes as follows:
With the founding of the “German Society for the Promotion of the Christian Truth and 
Piety,” in short “Christian Society” in 1780, Basel became an important centre of the 
Revival Movement. The aim of the society was to bring together like-minded, pious 
Christians across denominational and social boundaries. The directors included 
Basel vicars and merchants; the full-time secretaries all came from Württemberg 
(Klein 2002, p. 108. Transl. R.B.).
As Klein shows, the Basel Mission drew both in religious-theological sub-
stance and personnel on Württemberg Pietism, in which the Basel missionaries 
had been socialized, and – intensified by the training at the Basel Mission 
House – so thoroughly that their approach to the alien Chinese culture was 
“prestructured by home conditions” (Klein 2002, p. 120. Transl. R.B.). The 
nature of Basel missionary work can therefore be understood only if the 
particularities of Württemberg Pietism are taken into account. This brings us 
back to the key role of group membership and the special position of a 
community with a dense regulatory regime of its own to which it gives rise. 
Thoralf Klein:
The Pietists constituted a special community whose membership was based both on 
intensive piety and affirmation of the spiritual traditions of Pietism and on accept-
ance of the individual by the group. Male members addressed each other as “broth-
er,” using the familiar “du,” and to this extent met as equals. At the same time, there 
was a very special hierarchy in which the “Stundenhalter,” in charge of Bible study 
meetings, held a particular position of leadership; presumably still greater was the 
influence of local and regional leaders, the so-called “patriarchs,” who exercised 
unlimited authority especially in matters of faith ... Externally, the Pietist sub-culture 
kept distant from the rest of the population, whom they disparagingly referred to as 
“Weltkinder,” “children of the world” with their “worldly,” that is un-Christian way 
of life. ... 
The rigid social norms derived from the Pietist understanding of Christianity fav-
oured a special position in society. They sought to suppress all drives felt to be un-
Christian, such as aggressiveness, sexuality, indulgence, and enjoyment were 
frowned upon. Diligence, thri, “fidelity in small things” and willingness to make 
sacrifices for the Kingdom of God, humility, and patience were regarded as positive 
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attributes of a true Christian. Compliance with Pietist norms was considered the 
yardstick of piety. Abuse, cursing, failure to observe the day of the Lord, visiting 
public houses, drinking alcohol, and gambling were sanctioned, as was “Unzucht” – 
a concept that covered all sexual activities with the exception of marital intercourse. 
Great value was therefore placed on strict separation of the sexes, particularly among 
adolescents (Klein 2002, p. 118 f. Trans. R.B.).
With these norms and principles in their bags, the Basel missionaries set out 
for South China, where they found a local culture that deviated markedly 
from these internalized values and conceptions.
b) The Basel Mission as a Biotope
Klein’s description strongly suggests that the Basel Mission displayed certain 
peculiarities redolent of a biotope largely isolated from the environment. 
Three stand out:
aa) The Mission House: Locus of Socialization and Disciplining
“The basis for the social rise of most Basel missionaries was their training at the 
Basel Mission House. This was considered necessary because the Committee 
[the managing body of the Mission, G. F. S.] did not want to send out simply 
enthusiastic laymen” (Klein 2002, p. 129. Transl. R.B.). On the other hand, 
there could be no question of a university education owing to the threat of 
exposure to “worldliness.” Klein describes the instruction provided at the 
Mission House:
In contrast [to university education, G. F. S.], training at the Basel Mission House 
was designed to consolidate and build on the elementary school education of mis-
sion students. Apart from the natural sciences and the basics of medicine, modern 
languages were taught – English, to begin with also Dutch – as well as Latin, Greek, 
and Hebrew, which were also important for theological training. Education was 
completed by practical instruction in music – hymns naturally played a major role 
in missionary work – horticulture, and the cras that the missionary might have to 
master for his work in the field. Interestingly, the languages of the mission areas were not 
on the curriculum, nor was there any instruction on the cultures of the mission areas. The 
entire training programme aimed to strengthen the certainty of missionaries about 
the superiority of Christianity over all other religions ... At the latest during their 
time at the Mission House, prospective missionaries became acquainted with the 
militant rhetoric wide-spread in the missionary movement, which presented the 
“mission to the heathens” as a struggle against the kingdom of Satan and in meta-
phorical excess as an armed conflict. The hymn usually intoned at the departure of 
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missionaries or missionary brides “Go joyfully forth to war against sin”  ... was doubt-
less a familiar companion during this time (Klein 2002, p. 129 f. Transl. R.B.).
Even more than a training centre, the Mission House was a locus for social 
disciplining:
Until the outbreak of the Second World War, the home leadership insisted on 
seminarian training for missionaries, defending it even against objections from 
China missionaries in 1911, who asserted that the times called for missionaries with 
an academic education. ... the Committee took the view – not publicly expressed – 
that such a change would have unacceptable consequences for the organizational 
structure of the Basel Mission. Training at the Mission House was designed not only 
to equip the young missionary with the self-assurance he needed for his work but 
also to teach him to accept his place in the organism of the Basel Mission: it 
accordingly continued the mixture of inner piety and control through the community
that he had known from his earliest childhood. Entry into the service of the Mission 
was thus not only an escape from a narrow village world and an opportunity to rise 
socially; it also marked the beginning of oen lifelong social disciplining (Klein 2002, 
p. 131. Transl. R.B.).
This calls for a closer look at the composition and self-conception of the 
Mission’s managing body, the Committee.
bb) The Committee: A Board with a Sense of Mission
The Committee of the Basel Mission was composed largely of members of 
the Basel city patriciate. Thoralf Klein’s account of the self-conception of the 
Committee sounds at times like a caricature:
The charismatic trait of the Basel Mission manifested itself in the leadership role of 
the Committee, which in its own eyes managed the mission enterprise by divine 
legitimation and with infallible soundness. If the mission was really, as Hartenstein 
put it, an “action of God” ...; if God Himself had miraculously brought the Basel 
Mission into being, as its founding myth asserted, the Committee could claim to be 
authorized by God Himself to lead the missionary enterprise and to exercise this leader-
ship in His sense. Asked by what sign a missionary could recognize the will of God, 
Josenhans in his inimitable fashion responded “by the will of the Committee.”  ... 
This claim to infallibility was maintained until well into the 1920s, when a number 
of missionaries and the directors Dipper and Hartenstein called it into question 
(Klein 2002, p. 135. Transl. R.B.).
We have seen what an important role rules play, for example, in order-like 
associations and in the formation of a corporate identity. But the rules laid 
down by the Committee of the Basel Mission are more than astonishing and 
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did not spare the private sphere of missionaries; Thoralf Klein has this to say 
about their regulatory obsession:
To establish and safeguard their hierarchical structure and to allocate responsibilities 
among the various institutions, the Basel Mission required a precise set of rules that 
could function over enormous geographical distances. Despite Pietist rhetoric, it can 
be said with impunity that the urge of the Basel Mission to codify absolutely every-
thing amounted to a regular obsession. The lives of missionaries were very largely 
determined by the regulations of the Committee. It began early on during training 
at the Mission House, where the entire daily routine, including personal hygiene, 
compulsory attendance at the common meals and the strict limitation of social 
contacts were regulated by the house rules. Already at this stage, the young men, 
most of whom entered at the age of 18 or 19, were trained to a life of simplicity and 
integration into the Mission organization, but also to accept responsibility – the 
house rules listed a total of 39 small functions that students exercised in turn, 
including the supervisory functions of senior, famulus, and septimanar. In a quite 
comprehensive sense it can be said that the period of training at the Mission House 
served “to gain detailed practice in the missionary business” ...
Once the missionary or missionary sister had arrived in China, there was an abun-
dance of further rules for them to follow. In 1920, young missionaries were 
instructed as follows: “As far as your service status is concerned, we remind you 
that you set out not as a free missionary but in the service of a mission society with 
an established order that has developed through the experience of a century. Get to 
know this order as set out in the “Personal Regulations,” the Correspondence Rules, 
the Parish Order, the Church Organization Statutes, in the former “Official Gazette,” 
and in the correspondence of the Committee with the stations.” However, these 
regulations concerned with service-related matters were deemed far from sufficient. 
As during training in Basel, the private life of the missionaries in the field was regu-
lated by a codified set of rules. What and how many pieces of equipment the mis-
sionary took to China, what and how many items of furniture he acquired, how 
oen he reported back on his work, and what was to be reported on – all this was set 
out in black and white in separate regulations ... One particular and much-discussed 
case was the “Marriage Order,” which contained precise rules on marriage (Klein 
2002, p. 142 f. Transl. R.B.).
Looking over this chapter, it is striking what a key role social groups and 
their codes of conduct play – whether the group is an estate, a tribe, a 
profession, a gang, a religious community, or an urban “coniuratio.” Clearly, 
we can conclude that normative orders or law are to be conceptualized not 
only, as accustomed, in terms of the individual (“subjective rights”) but also 
in terms of the collective, which for reasons of external differentiation and 
the establishment of internal coherence sets itself rules and enforces com-
pliance with them. In the next chapter, on the plurality of norm producers, 
we shall also be concerned with this collective standpoint. We shall see that 
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there are collective actors – industrial associations, religious communities, 
international organizations – that produce and seek to enforce rules in their 
given socio-legal field. In the final chapter, we will be returning to the 
general topic of “governance collectives and their regulatory regimes.” 
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Chapter Three
From Plurality of Normative Orders 
to Plurality of Norm Producers
A. What is to be Discussed in this Chapter
Our foray into the thicket of normative orders has lent a great deal of 
support to the thesis of omnipresent multinormativity. Normative plurality, 
as we have seen, is not only the normal case in history, but, despite the 
dominance of state-made law, is now increasingly a reality that has nothing 
exotic about it. But since almost all normative orders can be attributed to an 
author or producer, in other words to a given legal source, it can be assumed 
that the plurality of such orders is matched by a plurality of norm producers, 
with most of whom we are also very familiar, for instance:
* God as lawgiver
* Parliaments as lawgivers
* The executive as issuer of regulations
* Local authorities as makers of by-laws
* Standard setters
* Transnational regulatory networks, and so on and so forth.
This chapter discusses the plurality of norm producers. But we shall not be 
working our way through all the norm producers we can turn up, let alone 
in alphabetical order. We are interested rather in what existing norms can be 
attributed to particular authors and the normative fields in which norm 
producers are typically to be found. Can “normative biotopes” be identified 
in which – generally equipped with a degree of autonomy – norm producers 
specific to the field are to be found and who can be named and described? 
Our aim is therefore to link up two of the key topics of the Max Planck 
Institute for European Legal History mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
namely multinormativity and legal spaces.
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For the structure of this chapter, this means that we must first set out in 
search of what we shall call normative spaces and keep a lookout along the 
way for what types of norm producers we can find.
B. The Search for Normative Spaces and How to Set About It
In the search for promising ways to track down normative spaces of all 
kinds, four – associated with particular authors, all interestingly enough 
from different scholarly disciplines – have caught our attention.
I. Brian Tamanaha’s Socio-Legal Arenas
Tamanaha suggests distinguishing various “systems of normative ordering in 
different social arenas” (Tamanaha 2008; 2010), and identifies the following 
“six socio-legal arenas” (Tamanaha 2008, p. 36 f.):
· Official legal systems
· Customary / Cultural normative systems
· Religious / Cultural normative systems
· Economic / Capitalist normative systems
· Functional normative systems
· Community / Cultural normative systems
This proposal is useful – regardless of whether Tamanaha has chosen the 
“right” arenas and whether an arena more or less would have been preferable 
– mainly because the “arena” concept is so inviting. Major communication-
intensive events take place in arenas like Madrid’s legendary Bernabéu Stadi-
um. The concept of arena therefore has to do with communication, and is 
consequently in excellent keeping with our view that the production, use, 
and enforcement of law are above all communication processes.
It also fits in particularly well with the actor perspective, which is always 
in the background. Anyone visitor to an arena knows that you have to 
distinguish between stage, backstage, and audience – the latter responding 
to the happenings on stage with varying intensity. Relations between actors 
performing their roles in an arena are communication relations and can be 
described and analysed as such.
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II. Sally Falk Moore’s Semi-autonomous Social Fields
In “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study,” the legal ethnologist Sally Falk Moore exam-
ines two social fields – the American clothing industry and the tribal society 
of the Chagga in Tanzania – to discover what rules of the game really influence 
behaviour. There are three possibilities: state-made law, at any rate law from 
outside the social field; rules made in the social field itself; or a mix of the two 
with variable degrees of authoritativeness. She formulates the issue as fol-
lows:
The concept of the semi-autonomous social field is a way of defining a research 
problem. It draws attention to the connection between the internal workings of an 
observable social field and its points of articulation with a larger setting. ... Theo-
retically, one could postulate a series of possibilities: complete autonomy in a social 
field, semi-autonomy, or a total absence of autonomy (i. e., complete domination). 
Obviously, complete autonomy and complete domination are rare, if they exist at all 
in the world today, and semi-autonomy of various kinds and degrees is an ordinary 
circumstance. Since the law of sovereign states is hierarchical in form, no social field 
within a modern polity could be absolutely autonomous from a legal point of view. 
Absolute domination is also difficult to conceive, for even in armies and prisons and 
other rule-run institutions, there is usually an underlife with some autonomy. The 
illustrations in this paper suggest that areas of autonomy and modes of self-regu-
lation have importance not only inside the social fields in which they exist, but are 
useful in showing the way these are connected with the larger social setting (Moore 
1973, p. 742 f.).
Her observations indicate that external state-made law naturally plays a 
certain role as general setting, but that the real rules of the game are made 
and practised within the given social field. They can dominate actor behav-
iour in the shape of an informal parallel order, or a pre-existing autonomous 
social group can confront and more or less “outflank” state reforms with its 
own normative system.
In the American clothing industry, the well functioning of the sensitive 
fashion sector appears to depend very strongly on personal relations between 
designers and retailers, and particularly on the exchange of favours. Moore 
comments on the functional logic of this informal parallel order:
A whole series of binding customary rules surrounds the giving and exchange of these 
favors. The industry can be analyzed as a densely interconnected social nexus having 
many interdependent relationships and exchanges, governed by rules, some of them 
legal rules, and others not. The essential difference between the legal rules and the 
others is not in their effectiveness. Both sets are effective. The difference lies in the 
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agency through which ultimate sanctions might be applied. Both the legal and the 
non-legal rules have similar immediately effective sanctions for violation attached. 
Business failures can be brought about without the intervention of legal institu-
tions. Clearly neither effective sanctions nor the capacity to generate binding rules 
are the monopoly of the state (Moore 1973, p. 743 f.).
The case of the Chagga, settled in the Kilimanjaro area, is quite different. In 
our terminology, the situation is that the governance and regulatory collec-
tive of the Chagga has a traditional governance regime for land use; a regime 
under which neighbourhood and lineage plays a decisive role. However, the 
government formed aer the independence of Tanzania tried to impose a 
radical change of course: 
For example, in 1963, the Independent Government declared that from then hence-
forth there would no longer be any private freehold ownership in land, since land as 
the gi of God can belong to no man but only to all men, whose representative was 
the Government. ... All freehold land was converted into government leaseholds by 
this act, and improperly used land was to be taken away (Moore 1973, p. 731).
Predictably, these measures met with resistance from the Chagga and were 
seen as encroachment on their traditional regulatory autonomy:
The second example, that of certain attempts to legislate social change in Tanzania, 
shows the same principles in a less familiar milieu. Here neighborhood and lineage 
constitute a partially self-regulating social field that, in many matters, has more effective 
control over its members and over land allocations than the state, or the “law”. The 
limited local effect of legislation abolishing private property in land and establishing 
a system of ten-house cells demonstrates the persistent importance of this lineage-
neighborhood complex. The way in which this legislation has been locally inter-
preted to require only the most minimal changes suggests something of the strength 
of local social priorities and relationships. The robustness of the lineage-neighbor-
hood complex, and its resistance to alteration (while nevertheless changing) suggests 
that one of the tendencies that may be quite general in semi-autonomous social 
fields is the tendency to fight any encroachment on autonomy previously enjoyed 
(Moore 1973, p. 744).
This suggests that the rules of the game comprise both state-made law and 
other bodies of norms (social norms, customary law), but that in effect non-
state norms predominate:
The law (in the sense of state enforceable law) is only one of a number of factors that 
affect the decisions people make, the actions they take and the relationships they 
have. Consequently important aspects of the connection between law and social 
change emerge only if law is inspected in the context of ordinary social life. There 
general processes of competition – inducement, coercion, and collaboration – are 
effective regulators of action. The operative ‘rules of the game’ include some laws and 
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some other quite effective norms and practices. Socially significant legislative enactments 
frequently are attempts to shi the relative bargaining positions of persons in their 
dealings with one another within these social fields. The subject of the dealing and 
much else about the composition and character of the social field and the trans-
actions in it are not necessarily tampered with. Thus, much legislation is piecemeal, 
and only partially invades the ongoing arrangements. Hence the interdependence or 
independence of elements in the social scene may sometimes be revealed by just 
such piecemeal legislation (Moore 1973, p. 743).
What we find convincing in Moore’s semi-autonomous social field concept 
is the notion of the graduated autonomy of non-state norm producers. It is 
this specific partial autonomy – whether based on tradition, network-like 
social relations, expert knowledge in the sense of epistemic authority, or 
whatever – that makes the actors in a given field into norm producers. 
We shall be coming back to this.
III. Thomas Duve’s Fields of Normativity
Duve convincingly shows that legal or normative spaces can be successfully 
explored and described only if we free our perception from a “container 
concept” of legal history:
Again, even a cursory look at early modern empires shows that it may indeed not be 
useful to abide by territorial concepts of space in our research, usually even guided 
by the ordering of the world into homogeneous areas which originate in the world 
of the fictitious authority of nation states. Would other frames of reference, like 
point grids, for example of global cities, settlement centres, and mission stations, or 
even networks with nodes in the harbour and trading cities perhaps not be more 
adequate frameworks for research? Do we have to concentrate on secular civil law 
to (re)construct our traditions? Or could other frames of reference which are no 
longer defined by territory but by types guide our research? Our “container-con-
cept” of legal history in Europe saves us from asking ourselves these productive 
questions – by the way questions which might be seen as pivotal for today’s general 
jurisprudence concentrated on law in a diverse and global world (Duve 2013a, 
p. 16).
This passage draws attention to what we could term “point grids” or “nodes” 
of legal spaces, such as global cities, mission stations, or networks. This is 
extremely important because legal spaces, too, are structured spaces 
“inhabited” by specific actors who communicate the law and about the law.
But Duve also draws attention to a second important point. To grasp the 
essence of normative spaces requires first a multidisciplinary approach and 
second the placing of normative fields in their specific cultural context:
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The analytical tools needed by a science that takes a world of “multinormativity” 
seriously can be ... obtained only through an empirical approach that captures and 
orders fields of normativity, and thus through an empirically grounded and inter-
culturally validated model of different forms of normativity. This needs cooperation 
between disciplines that address not only law but various socio-legal arenas – and 
which are hence not always pursued in faculties of law. The expertise of ethnologists, 
sociologists, cultural scientists, religious scholars, and others is required.
However, such a transdisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary approach is needed 
not only for a transnational legal science and its transcultural communication about 
law. This points to what legal theory and the sociology of law have long demanded 
anyway: the abandonment of a liberal arts oriented, philosophical, or historico-
hermeneutic concept of law as the basis for jurisprudence. The focus has thus shied 
to science-of-actuality, empirical legal concepts. From a cultural studies point of view, 
the issue is the analysis of law as a societal system of symbols, with all its historical 
contingencies. This has important consequences for the links between jurisprudence 
and other disciplines. Law is then no longer to be seen as a phenomenon somehow 
embedded in a culture: it is culture itself that produces law. In order to analyse this 
law, the rules of cultural production have to be understood, which requires a 
number of disciplines to be drawn on. Legal theory, the sociology of law, as well 
as legal history as the locus of research into the evolution of law with all its historical 
contingencies assume a constitutive function for this process of integrating other 
disciplines (Duve 2013b, p. 10 f. Transl. R.B.).
This is a truly demanding research programme, but one that makes sense 
and is well worth contributing to.
IV. The Organizational Fields of Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell
What the organizational field, a concept situated on a somewhat different 
level, is doing in this context needs explaining. We came across it (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983) in connection with one of Thomas Duve’s normative 
point grids, namely the mission societies and their normative products: so-
called mission regulations.
Hartmann Tyrell (2004) has examined the impressive variety of Protestant 
mission societies, particularly from the organizational sociology perspective. 
This quite unusual approach allows Tyrell to treat mission societies as organ-
izations of a special type operating in an interesting semi-autonomous social 
field. On this normative field, markedly distant from both state and estab-
lished Church, he notes:
[Mission societies] are [a subject of research in organizational sociology] as speci-
alized religious organizations beyond Church and sects, as organized actors with 
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transcontinental and ... “transcultural” reach; as organizations in a field of mutual 
observation and imitation, competition and cooperation with one another and 
within a network of clearly global dimensions; and as specialized religious organ-
izations beyond state and Church. The denominational diversity of Protestantism 
and a Europe-wide (and transatlantic) network of supra-denominational “neo-pie-
tist” and “awakened” milieus form the social basis of the missionary movement. But 
the organizational form chosen is that of the “voluntary association” (Tyrell 2004, 
p. 77. Transl. R.B.).
As voluntary religious associations, which do not see themselves either as 
extensions of the state or the established Churches, they depend in consid-
erable measure on the motivation of their members and – as fundraising 
institutions – on the generosity of their supporters:
As far as activation is concerned, [religious associations] depend strongly on moral 
solidarity and a certain “voluntary” but consensually directed “commitment” on the 
part of their members. Such inevitable reliance on the motivational resources of 
members and on the mobilization of the broader “mission community,” which 
donates and prays ... is particularly typical of mission societies. The enthusiastic 
beginnings “driven by the spirit of love” are part of the founding legends of almost 
every society. But then, as their complexity grows, they come under the pressure of 
multiplying tasks and obligations and consequently find themselves on the road 
(very much in the sense of Max Weber) to bureaucratization and growth (Tyrell 
2004, p. 81. Transl. R.B.).
As professionalized and bureaucratized institutions, they had to operate in 
an organizational field densely “populated” by other mission societies,1
which led to growing competition and mutual observation. This uncon-
nected coexistence of mission societies was increasingly felt to be unsatisfy-
ing. To remedy the situation, interdenominational and international confer-
ences were convened aer 1850 with growing regularity at which the prob-
lems facing the shared Protestant faith could be discussed:
Not by chance, this started in Asia: from 1855 in India, from 1872 in Japan, and 
from 1877 in China. The multifunctionality of these conferences is understandable. 
Over and above the conclusion of agreements and the resolution of disputes, they 
were – with regard to information, consultation, and personal contacts – invaluable 
as venues for “exchanges” among missionaries and societies, and were thus to some 
1 In South Africa in 1872, there were, in addition to the Berliners, the Moravian Brethren 
Mission, the London Mission Society, the South African Mission Society, the Methodists 
(Wesleyans), the two Scottish mission societies, as well as the Rhineland, Paris, American, 
and Norwegian mission societies, the Hermannsburg Mission Society, also the Episcopal-
Anglican and Finnish missions, and well as the Roman Catholics (Tyrell, footnote 316).
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extent resembled markets. Not least of all, it was praying and worshipping together 
that furthered a “spirit of unity” and Protestant brotherliness. Aer 1900, special joint 
institutions were established above the individual societies, for example a Standing 
Arbitration Committee in India (1902). ... Conferences were then organized at the 
national and to some extent at the supranational level, as well as in the home coun-
tries. Bremen, for example, welcomed the Continental Missions Conference, a series 
of gatherings at irregular intervals with delegates from French, Dutch, Scandinavian, 
and German societies. The national mission councils embarked upon the establish-
ment of an umbrella organization with great hesitancy; ... Germany led the way with a 
joint “committee” set up in 1885 endowed with special authority; its task was to 
represent the societies vis-à-vis the Colonial Office. Further developments cannot 
be gone into here, but it is easy to see that the “isomorphic principle” of learning, 
imitation, and adaptation came into play (Tyrell 2004, p. 131 f. Transl. R.B.).
As we see – and this is important – institutions, especially norm producers, 
have not only to be placed in their specific cultural context but also exam-
ined against the backdrop of the organizational environment. It is essential 
to look closely at this specifically structured organizational field, because it 
can explain the organizational behaviour of an institution, which can of 
course also influence the nature of its norm production.
Aer these methodological considerations, we can now look in greater 
detail at some of the normative fields we have selected.
C. A Tour through Five Normative Fields and to the 
Norm Producers they Accommodate
I. Societal Subsystems and “Their” Law
Two examples will show that societal subsystems tend themselves to develop 
the rules necessary for their specific functional requirements – especially 
when the state cannot or does not wish to provide what is needed (on the 
providing function of law see Schuppert 1993). These examples are the “law 
of the economy” and the “law of sport.”
1. The Law of the Economy
One of the most important subsystems whose well functioning is essential to 
the well-being of a society is “the economy.” Economic processes are trans-
actional processes, and to keep transaction costs low transactional processes 
require a reliable legal environment. The link between economic rationality 
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and the production of legal certainty by a polity under the rule of law is 
unlikely to be denied. 
Where reliable rules are lacking – for instance, in the transnational 
domain not subject to national regulation – “the economy” itself takes 
action as norm producer, giving itself, as it were, the rules that facilitate 
transactions in global markets or even enable them in the first place. Dieter 
Grimm describes this sort of norm production as follows:
Beyond states and beyond international organisations, forms of lawmaking are 
spreading over which the two no longer have any influence. Global markets create 
legal arrangements quite independently of politics. More and more, multinational cor-
porations, represented by international law firms, are concluding agreements that 
no longer fall under any national legal order or jurisdiction. In the event of conflict, 
international arbitration tribunals decide, which are expected to apply transnational 
law they have largely made themselves in the course of application, and which 
spreads by analogy to similar cases (Grimm 2003, p. 19. Transl. R.B.).
Thomas Duve argues in the same vein, observing that a veritable market for 
law practised alongside state structures has developed in recent decades:
A mass of new non-state norms and decision-making institutions has developed – in 
the field of the Internet, in the economic field, in sport; ...
The importance of this law beyond the bounds of national or even supranational 
institutions is by no means limited to Europe, to industrial countries, or areas of 
intensive legal cooperation. On the contrary: the growing integration of so-called 
developing and newly industrialized countries into the world economy as produc-
tion locations or raw material suppliers has in many regards subjected local pop-
ulations to rules and practices that are neither local, state, nor international, but set 
solely by non-state actors. “Global governance” has produced rules and enforcement 
tools that in their impact on states or people are comparable to or even surpass the 
classical control of behaviour and sanctioning of misconduct through law. Safe-
guards developed in state legal systems against the accumulation of market power, 
control mechanisms, and legal protection authorities are frequently ineffectual in 
this space of non-state action, oen with serious consequences for people. Owing to 
hopes aroused by modernization theory (law and development; theories of legal 
transplant, etc.) and not least because the export and import of law and the asso-
ciated services have increased substantially since the 1990s, a market for such “law” 
practised alongside state structures with concomitant communicative and institu-
tional networks has formed (Duve 2013b, p. 6. Transl. R.B.).
But law made by the economy itself is not – as one might think – merely a 
consequence of transnationalization and globalization, and hence a thor-
oughly modern phenomenon. As long ago as 1933, Hans Großmann-Doerth 
had already discussed the relationship between the self-made law of the 
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economy and state law, taking standard business terms as his example. He 
described general standard terms and conditions explicitly as “law” and 
consequently treats the relationship between the self-made law of the econ-
omy and state law as an instance of applied normative plurality:
I call standard business terms “law,” in contrast to state law, the self-made law of the 
economy. This is an extension of the “law” concept: unlike state law, standard 
business terms do not apply without further ado for the individual contract but 
only on the basis of a corresponding agreement between the parties, thus by virtue 
of the intention of the parties. This distinction is certainly not unimportant: the 
courts have to ensure that in the individual case standard business terms do not 
come into effect against the intention of the contracting parties; and they have 
effective – albeit not always sufficiently exploited – means to act against this self-
made law. But the practical importance of this distinction from state law should not 
be overestimated. Agreement on standard business terms as lex contractus of the 
individual contract is purely a matter of form in many areas of economic life. These 
legal norms must be in conformity with the intentions of the parties to be effective, 
but societal powers regularly loom behind them that ensure that these intentions 
are supplied. Over and above this, standard business terms are in the same position 
as state-made law. Not draed by the parties to the individual contract but rather 
independently of them and oen with no provision for alteration, standard business 
terms, like state law, are a power that determines the contractual relationship from 
without. In my view, this similarity in societal position justifies calling standard 
business terms “law.” This is no mere terminological issue. I use this designation 
time and again, as today, to indicate the true meaning of a development to which 
jurists usually pay too little attention. I certainly do not call standard business terms 
law because I approve of this development but, on the contrary, because I consider 
the coexistence of the two legal orders, state law and economic law, to be a highly 
problematic matter (Großmann-Doerth 2005, p. 78 f. Transl. R.B.).
All three authors show that this self-made law is not born without subject, so 
to speak, nor in the lap of a vague civil society, but that specifiable actors are 
at work: big international law firms (as we shall see), the communicative and 
institutional networks identified by Duve, or industrial and business organ-
izations, generally with professional legal “coaching.”
We now move on to standard-setting as a prime example of a semi-auton-
omous field for the self-production of norms by the economy.
a) Standards and their Semi-Autonomous Field: 
Standards as Norms of the Economy for the Economy
The conviction with which most standard-setters regard their norm produc-
tion as a service to the economy is revealed by a 2002 article in a Süddeutsche 
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Zeitung report on an interview with the then president of the German 
Standards Institute (DIN) Dietmar Harting under the heading “The Lord 
of Standards.” Harting explains the link between standardization and global-
ization and the function of product standards to open up more and more 
international markets:
The various standards are the precondition for marketing products worldwide and 
for successful participation in globalization, said Hartung. He is certain that “Who-
ever sets the standard makes the market.” The president of the institute knows only 
too well what he is talking about. He is general partner of the Harting Technology 
Group, which has become the biggest producer of electronic connectors in the 
world thanks not least to consistent standardization work. ...
For the company head and DIN president, this success is proof that standards open up 
markets and promote the fast implementation of innovative ideas in marketable 
products. Standards are set above all by industry for industry. But they are not binding 
rules but only recommendations based on broad consensus. 
The standardization committees, on which some 26,000 experts collaborate, repre-
senting firms, testing institutes, public authorities, research and development, as 
well as environmental and consumer protection organizations, look for common 
solutions. The cost of this democratic standardization apparatus is enormous. The 
Fraunhofer Institute for Innovation Research puts the annual cost of standardiza-
tion work in Germany at some € 700 million.
 On the debit side, however, at least € 16 billion are saved by the painstaking 
harmonization undertaken by the DIN. The work also commands respect abroad. 
Some 90 per cent of the standards set by the DIN are now used outside Germany, as 
well (Uhlmann 2008, p. 20. Transl. R.B.).
Situating a certain type of norm in a given semi-autonomous field does not, 
however, mean that this is for all time. Bodies of norms can, so to speak, 
“emigrate,” from the private locus of origin into the public sector. One 
interesting example of such a shi from the private sector to the domain 
of the state are international accounting standards. Sebastian Botzem and 
Jeanette Hofmann report on their “migration”:
The second case example is the genesis of transnational private standards for corpo-
rate accounting. Emerging from an association-based harmonization project domi-
nated by experts and of initially questionable character as an alternative to state 
regulation, an effectual private organization developed over three decades whose 
standards have been accepted almost throughout the world and with increasingly 
binding status. The development of the originally discretionary standardization 
project has been marked by the growing integration of important – also critical – 
actors. On the other hand, it has also been tied into the public hierarchy, above all 
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where transnational standards have been recognized (Botzem and Hofman 2009, 
p. 226. Transl. R.B.).
Such cases – Sebastian Botzem and Jeanette Hofmann’s other example is 
regulation of the Internet infrastructure – therefore involve the interactive 
dovetailing of private and state actors and the emergence of mixed, i. e., 
public-private regulatory arrangements:
The interdependence of private and state actors in transnational rule-making produces 
empirical oscillation between private and state-dominated governance arrange-
ments. In other words, our comparison shows that changes in governance struc-
tures are not, as oen assumed, linear, either as denationalization or more recently 
as “re-regulation” ... but are rather a process of oscillation between different forms 
of transnational norm-setting. Empirical comparison reveals different phases in 
interaction between private and public actors and underlines the dynamism of 
transnational standardization. However this case comparison also shows that the 
oscillation involved is not merely a return to the point of departure. Actor constella-
tions undergo organizational and functional changes in the course of negotiations. For the 
present at least, there is a great deal of evidence that actors’ perception of problems, 
organizational structures, and legitimation strategies tend to harmonize ... This also 
shows a double dynamic of transnational regulatory arrangements: in the content of 
regulatory measures and the design of public-private regulatory arrangements (Botzem 
and Hofman 2009, p. 227 f. Transl. R.B.).
b) The Norm Producers: Non-State Actors as Standard Setters
Institutions that produce standards are called standard setters. As Anne 
Peters et al. (Non-State Actors as Standard Setters, 2009c) show, such institu-
tions are predominately non-state actors. In their introduction, Anne Peters, 
Lucy Koechlin, and Gretta Fenner-Zinkernagel explain this increase in the 
importance of non-state regulatory actors mainly in terms of the general shi 
in weight between market and state brought about by transnationalization 
and globalization, evidenced especially in the erosion of the state monopoly of 
regulation:
On all levels of governance, standard setting (norm formation or regulation), is no 
longer the exclusive domain of states or governmental authorities. The role and the 
capacity of increasingly diverse and polymorphous non-state actors involved in 
standard setting are expanding. Also, the processes by which norms are shaped 
are becoming more varied. Finally, the rapidly growing number of national, sub-
national, and international standards has increased these standards’ diversity, but 
also regulatory overlap and norm conflicts.
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The context in which the proliferation of non-state actors’ standard setting occurs is 
well known. Globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation waves which swept the 
globe in the 1980s and 1990s have contributed to shiing the focus away from the state
as the sole source of regulation. The result is the oen referenced blurring of the 
public and the private sectors. The integration of national economies into a world 
economy has diminished or at least modified the authority of the state and has 
pushed its regulatory capacity to its limits both in substance and in terms of terri-
torial scope. Policy issues that have formerly been treated at the level of nation 
states, for instance environmental pollution, migration, or organized crime, are 
increasingly understood as phenomena with global scope and global roots which 
cannot be tackled in a satisfactory manner through national standard setting (Peters 
et al. 2009b, p. 1 f.).
For Peters et al., two types of non-state actor play a key role: NGOs and 
TNCs (transnational corporations). Since these two types of governance 
actor will be dealt with separately at a later stage, the focus here is on another 
typology of standard setters displaying the mixture of state and non-state actors
mentioned.
Hans Christian Röhl (Internationale Standardsetzung, 2007) proposes 
four types of standard-setting clearly demonstrating that standards and stand-
ard-setters should always be thought about in conjunction, because in this 
area of non-state rule-making the connection between the two is not nearly 
as evident as between legislation and legislator, regulation and regulator. 
Whereas when considering the classical sorts of lawmaking, the author of 
the norm is always at the back of one’s mind, this is simply impossible when 
it comes to the multitude of standards and standard-setting actors. This is 
confirmed by Röhl’s four types of standard-setting, which are rather four 
types of standard-setting organization:
(1) Standard-setting in the framework of the ISO (International Organization for 
Standardization). Standard-setting here takes the form of private law, which, 
however, builds on collaboration with national standardization organizations. 
Such – non-binding – standards are set by a quasi-private institution. Their 
purpose is above all to coordinate the behaviour of private parties. They are 
important for European law because the European Committee for Standardiza-
tion (CEN) bases its standards to a very large degree on ISO standards or sets 
them in cooperation with the ISO. But CEN standards (and their national 
transpositions) also play a key role in the context of the European product 
safety policy “new approach”.
(2) Codex Alimentarius: the Codex Alimentarius Commission sets food standards, 
which are also non-binding. These standards are set with the backing of two 
international organizations (FAO / WHO). States are formal collaborators. 
Unlike the ISO, this is an institution under international law. Much more 
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strongly than in the case of the ISO, transposition into national law is the aim of 
these non-binding norms.
(3) The third example is rule-making under the aegis of organizations governed by 
international law that set standards on amendments to appendices to inter-
national treaties. This – so to speak – secondary international law is intended 
to be transposed into national law. This can be illustrated by agreements in the 
field of transport: the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) estab-
lished by the Chicago Agreement, and the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO).
(4) Finally, there is a trend towards standard-setting by exclusive organizations that 
do not seek general international accessibility. They can be based on cooperation 
between public authorities, for instance cooperation in the Basel Committee for 
Bank Regulation, or even be purely private organizations like the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which sets the rules of international ac-
counting, International Fiscal Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Röhl 2007, p. 321 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
2. The Law of Sport
The law of sport is association law. This is simply because, in Germany and 
throughout the world, sport is association sport. Uwe Schimank:
Sports clubs and sports organizations equivalent to clubs are embedded in sports 
associations. Sports associations are in the first place organizations of persons who 
practise sport – usually a particular type of sport. ... they exist for almost every type 
of sport – one example being the German Football Association (DFB) – and also 
as overarching organizations – such as the German Sports Confederation (DSB). 
National associations are in turn embedded in international associations. Sports 
associations have a number of functions ... They set the rules for the given type of 
sport and montor compliance with these rules in competitions, ratify wins and 
records, organize and coordination competitions, and represent the sport externally 
– especially vis-à-vis state authorities (Schimank 1988, p. 191. Transl. R.B.).
Sports associations’ strong position is due mainly to the so-called one-asso-
ciation principle, which gives them a de facto monopoly of rule-making, a 
constellation that Klaus Vieweg describes as follows:
The one-association principle states that a single association should be exclusively 
responsible for each sport (specialism component) and that for a defined territory 
only one association should exist (territorial component). The variants that can be 
derived from this permit the establishment of specialism / territorial monopolies of 
international and national sports associations. This facilitates control over a sport 
practised in accordance with uniform rules and helps avoid conflicts of competence. 
The one-association principle has been universally adopted in the statutes of world-
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wide international sports associations, continental and regional sports associations 
and organizations. There are practically no major exceptions (Vieweg 1990, p. 66. 
Transl. R.B.).
Because all this runs so well, sports associations and their members treat the 
relevant rules as “their” law, which, as Vieweg stresses, is in keeping with the 
sociological facts:
The common interests of the association and the typical member is to obtain the 
status of legal norm for association rules. This is the best way to establish association 
norms as part of an overall ordering that is binding on all members and cannot be 
individually negotiated. Acceptance of the rules as legal norms corresponds to the socio-
logical facts of the case. It finds expression in the titles given to the statutes and 
secondary rules of German sports associations: “Grundgesetz” (“basic law”), “Geset-
ze” (“laws”), and “Ordnungen” (“regulations”) (Vieweg 1990, p. 323. Transl. R.B.).
The power of sports associations also – until the ruling of the Munich High-
er Regional Court of 15 January 2015 – rested strongly on the monopoly 
they claimed of arbitration; athletes participating in international compet-
itions were required to sign a declaration that they recognized the sole 
competence of the disciplinary commissions of the given association and 
the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) in Lausanne as the final court 
of appeal for all arbitral decisions “to the complete exclusion of the ordinary 
courts.”
The decision of the Munich court has now toppled this pillar of associ-
ation power, ruling that any such requirement is illegal because it constitutes 
an abuse of a market-dominating monopoly position. Recourse to the ordi-
nary courts is now open. This is seen as an important milestone because – as 
the court convincingly argued – of the structurally predominance of associ-
ation representatives in these arbitration tribunals.
But the court’s ruling is interesting not only because in the Pechtstein 
case it put an end to the monopoly of the sports association in dispute 
resolution but also because, in stating the grounds for its decision, the court 
argued above all in terms of cartel law, emphasizing the economic nature of 
the organized practice of sport in a manner that shows the law of sport to be 
almost a subsystem of the law of the economy. To begin with, the plaintiff
Claudia Pechstein was presented as follows: “The plaintiff is an internation-
ally successful speed skater, who earns her living by practising this sport.” 
Particularly interesting, however, is what the court had to say about the 
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entrepreneurship of the International Speed Skating Association – the sec-
ond defendant:
For the purposes of the enterprise concept underlying the Act on Restraints on 
Competition, an economic activity is any activity consisting in offering goods or 
services in a given market. If this precondition is met, the circumstance that an 
activity is connected with sport poses no obstacle to application of the rules of 
competition law ... Sports associations are to be seen as enterprises in so far as they 
operate in the market for sporting events ... because they offer the corresponding 
services.
Substantively relevant in this dispute is the market for organizing world champion-
ship competitions in speed skating.
The second defendant holds a monopoly in the relevant market for admission to 
speed skating world championships, and as market-dominating enterprise is the 
addressee of Section 19 (1 and 4 (2)) of the Act on Restraints on Competition.
On the market for organizing world championships in speed skating, the second 
defendant is the sole offeror owing to the one-place principle and due to the lack 
of competitors therefore dominates the market as monopolist in accordance with 
Section 19 (1 and 4 (2)) of the Act on Restraints on Competition. Under Section 19 
(1 and 4 (2)) of the Act on Restraints on Competition, a market-dominating enter-
prise is forbidden to demand remuneration or other terms and conditions that 
deviate from those that would with strong probability prevail in effective competi-
tion. The second defendant was therefore not allowed to demand the consent of the 
plaintiff to the arbitration agreement of 2nd January 2009 (OLG München, partial 
judgement of 15/01/2015, Marginal no. 77ff. Transl. R.B.).
In sum, sport and commerce are close companions, united also in their 
tendency not only to give themselves their own rules but also to withhold 
legal disputes from the jurisdiction of the state and entrust them to arbitra-
tion tribunals.
Aer this instructive excursion into the apparently close-knit world of the 
economy and sport, we turn to another normative field, the world of basic 
rights.
II. Fundamental Rights as Collective Ordering Phenomena and 
Supra-Individual Fields of Meaning
Thomas Vesting et al. in their treatment of basic rights as phenomena of 
collective ordering (Vesting et al., 2014) draw our attention to the circum-
stance that fundamental rights with their protected areas both open up and 
legally circumscribe specific normative fields. In their preface they state:
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In the current view, legal positions protected by basic rights are largely equated with 
individual freedoms. The guiding principle is the autonomy of the individual sub-
ject. From this standpoint, “collective” or “institutional” aspects of fundamental 
rights protection beyond the individual dimension are only a secondary phenom-
enon that derives from the primary individual freedom. ... The contributions to this 
volume put this common conviction to the test. The authors address the extent to 
which traditional basic rights theory and dogmatics systematically underestimates 
the trans-subjective societal content expressed in basic rights (Vesting et al. 2014, 
p. V. Transl. R.B.).
Consideration of the basic rights particularly prominent in this connection – 
the freedom of organization, the freedom of religion, and the freedom of 
occupation – shows that such institutionally protected areas can be under-
stood as normative fields, as semi-autonomous social fields in which specific 
types of norm producer operate. A closer look at the arguments put forward 
by some of the authors in this volume will throw light on this insight.
1. The Collective Understanding of Fundamental Rights
Thomas Vesting et al. seek to counter the subjectivist understanding of 
fundamental rights with a collective understanding. Under the heading “the 
priority of the whole – as rule and institution,” the editors outline their 
collective or rather institutional approach as follows:
Precisely this [collective] aspect is nowadays largely ignored by prevailing basic 
rights theory and dogmatics. The individual is taken as a self-evident reality instead 
of recognizing that all the (necessary) state structuration of basic rights practices is 
preceded by the self-organization of society through an infrastructure comprising social 
norms, institutions, practices, conventions, and ways of life, which produces subjects and 
a collective order among subjects; that is to say, sets rules of co-existence. This way of 
seeing things objectifies subjects as subjects of freedom only to place them in 
relation to an (also objectified) collective order of society, which is understood as 
instituted by the state or democracy.
This overlooks the pre-existing dependence of the individual on rules and institutions. 
This oversight leads to a misunderstanding of the institutions, which then appear to 
be merely permanent “institutional complexes” in the public space. Instead of thus 
narrowing the concept, it should be defined more broadly as a “totality of actions 
and ideas” that have “completely established themselves”; “institution” accordingly 
means the sum of the “ways of acting and thinking that the individual finds already 
in place and which are generally transmitted through education” ... Modern society 
in particular must be conceptualized as depending on an abundance of scattered 
practices and institutions. In the theoretical language of institutional analysis, we 
could also speak of norms as decentralized societal mechanisms that regulate behav-
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iour and accordingly have consequences for society (Vesting et al. 2014, p. 6 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
Thomas Vesting adopts a particularly programmatic stance in his article on 
the collective understanding of basic rights. First, he rejects the container 
conception of fundamental rights underlying the view that they are rights of 
defence: “The notion of defence against encroachment shows the subject of 
basic rights as a sort of closed container, as an ‘individual,’ who ‘holds’ or 
‘possesses’ freedoms like things, whereas vice versa the state faces the abstract 
and closed individual as a similarly abstract and closed legal personality” 
(Vesting 2014, p. 62. Transl. R.B.). To counter this approach he proposes 
the concept of a culturally embedded individual:
The point of departure is now not the freedom of an isolated individual but the 
notion of a individual who is already culturally embedded, who is for his part 
already entangled in specific narratives and who, through his own actions, his 
practical life, himself contributes to reproducing neighbourly forms of basic-law 
subjectivity: as a father bringing up children, as a consumer of media, as entrepre-
neur, or as amateur yachtsman. The subject of fundamental rights must be concep-
tualized as inseparably interwoven with the horizon of human experience and its 
pre-reflexive components. In this cosmos of basic-rights theory, the self-reflexivity 
and self-determination of subjects in pursuit of their possibilities and ways of life are 
naturally included. However it is assumed that a self open to the future and which 
takes on the social world and its constraints is possible only because individuals are 
already in norm-controlled relationships with one another, are already part of an 
existing way of life, already have neighbours before the state comes into play (Vest-
ing 2014, p. 73. Transl. R.B.).
From this basic position, Vesting comes to an understanding of basic rights 
as fields of meaning. With reference to Husserl, he notes:
The insights of phenomenology undermine the widespread notion in conventional 
basic rights theory and dogmatics that it is possible to capture basic rights as explicit 
corpus, an institution laid down in a document and hence strictly separate from all 
external references − such as moral norms, social conventions, and practical knowl-
edge. Phenomenology redirects basic rights theory. From its perspective basic law 
theory must emphasize the embeddedness of all fundamental rights in networks of practical 
relationships, which would mean treating these rights as inseparable from complex 
social fields of meaning and cultural life worlds − not only because this is in better 
keeping with the facts, but also because basic-rights normativity is constituted in the 
first place only through practical (life-world) networks of relations and communi-
cation, which are themselves normatively structured. In short: there is no freedom 
of art without the institutions and conventions of the art world, no freedom of 
religion without the “particular domain” of lived religions, no freedom of property 
and contract without a practical culture of market economy, no media freedom 
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without journalism, publishers, media firms, etc. Basic rights would then have to be 
construed as primarily impersonal rights, and the individuals that assert them as 
interactional participants in a network of relations and communication that always sur-
passes them (Vesting 2014, p. 70 f. Transl. R.B.).
These lengthy observations justify use of the term “normative fields” in the 
sense of semi-autonomous social fields to capture the notion of institution-
alized basic-rights fields of meaning in the context of this discussion.
2. Reference Areas for Normative Fields Protected by Basic Rights
In what follows, we look at three reference areas focused on constellations of 
fundamental rights “not limited (solely) to protecting the individual subject 
of basic rights” but which have an overarching impact dimension and /or 
presuppose a supra-individual concretization component” (Augsberg 2014, 
p. 165. Transl. R.B.). Such an “overarching impact dimension” is particularly 
well illustrated by our first example, the freedom of association and organ-
ization.
a) The Freedom of Association and Organization
The collective character of these basic right guarantees is especially evident in 
the freedom of association. Under the heading “the collective element in 
economic basic rights,” Steffen Augsberg (Augsberg 2014) notes:
* Obviously, the freedom of association directly concerns the concept of people 
joining forces to form collective entities. Even if associations themselves are 
not regarded as protected under Article 9 of the Basic Law, the separate but 
by no means normatively singular (see, e. g., Art. 4 (140) of the Basic Law) em-
phasis on organizationally consolidated and stabilized human contacts is not 
to be understood only as strengthening protection of the individual personality; 
as a “principle of free social group formation” it has an intrinsic value recognized by 
constitutional law, but attributed functionally to democracy governed by the rule of 
law.
* Furthermore, the institutional guarantees that are to some extent read into Art. 9 of 
the Basic Law can (also) be developed in collective regard. ... This means not only 
an obligation on the part of state institutions to provide “a sufficient diversity of 
forms of law” (BVerfGE 84, 372, 378 f.) but is also implicitly to be understood as 
including the creative potential of norm addressees that can be exploited only 
together with others (Augsberg 2014, p. 168 f. Transl. R.B.).
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The freedom of organization is a normative field of largely autonomous 
private law production protected by basic rights. Steffen Augsberg:
* This brings us already to a field of law that, while shaped by constitutional law, 
also has an intensive life of its own and is subject to active development by the 
courts: collective labour and industrial action law. This not only provides a partic-
ularly drastic example of the general debate on relations between the first and 
third branches of government; precisely in this context there have recently been 
complaints about a “loss of constitutional thinking” ... Criticism has been directed 
against a line of development in adjudication and literature under the heading of 
“new law of industrial action,” which, although recognizing the individual and 
collective guarantees under the freedom of organization nevertheless neglects the 
institutional dimensions ...
* Finally, the legal institution of the declaration of general application of collective 
agreements should be mentioned as an example of the application of a concrete 
organizational / procedural effect dimension. This institution allows the state to 
extent the binding application of agreements to non-participants. This form of 
“private lawmaking,” which replaces individual by collective legitimation or at 
least supplements the first by the second, is acceptable (only) because there is not 
only a long, pre-constitutional tradition to this effect in collective bargaining law 
but also because Article 9 (3) of the Basic Law provides a specific basis in con-
stitutional law for this form of cooperative lawmaking (Augsberg 2014, p. 169 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
b) Freedom of Occupation
The freedom to choose an occupation or profession protected by Article 12 
(1) of the Basic Law does not stress the collective component so strongly, 
first because the Federal Constitutional Court has emphasised above all the 
importance of practising an occupation for developing the individual’s per-
sonality, and second because the phenomenon of professional organizations 
and their law production is measured above all against the yardstick of the 
freedom of association. But from the functional point of view, the profes-
sions and their law – from canons of professional ethics to codes of conduct 
– undoubtedly belong within a broad normative field of freedom of occu-
pation.
Steffen Augsberg has his sights on another interesting topic, namely how 
job profiles arise and who has the right to “invent” them:
It is also recognized ... that not only occupations that present themselves in specific, 
traditional, or even legal prescribed occupational descriptions are protected. The 
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freedom of occupation also covers atypical activities chosen and shaped by the 
individual subject of fundamental rights; the concept of occupation or profession 
is accordingly broad and regarded as in principle “open (to development).” What is 
therefore required is a model that builds on the creativity of the practitioner, a model that 
takes account of the factual plurality and diversity of occupational forms and does justice to 
the basic-rights interest in maintaining and protecting this variety. Given the tendency in 
legal practice to fix occupational descriptions permanently through normative, par-
ticularly statutory requirements, the preferability of such a liberal approach should 
be underlined. This does not preclude the state from defining professions and 
occupations; but such definition must be recognized as a restriction of liberty and 
not be accepted as mere demarcation of protected areas. But it would also be wrong 
to understand as solipsistic a return to an open conception of the freedom of 
occupation and the concomitant autonomous right of practitioners to shape and 
invent occupations. On the contrary, it offers a collective, interactive element in the 
sense that the right to design and invent occupations regularly and implicitly pre-
supposes the societal recognition of a certain activity, thus tending to oppose uni-
lateralism (Augsberg 2014, p. 173 f. Transl. R.B.).
In short, the normative field of the freedom of occupation has strong inter-
nal dynamism.
c) Freedom of Religion
But the prime example for the correctness of an (at least also) collective 
understanding of fundamental rights is the freedom of religion. We cite 
three authors on the subject:
* The first, Stefan Korioth, has this to say about the collective character 
of the freedom of religion (Korioth 2014):
Like the other fundamental rights of communication ... the freedom of religion 
depends particularly strongly on an infrastructure of societal habit and communi-
cation opportunities. What distinguishes the freedom of religion from fundamental rights 
of communication is the collective framework. Religion has a collective proprium; it is 
about the freedom to act in a common context and on the basis of shared convictions. A 
private religion as the sum of individual convictions that no-one else shares is not 
a religion. The freedom of religion as a individual right addresses a space of self-
determination derived from religious groups and collectives and which in the event 
of conflict has to be rendered plausible by reference to them (Korioth 2014, p. 233 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
* The second author to be cited is once again Thomas Vesting, who backs 
Korioth as follows:
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... this position would also mean recognizing the freedom of religion as a basic right 
addressing a supra-individual field of meaning from the outset. “The individual 
believer does not constitute the faith anew; he finds his way into a pre-existing body 
of rules, patterns of behaviour, and common convictions. In this sense, individual 
belief is a downstream effect, made possible only on the basis of a religion conceived 
of as a collective phenomenon” (Vesting 2014, p. 72. Transl. R.B.).
* The third author, just quoted by Vesting, is Ino Augsberg, who in an 
essay entitled “‘If you want to believe, you have to pay’?” (2013) com-
ments on the collective nature of the freedom of religion: “In brief, it 
can be argued that such a thing as a ‘private’ religion cannot exist. 
Religion is directed from the outset towards a collective form of prac-
tice ... In the nature of things, collective religious determination there-
fore has primacy over individual, self-determination” (Augsberg 2013, 
p. 518. Transl. R.B.).
The ecclesiastical right of self-determination lies primarily in the power 
of the Church to give itself a legal order of its own, with the conse-
quence that the individual believer is subject to two different legal 
orders at the same time:
... above all, the special emphasis on the collective dimension of the freedom of 
religious belief is in keeping with an understanding of religious constitutional law 
which regards its mechanisms and approaches as a reaction not to an individual 
problem but to a fundamental legal-pluralistic conflict. The individual believer is 
accordingly not subject only to obligation arising from his private convictions. As a 
member of a religious community he is rather subject to the legal orders of both the 
state and his religious community. He must therefore address the problem of pos-
sible divergence between normative commands, not only in the narrow field of 
morally decisive decisions of conscience but also in relation to modes of behaviour 
that, looked at from outside, may seem neutral and banal (Augsberg 2013, p. 521. 
Transl. R.B.).
Ino Augsberg’s observations are particularly interesting for another 
reason, too. He associates his reflections on religious constitutional 
law with general conclusions in the domain of fundamental rights theory, 
which we see as confirming our own thoughts on the conceptualiza-
tion of normative spaces. Looking at the freedom of science and art, 
Augsberg rightly insists that a spatio-static notion of the domain that 
basic rights protect needs to be replaced by a model that defines the 
object of such protection in processual terms:
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The exercise of fundamental rights in these fields cannot be convincingly described 
in terms of possession and the use of pre-existing communication possibilities. What 
is decisive is protection of acts that break out of pre-existing communication rou-
tines and open up new, hitherto inconceivable possibilities. Such a model can be 
described as creative rather than possessive. It is grounded above all in the reflexive 
structure of science and art. It posits that what is to be recognized as art or science 
is not a quasi-ontological datum but is itself the necessary, always provisional result 
of a permanent process of artistic or scientific preoccupation. An exclusively “objec-
tive” definition of protected areas must therefore fail. Art and science are discursive 
products: what the scientific community or art scene recognizes as art or science. 
The spatio-static concept of the protected area is therefore replaced by a model that 
defines the object to be protected by basic rights in processual terms (Augsberg 
2013, p. 528 f. Transl. R.B.).
Still more importantly, he understands this processual event as communica-
tive event:
From the point of view of religious constitutional law and its conceptualization of 
the conflict between the individual and collective dimensions of basic-law protec-
tion, this model with its implicit assumptions can be still further radicalized. ... 
discourse participants qualify as such only in and through discourse. Who is a 
scientist is decided by the scientific community – for example, by specific rites of 
initiation, that is to say, specially designed admission procedures subject to defined 
conditions, but also in more informal but no less effective fashion. In analogy to 
Lindbeck’s description of the connection between religion and subject constitution 
it can be said that in both science and art the subjects of basic-rights protection do 
not precede it; they are produced through communicative processes within a specific 
social sphere. The specific scientistic language game and its rules precede the individ-
ual player and his moves. Basic-rights protection that sets in at this point can 
accordingly relate neither to an ostensibly objective protected area nor to ostensibly 
pre-existing discourse participants. The primary point of reference is the given com-
munication sphere within which individual communicative acts and communica-
tive subjects themselves come into being (Augsberg 2013, p. 529 f. Transl. R.B.).
This confirms our view that normative or legal spaces cannot be defined in 
spatial terms but are produced only through processes of communication. 
This is an important insight.
Leaving the issue of normative fields under the protection of fundamental 
rights, we turn to a quite different arena with quite different norm pro-
ducers: international institutions.
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III. The International Arena and “Its” International Institutions
1. The Arena of International Institutions: An Arena with 
High Change Dynamics
a) The Growing Importance of Transnational and International Institutions: 
From Rule to Authority
The indisputable increase in the importance of international institutions is 
understandable against the backdrop of the growing “denationalization of 
problems” (Zürn 1998): the challenges posed by denationalized problems 
demand denationalized institutional solutions, that is to say, the establish-
ment of new international institutions or the strengthening of existing ones. 
International institutions will thus become not only more important – in 
terms of the problem-solving competence vested in them – but also more 
political; a process that Michael Zürn, Martin Binder und Matthias Ecker-
Ehrhardt rightly call the “politicization of international institutions” (2012). 
This is comprehensible and not particularly surprising.
However, our interest at this point is another: we want to examine a 
process that Michael Zürn has recently described as the path “from rule to 
authority” (Zürn 2014). By this he understands an observable shi in impor-
tance from the classical, rule-determined exercise of power typical of West-
ern constitutional states with norm-setting parliaments to a form of gover-
nance in which national governments and their parliamentary institutions 
do not have the primary say but where command is taken by transnational 
or international institutions, institutions that rely not on the classical legit-
imation resource of democratic elections but on their specific authority, fed 
by their special expertise, impartiality, and independence.
On closer inspection, the process “from rule to authority” consists of two 
sub-processes: first, shis of power within institutional structures, and, sec-
ond, changes in the legitimation basis of political decision-makers.
* The former can be illustrated by the consequences of the euro crisis for 
the institutional structure of the European Union. Michael Zürn:
First, the current institutional outcome does not point at all towards a renational-
ization of European politics. In spite of growing public skepticism, the European 
institutions seem to emerge from the crisis with more competences than ever. The 
neo-functional logic of European integration seems to prevail again. Earlier deci-
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sions written into the Maastricht treaty make further integration necessary, thus 
creating a demand for the strengthening of European institutions.
Second, the institutional losers are parliaments on both the national and the European 
level, the winners are expert bodies on both levels such as courts and central banks. 
Very telling is the episode with the German Constitutional Court: Here, a non-
majoritarian national institution was asked to protect the rights and competences of 
the majoritarian German parliament against non-majoritarian European institu-
tions. While rhetorically taking the side of the German parliament, in substance 
it decided for very good reasons in favour of the European institutions. And what is 
even more telling: It was neither Merkel nor Sarkozy, but the European Central 
bank that sent the decisive signal to the markets (Zürn 2014, p. 2).
There are, as we learn, institutional losers and institutional winners 
and international and transnational institutions appear to be among 
the winners.
* Following Michael Zürn’s formulation, the second process can be 
described as progression from constitutional rule to loosely coupled spheres 
of authority. Denationalized problems are no longer coped with pri-
marily through the showpiece institutions of modern constitutional 
statehood, that is to say parliaments and national governments, but 
through constitutional institutions of a different type like constitu-
tional courts, central banks, and regulatory agencies, to mention only 
the three most important. This movement from constitutional rule to 
loosely coupled spheres of authority can be described in still relatively 
abstract terms as follows:
Leaving the era of neatly separated territorial states does not lead us to a world state, 
to a moving up of the constitutional state to a higher level. It rather seems that 
segmentary differentiation as the fundamental principle of politics is partially 
replaced by functional differentiation in absence of a meta-authority that can coordinate 
from above. There is no constitutionalized place for the final decision. It may be too 
far-fetched to talk about full-scale institutional fragmentation, yet it is an institu-
tional architecture which lacks centralized coordination – which is why we move 
from encompassing constitutional rule to plural and only loosely coupled spheres of 
authority ...
The depicted institutional developments on the domestic and the international level 
are oen analyzed separately, both within their subdisciplinary niche. They have 
however a lot in common. Most obviously, their empowerment took place in 
parallel. Both non-majoritarian domestic institutions within democracies and inter-
national institutions became more powerful especially in the last three to four 
decades. All of these institutions, moreover, represent a type of public power which 
is limited in scope and oen stands in competition with other institutions. In this 
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sense, they are different from the constitutional state and indicate a shi toward plural 
spheres of authority. Finally, all the mentioned national and international institutions 
show similar patterns both with respect to the justifications they use and to the level 
and sources of social acceptance (Zürn 2014, p. 10 f.).
We must accordingly investigate what constitutes these spheres of authority 
and who operates in them.
b) The Institutional Architecture of Spheres of Authority
The first question to ask about spheres of authority is naturally what sort of 
authority is actually meant (on the variants of authority, especially in com-
parison between legal and religious authorities see Schuppert forthcoming). 
The classical types of personal, e. g., charismatic authority or the institutional 
authority of constitutional institutions are increasingly being joined by what 
can be called epistemic authority, based above all on trust – in the expertise, 
independence, and integrity of an institution. Michael Zürn:
The other basic type of authority [as opposed to political authority, G. F. S.] can be 
labeled epistemic authority. This type of authority is based on expert knowledge and 
moral integrity. In this case, the views and positions of an individual or an institu-
tion are adopted because they appear at the same time to be both knowledgeable 
and nonpartisan. Epistemic authority is based on the assumption that knowledge 
and expertise are unequally distributed, but that there is a common epistemological 
framework which makes it possible to ascertain inequality. An epistemic authority 
need not in all cases convince people factually and in detail. It is therefore not the 
quality of the specific argumentation, but rather the general reputation of an institu-
tion or person which is decisive. What is involved is governance by reputation ... (Zürn 
2014, p. 7).
What sort of institutions “populate” this sphere of epistemic authority and 
give it its distinctive character? Michael Zürn has coined the term “politically 
assigned epistemic authorities” (PAEAs), what we might call a “new institu-
tional trinity” of constitutional courts, central banks, and independent reg-
ulatory agencies:
A special version of this type of public authority arises when an epistemic authority 
is assigned to that status by political institutions. Then we may speak of politically 
assigned epistemic authorities (PAEAs). And it is especially this type of authority which 
has gained enormously in importance and has changed the constellation in the 
exercise of public power.
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On the one hand, three developments in the domestic realm need to be mentioned. 
* As Ran Hirschl has pointed out: “Over the past few years the world has witnessed 
an astonishingly rapid transition to what may be called juristocracy. Around the 
globe, in more than eighty countries and in several transnational entities con-
stitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power from 
representative institutions to judiciaries.”
* Independent central banks in the Western world also have uniformly become 
more important. They have gradually been introduced in many countries and 
their independence has been strengthened. Between 1990 and 2008 no fewer 
than 84 countries passed legislation to enhance the formal autonomy of central 
banks. At the same time, the importance of monetary policy tools in the general 
economic control toolbox has generally increased with the spread of monetar-
ism. Central banks thus became more autonomous and more important at the 
same time.
* Ultimately, however, central banks are only the manifestation of a broader devel-
opment: the increase in so-called “independent agencies.” On average, according to a 
quantitative study “autonomous regulatory agencies” play a role in 73 per cent of all 
policy areas in the countries under investigation in a study by Jacint Jordana and 
Levi-Faur. The study shows steady quantitative growth between 1966 and 2007, 
becoming almost exponential in the 1990s and declining slightly only aer the 
turn of the century (Zürn 2014, p. 8 f.).
So much on this key context for understanding the growth in the impor-
tance of international institutions.
c) Norm Production and Norm Interpretation as Components of 
the Governance Functions of International Institutions
Norm production and interpretation are increasingly integral components 
of the governance function of international institutions. In “International 
Authority and its Politicalization” (2012), Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 
write:
We first show that international institutions exercise authority to a significant 
degree. They do so across a wide range of governance functions including rule 
formulation and decision making ..., monitoring and verification of rule implemen-
tation ..., interpretation of rules ..., rule enforcement in the case of non-compliance 
..., and direct implementation by international agencies ... In this sense, interna-
tional institutions exercise authority in that they successfully claim the right to 
perform these functions and in that member states recognize – at least to some 
extent – the right of international institutions to do so (Zürn et al. 2012, p. 89).
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The authors go into detail about these governance functions:
(1) Rule setting and majority decisionmaking
International institutions that set rules via majority decision-making exercise polit-
ical authority. ... Majority decision making increases the ability of international 
institutions to act by nullifying the vetoes of individual states and overcoming 
blockades. Majority decision making is not a practice limited to just a handful of 
well-known organizations like the EU, the UN Security Council and General Assem-
bly, or the World Bank. Today, roughly two-thirds of all international organizations 
with at least one participating great power have the possibility to decide by majority. 
...
(2) Monitoring and verification
[T]he need for independent actors who process and make available information on 
treaty compliance is growing steadily. Such information is increasingly provided by 
the international secretariats of treaty systems ... and autonomous organizations 
such as the World Health Organization (WHO) or the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), to name just two prominent examples ... These are cases of politi-
cally delegated epistemic authority. NGOs may also function, more or less infor-
mally, as monitoring agencies. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 
for instance, are important actors for monitoring compliance with human rights 
standards. In general, Jonas Tallberg and colleagues have shown that, since the 
1980s, the access of NGOs to international policy processes has increased signifi-
cantly. ...
(3) Rule interpretation
Regarding rule interpretation, we find a significant increase in the number of 
international judicial bodies dealing with collisions between international and 
national law, and between conflicting international regulations. In 1960, there were 
only 27 quasi-judicial bodies worldwide; by 2004, this number had grown to 97. If 
we narrow the definition and include only those bodies that meet all of the pre-
requisites for formal judicial proceedings, then only five such bodies existed world-
wide in 1960, their number climbing to 28 by 2004 ... For example, the World Trade 
Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body (WTO-DSB) decides in matters of contro-
versy over the application of rules in international trade, while the ICC has juris-
diction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. These institutions 
produce legally binding decisions that cannot be easily revised by their members. In 
this sense, they exercise a form of political authority that claims to be epistemic 
authority. ... 
(4) Rule enforcement vis-à-vis states
Only a few international institutions have the capacity to enforce their own deci-
sions, thus exercising the strongest form of political authority. Nevertheless, we 
can observe that the practice of levying material sanctions against violators has 
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increased. For example, jus cogens (independent and binding international law not 
requiring the consent of states) in the meantime reaches beyond the prohibition of 
wars of aggression to include inter alia the prohibition of crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and apartheid. In the same vein, under Chapter VII authority, the Security 
Council makes use of coercive measures against the will of affected governments or 
parties to a conflict [...], including military humanitarian intervention, economic 
sanctions, or “robust” peacekeeping operations [...]. From 1946 to 1989 only 3.4 
percent of Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
This number rose to roughly 38 percent between 1990 and 2008. By 2008, about 
62 percent of all Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII 
authority. ...
(5) Implementation
The implementation of international regulations is frequently le to member states. 
Nevertheless, some institutions such as the World Bank or the WHO implement 
their policies directly [...] and therefore exercise a strong form of political authority. 
Likewise, UN agencies in the field of humanitarian assistance or development aid 
have gained significant implementation authority. Transitional administrations that 
were set up aer the end of the Cold War in Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, or East 
Timor, for example, represent a special type of implementation authority; to estab-
lish them, UN took on far-reaching executive, legislative, and judicial powers (Zürn 
et al. 2012, p. 90ff.).
Given the background material provided by this overview, we turn to the 
question of what sort of rules international institutions make, interpret, and/
or enforce. 
2. Modes of Rule-Making by International Institutions
a) Exploring the Regulatory Diversity of International Institutions
When exploring difficult, highly diversified terrain, it is advisable to secure 
the services of a guide familiar with it. José E. Alvarez is such a guide. In 
International Organizations as Law-makers (2006) he has investigated the “var-
ied forms of international institutional law” and classified the types of reg-
ulation IOs produce on the basis of ten different international institutions. We 
cannot go into this material in depth but will have to be content with a 
simplistic overview:
* The Codex Alimentarius
The Codex Alimentarius der FAO (Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion) comprises more than 200 Standards “[that] deal with maximum 
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limits of pesticide, food hygiene, food additives, and even labeling. The 
Codex’s legal status is a matter of some doubt” (Alvarez 2006, p. 222). 
Although the standards are not legally binding in the strict sense, they 
are de facto so:
Even though many states have not filed their acceptances and the Codex is formally 
only a “recommendation” in such cases, there is abundant evidence that its terms are 
widely accepted by those engaged in the food trade as well as governments, and that 
the pressures of the market (as well as those imposed by the WTO as described 
above) render its standards binding in practice, irrespective of whether governments 
have formally consented to them (Alvarez 2006, p. 222 f.).
* ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
The case of the International Civic Aviation Organization (ICAO) is 
also concerned with whether the standards and recommendations it 
issues can claim binding force. For members of the ICAO “merely 
undertake to “collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree 
of uniformity” with respect to such standards and only undertake to 
notify the organization should they find it ‘impracticable’ to comply in 
all respects with such standards and procedures” (Alvarez 2006, p. 223). 
Alvarez therefore speaks of rule “existing in a motherworld between 
binding and non-binding.”
* IO “Advisory” Material
Alvarez cites amongst others the “continuous stream of opinions” 
issued by the Secretariat of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) as an example of such “advisory material”: 
That Office has given, when requested by states, hundreds of advisory opinions 
relating to both general legal matters, such as whether reservations are permitted 
to labor treaties adopted within the ILO, to interpretations of specific ILO conven-
tions. Such interpretations, ... have established a considerable body of ILO institu-
tional law that is difficult to disentangle from the substantive international labor law 
produced by ILO conventions (Alvarez 2006, p. 225).
* ILO Recommendations
ILO recommendations, too, which explain and interpret the ILP con-
ventions, are “halfway houses” between binding and non-binding reg-
ulation: 
ILO recommendations are adopted by its General Conference in the course of 
adopting labor conventions that only bind members that ultimately ratify them. 
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The uses and effects of such recommendations need to be examined alongside the 
labor conventions that they are meant to elucidate or interpret. Under the ILO 
Constitution, such recommendations are, upon adoption by the General Confer-
ence, to be communicated to all members for their consideration with a view to 
giving them effect and to be presented not later than eighteen months aer the 
closing of the Conference before the domestic authorities that might be expected to 
enact appropriate legislation or otherwise take action (Alvarez 2006, p. 227 f.).
* IAEA Standards
On these standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Alvarez 
notes: “IAEA recommendations, like some ILO recommendations, per-
form a gap-filling role by providing the elaborate, context-specific, and 
changing implementation details that are impossible or impractical to 
achieve via treaty” (Alvarez 2006, p. 231).
* The FAO and UNEP Prior Informed Consent Regimes
The concept of prior informed consent (PIC) is about protecting devel-
oping countries against unregulated imports of hazardous chemicals 
and pesticides. To this end, the FAO adopted an International Code of 
Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides in 1985, and the United 
Nations Environment Programme formulated the London Guidelines for 
the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade: 
These codes made it illegal for states to export banned or severely restricted pesti-
cides or chemicals without the explicit agreement of the importing countries. These 
two so law approaches relied on comparable approaches and procedures thanks to 
joint expert and governmental consultations and close coordination between the 
two organizations (Alvarez 2006, p. 232).
* WTO So Law
Alvarez uses this term to draw attention to the fact that even in an 
institution like the World Trade Organization, which normally has to 
do with “hard” contract law and its “harder” enforcement, declarations 
in the sense of “deals” occur whose legal status is not clarified: 
A knowledgeable observer of the WTO concludes that the legal status of these two 
Doha Declarations is ambiguous given their text and negotiating history since they 
could be viewed alternatively as (1) merely political commitments no different from 
G-7 declarations, (2) binding decisions whose provisions may or may not be subject 
to interpretation and enforcement under the WTO’s dispute settlement scheme, or 
(3) a new kind of secondary law emerging from the ‘constitutive process of decision-
making of the WTO as an organization’ (Alvarez 2006, p. 233).
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* The WHO Code on the Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes
The background to this code was a bitter dispute between various 
NGOs like Oxfam, Christian Aid, and Third World First with the 
Nestlé group, which was accused of marketing breast-milk substitutes 
very aggressively and misleadingly to induce mothers to wean their 
children and to develop an artificial dependence on milk substitutes. 
In 1981 this led to adoption by the WHO Assembly of the Code of 
Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, which contained guidelines on 
the sale, effect, and labelling of such substitute products. Alvarez com-
ments on the process by which this code was produced: 
The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the WHO Code suggest a law-
making process very much at odds with the positivist conception of traditional 
sources of law. In that instance, states, ostensibly the only actors with authority 
to make international law, were only one group of actors in creating the relevant 
rules of conduct. To a considerable extent, these rules emerged as a result of the work 
of non-state actors: IOs, NGOs, and multinational corporations. These other actors, 
to a great extent, took the initiative, served as the venue for negotiations, and draed 
the relevant rules. To a considerable extent, these non-state actors were responsible 
for enforcement and even on-going interpretation (Alvarez 2006, p. 235).
* The World Bank Guidelines
The “World Bank Guidelines” are another interesting case. They have 
nothing to do with interpreting and applying bank’s charter but 
addresse only the staff of the bank, imposing certain behavioural obli-
gations of a mostly procedural sort; but even such internal organiza-
tional rules of conduct, as Alvarez shows, can develop into law: 
The World Bank’s ombudsman, its Inspection Panel, created in 1993 by resolution 
of the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors, receives and investigates complaints 
from those adversely affected by the Bank’s activities and enforces compliance with 
the Bank’s standards on the Bank’s staff. The adoption of an internal “disclosure 
policy” that made its policies accessible to the public at large and the creation of the 
Inspection Panel, nowhere explicitly authorized in the World Bank’s charter but 
which “judicialized” its policies by empowering private guardians to ensure com-
pliance with their terms, transformed the Bank’s Guidelines effectively into law, at least 
in terms of general perceptions (Alvarez 2006, p. 236 f.).
* IMF Conditionality
The last item in this overview is the conditionality regime of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the IMF practice of setting con-
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ditions for loans – particularly to developing and newly industrialized 
countries: 
By 1997, the Fund was following in the path of the World Bank and broadening its 
concept of appropriate conditions to embrace good governance generally. Its new 
guidelines indicated that it would now take note of a broad range of institutional 
reforms “needed to establish and maintain private sector confidence and lay the 
basis for sustained growth” (Alvarez 2006, p. 242).
Critics of the conditionality regime complain that it places borrowing coun-
tries under economic and legal guardianship and transferring regulatory 
power from the developing countries to the industrial countries.
We have briefly presented all ten of the cases Alvarez deals with because 
we need a concrete idea of what sort of law-making and law interpretation 
actually takes place in international institutions. Without an adequate 
empirical basis neither informed normative judgements let alone – as Tho-
mas Duve demands – the development of empirical legal concepts is con-
ceivable. Our review allows general consideration of the concept and func-
tion of so-called so law.
b) The Eroding Distinction between Binding and Non-Binding Norms, 
between Hard Law and So Law
As the cases presented show, the question of “law” or “non-law” cannot be 
avoided here, either. Given that guidelines and standards are in practice fol-
lowed and treated as law by those involved, are they already law or are only 
rules made or recognized by the state admitted to the table of the law? One 
way out of this dilemma is simply to posit two fields of law, the world of 
hard law and the world of so law. But on closer inspection this seemingly 
practicable solution more and more frequently leads nowhere because in 
practice the cleancut distinction oen proves impossible, and because so 
law can harden – for example, when in hard law cases reference is taken to 
originally non-binding rules, as in decisions of the WTO or other interna-
tional organisations. Alvarez describes what this adds up to in practical 
terms:
Examples whereby more than one IO is involved in law-making are becoming ever 
more abundant. The Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for example, 
incorporates by reference “generally accepted” international “rules, standards, regu-
lations, procedures and/or practices.” This effectively transforms a number of the IMO’s 
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[IMO = International Maritime Organization] codes, guidelines, regulations, and 
recommendations (dealing with such matters as pollution control measures to be 
obeyed by vessels while traveling their international straits or exclusive economic 
zones, for removal of installations to ensure safety of navigation, or relating to sea 
lanes or traffic separation) into binding norms, even for states that may not have 
approved of these standards within the context of the IMO but have become parties 
to the Law of the Sea Convention. Even though the IMO formally has no power 
under its constitution to take formally binding decisions, UNCLOS, a treaty whose 
scope and history suggest its comprehensive impact on general customary law bind-
ing even on non-parties, has remedied that handicap at least with respect to some of 
the IMO’s work products. Similarly, ... the World Bank makes use of a wide number 
of non-binding instruments produced by other IOs, such as FAO’s Code of Conduct 
on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, in effect turning such instruments into 
binding rules for its staff, and when incorporated into its loan agreements with states, 
perhaps even into binding forms of international or national law (Alvarez 2006, 
p. 220).
c) The Concept and Functions of So Law
Although we essentially know what so law is, it could be useful at this 
point to summarize the generally accepted criteria:
So law ... refers to regimes that rely primarily on the participation and resources of 
nongovernmental actors in the construction, operation, and implementation of a 
governance arrangement. Although the parameter of “primarily” permits some 
ambiguity (as well as flexibility), the key characteristics of a so law arrangement 
are clear, in contrast with a hard law arrangement. First, in a so law regime, the 
formal legal, regulatory authority of governments is not relied upon and may not 
even be contained in the institutional design and operation. Second, there is vol-
untary participation in the construction, operation, and continuation. Any partic-
ipant is free to leave at any time, and to adhere to the regime or not, without 
invoking the sanctioning power of state authority. Third, there is a strong reliance 
on consensus-based decision making for action and, more broadly, as a source of 
institutional binding and legitimacy ... Fourth, and flowing from the third, there is 
an absence of the authoritative, material sanctioning power of the state – police 
power as a way to induce consent and compliance (Kirton and Trebilcock 2004, 
p. 9).
More interesting are the various functions of so law. In So Law in Gover-
nance and Regulation, Ulrika Mörth identifies six:
· Soft law may precede hard law
· soft law has the potential for independence
· soft law can be disguised
· soft law is closely linked to politics
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· international organizations can modernize themselves through the use of soft law
· soft law provides room for flexibility and unintended consequences (Mörth 2004,
p. 19).
With the help of Mörth, we shall take a brief look at three of them:
First, so law can be a precursor to binding legal instruments, which means that it is 
not always linked to network governance; rather it can be more closely linked to the 
traditional steering mode of government. The regulatory status of so law is, how-
ever, a complex issue. Several authors in this volume have emphasized the difficulty 
of determining if so law develops into hard law, given the close connection 
between these two types of law. Indeed, there are fuzzy boundaries between regu-
lations. ... Several cases in this book have demonstrated different ways of transform-
ing so law into hard law. In Aldestam’s on EU’s state aid policy, for instance, the 
transformation of so law into hard law is oen a function of the Commission, which 
issues guidelines, recommendations and letters to the Member States. According to 
Aldestam, the Commission’s position has even been interpreted as having the power 
to establish rules with or without the agreement of the Member States. The chapter 
on state aid also showed that so law can be transformed into hard law if the 
national administrations believe that the rules are hard. Thus, the perception of rules
is an essential mechanism in deciding whether so law will be transformed into 
hard law. ...
A fourth conclusion is that so law is closely linked to politics. ... In the EU policy 
cases on employment and state aid, one might expect a less powerful position for the 
European Commission. This is especially striking in the case of State aid as outlined 
in Chapter 2. According to conventional wisdom in the EU literature so law is 
presumed to be useful because it preserves national sovereignty. In practice, how-
ever, the autonomy of the Member States seems to be relatively weak. One explan-
ation for this discrepancy between the formal and informal processes is cosmetic. It 
is important for the politicians to retain national sovereignty, however symbolic it 
may be, if they are to co-operate on politically sensitive domestic issues.
The fih conclusion is that international organizations use so law because they see 
it as a characteristic of the modern way. Göran Ahrne and Nils Brunsson suggest that 
so law is not only the most readily available regulatory mode for modern organ-
izations, particularly for meta-organizations, but also the most attractive way of 
compelling members to comply with the rules. Modern organizations are less prone 
to use their hierarchical authority, and so become advisory rather than directing. 
Even organizations like the European Union with the potential and the ability to 
use hard law seem to follow this modern trend toward so law. Thus, so law is an 
attractive form of regulation and governance because it is considered to be modern 
(Mörth 2004, p. 191ff.).
She concludes:
... so law is sometimes an independent form of regulation that fits well into a 
system of governance characterized by networks, horizontal relations and voluntary 
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rules. Whether so law is an independent form of regulatory mode or a step in a 
process of hardening the rules depends on several factors and mechanisms. One 
factor and mechanism is the way in which the actors perceive the rules and to what 
extent the organization wants to identify itself with hierarchy and coercion. The 
political will and context can also determine whether the rules will lead to a more 
formal legislation process or if the rules will stay so. Another factor has to do with 
the organizational authority and capacity. Rules do not float freely. Meta-organizations 
– organizations that have other organizations as their members – oen lack a clear 
authoritative centre, common resources and the right to issue legal sanctions (Mörth 
2004, p. 195).
IV. The Global Administrative Space and its Regulatory Agencies
We had briefly addressed the question of how legal spaces can actually be 
identified, described, and analysed. In the course of the repeatedly – oen in 
very general terms – evoked transnationalization processes, one such legal 
space is increasingly taking shape. Richard B. Stewart (2012) calls it the 
global administrative space:
The growing density of international and transnational regulation, which in part 
reflects the inadequacies of uncoordinated national systems of regulation as means 
to address global interdependencies in fields that include market activities and their 
spillovers, security, and human rights, has created a multifaceted “global administra-
tive space” populated by several distinct types of regulatory administrative bodies 
together with various types of entities that are the subject of regulation, including 
not only states but firms, NGOs and individuals (Stewart 2012, p. 4).
According the Stewart, four types of regulator operate in this global admin-
istrative space:
Formal intergovernmental organizations, established by states (or and in some cases 
other international organizations), typically through treaties that impose obligations 
on states parties but whose ultimate aim is oen regulation of private actors (e. g., 
Kyoto Protocol) and include a variety of administrative bodies operating under 
treaty aegis but oen exercising very significant lawmaking and discretionary and 
administrative powers, including lawmaking powers.
Intergovernmental networks of national regulatory officials responsible for specific areas 
of domestic regulation (banking, money laundering, etc.) who may agree to com-
mon regulatory standards and practices which they then implement domestically. 
These bodies are increasingly becoming strongly institutionalized with significant 
administrative components.
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Hybrid intergovernmental-private bodies composed of both public and private actors, 
such as the Global Partnership for HIV/AIDS and the global sports regime complex, 
a type that is becoming increasingly significant in contemporary governance gen-
erally and private bodies exercising public governance functions, such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council deciding on criteria for products from sustainably managed 
forests to be certified and labeled, or the International Olympic Committee deciding 
where the Olympic games should be held and under what conditions.
Domestic administrations forming an integral part of global regulatory regimes represent a 
fih type of body involved in global regulation. These agencies implement global 
regulatory law through a distributed system of administration, and in so doing (and 
in other ways) shape it (Stewart 2012, p. 4 f.).
This transnational legal space has taken shape with the emergence of a global 
administrative law (Kingsbury 2009; Cassese 2005; Cassese et al. 2008), which 
the relevant scientific community affectionately calls GAL, and which, un-
like national administrative law, consists less of concrete legal provisions and 
legal institutions than of a bundle of very general principles: 
... diverse forms of global regulatory administration and their interactions are (or can 
be) organized and shaped by principles of an administrative law character. A growing 
body of global administrative law, based on largely procedural principles of trans-
parency, participation, reasoned decision, review, is emerging in global regulatory 
administration to promote greater accountability and responsiveness to affected 
actors and interests, including developing countries and civil society interests (Stew-
art 2012, p. 5 f.).
We are naturally particularly interested in how to conceive the emergence of 
such global administrative law and who can be regarded as the producer of this 
legal regime. Stewart shows that there has been no master plan behind the 
“creation” of the GAL and that a plurality of producers have contributed to the 
development of the legal principles that have shaped it:
The development and spread of GAL practices and norms has been accomplished by 
many different types of institutional actors, motivated by a variety of objectives. 
There has been no overall plan or system. Rather GAL has accreted through the 
accumulation of discrete decisions by the different generative actors responding 
to the need to discipline the exercise of administrative power occurring in certain 
recurring structural modes ... These actors include not only domestic regulatory 
authorities, business firms, NGOs, and private and public / private networks or 
actors. Some of these actors, such as courts and tribunals and international invest-
ment arbitral bodies, review the legality of global administrative decisions and 
norms (including those of their distributed domestic components) as a condition 
of their validity and enforcement. In other cases, a domestic agency or another 
global regulatory body, in deciding whether or not to recognize or validate a global 
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regulator’s decisions or norms may give weight to whether or not it followed GAL 
practices in decisionmaking. . [sic!] As discussed below, these decisions are instinct 
with the need to channel and regularize the exercise of authority through law. 
In still other cases, private actors are deciding whether to conform to the decision 
or norm in order to enhance their reputations, become credible partners in business 
or other transactions or ventures, or otherwise further their interests. In all of these 
contexts, the extent to which the global regulator has followed GAL practices 
of transparency, participation, reason giving, and opportunity for review in mak-
ing decisions is oen a substantial and in some cases a controlling factor in the 
decision of the validating or recipient authority or actor in deciding whether or not 
to validate, recognize or conform to the decision or norm in question (Stewart 2012, 
p. 7).
The conclusion is that legal spaces can perhaps be conceived of less as spaces 
characterized by the validity of a common, detailed legal regime than as 
spaces that – at least in the early stages of their development – come into 
being on the basis of common, recognized legal principles to which the 
“population” feel themselves committed. Legal spaces could then be con-
ceptualized as spaces of common legal principles – such as the principles of 
the rule of law. We shall be returning to this at the end of the present 
chapter.
V. The Transnational Legal Arena and its Norm-Entrepreneurs
As when dealing with the norm-producing role of standard-setters and inter-
national institutions, we are concerned here with the nature of the playing 
ground on which norm entrepreneurs (see Flohr et al. 2010; Wolf 2011) are 
to be found. Returning to our arena concept, this playing ground can perhaps 
best be described as a transnational legal arena.
1. The Transnational Legal Arena as Field of Operation for Norm-
Entrepreneurs such as NGOs, TNCs (Transnational Corporations) 
and Big Law Firms
As noted elsewhere (Schuppert 2008c; 2010), we are witnesses to an ongoing 
process of the transnationalization of law. This process, too, is accompanied 
and promoted by a number of actors for whom operating in spaces beyond 
the state is a matter of course and, moreover, for whom the given trans-
national space is where they are at home. This is particularly the case for 
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transnational corporations and for international law firms, as well as for 
many NGOs that use to world stage with great professionality.
It therefore seems obvious to relate the transnationalization process of law 
to the actor perspective in order to gain an idea of a transnational legal arena. 
With reference to Buaventura de Sousa Santos (1995), Klaus Günther and 
Shalini Randeria provide the following, very informative description (2001, 
p. 87) under the heading “The Transnationalization of Law.” We take the 
liberty of replacing this title by the formulation “The Transnational Legal 
Arena,” giving the following overall picture:
Going a step further, we could perceive not only certain institutional actors 
in this transnational legal spaces but also the people operating in them, such 
as the stressed manager so brilliantly and ironically portrayed by Martin 
Suter (Suter 2014); administrative networkers commuting between Wash-
ington, Brussels, and Berlin; or the familiar international lawyers, who can 
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be regarded as the personification of transnational legal knowledge and a 
transnational legal elite.
In “Governance by Practitioners” Sigrid Quack describes the role of inter-
national law firms as carriers of transnational legal knowledge:
Law firms operating internationally are big business enterprises. As such, they seek 
to satisfy the needs of their clients and to maximize income in subsidiaries through-
out the world. Lawyers working for them also serve as development platforms for 
solving the legal problems their clients face. Marc Galanter ... takes the view that the 
working style in mega law firms differs qualitatively from that in “ordinary” law 
firms. According to Galanter, thorough investigation of different legal options and 
creativity in problem-saving approaches and in court-room tactics are characteristic 
of such firms. Because they work for many clients in similar areas, lawyers in mega 
law firms gain good insight into current developments. They are “repeat players” and 
oen take a leading role in new developments. Owing to their strategic position, 
they can better understand emerging organizational problems and find suitable 
legal solutions ... The knowledge acquired in various projects is thus stored in 
accessible form, so that over time law firms become sources of valuable legal knowl-
edge. Owing to their size, international law firms cover both different national 
jurisdictions and many special legal fields. For this purpose, they employ lawyers 
from different countries and with different specialities, who can profit from one 
another’s experience and. These international firms consequently have unique access 
to “application of the law at the stage of its development” and can use this knowl-
edge in many fields of transnational law. Robert Nelson’s ... assertion that the 
business of American mega law firms is to change the law is more true today than 
ever before. Like 25 years ago, “the intellectual impact of big law firms exercises a 
permanent influence on the jurisprudence of our times” (Quack 2009, p. 582 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
Taking an image from the world of soccer, the biggest of these international 
law firms constitute something of a “Champions League” among transla-
tional legal actors. Quack:
The Americans and British dominate the top bracket of international law firms. This 
Anglo-American predominance is attributable to the enormous size of the American 
market and to British history shaped by colonialism and the commonwealth, the 
economic influence of the American economy, and the importance of the London 
and New York financial centres. The case law that applies in the USA and Britain 
offers law firms domiciled there more liberal possibilities in creating innovative con-
tractual arrangements than the more restrictively codified legal systems on the Euro-
pean continent. British and American law firms have accordingly had a head start in 
the internationalization process. ... The social stratification of law firms in terms of 
membership of the “magic circle,” the opening of foreign subsidiaries of these firms 
in a limited number of metropolises in proximity to other professional service 
providers, the hierarchy of lawyers in international mega law firms between those 
176 Chapter Three
from the US or Britain and those from elsewhere: these are typical aspects that 
influence membership of the new cosmopolitan legal elite, whose members contribute 
to resolving problems of cross-border coordination and intercultural communica-
tion (Quack 2009, p. 583 f. Transl. R.B.).
2. Three Types of Norm Entrepreneur at Work
a) NGOs
The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in norm production 
and diffusion has oen been described. Klaus Günther and Shalini Randeria 
provide a particularly striking portrait of such organizations:
NGOs are important, hardly researched new actors in law production, law diffusion, 
and monitoring. The making of new transnational norms in the field of human 
rights and environmental protection and their global diffusion is to be counted 
among their achievements, as well as the establishment of a general and public 
awareness of injustice in the face of violations of the law. They influence national 
and supranational lawmaking and thus oen call the legal sovereignty of the state 
into question. To be seen in this context are the new coalitions between NGOs, 
certain governments, and some private sector actors which cooperate in formulating 
and implementing human rights and contribute to changing the state monopoly in 
this field. This new sort of public private partnership constellation is also becoming 
more important in global environmental policy. In climate policy, for example, 
strategic alliances between NGOs, international organizations, and business enter-
prises set new environmental standards and push their implementation. This type of 
“privatization of world policy” offers opportunities for the just and effective reso-
lution of global problems, but it also endangers the democratic control of policy 
decisions. Nevertheless, the state is not deprived of its rule-setting function. Not 
only must it subsequently embed international norms and treaties in the national 
context but also ensure their implementation (Günther and Randeria 2001, p. 63 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
Following this first overview, we turn to a particular field of NGO activity, 
looking over their shoulder as they work at the law, participating in the 
setting of standards. Anne Peters, Till Förster and Lucy Koechlin (2009c) 
identify three variants defined in terms of the type of standard involved.
* In the first, the contracting states are the actual standard setters and 
NGOs are only lookers-on, reduced to lobbying: 
First, NGOs are engaged in the elaboration of ordinary inter-state international 
conventions ... Here NGO involvement is largely informal. NGO forums are held 
in parallel to and separate from the intergovernmental standard-setting conferences, 
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such as the Rio conference of 1992. So NGOs do not have any negotiating role 
whatsoever here. However, their direct lobbying at those conferences can be crucial 
(Peters et al. 2009a, p. 493).
* In the second variant of participation, NGOs are involved above all 
procedurally in the process of norm production:
The second type of standard setting occurs within international organisations or 
quasi-organisations, in particular in the framework of the highly institutionalized 
multilateral environmental agreements. Here, the governmental bodies or confer-
ences of the parties create secondary law for the implementation of the respective 
regimes. To most of these bodies, NGOs are accredited in formal procedures and thus 
enjoy an observer (or in the Council of Europe: “participatory”) status. This legal 
status is an intermediate one between exclusion and full participation as co-law makers. 
It entails various rights to be invited and to sit in meetings, to obtain information 
(agendas, dras), speaking time, the allowance to distribute documents and the like 
(Peters et al. 2009a, p. 493).
As Anne Peters et al. note, international lawyers do not agree whether 
customary law meanwhile permits NGO participation in setting interna-
tional standards. The authors believe this not yet to be the case, but that 
things are moving in this direction:
Among international lawyers, it is controversial whether NGOs have, as a matter of 
customary law, a general entitlement to participate as observers (and thus to be 
heard) within the law-generating international institutions. Such an NGO right to 
be heard would come to bear in institutions which have no or only deficient special 
rules of procedure. We submit that a customary right of NGOs to participate in the 
international legal discourse does not yet exist, because practice and opinion iuris
have not sufficiently matured. But NGOs already enjoy a legitimate expectation that 
– once an institution has admitted them – the participatory conditions will entail 
two core components: oral interventions and written submissions. Refusal of these 
rights must be specifically and concretely justified. In the current international legal 
system, the NGOs’ voice is thus the functional equivalent to the formal law-making 
power which other actors (the international legal subjects) possess. Because of this 
legal function of NGOs’ voice, there is a need to legally structure NGO participation 
(Peters et al. 2009a, p. 494).
* In the third and final variant, NGOs are directly involved in norm 
setting in that they produce their own dra texts and formulate con-
crete proposals for norms:
Finally, NGOs sometimes dra private texts or propose norms (oen in conjunction 
with academics), such as codes of conduct and guidelines, interpretative treaty 
commentaries, or principles, in the hope that they will be adopted by other interna-
tional actors, cited, and accepted as contributing to the corpus of international law. 
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Examples are the numerous Rules of the International Law Associations, the Hel-
sinki Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers of 1966, the Limburg 
Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of 1997, the Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of 2000, or the Princeton Principles on Universal Juris-
diction of 2001 (Peters et al. 2009a, p. 494).
Despite this broad range of NGO activity in the norm-setting field, states still 
have “a tight grip on the formal law-making processes” in the view of Peters 
et al. Even in those areas where NGOs have had greatest impact, states control 
the agenda and the access to the law-making arenas, in particular through the 
accreditation procedures (Peters et al. 2009a, p. 494). We have our doubts 
about the general accuracy of this assessment, suspecting that it underesti-
mates the potential for networked NGOs with a sovereign command of the 
Internet to at least strongly influence the political agenda. But we cannot go 
into this question here.
b) Transnational Corporations (TNCs)
There is abundant evidence of and research into the important role that 
transnational corporations play in the “rule-making business.” We call two 
authors to the witness box. 
In her oen quoted book A Public Role for the Private Sector: Changes in the 
Character of Business on the phenomenon of industry self-regulation, Virginia 
Haufler (2001) examines the extent to which TNCs play a public role apart 
from their private one as money-making stock corporations, and therefore 
assume public responsibility. This double role of transnational corporations, 
their commitment to profit-oriented “shareholder value” and their assump-
tion of “corporate social responsibility,” can be seen as one of the most 
important consequences of globalization, because both the composition of gov-
ernance actors and transnational corporations’ understanding of their role have 
changed as globalization has proceeded.
On the change in the governance scene, Haufler notes:
The character of international relations has changed in the past 50 years from one in 
which the global agenda was established by the most powerful countries, to one in 
which powerful commercial and activist groups shape the debate and oen determine 
outcomes. Industry self-regulation is just one more piece of evidence regarding the 
changing nature of efforts to govern the global economy and establish collective mech-
anisms for resolving global policy issues (Haufler 2001, p. 121).
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According to Haufler, this change in the governance scene has been accom-
panied by a change in the role of big companies, which manifests itself above 
all in a new conception of their role (see Schuppert 1998). On this new 
public role of transnational corporations, which ties them through their self-
regulation into what we could call a system of shared responsibility, she 
comments:
The voluntary adoption of social standards by an increasing number of companies 
presents a different picture of the role of the corporation in world affairs. Observers and 
participants alike point out that the standards these companies establish are oen 
higher than national or international ones. They address contentious public issues 
and not just technical standards that only concern industry. When companies estab-
lish their own rules and standards in socio-political areas, these can complement or 
supplement government regulation, especially in countries with weak capacity to reg-
ulate. International standard setting fills in the gaps where national regulatory 
systems conflict or remain silent. Where governments do not govern, the private sector 
does – oen in response to the demands of public interest groups who find them-
selves unable to move national governments. And when governments are unwilling 
or unable to govern effectively, potential leaders may see private governance as a 
valuable tool to achieve public ends.
National policy makers are beginning to pay attention to the possible benefits of 
industry self-regulation. They may hope that as business improves its behavior 
abroad then government will be under less pressure to act against the private sector 
at home or abroad. They may also hope to use corporate social responsibility as a tool to 
promote “so” foreign policy goals, such as human development (Haufler 2001, p. 29).
Doris Fuchs (2005), our second witness, has systematized the “channels of 
influence” used by TNCs in her book Understanding Business Power in Global 
Governance (2005). She distinguishes between “instrumentalist, structuralist 
and discursive approaches.” We are particularly interested in the structural 
power of business, within which she differentiates as follows:
* “Channels of the Structural Power of Business
* Mobile Capital: The Agenda-Setting Power of TNCs ...
* Quasi-Regulation: The Agenda (and Rule) Setting Power of Coordination Serv-
ice Firms ...
* Public-Private Partnerships: Participation in Rule-Setting ...
* Self-Regulation: Increasingly Autonomous Rule-Setting Power ...” (Fuchs 2005, 
p. 120ff.).
But what is behind these three variants of rule-setting? What Doris Fuchs 
calls “quasi-regulation,” has to do with the development of standards set by 
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private, profit-making corporations and which perform a – sometimes 
worldwide – control function. Two actors take the scene: rating agencies 
and the big multinational law and accounting firms. As far as rating agencies
are concerned, she has this to say: 
Quasi-regulation provides the second mechanism through which business actors 
exercise passive structural power in global governance today. Quasi-regulation, in 
the context of the present analysis, refers to the ability of coordination service firms 
to indirectly set standards for policies and practices worldwide. At the core of this debate 
is the role of rating agencies and their ability to determine the acceptability of 
national policies. In this context, quasi-regulation is related to the passive structural 
power exercised by corporations vis-à-vis national governments delineated above, 
the only difference being that rating agencies do not threaten that one company will 
move its investment out of a country, but rather influence the investment decisions of 
the entire global financial market. To the extent that these standards are made explicit, 
moreover, this passive structural power comes close to an active one (Fuchs 2005, 
p. 124).
But the big international law and accounting firms also play an important role 
in developing transnational standards:
Next to rating agencies, other coordination service firms have obtained substantial 
structural power in global governance. Multinational law and accounting firms as well 
as management consultants exercise transnational rule-setting power by determining 
and enforcing standards for the behaviour of business companies ... Again, this 
structural power reaches into the realm of active structural power to the extent to 
which these rules are made explicit. While these actors do not influence public 
policy as directly as rating agencies, they do have a substantial impact on corporate 
conduct and economic organization. In consequence, similar criticisms pertain to 
their structural power as to that of rating agencies (Fuchs 2005, p. 125).
With regard to participation in rule-setting in the framework of public 
private partnerships (PPPs), Fuchs sees the participation of firms in PPPs 
as an avenue to collaboration in setting “transnational rules”:
PPPs, then, provide business with an avenue to exercise active structural power. 
In PPPs, business actors directly participate in decisions on rules and regulations. The 
extent of this power, however, differs across PPPs. While in some PPPs, business may 
dictate agenda- and rule-setting, in others, public actors enforce strict limits on the 
decision room of business actors. Moreover, public actors still are in control to the 
extent that they can decide with whom they want to sit at the table. This may be 
more so in the national arena, however. In the international arena, PPPs can provide 
large business actors with considerable leeway in agenda- and rule-setting due to 
resource scarcity among public actors and a frequent lack of transparency in deci-
sion-making processes (Fuchs 2005, p. 127).
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Turning finally to industrial self-regulation: it is not a new phenomenon – the 
lex mercatoria inevitably comes to mind, in our view a “legal phantom” 
difficult to pin down (see also Ipsen 2009) – but, owing to its growing 
diffusion, it is attracting more and more attention (see, e. g., Cutler et al. 
1999):
Partly, however, the rise in interest results from the dramatic increase in quantity 
and influence of self-regulatory arrangements as well as new facets to self-regulatory 
practices. Private actors today define regulations across a wide range of policy arenas, 
including environmental issues, human rights, or the international financial system. 
Developments are particularly noteworthy in the area of standards and codes of con-
duct, which now exist at the level of individual companies such as Levi-Strauss or 
Karstadt; at the sectoral level such as the Responsible Care Program of the Chemical 
Industry; and at the global level, such as the regulation of transport of dangerous 
goods by the International Air Transport Association, the ISO 14000 or SA 8000 
standards for environmental management and social accountability ..., or the adver-
tising code of conduct developed by the International Chamber of Commerce. 
Importantly, much of this activity extends beyond core activities of business (Fuchs 
2005, p. 129).
To sum up, what interests Virginia Haufler and Doris Fuchs – among many 
others – is the role of corporations that, in the absence of a transnational 
lawmaker fill existing regulatory gaps and substitute or supplement state law. 
To this extent we can indeed speak of norm-setting by corporations and thus 
of a type of coproduction of law.
c) International Law Firms (Mega Law Firms, MLFs)
If we now cast a brief glance at the role of international law firms in setting 
norms, we are interested less in their concrete activities than in explaining 
why they have acquired so dominant a position in the transnational legal 
arena. There appear to be two main reasons: a growing market for legal 
advice and a type of legal advice practised by such firms that is referred to 
in the literature as creative lawyering.
aa) The Growth of the Legal Advice Market
The thesis that – chiefly as a consequence of transnationalization and dena-
tionalization – there is a growing market for legal advice, is in keeping with 
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our own observations. This thesis is advance particularly strongly by Klaus 
Günther and Shalini Randeria:
In the sectors of the world in which the economic system is transnationally differ-
entiated, there is a growing market for legal advice in which law firms can successfully 
operate that also organize themselves transnationally, usually in the form of a net-
work-like groups of locally more or less autonomous law firms, which do business 
under a common name. They can therefore serve as an example of organizations that 
Rudolf Stichweh has called “engines of globalization.” He describes them as follows: 
“They are membership associations that, through personnel mobility within the 
organization, their ability to establish branches and subsidiaries in many different 
places, and through facilitated communication flows in the organization, can devel-
op considerable globalization effects, effects that can be held within the organization 
or impact the societal environment.” This question is likely to be an important 
research topic particularly with regard to transnational law firms because they inter-
act closely and intransparently with the international capital market and are inte-
grated into the dynamics of global competition between transnational corporations.
Law firms have become such organizations through the high demand for legal 
advice, legal organization, and out-of-court conflict settlement competence that 
necessarily accompanies the process of economic transnationalization. Compared 
with early periods, legal problems to do with the international exchange of goods 
and services have increased only in number. However, new sorts of legal problem 
have arisen with the privatization of state enterprises (e. g., Deutsche Telekom AG), 
with long-term borrowing by transnational corporations and growing investment 
activities by transnational investment funds and pension funds on the international 
capital market, with transnational mergers (German examples: Daimler / Chrysler, 
Vodafone / Mannesmann), and with international joint ventures (e. g., dam projects 
in India and China, oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea to Germany) (Günther and 
Randeria 2001, p. 52 f. Transl. R.B.).
Not only the need for legal advice is growing but also the need for regulation 
to be satisfied by lawyers – which brings us back to the function of filling 
regulatory gaps:
Law firms can ... become important actors in global locational and regulatory 
competition when advising their clients in “forum shopping” about the production 
and distribution locations that offer the most favourable tax, social, competition, 
labour, and company law conditions. Ultimately, however, lawyers also become 
actors in law generation beyond the state everywhere where global markets have 
to rely on legal rules to coordinate activities and on conflict settlement mechanisms 
that a national lawmaker and state judiciary cannot provide alone or not fast 
enough – or where such rules are more favourable for everyone concerned without 
state intervention. Finally, political measures for deregulation by transmuting pub-
lic-law forms of regulation into private-law forms and through privatization con-
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tribute for their part to increasing the demand for private-law regulation to be 
satisfied by lawyers (Günther and Randeria 2001, p. 53. Transl. R.B.).
bb) Assumption of Creative Legal Functions – Creative Lawyering
The increasing importance of international law firms – particularly in 
Europe and in Germany, where the legal profession is still considered an 
“independent institution of the judicature” – can really be understood only 
if the type and style of legal advice that such firms practise are taken into 
consideration, whose lawyers are either themselves from the Anglo-Ameri-
can legal system or have undergone at least some of their training in the 
United States.
In an interesting working paper on “The The Role of International Law 
Firms in Cross-Border Commerce” (2006), Fabian Sosa and John Flood offer 
reflections that deserve our attention for two reasons: they describe first the 
creative form of legal advice practised and the semi-autonomous legal fields
created and dominated by such mega-law firms:
The discourse about international lawyering focuses mostly on Anglo-American 
mega-law firms, whose services are usually limited to the large multinational com-
panies. The prevailing opinion assumes that only these law firms are able to provide 
effective legal support at the global level. Most of these firms have their headquarters 
in the US (with subsidiaries in many areas of the world). They have hundreds of 
partners and oen over a thousand associates. Trubek et al. ... describe this ‘American 
mode of production of law’ and the decisive role played by these multi-purpose, 
commercially-oriented law firms in the common law. US lawyering known as “legal 
entrepreneurialism” has lead to a pro-active strategy in structuring, negotiating and 
draing contracts, requiring an understanding of legal as well as economic and 
management competences. Lawyers advise their clients, dra complex contracts, 
influence the lawmaking procedure and file class actions. Law firms exercise an 
enormous influence on cross border commerce through this creative form of lawyer-
ing ... According to some authors, the mega law firms have created a largely auton-
omous system of private ordering which is of much greater importance for global 
commerce than the legal structures provided by nation states (Sosa and Flood 
2006, p. 1 f.).
What Sosa and Flood have to say about American research into this specific 
style of legal advice is also interesting. How international law firms function 
is described in a fashion that makes their central role in the transnational 
arena very plausible:
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In the context of the law firm literature, those approaches are of interest which focus 
on the function of lawyers and the effect of their work. Well known concepts from 
this literature are the concept of creative lawyering ..., the concept of the lawyer as legal 
entrepreneur or legal engineer ..., or the lawyer as manager of uncertainty ... However, 
despite their relevance for the present project, these approaches seem to be too 
specific for a basic general approach.
A more general approach can be derived from the works of Lawrence Friedman, 
who has argued that the significance of lawyers and their indispensability increases 
the weaker and lumpier existing legal structures are ... This argumentation has also 
been used to explain the dominance of Anglo-American MLF in the global context 
and the growing Americanization in the global legal field ... The fragmentariness of 
the global legal system leads to a comparative advantage for US law firms because 
these firms are familiar with the openness of the legal system in the common law 
and the coexistence of different legal systems. In this context they were able to 
develop a particular style of lawyering, much more creative and business oriented than 
in the civil law countries (Sosa and Flood 2006, p. 4).
These reflections on the three types of norm-entrepreneur encourage us to 
bring a concept into play that we have found useful elsewhere (Schuppert 
1994), namely “institutional competence.” Both NGOs and transnational 
corporations, and especially international law firms, have their own specific 
competence, which enables them to play an important role in the norm-
setting processes of the transnational legal arena. For NGOs, apart from their 
enormous agenda setting power, it is the critical scrutiny of existing norma-
tive regimes in global justice discourses and their role as carriers of local and 
alternative regulatory knowledge. The institutional competence of transna-
tional corporations for participating in norm production in arenas beyond 
the state is, so to speak, innate to them. Global players by definition, they 
operate in the framework of transnational regulatory structures and – if 
other regulatory authorities fail to provide them – establish such structures 
themselves. As far as the institutional competence of international law firms 
is concerned, it clearly consists in the ability to satisfy the need of a global-
ized economy for legal advice and regulation better than any.
Before concluding this third chapter with reflections on the normative 
benchmarks of pluralized law production, an important issue needs to be 
considered: the public function of private norm-setting. 
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D. Normative Yardsticks in the Pluralized Production of Law: 
The Rule of Law
I. Private Norm-Setters as Public Institutions
Andreas Engert has recently examined the manifestations and consequences 
of private norm-setting power (2014). Taking three examples, the rules of the 
International Swaps and Derivates Association (ISDA), the German Corpo-
rate Governance Code (DCGK), and the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), he describes the most important functions of private 
norm-setters:
Recurrent transactions almost inevitably generate network effects and thus natural 
standardization. Widespread rules like the pari passu clause [debtor declaration vis-à-
vis the creditor that his claim will be treated “on an equal footing”] therefore shape 
contracts at least as much as the norms of state dispositive law. However, whereas 
legal norms can mostly be attributed to the legislator, private standards have so far 
appeared to be “heteronomy without heteronomous agents.” The ISDA rules, the 
DCGK, and the IFRS show that private standards also frequently build on a central 
institution. When a particular actor claims responsibility for the private norm, its 
heteronomous effect is more apparent. The most important role in this is to give 
substantive shape and an authoritative formulation to the rule (Engert 2014, 
p. 331 f. Transl. R.B.).
These functions, and particularly the network effects of private rule-makers 
noted by Engert mean that they obtain a “certain power over ‘their’ norm” 
(Engert 2014, p. 334) and accordingly perform de facto a public function. 
Engert identifies two groups of actors that have outgrown the purely private 
sphere: big law firms, and industrial federations or other non-profit institu-
tions.
He outlines the action logic of big law firms, which at first glance are not 
obviously norm-setters:
Legal advisers can go to great lengths to develop appropriate solutions; others copy 
their arrangements, so that network effects arise and the solution becomes an estab-
lished standard. Since lawyers and other service providers frequently accompany the 
same sort of transaction with changing parties, they are in an especially favourable 
position to diffuse a solution and coordinate market participants. However, the aim 
of their activity as “norm entrepreneurs” is to keep their consultancy fees flowing. 
They have no interest in making their services superfluous. No norm-setting is to be 
expected from them in the sense of formulating generally applicable rules and 
making them available to others. Legal consultants will more likely seek to at least 
avoid any impression of standardization for fear their services could appear inter-
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changeable. The publication of a uniform normative text and concomitant guidance 
for application is therefore not to be expected from legal consultants (Engert 2014, 
p. 334 f. Transl. R.B.).
As far as the second group of actors is concerned, their norm production 
quite clearly “provides a public good and therefore constitutes a public task”:
Where rules are set not only as a collateral effect of providing legal advice, private 
norm-setters are generally industrial federations or other non-profit institutions. The 
network effects of arrangements mean that an efficient normative configuration – 
including the substantive quality of predominant standards – is a public good of the 
given market. ... With regard to the status quo, it should be noted that, with the 
services they render but also with their (limited) disposition over the norms they 
provide, private norm-setters perform a public task. In influencing the normative 
configuration, they influence the developing network effects without fully internal-
izing them. How they employ this norm-setting power depends on their internal 
constitution. This raises questions for private standard setters similar to those facing 
other public institutions, especially about the representation of the interests con-
cerned (Engert 2014, p. 335 f. Transl. R.B.).
If not only state-made law but also private law production provides public 
goods, a yardstick is needed not only for good lawmaking but – in keeping 
with our science of regulation approach – for good rule-making, notably rule-
making beyond state law.
One such yardstick could be the sheaf of principles that constitute the rule 
of law. By the rule of law we understand not a state-centric principle but – on 
the contrary – an ensemble of second order rules that can be drawn on as a 
benchmark wherever rules are being made, also and particularly by non-state 
rule-makers.
II. Rule-of-Law Principles as Second Order Rules in the Sense of 
“Rules for Rule-making”
In our view, rule-of-law principles in the sense of second order rules are a 
particularly suitable normative yardstick for every form of rule-making. 
Robert S. Summers (1999) explains the distinction between primary and 
secondary rules commonly drawn in legal theory:
The principles of the rule of law differ from principles of ordinary “first order law.” 
Principles of ordinary first order law apply directly to determine legal relations 
between immediate addressees of such law. ... Unlike such “first order principles,” 
the principles of the rule of law are what might be called “second order” principles. ... 
Principles of the rule of law are about first order law in the sense that they are 
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general norms that direct and constrain how first order law is to be created and 
implemented (Summers 1999, p. 1692).
Michael Zürn and Bernhard Zangl also take up this distinction, finding it 
useful in examining juridification:
Characteristic of juridification processes is ... that so-called secondary rules are 
defined institutionally. Where the making, application, and enforcement of rules 
do not function in accordance with pre-defined procedures ... one can hardly speak 
of law. To this extent, a meticulous legal system presupposes primary and secondary 
rules ... (Zürn and Zangl 2004, p. 21 f. Transl. R.B.).
With this in mind, we can conceive the role of rule-of-law principles as 
second order rules:
* On law production or – to put it more generally – rule-making, and 
notably on what authority is legitimated to make rules and what 
procedural law demands are to be made of the production process
* On the nature of the product itself, i. e., the quality of the norms produced, 
not only in the sense of what type of norms are to regulate what areas, 
but in the sense of the demands made on every type of norm designed 
to control behaviour and which must therefore have a modicum of 
clarity, certainty, and freedom from contradictions
* On law enforcement, since such enforcement rules are indispensable for 
modern societies: 
The effectiveness and societal relevance of a legal order is determined essentially by 
the extent to which it can guarantee its realization. At the same time, fundamental 
decisions of a society on values are revealed by the extent of and limits to the 
coercion considered acceptable (Nehlsen-von Stryk 1993, p. 350 f. Transl. R.B.).
If by the rule of law we understand an ensemble of second order rules for the 
generation and enforcement of behavioural control rules, it is also clear that 
such second order rules cannot be limited to state-made law. The yardstick of 
rule-of-law principles therefore needs to be applied above all in areas in 
which no state-made law exists or where it is ineffectual but where other, 
non-state forms of ordering and conflict resolution are to be found that are 
equivalent in function to “classical law.” The scope of application for rule-of-
law principles can therefore not be meaningfully limited to the state and the 
law it produces. To the extent that the rule of law means the exercise of 
power and the management of societal conflicts through the law, this scope 
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must be seen as including forms of regulation other than law made by the 
state. 
What is also needed is the area-specific operationalization of the second order 
rules – described here only in very general terms. This is a task that the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has already set itself. 
It has drawn up a “Code of Good Practice for Standardization,” providing 
standards for standardization. Note particularly rule 3.1, which explicitly 
explains that these second order rules have to do with every sort of stand-
ardization:
3.1 This code is intended for use by any standardizing body, whether governmental 
or non-governmental, at international, regional, national or sub-national level. ...
4.1 Written procedures based on the consensus principle should govern the methods 
used for standards development. Copies of the procedures of the standardizing body 
shall be available to interested parties in a reasonable and timely manner upon 
request.
4.2 Such written procedures should contain an identifiable, realistic and readily 
available appeals mechanism for the impartial handling of any substantive and 
procedural complaints.
4.3 Notification of standardization activity shall be made in suitable media as 
appropriate to afford interested persons or organizations an opportunity for mean-
ingful contributions. ...
4.6 All standards should be reviewed on a periodic basis and revised in a timely 
manner. Proposals for the development of new or revised standards, when submit-
ted according to appropriate procedures by any materially and directly interested 
person or organization, wherever located, should be given prompt consideration. ...
6.1 Participation in standardization processes at all levels shall be accessible to 
materially and directly interested persons and organizations within a coherent proc-
ess as described in this clause (ISO / IEC 1994).
In brief, it can be said that, in the field of non-state standard setting, rules for 
rule-making have already developed, which in this domain fulfil precisely 
the functions that we assign to the rule of law as an ensemble of second 
order rules. Standards for standardization are nothing other than second order 
rules designed to control the process of standard setting, and which there-
fore, as we have seen, formulate certain procedural “law” and organizational 
requirements for this process. From the point of view of a science of regu-
lation not focused exclusively on the state legal order but which embraces 
the full span of normative regulatory systems, it is easy to comprehend that it 
is essentially about the application of rule-of-law principles. This should be 
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no surprise when one considers that from an Anglo-American standpoint, 
the rule of law has never been an exclusively state-centric concept.
This third chapter comes to an end with a glance at the rule-of-law 
concept recently presented by Jeremy Waldron, who argues in very similar 
vein, adding a noteworthy normative point.
III. Jeremy Waldron’s Rule-of-Law Concept
The conception of the rule of law to be presented in conclusion argues – as 
we have just done – in a number of steps:
* The first is what we have called the requirements of law production. We 
agree with Waldron that law must be produced essentially in a “con-
straining framework of public norms”: 
The rule of law is a multi-faced ideal, but most conceptions give central place to a 
requirement that people in positions of authority should exercise their power within a 
constraining framework of public norms rather than on the basis of their own prefer-
ences, their own ideology or their own individual sense of right and wrong.
Beyond this, many conceptions of the rule of law place great emphasis on legal 
certainty, predictability, and settlement ... (Waldron 2008, p. 5).
* The second step is concerned not with rule-bound law production but 
with what we call the requirements of normative quality, i. e., clarity, 
reliability, and consistency, which arise from the control function of 
law:
A conception of the Rule of Law like the one [outlined above] ... emphasizes the 
virtues that Lon Fuller talked about in his book The Morality of Law: the prom-
inence of general norms as a basis of governance, the clarity, publicity, stability, consis-
tency, and prospectivity of those norms, and congruence between law on the books and 
the way in which public order is actually administered. On Fuller’s account the Rule 
of Law does not directly require anything substantive: for example, it does not 
require that we have any particular liberty. All it requires is that the state should 
do whatever it wants to do in an orderly predictable way, giving us plenty of advance 
notice by publicizing the general norms on which its actions will be based, and that 
it should then stick to those norms and not arbitrarily depart from them even if it 
seems politically advantageous to do so. Requirements of this sort are described 
sometimes as procedural, but I think that is a misdescription. They are formal and 
structural in their character: they emphasize the forms of governance and the formal 
qualities (like generality, clarity, and prospectivity) that are supposed to characterize 
the norms on which state action is based (Waldron 2008, p. 6).
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* The third step is about the application of norms; Waldron’s position on 
this has been summed up by Richard B. Stewart under the heading 
“regularity of norm application” in his essay on global administrative 
law:
Norms must be applied in specific instances through procedures that ensure accu-
rate and impartial administration, ensuring that official respects [sic!] the limits on 
their authority that those norms establish, and protect the correlative rights and the 
security of persons subject to their exercise of authority. Regularity of application 
requires procedural and institutional arrangements to ensure impartial decisions in 
specific instances in accordance with relevant regulatory norms that are accurately 
and consistently applied. In the core situation, where officials enforce sanctions, 
impose liabilities, or make other decisions that impact the rights and obligations 
of specific persons in ways that have serious consequences, domestic administrative 
law typically requires adjudicatory hearings in which the affected person has a right 
to participate and present evidence and argument to an impartial decisionmakers to 
why norm does or does not apply in his case, a reasoned decision based on evidence 
of record, followed by opportunity for review of the decision by an independent 
authority (Stewart 2012, p. 10).
* But the aspect we find most interesting is what Stewart calls “public 
regarding” – “the norms regulating official conduct towards citizens 
must be public regarding, in substance and the procedures for their 
adoption and application must promote their public-regarding charac-
ter” (Stewart 2012, p. 10). Jeremy Waldron writes:
[T]he norms must be not only general but public. They must be promulgated to the 
public – to those whose conduct will be assessed by them and to those whose 
interests their application is supposed to affect ... The publicity of these norms is 
also not just a matter of pragmatic administrative convenience along the lines of its 
being easier to govern people if they know what is expected of them. It embodies a 
fundamental point about the way in which the systems we all call legal systems 
operate. They operate by using, rather than short-circuiting, the responsible agency 
of ordinary human individuals. ... 
We recognize as law not just any commands that happen to be issued by the power-
ful, but norms that purport to stand in the name of the whole society and to address 
matters of concern to the society as such (Waldron 2008, p. 25ff.).
There is nothing to add.
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E. Concluding Remarks
A chapter on the plurality of norm producers might have offered a closer 
look at “law as a product.” As we have seen in discussing the law of the 
economy, there can be said to be a global market for law in which states 
compete. The Federal Republic of Germany is no exception: writing on the 
website of the Federal Ministry of Justice, former minister of justice Leu-
theusser-Schnarrenberger had the following to say about the “Law – Made in 
Germany” project:
“Made in Germany” is not just a quality seal reserved for German cars or machinery, 
it is equally applicable to German law. Our laws protect private property and civil 
liberties, they guarantee social harmony and economic success. For entrepreneurs, 
German law constitutes a genuine competitive advantage. It is predictable, afford-
able, and enforceable. Our law codes ensure legal certainty. Whoever loses his case in 
court will have to bear the costs of the litigation. Once a court has made its rulings, 
its judgments are enforced swily and effectively. It is primarily for the sake of legal 
certainty and swi enforcement that German law does not recognise some legal 
concepts, such as class actions or punitive damages, which are common in other 
legal systems. German law is steeped in the tradition of the system of codified law 
that has evolved throughout continental Europe and that has proven its worth even 
in difficult times. Aer the Second World War, it was German law that helped 
facilitate the “economic miracle” in West Germany. Aer the fall of the Berlin wall, 
German law assisted in the transformation of East Germany. Today, prosperity and 
democracy prevail throughout Germany. In large measure, we owe this success to 
our law. Anyone choosing continental European – German – law today, is making a 
wise choice, as “Law – made in Germany” helps guarantee success (Bundesministe-
rium der Justiz 2011).
Leaving aside the advertising jargon, the kernel of truth in this statement is 
that there is something like a world market for law, because other states or 
corporations have a choice, albeit limited, between American and German 
insolvency law or American and British accounting standards (see Botzem 
und Hofman 2009 on competition between accounting standards). To this 
extent, we can speak of competition between legal orders, with the very real 
consequence that “law – made in Germany” and law made in the USA come 
up against one another in certain markets, with, so we hear, the Americans 
not hesitating to deploy even members of the Supreme Court as “legal 
advisers” (see Gemkow 2012 for a highly graphic description of American 
legal imperialism).
The focus of this chapter, however, has been different. Our concern has 
been to link examination of a plurality of norm producers with investigation 
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of the normative spaces in which such norm-producing institutions are to be 
found. The aim has been to contextualize what we call norm production: to 
place it in the context of a given normative arena or normative field.
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Chapter Four
From the Plurality of Normative Orders to 
the Plurality of Norm Enforcement Regimes: 
Jurisdictional Communities and their Specific 
Jurisdictional Cultures
A. Normative Orders: “Ought-Orders” Intended for Realization:
The Enforcement Dimension of Every Normative Order
I. Law Enforcement: A Necessary Element of Effective Legal Orders
Karin Nehlsen-von Stryk stresses that every legal order aspiring to effective-
ness depends on orderly enforcement: “The effectiveness and societal rele-
vance of a legal order are also essentially determined by the extent to which 
it can guarantee its realization. At the same time, fundamental decisions of a 
society on values are revealed by the extent of and limits to the coercion 
considered acceptable” (Nehlsen-von Stryk 1993, p. 550 f. Transl. R.B.). 
Christian Waldhoff has taken this quote as a leitmotif for his treatment of 
the state as a law enforcement authority, adding:
The law as an “ought” system aims not at abstract validity but at realization. In the 
democratic constitutional state, the two types of legal coercion, namely enforcement 
and sanctions, are the final stages in a uniform and comprehensive process of real-
izing the law. It begins with lawmaking, continues with application of the law as the 
concretization of general / abstract rules in relation to individual cases, and ends – if 
need be – with the more or less coercive enforcement of the law. This model can be 
graduated, extended, or adapted in many ways. In all variations, however, in remains 
essentially the same. Under this uniform model for realizing the law, coercive 
enforcement as the category subsuming enforcement and sanctioning is given sub-
stance and impetus, goals and programmes by the law to be enforced. ...
Not only the goal but also much of the legitimation for [the coercive realization of 
the law] derives from the law to be enforced – which for its part requires democratic 
legitimation – while procedural decoupling from the rights and rulings to be 
enforced keeps this realization at a rule-of-law distance from them. The law to be 
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enforced can be described as substantive law, the norms of the enforcement and 
sanctioning regime as law-enforcement law (Waldhoff 2008, p. 13 f. Transl. R.B.).
We turn to another author who gives a vivid account of the enforcement 
dimension of every normative order intent on realization. In his habilitation 
thesis on The State Guarantee for Public Safety and Order, Markus Möstl writes 
– with regard to state-made law – of the rule-of-law mandate to enforce the legal 
order.
The mandate to enforce the law is in many regards immanent in the principle of the 
rule of law. On the one hand, it follows from the fundamental rule-of-law mandate 
to preserve and safeguard the public peace and legal certainty: both historically and 
dogmatically, keeping the peace through a legal order is among the original and 
constitutive properties of the rule of law. However, the public peace and certainty as 
to the law (legal certainty in the broader sense of the term) presuppose that the legal 
order of the state, which is to provide this peace and certainty, not only exists but is 
effective, which in turn requires this legal order to be sufficiently efficient and 
actually enforced. The efficiency and enforcement of the law are therefore perma-
nent requirements of a state governed by the rule of law. But even if – second – the 
focus is less on peace than on freedom as a conceptual cornerstone of the rule of 
law, the result is no different: if the essential property of the rule of law is to ensure 
lawful freedom and self-determination through the law, this presupposes that law-
fulness and the law are actually realized and enforced, not only in relation to the 
state to ensure freedom from unlawful coercion but also in relation to third parties 
to ward off unlawful encroachment; for only the all-round enforcement of the law 
produces the state of lawful freedom that the rule of law seeks to guarantee. ...
Third, this idea is reinforced in the democratic constitutional state, because in such a 
state the enforcement of the law serves not only to produce lawful freedom but also 
to give effect to the law as the outcome of democratic will formation (Möstl 2002, 
p. 65 f. Transl. R.B.).
There seems to be full agreement that the law (as a prime example of a 
normative order) must if necessary be enforced by coercion. This insight 
brings the realization that the law, which seeks to prevent the use of coercion 
and violence to impose interests and purported claims cannot itself manage 
without coercion if it is to perform its central function with credibility. We 
can therefore speak of a law-enforcement paradox, a situation that Christian 
Waldhoff describes as follows:
The law works by enabling disputes to be resolved without the exercise of physical 
force, and thus keeps the peace. To this extent, the law is a tool for non-violent dispute 
settlement. In borderline cases, however, the law itself has to use coercion and phys-
ical force to perform its function: to domesticate power and violence, the law has to 
threaten the use of force, violence, and coercion (Waldhoff 2008, p. 17. Transl. R.B.).
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II. The Organizational-Institutional Dimensions of Norm Enforcement: 
Norm Enforcement Law and Norm Enforcement Regimes
Norm enforcement law has already been mentioned; it determines the cir-
cumstances under which and the means by which coercive measures may be 
taken to enforce the law. Waldhoff describes the administrative enforcement 
of the law as follows:
In relation to substantive law, the law pertaining to enforcement is instrumental. 
The distinction, effective impact and interaction between between these two levels 
are key problems in the administrative law dogmatics of the law pertaining to 
enforcement. In other words, this dogmatics is concerned, first, with enforcement 
norms and procedures themselves, and, second, with examining the relationship 
between the substantive and enforcement norms. What is at issue is ultimately the 
choice between different models of law enforcement, the relationship between 
enforcement and sanctioning, but also alternatives to the coercive realization of 
the law. This choice between “models” of coercive administrative realization of 
the law can be made at the law-making and application levels (Waldhoff 2013, 
p. 271, marginal note 2. Transl. R.B.).
Waldhoff thus points out that law enforcement is not only about normative 
statements – about what enforcement measures are permissible and required 
and when – but also about the enforcement procedures and the organization of 
enforcement: he writes of various law enforcement models, a useful concept 
that we shall, however, modify. The concept of law enforcement regimes 
brings together the substance, procedures, and organization of law enforce-
ment with deliberate allusion to the concept of governance regime as a task-
related institutional arrangement that has to consist not only of legal rules but 
also legally non-binding modes of control such as social pressure or gover-
nance by reputation (Schuppert 2010, p. 93ff. On the concept of governance 
regime see Trute et al. 2008).
If we thus leave the somewhat too narrow world of state-made law and 
recall the plurality of normative orders treated in chapter two, we can expect 
to come across a variety of law enforcement regimes. And this proves to be the 
case. Werner Gephart and Raja Sakrani identify at least four norm enforce-
ment regimes – from excommunication to social exclusion mechanisms 
(Gephart and Sakrani 2012, p. 108):
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On the basis of this overview, we shall be looking at various manifestations 
of norm enforcement regimes; but first we turn to the fundamental question 
of what authorities or actors provide for the validity and enforcement of a 
normative order.
Figure: Validity and Binding Force of Normative Orders 
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III. The Diversity of Norm Enforcement Regimes as a Reflection 
of the Diversity of Normative Orders
As discussed in the introductory chapter, our concern in “The World of 
Rules” is to capture the diversity of normative orderings, of which the state 
legal order is only one, albeit particularly important element. If, as we have 
just seen, it is immanent in every normative order to develop a specific 
regime to ensure that it is respected and complied with, we posit that the 
diversity of normative orderings must be mirrored in a diversity of norm 
enforcement regimes.
If this is indeed the case, a key methodological consequence is that we 
need a wide-angle lens in this chapter, too. Not only the state sanctioning 
system needs to be considered, which, as Christian Waldhoff has shown, is 
legally so wonderfully elaborated – as doubtless appropriate for a commun-
ity that sees itself as a state governed by the rule of law. We need also to 
ascertain the mechanisms that come into play in enforcing legally non-bind-
ing norms that nevertheless control behaviour – for instance, monitoring 
and evaluation systems up to and including intangible forms of “mere” 
social control, which – as the example of political correctness will show – 
can be particularly unforgiving in the intensity of their sanctions.
But this does not mean that we intend to go through the various types of 
norm ordering again from the point of view of what sort of norm enforce-
ment regimes they have developed in order to propose more or less convinc-
ing couplings – for instance, on the pattern:
* state law – state judiciary
* customary law – customary courts
* canon law – ecclesiastical court and penance system
or the like; this in itself quite plausible procedure (on the comparison of 
various types of state and various types of regulation see Schuppert 2001) 
runs the risk of neatly dividing up the world of rules into such diverse 
couplings without placing them in their given specific societal and political 
contexts – for instance, the link between norm enforcement and functional 
differentiation or norm enforcement as a manifestation of institutionalized 
social disciplining. But these functional links are particularly interesting, and 
they explain the structure of this chapter, which addresses “norm enforce-
ment in context” on the basis of examples.
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B. Safeguarding and Enforcing the Law 
as Functions of Government
Law affects the development of a community in many and varied ways. 
As Carl Schmitt noted (1923/2008), the law sides with revolutionaries who 
make throne and altar tremble in the name of inviolable human rights and 
with the defenders of an existing social order. For the latter, in particular, 
it performs what we shall call a transformation function. Law – as we have 
shown in detail elsewhere (Schuppert 2003b) transforms power into govern-
ment. By grounding pure power in law as well as channelling it, the exercise 
of power becomes government and proving and safeguarding the law 
become key functions of government. 
Benno Zabel describes this link between the legitimation of rule through 
law and the safeguarding of the law:
The paradigm of safeguarding the law points to ... the key link between providing 
certainty and legitimating rule. It played an outstanding role in the difficult birth 
of modern criminal law. The corresponding leges or sanction patterns along with 
the “staged” principle of public trial and proceedings establish institutions and 
rituals, that is to say stabilization factors, which alone can ensure durable, albeit 
proto-state guarantees and public peace. We can hence also speak of the basic 
structures of sovereign power or of an independent “mode of the legal” (Zabel 
2012, p. 24. Transl. R.B.).
Historically, the task of safeguarding the law – especially by ensuring the 
public peace and legal certainty – has fallen primarily to the governance 
collectives state and church, each with a monopoly of power in its specific 
field:
The genesis of and changes in the form of safeguarding the law were ... closely 
associated with the development and transformation of governance monopolists, 
namely, empire and church. The governance monopolist par excellence was, at the 
latest since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the (secular) state as an ordering and 
sense-making functional entity. The evolutionary history of the state always has to do 
with a changing and to this day controversial history of sovereignty. It should be 
remembered that Bodin’s Six Books of the Commonwealth begins with the key 
thought “A commonwealth may be defined as the rightly ordered government of 
a number of families, and of those things which are their common concern, by a 
sovereign power” (http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin_1.htm). Worth noting 
in the postulate is that, at the rational level, sovereignty and government are pri-
marily directed towards greater rationality, which, over and above particular, moral, 
and religious interests, can guarantee peace and protection. As things have developed, 
the scope of the Leviathan has changed and grown. Alternately or simultaneously, 
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the ordering power became a welfare state, a state governed by the rule of law, an 
ensuring or social state. ... [W]hat has remained constant, however, is the pretension, 
namely to concentrate rule, with or without a separation of powers, in an institu-
tionally organized functional unit (Zabel 2012, p. 151. Transl. R.B.).
These considerations invite the conclusion that any observable change in 
statehood would have to be reflected in changes in how the law is safe-
guarded. Zabel therefore rightly speaks of a structural change in the safeguard-
ing of the law, a change that cannot be overlooked, despite the fact that the 
state continues to be the dominant governing authority. His arguments are 
worth looking at, because they not only bring the governance perspective 
into play – safeguarding the law as a governance problem – but also point to the 
key importance of self-disciplining on the part of governance collectives:
... Governance models and strategies, thus cooperative forms of coordinating action, 
safeguards, and conflict resolution [play] an important role in both political and 
legal contexts. With regard to structural change in safeguarding the law, this aspect still 
needs to be looked at more closely. Governance strategies are primarily concerned to 
meet the need for less control and for informalization in modern regulatory and 
crime policy. In contrast to a hierarchical / vertical ordering regime, they stress the 
horizontal, that is to say, negotiatory nature of societal interaction and interest 
communication. Developed originally in the transnational and international field 
as global or good governance, governance has meanwhile become firmly established 
[on the relationship between transnational or international governance concepts 
with domestic governance concepts see Behrens 2004, p. 93ff.; on informalization 
tendencies see Schuppert 2011b, p. 27ff.]. The focus today is on maintaining, re-
establishing, and coordinating the political and economic, institutional and legal 
balance by activating non-state or “semi-state” actors. For society as a whole, this 
then affects social subsistence, economic development, cultural, educational, and 
science management. The goal is the self-regulation of entire areas of society, either 
through cooperation among themselves or with state authorities. The latter not only 
eases the burden on the state – a direct goal – but also leads to various forms of 
endogenous and exogenous disciplining of the parties involved (Zabel 2012, p. 155 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
We now turn to variants of the link between the exercise of authority and 
the safeguarding and/or enforcement of the law.
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I. The Safeguarding of the Law and Judicial Office as Tasks 
of the Divine and/or Religious Exercise of Power
1. God as Judge
Wolfgang Schild, writing about “God as judge” notes from an art history 
perspective that the Christian faith has always conceived of God as a judge.
One of the key elements of the Christian creed is the notion of God as judge: “From 
thence He shall come to judge the living and the dead.” He is Christ, the incarnate 
Son of God, who “sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty,” to whom, 
according to John (5.22) the Father “hath committed all judgement”  ... “That all 
men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father”; “And hath given him 
authority to execute judgement also, because he is the Son of man” (John 5.27). 
According to St. John the Evangelist, Jesus says “I can of mine own self do nothing: 
as I hear, I judge; and my judgement is just; because I seek not mine own will, but 
the will of the Father which hath sent me” John, 5.30). Judgement therefore lies also 
in the will of the Father. What is more, Christians have also regarded God the Father 
Himself as judge (Schild 1988, p. 44. Transl. R.B. Bible quotes from the King James 
translation).
Delving deeper into this fascinating material, we come across innumerable 
representations of God the Father and Christ as judge and depictions of the 
Last Judgement. At the Last Judgement, the focus on Christ the Judge in all 
these pictures also – as Schild posits – has to do with the development of law:
Theologians had always compared the Last Judgement with legal proceedings before 
an earthly court – one need only recall Tertullian († 160) and John Chrysostom 
(† 407). But this forensic aspect had been relegated to the background by the idea of 
Christ the Ruler. But the parallels between the Last Judgement and the earthly court 
now became apparent and were expressed. In the commentary on the Saxon Munic-
ipal Law (Weichbildrecht) written between 1330 and 1386, the author notes: “Where 
the judge sits and judges, in the same place and at the same hour God sits in divine 
judgement over judge and lay judges, and every judge should therefore have the 
stern court of our Lord depicted in the courthouse.” ...
As the tasks of presiding and passing judgement were gradually united, with the 
judge playing an ever more active role, the notion of Christ as Last Judge changed. 
He had to become what he had really always been: the active lord of the court, 
behind whom the apostles appointed as (co)judges according to Matthew 19.28 had 
to take second place.
The Last Judgement itself followed an elaborate judicial procedure like every 
earthly court:
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Witnesses did not need to be heard, since the Book of Life was read and so forth. 
The act of judgement itself was differentiated: Mary, John the Baptist, the apostles 
and martyrs (Rev. 20.4), the saints (and holy rulers) were not judged. Similarly, no 
judgement needed to be passed on the Jews, the heathen (including the old gods of 
the Greeks and Romans), Saracens, Egyptians, or, for example, on Nero, for they 
were damned from the outset, like Lucifer and the fallen angels. Only sinful Chris-
tians had to face judgement, which is described as the weighing of their deeds. The 
subsequent sorting of the saved and the damned to the right and le of the throne 
are dramatically played out; above all the torments of hell are graphically displayed 
as deterrence and warning (Schild 1988, p. 70ff. Transl. R.B.).
From Divine Judgement we now move “downstairs” to canon law.
2. Utrumque ius in utroque foro: Normative Pluralism as Reflected 
in the Specific Jurisdictional Culture
a) The Duality of Secular and Ecclesiastical Jurisdictional Cultures
The duality of temporal / secular and spiritual / ecclesiastical legal order that 
prevailed throughout the Middle Ages is interesting in this context as a 
duality of jurisdictional communities each with its own jurisdictional culture. 
This duality manifests itself in two ways: in the dualism of punishment 
and penance and in a dualism of administration of justice and administra-
tion of penance.
* Paolo Prodi has this to say about the dualism of punishment and pen-
ance:
Many Roman-Germanic peoples introduced the norms of the Ten Commandments 
into their own secular criminal law. On the one hand, secular adjudication sought 
to guarantee the capacity of the individual to act in order to obtain satisfaction for 
violations suffered, and did so through legal means, from the feud and judicial 
vengeance to many forms of compensation and financial penalties such as the were-
gild. The aim was thus to re-establish a balance in the human relations at issue. There 
is no superordinate justice “out of the blue,” and the state limits itself in a certain 
manner to regulating the procedure for expiation and to “quantifying” compensa-
tion. On the other hand, the institution church sought in the same fashion to 
regulate relations on earth between people and God. In so doing, it did not exercise 
divine judgement but intervened in the visible part of sin to allow the human being 
to achieve true and sole judgement through a different, inner accounting in which 
sin is set off by acts of penance, prayer, fasting, alms, or other acts that the church 
regards as equal in value and imposes. This was the perspective adopted by one of the 
prominent church fathers of the Early Middle Ages in Europe, the Venerable Bede: 
penance does not expunge the offence, but while confession before the judge leads 
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to punishment, confession before God leads to forgiveness (Prodi 2003, p. 38. 
Transl. R.B.).
* This sanctional dualism finds institutional correspondence in a dual-
ism in the administration of justice and the administration of penance. 
Prodi:
The fact that canon law holds its own as a legal order means that Roman thinking 
developed belatedly and from a defensive position, in close symbiosis with the 
imperial ideology of the separation from and autonomy of the secular power of 
the empire from the spiritual / ecclesiastical power of the papacy. This is the sense in 
which the famous commentaries of Accursius “Sacerdotes” aund “Cuique” prefacing 
the digests are to be interpreted, in which the jurist is compared with the priest: Just 
as the priest administers things sacred (“sacra”) the jurist administers the laws, which 
are “sacratissimae.” Scholars have rightly paid attention to this solemn assertion. But 
what is particularly interesting is that, in the same passage, Accursius makes a much 
more valid comparison, between the administration of justice and the administra-
tion of penance as two different and parallel applications of the law, which Ulpian 
defines as “suum cuique tribuere.” There appears to be no competition between the 
two orders but rather a difference of level, a justice spanned between God and 
humanity. In the following considerations of the commentators, however, the prob-
lem seems to be a quite different one. Competition – with common reference to 
natural and divine law – exists between two concrete institutions, the papacy and 
the empire; both are equipped with the same power with regard to the forum and 
differ only in competence. Canon law is law, in both ecclesiastical and secular 
regard: it applies in the territories of the church; on the territory of the empire, 
secular law applies, but canon law increasingly has the upper hand when it comes to 
sin, and it is the church alone that passes judgement in this field (Prodi 2003, p. 90. 
Transl. R.B.).
b) Norm Enforcement through a “Scaled” System of Penance: 
The Priest as Judge
Finally, Paolo Prodi also provides us with the relevant information about the 
judicial function of penance and the role of the priest as judge:
In the treatise De vera et falsa poenitentia, written in the mid-11th century and attrib-
uted to Saint Augustine (which had great influence throughout the following cen-
tury), confession heard by a priest itself, causing the penitent to blush at his own sins 
before the representative of God, is already the penance required. The priest is 
therefore the judge and must have the knowledge and ability to proceed against 
the person before his court; he must be capable of inquiring into and assessing the 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the sin committed, as well as uncovering 
sins the sinner has not admitted to himself. Absolution – the remission of sins – 
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precedes penance; it follows immediately aer confession and is a final judgement. 
It is no longer determined by completion of a long process of penance; and the 
absolution formula itself develops out of the preceding and differing formulations 
asking for divine intervention in forgiveness, up to and included the juridical judge-
ment: “ego te absolvo ...”. Penance in the traditional sense of atonement now seems a 
mere appendage; it remains a condition but not a necessary condition for a juridical 
act that is considered valid in itself before penance has been done. What was once 
the solemn procedure of penance and reserved solely for public, punishable sins 
now extended in simplified and milder form to the entire sphere of sin, i. e., even to 
venial and private sins (Prodi 2003, p. 57 f. Transl. R.B.).
Abandoning the religious, ecclesiastical domain, we now turn to that of 
secular law. 
II. Law Enforcement as a Task of the State: The Duty of the State to 
Maintain the Well-Functioning Administration of Criminal Justice
Markus Möstl (2002, p. 65 f.) had pointed out that law enforcement can be 
understood as a constant requirement of a state governed by the rule of law. 
Criminal law is doubtless the most powerful enforcement weapon, suggest-
ing that the rule of law also requires criminal law to be used as a tool for enforce-
ment. Writing about “the duty of the state to ensure the effective adminis-
tration of criminal justice” Herbert Landau, judge at the Federal Constitu-
tional Court underlines this conclusion (Landau 2007). Interestingly, he 
embeds this requirement in the overall system of social control, a context we 
shall be looking at later from the social disciplining perspective. Landau:
The efficient administration of criminal justice ... is a conditio sine qua non for 
every ordered state, just as the well-ordered administration of civil law is indispen-
sable for the economic system. This is obvious and therefore needs no more explain-
ing than does the need for every state to engage not only in will formation but also 
to exercise authority if it does not wish to see a state of nature reasserting itself. ... If 
this is the case, the telos [of the efficient administration of criminal justice] lies in 
simple social contexts: the necessity of exercising social control through state insti-
tutions to ensure comprehensive internal public peace. The administration of crim-
inal justice is only one aspect of societal and social control. What is decisive is the 
overall system of social control that enables the public peace to be kept. But without 
criminal law no state can survive; protecting the coexistence of people in commun-
ities is a fundamental task, indeed one of the most essential objectives of the state. 
It is the precondition for all life befitting a human being in freedom and security. 
Criminal law is so important because its function is reflected more cogently and 
obviously in people’s awareness than that of all other fields of law, which oen do 
not invite such insight. With respect to the aim of ensuring social acceptability and 
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the public peace, the criminal law is, in the eyes of the public, the very epitome of 
law (Landau 2007, p. 124 f. Transl. R.B.).
The second main argument that Landau advances for the fundamental task 
of the state to ensure the effective administration of criminal law is the need 
to secure a minimum standard of social ethics within the state, particularly 
in the interest of those subject to the law, who trust in the enforcement of 
such a standard:
Since every state must ensure a minimum standard of social ethics, and under the 
prevailing circumstances this can be done only through criminal law, the admin-
istration of criminal justice must seek to ensure the acceptance of this standard. 
Criminal law safeguards the inviolability of this order, i. e., it aims to maintain an 
objective state of public peace and to safeguard the legal goods of the individual and 
the state. But its objective is also and in equal measure to provide for the subjective 
certainty of those subject to the law that members of the community will comply 
with this objective order. The ultimate goal of the administration of criminal law in 
every polity is thus to establish a socio-psychological state of certainty as to the 
inviolability of recognized ethical minimum standards. Experience has shown that 
this can be achieved only through the threat and exercise of state coercion, which 
therefore is also the focus of criminal law methods. It is generally recognized that 
only the state can proceed against violations of this order with the most effective 
means available to a polity, namely the public punishment of offenders. This cen-
turies-old cultural conception is undisputed. Awareness that the guarantees of free-
dom associated under the rule of law with the attainment of this goal are specific, 
hierarchically derived ends and methodological instructions cast in procedural rules 
can develop only if these simple conditional relations are taken into account. Here, 
too, it can be said that we owe our freedom to the limits to freedom that result from 
the necessity of penalization by the state. If we accept these conditions, the topos of 
the effective administration of criminal law must be a prime duty of the state, 
regardless of its concrete structure; it can therefore not represent a countervailing 
interest in taking account of individual interests and basic rights or a partial aspect 
of the obligation to provide justice (Landau 2007, p. 126. Transl. R.B.).
We do not share this “fundamental-theological position” as such, but shall 
not comment on it at this stage; we let it stand as – probably – prevailing 
opinion. In the course of the chapter, we shall be going into greater detail on 
the mechanisms of social control as part of a differentiated, “broad” concept 
of law compatible with the rule of law.
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III. Judicial Authority as a Component of the Manorial System: 
Two Examples
Until the state monopoly of lawmaking and law enforcement became estab-
lished, the exercise of judicial authority was viewed as a subfunction of the 
manorial system, as we shall show with two examples. 
1. The Example of the English Justice of the Peace
Particularly from the point of view of regulated self-regulation, the English 
justice of the peace is an interesting construction; “JPs” were culled from 
among the propertied classes and entrusted with judicial authority on an 
annual basis by the crown. Ronald G. Asch:
In England, the crown managed to win the nobility for the task of keeping the peace 
at the local level, even though the inclination to resolve conflicts by force, as in the 
so-called “poaching wars” was still rife in the sixteenth century. In the shires, the 
corresponding functions were in the hands of the gentry, in particular, who pro-
vided the membership of the so-called commission of peace. Ever since the four-
teenth century, the king had commissioned a small number of local landowners in 
the shires with the task of punishing offences of all sorts by vesting judicial powers 
in them through an annually renewed commission. The members of this commis-
sion were entitled “justice of the peace.” In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
the number as well as the powers of these royal commissioners grew (in the late 
Middle Ages there had oen been no more than 12 or 15 per shire, their numbers 
later increased to 40 or 50 and aer 1600 to 100 or more). They were de facto 
responsible for enforcing all laws, issuing licenses to publicans, administering poor 
relief, ensuring that roads and bridges were in good repair, setting wages and some-
times food prices, settling disputes, and punishing all minor criminal offences. Since 
the Reformation they had also been responsible or partly responsible for prosecut-
ing Roman Catholics. However, the crown could only appoint people to the office 
of justice of the peace if their wealth, pedigree – this factor still played a role in the 
sixteenth century – and general standing gave them enough authority in the county. 
Vice versa, misconduct as justice of the peace could lead to them being excluded 
from the commission. This was naturally a blot on the family escutcheon and a 
threat to their reputation, namely when their position within the gentry was in 
some doubt, owing, for instance, to humble origins (Asch 2008, p. 243 f. Transl. 
R.B.).
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2. The Example of the Manorial System
a) The Manorial System as Type of Government
The so-called manorial system or manorialism was an autonomous type of 
government in Europe from the 15th century on (Peters 1995); one could 
even speak of manorial societies (see Peters 1997). The study by Monika 
Wienfort on the nobility in the modern age provides first information in 
the following infobox (Wienfort 2006, p. 63):
Since jurisdiction relating to land rights can be understood only in the social 
context of the Gutherrscha system, we shall cast a brief look at the manorial 
system as an ensemble characterized by communicative interaction (see 
Wunder 1997, p. 227), where judicial authority constitutes only one element 
of this ensemble.
Heide Wunder gives us a graphic description of the governmental system 
of a manor, taking the example of the Dohnas (1997). She reports on the 
how this noble Prussian family understood government and its Christian foun-
dations:
... [T]he conception of government held by Peter’s Calvinist grandsons, the brothers 
Friedrich, Abraham, Fabian, Achatius und Christoph is contained in the “Eternal 
Will and Testament” of 1621. They drew up a “constitution” that was to be followed 
by their children and descendants “in the future and for all time.” With regard to 
relations with their subjects, it stated: 
“It is our firm will that our future descendants treat their subjects and servants not 
tyrannically but in a Christianly and moderate manner, for they must bear in mind 
The Germanic Paradigm Grundherrscha  / Gutsherrscha 
The term Grundherrscha  to describe a type of manorial regime was fi rst record-
ed in the fi  eenth century, but the system had existed since the early Middle 
Ages. It combined landholding and lordship rights (vested in the nobility / gen-
try). Rentengrundherrscha  was a type of manor where the lord derived his in-
comes primarily from cash dues paid by peasants and the rural population. 
The Gutsherrscha  regime combined Grundherrscha  and adjudicative authority. 
The lord of the manor operated a large enterprise of his own. In early modern 
times, freedom of movement for the rural population was restricted in many 
places by hereditary servitude [Erbuntertänigkeit]. In everyday life, Gutsherrscha  
manifested itself above all in greater greater services and dues owing to only 
one lord.  
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that Christ our Lord and Saviour shed His holy blood for the least pauper and for 
the noble mighty of this world. Therefore they should follow our example and be 
satisfied with only moderate interest and benefit from their labour and the labour of 
their beasts in such fashion that the poor shall have bread and nourishment. For 
where his subjects perish so does the lord also. If they are not burdened with 
toilsome service or bled dry by severe chastisement they will flourish, so that the 
poor will pray for their masters and God will send his blessing from heaven on both 
for their wellbeing; for the tears of the poor provoke God’s just punishment. So may 
our beloved descendants be mindful of this for the sake of their earthly and eternal 
welfare” (Wunder 1997, p. 229 f. Transl. R.B.).
This conception of government was very much that of sovereign rulers in 
that, for example, the Dohnas were intent on decreeing and enforcing the 
uniform regulation of village conditions throughout the area over which 
they held authority: 
While their conception of government showed the mindset of a sovereign ruler, the 
Dohna’s specific governmental arrangements, also introduced in 1624, reinforced 
this impression. With the “Willkür” [statute or constitution] for all the villages under 
his dominion, Count Dohna succeeded in a project that the ducal administration 
had sought to achieve in vain in the sixteenth century, namely the uniform regu-
lation of village conditions by means of a “general,” i. e., identically worded statute, 
which also covered fire prevention and the use of forests and wood, not to mention 
the celebration of betrothals, weddings, and baptisms. These “Dorfwillkür” thus 
aimed to guarantee “good public order.” Such normative standardization of local 
conditions was certainly in the interests of rational estate administration; neverthe-
less most of the substantive provisions of communal statutes went back to the 
period of the Teutonic Order, so that the Willkür cannot be read only as a document 
of a lord. In key sections it established peasant participation in local government 
and is therefore constitutes a form of government in which peasants organized in 
the community took part. How this proceeded in detail can only be ascertained “ex 
negativo” from judicial conflict resolution. The series of Willkür accounts from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – which recorded the dates for reading out the 
Willkür, the activities of the bailiff and suitors, the income and expenditure of the 
community – provide evidence of specific communal practices and of the independ-
ent life of the community.
Further insight into the importance of community participation in “public order” in 
the manorial system is provided by the rules for the common court of the Dohnas in 
Deutschendorf. Although the version available to me dates only from 1710, the 
precise provisions pertaining to participation of village court officials are all the 
more important. In addition, the rules of the court give insight into questions 
important to subjects: bailiffs were not to interfere in judicial matters but limit 
themselves to maintaining “law and order,” i. e., adjudication and administration 
were kept apart. In holdings outside the immediate demesne, however, there were 
subsidiary courts (Beigerichte) with jurisdiction over fellow tenants. Fines paid to the 
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manor are recorded, for example in the annual accounts for Reichertswalde and 
Lauck for 1710/11 under the heading “Fines imposed out of court” (An Straffen. 
Außer Gericht erkant) (Wunder 1997, p. 231 f. Transl. R.B.).
* In general, the Gutsherrscha manorial system must be conceived of as 
an ensemble with various actors playing specific, more or less defined 
roles. Writing about big landowners in Hungary, András Vari uses the 
concept “game of government” (Herrschasspiel):
There were at least five players in the game of government: the lords of the manor, 
the officials, the tenants, the rich peasant members of the municipality or the mayor 
and peasants. Of these five participants, the mayor (Gemeindevorsteher) and the 
tenants (Pächter) need more explaining. The important role of the mayor arose from 
the far-reaching autonomy of the farming community during the reconstruction 
period in the first half of the eighteenth century. Municipalities regulated the 
ploughing of waste arable land and land use to a large extent jointly, and on this 
basis interpreted the competence of the freely elected village judge very broadly. 
Although the reaction of the manorial authorities meant that they had to accept 
curbs to the judicial competence of the village court, for instance that the village 
judge was to be appointed from among three candidates nominated by the lord of 
the manor, other more essential rights were not touched (e. g., the free election of 
village jurors, the right of appeal to the district (Komitatstuhl) and to the royal 
governor’s office (königliche Statthalterei). In many places, the municipality was 
strengthened by the acquisition of municipal property (Vari 1999, p. 265. Transl. 
R.B.).
b) Jurisdictional Authority as a Right in Rem
As defined by the General Law for the Prussian States (Preußisches Allgemeines 
Landrecht – ALR), so-called patrimonial jurisdiction (see Wienfort 2001) was, 
as juridical construction, a right in rem, tied to possession of certain prop-
erty, with the consequence that judicial rights went with the property when 
transferred. Since possession of the given property was the decisive factor 
(possession was treated as synonymous with ownership), anyone could in 
principle assume judicial authority, “what counted was not the noble status 
of the candidate but only the circumstance of possession” (Wienfort 2001, 
p. 34); but this did not change the fact that in social reality judicial authority 
was reserved to the nobility:
It was therefore not contradictory that in around 1800 judicial authority was almost 
everywhere vested in nobles. In sum, it can be said that the legal perspective of rights 
in rem concealed the politico-social classification of patrimonial jurisdiction as a 
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socially exclusive privilege. A treatise published in 1790 on “the law of the proper-
tied nobility in Germany” described patrimonial jurisdiction as a “right in rem of 
the nobility,” which, however was grounded in a universal “property law.” In the 
pursuit of various and sometimes opposing interests, judicial rights therefore devel-
oped into a question of possession (Wienfort 2001, p. 34. Transl. R.B.).
c) Patrimonial Jurisdiction between State Sovereignty and Private Property
The extent to which traditional patrimonial jurisdiction could be reformed 
or even abolished was not only a question of the political relation of forces 
but also a subject of vehement legal controversy (see Wienfort 2001, p. 134). 
Whereas the one camp stresses the administration of justice as a function of 
state law that is conferred but can also be withdrawn, the nobility and 
sections of the noble reform bureaucracy evoked the duly acquired right 
of property in land, which since the Middle Ages had included judicial 
rights; we shall take a brief look at two views on the subject. 
The renowned criminal lawyer Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach was a 
strong opponent of patrimonial jurisdiction as a privilege of the nobility. 
Since the French Revolution, in his opinion, manorial jurisdiction should be 
burnt at the stake of history:
The same blow that in France destroyed the feudal aristocracy also struck down 
patrimonial jurisdiction. Confronted by the personal freedom and independence of 
the citizens in their mutual relations, by the idea of the universal equality of subjects 
before the law, patrimonial jurisdiction, like slavery, serfdom, and hereditary servi-
tude had to vanish (quoted from Wienfort 2001, p. 135. Transl. R.B.).
The opposing view was put by Carl Ludwig von Haller in his programmatic-
conservative and very influential “Restoration of Political Science” (Restau-
ration der Staatswissenscha); Monika Wienfort:
In Haller’s 1817 work, the jurisdiction of the lords of the manor was described as “natural” 
and “not a delegated right.” Hereditary and patrimonial jurisdiction, he lectured, 
could “well be restricted as to its scope but never fully abolished.” Haller thus 
cautiously sanctioned the state assuming criminal jurisdiction. The majority of those 
exercising patrimonial jurisdiction welcomed such a plan without reservation 
because of the high costs of criminal proceedings. The view of statists and some 
liberals that judicial rights had been delegated to the sovereign by “social contract” 
was explicitly rejected. Haller’s praise of patrimonial jurisdiction as “local, fast, 
cheap,” just and impartial stylized and emotionalized the relationship between the 
lord of the manor as judge and those under his jurisdiction as “family,” as paternal-
ism par excellence. All authors intent on defending judicial rights in the period 
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leading up to the March Revolution of 1848 referred, sometimes with direct quo-
tations, to Haller’s “Macrobiotics of Patrimonial States” (Makrobiotik der Patrimo-
nialstaaten) (Wienfort 2001, p. 137. Transl. R.B.).
C. Safeguarding the Law as Civil Right and Civic Duty
In the preceding section, we were concerned exclusively with safeguarding 
the law and enforcing norms as functions of government. If, however, gov-
ernance collectives are understood as regulatory collectivities and hence as 
legal communities – as they are throughout this book – an eye needs to be 
kept on the actors who exercise power and their “legal staff” (Max Weber) as 
well as citizens, not only as the addressees of norms but also as members of 
the given legal community, which both endows them with basic rights and 
imposes basic duties on them.
If – as we have just seen – every normative order has a norm enforcement 
dimension, for the state legal order, which springs primarily to mind, this 
would mean that the enforcement of the law is also a task of the state; logically, 
the modern state claims a monopoly not only on lawmaking but also on law 
enforcement. However, inspired by Anglo-American models and the Euro-
pean Union, there are an increasing number of interesting exceptions that 
invite more thorough consideration of the relationship between law enforce-
ment by the state and enforcement under private law.
Comprehensive treatment of this interesting perspective is beyond our 
present scope. We limit ourselves to examining three brief examples of the 
role of the citizen as autonomous actor in safeguarding the law.
I. Mobilization of the Citizen for Environmental Protection 
in European Law 
It has always been the right of all citizens to defend themselves when their 
rights are restricted or even unlawfully encroached upon. On the grounds 
that their subjective rights have been violated, citizens can take action before 
the courts – the “right of action” or “standing to sue” in juridical jargon – 
which is additionally protected by Article 19 (4) of the Basic Law. There are 
corresponding provisions in European law, which by waiving the criterion 
of individual involvement essentially go much further towards mobilizing 
the citizen to enforce the law (see Masing 1996); the citizen is quasi institu-
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tionalized as advocate of the common good and the safeguarding of the law 
(see Schuppert 2004c).
Significant for the mobilization of the citizen under European law in 
support of environmental protection as a public good is the highly regarded 
Council Directive on Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment 
of 7 June 1990 (OJ No. L 158/56) – unusual for German law – which has 
meanwhile been transposed into national law by the Environmental Infor-
mation Act. The duties to provide information under the directive ensure 
that the interested citizen receives comprehensive access to all relevant envi-
ronmental data without this material having been pre-sorted or processed, 
for example in the course of public relations work by the authorities. The 
aim of such transparency is to provoke an “open discussion on the environ-
ment” and “strong public participation in the environmental policy decision-
making process,” notably “improved cooperation with environmental organ-
izations, non-governmental organizations, and other interested parties” 
(Economic and Social Committee 1989) Freedom of access to information 
on the environment is intended to “strengthen public participation in pro-
cedures for supervising environmental pollution and preventing environ-
mental damage and ... thus contribute effectively to attaining the objectives 
of Community action in the field of environmental protection” (European 
Commission 1988). Johannes Masing has summarized the concept as fol-
lows:
The concept pursued is clear. The implementation and design of Community envi-
ronmental law is not to be assigned to the arcana of national administrative author-
ities but made public through the participation of vigilant citizens. Responsibility is 
not to be vested only in the national executive machinery; the citizens themselves 
are to be mobilized as stewards of the environment. They, too, should take care of 
the environment. Public information on the environment thus brings citizens and 
administration closer together: both authorities and citizens keep watch. Not only 
the public sector but also private organisations consider and initiate measures (Mas-
ing 1996, p. 33. Transl. R.B.).
II. Enforcement of Antitrust Law by Public Authorities 
or through Private Law?
Market economy activity is activity under competitive conditions. The Act 
on Restraints on Competition (GWB) and the existence of the Federal Cartel 
Office indicate that the state is responsible for guaranteeing well-functioning 
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competition. This is also quite particularly close to the heart of the European 
Institutions. The smooth running of the European single market requires 
undistorted competition among the participants in such an internal market. 
Considering, however, what tools are suitable for ensuring well-functioning 
competition, individual market participants should obviously be brought 
into play as guardians of competition and given the appropriate legal means 
to fulfil this task. This is the declared policy of the European Commission 
and points to a trend that Wernhard Möschel criticizes:
The strengthening of private legal protection under antitrust law is in keeping with the 
international trend. In 2005, the German legislator amended the Act on Restraints on 
Competition to comply with the 2004 reform requirements of EU competition law. 
A key aim of the legislation was to expand the possibilities for private legal protec-
tion. In December 2005, the EU Commission issued a Green Paper on damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules. The purpose was to make it easier for 
consumers and businesses to claim compensation from offenders for damages suf-
fered. It was also sought to strengthen the application of competition law (Möschel 
2007, p. 483. Transl. R.B.).
Individual competitors that consider they have been specifically disadvan-
taged or have suffered damages were thus to be enabled and encouraged to 
enforce the application of competition law; the necessary tools are the effec-
tuation of damages claims, but above all the admission of so-called compe-
tition complaints, which allow market competitors to take legal action 
against state aid detrimental to competition (for example, unlawful state 
aid to finance regional airports, see Martin-Ehlers and Strohmayr 2008).
Not aspiring to the status of experts on competition law, we shall be 
content with these few remarks to point the way to a more general issue, 
namely whether law enforcement is necessarily a primarily state task or 
whether private law, “normally” serving private interests, is “called upon” 
to enable or facilitate enforcement of the law with an eye to the public 
interest. It is a both fundamental and interesting question. 
III. Norm Enforcement through Private Law?
How enforcement by the state and through private law relate to one another 
has been thoroughly and convincingly examined by Dörte Poelzig (2012), 
taking the example of antitrust law and capital market law. She sees norm 
enforcement through private law as in conformity with the system because 
business law in the form of the antitrust and capital market law on which 
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she focuses has the job of advancing private interests; ultimately it pursues 
public interest goals (in the importance of the public interest topos in 
economic law, see Eberhard Kempf et al. 2013), since it is concerned to 
order and maintain the institution of the market:
With the involvement of private parties in the effective enforcement of business law, 
private law assumes a function in the enforcement of objective law that serves the 
general economic interest. Private law is accordingly assigned a control function of 
its own in the interest of protecting the market. ... [T]he focus is not on the private 
utility of private-law powers but on the public good. The general interest that 
private-law sanctions pursue in enforcing the behavioural norms of economic law 
thus goes beyond the public interest, which generally consists in upholding the 
objective legal order by exercising subjective private rights. Concern about the 
instrumentalization of private law as a control tool in economic law is therefore 
due largely to the classical understanding of private law as a system of action by 
private-law subjects in their own interest. There are fears that the “collectivization of 
interest evaluation” in economic law could eliminate the advantages of the decen-
tralized evaluation of interests in concrete relations between parties proper to pri-
vate law. If a party can invoke the public interest and thereby strengthen its position, 
the balance between parties would be seriously perturbed. The common good could 
be advanced at best as a useful side effect of individual legal protection (Poelzig 
2012, p. 29 f. Transl. R.B.).
Dörte Poelzig sees the division of labour between the two legal orders quite 
differently; she considers enforcement under public law and under private 
law to be equivalent alternatives for inducing market participants to comply 
with the rules of market conduct:
The enforcement of rules of market conduct is the common goal of public-law 
supervision and private-law demands. Public-law and private-law sanctions are 
therefore functional alternatives directed towards a common goal – enforcement 
of market conduct norms in the public interest to protect the market as institution. 
Public law and private law thus differ not in their regulatory purpose but in the 
tools they use to attain this purpose. The decision about public-law and/or private-
law norm enforcement is more oen a question of practicality than of principle. 
Whether a legal order opts for private-law or public-law forms of enforcement is 
therefore oen also determined by history (Poelzig 2012, p. 566. R.B.).
The thought behind this argument is the conceptualization of the two legal 
sub-orders of civil law and public law as “mutually supporting systems” that 
we owe to Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann and Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem 
(Schmidt-Aßmann and Hoffmann-Riem 1997). This theoretical approach 
allows the relationship between norm enforcement by the state and through 
private-law to be perceived as a division of labour. Poelzig:
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As the law stands, private law is already a key regulatory instrument in markets – 
traditional with respect to fair trading, antitrust matters, and the capital market. 
It seeks to enforce rules of market conduct. Such rules serve primarily to protect the 
market as institution and the interest of all participants in its well-functioning. 
To this extent, private law as a regulatory tool is committed not primarily to pro-
tecting the individual but to protecting the market as institution. In order to control 
the market, private persons are vested with a claim to its regulation. The private-law 
enforcement of rules of market conduct thus places the law in the hands of market 
participants with an interest in the well-functioning of the market and thus in 
compliance with such rules. General and individual interests hence run in parallel 
or indeed converge. Societal countercontrols through organizations and market 
participants acting to protect the market are hence an expression of secondary 
societal responsibility – in other words supportive responsibility – for the common 
good. Together with public law, private law forms a regulatory system “in joint 
ownership,” which can achieve effective enforcement of the rules of market conduct 
only in conjunction, and thus efficiently defend the interests of the community as a 
whole (Poelzig 2012, p. 593. Transl. R.B.).
IV. Defence of the Law (Rechtsbewährung) in Criminal Law – Self-Defence
One of the few cases in which the citizen is lawfully permitted to use force to 
uphold the law is self-defence, which in Germany is dealt with under Section 
32 of the Criminal Code. It is a matter of controversy whether what is being 
defending in the exercise of self-defence is only the specific individual object 
of legal protection – such as property and the physical integrity of the victim 
in a robbery – or whether the person attacked is also defending the legal 
order as a whole and thus exercising an essential function of state authority. 
Johannes Kaspar sums up opinion on the subject:
Three opposing views have long been advanced in this field. A minority view, which 
has gained increasing support in recent times, is that the rationale of Section 32 of 
the Criminal Code is solely the protection of the individual good. The counterposition, 
represented particularly by Schmidhäuser, is that self-defence is grounded solely in 
the supra-individual aspect of “defending the law.” The act of self-defence directed 
against an unlawful assailant is to be seen solely from the perspective of “defending 
the legal order,” whereas the protection of the individual good that it also effectuates 
is to be regarded as a side effect of the act of defence and mere “reflex.” 
Common to these two approaches is that they are monistic, that is to say, they set 
out from a single fundamental principle. The predominant dualistic view, by con-
trast, combines these two aspects: the justification of Section 32 of the Criminal 
Code is considered to be correctly understood only if it is based on both protection 
of the individual and defence of the law. ... 
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The main argument advanced by proponents of the dualistic approach against a 
purely individual understanding of self-defence is that the special “forcefulness” of 
the right of self-defence cannot be explained in these terms. The right of self-defence 
under Section 32 of the Criminal Code is very far-reaching; according to prevailing 
opinion it also covers the right to kill an assailant to defend material assets without 
weighing “proportionality” in the balance between the attacked and defended good. 
Furthermore, neither evasive action nor the securing of outside help is expected of 
the party attacked. All this, it is argued, cannot be explained only in terms of 
protection of the threatened good but is to be understood only against the backdrop 
of “defending the law” (Kaspar 2013, p. 41 f. Transl. R.B.).
The probably predominant dualistic approach with its stress on the supra-
individual aspect of defending the law necessarily finds itself in difficulty 
when it comes to so-called petty offences, when things of minor value are 
involved. The critical question is then whether the party exercising self-
defence can with good conscience invoke the oen quoted statement of 
A. F. Berner: “it would be wrong if justice had to give way to injustice” 
(Berner 1848, p. 557. Transl. R.B.). Johannes Kaspar:
Here, too, [the proponents of the dualist approach] abide by the strict principle of 
permissible defence. Since in the case of petty offences ... we are dealing only with a 
“diminished” and not with fully eliminated interest in upholding the law, the right 
of self-defence is given; sparing the attacker is appropriate only with respect to due 
consideration for his life. Schmidhäuser goes even further as apologist for the purely 
supra-individual approach, according to which the adult fruit thief who ignores a 
warning to climb out of the apple tree may be shot. He argues that this is part of the 
indispensable “struggle for the law,” which depends on the “defensive willingness of all 
members of the legal community.” The fact that many members of the legal community 
fortunately see things differently will later be shown on the basis of empirical data 
(Kaspar 2013, p. 43. Transl. R.B.).
The empirical data Kaspar mentions are findings of the so-called Dresden 
Self-Defence Study by Knut Amelung and Ines Kilian, who looked at the 
public acceptance of such a far-reaching right of self-defence (Amelung und 
Kilian 2003; Amelung 2003). The outcome of the study is clear, showing 
“that the majority of population quite self-evidently assumes that the right of 
self-defence is limited by considerations of proportionality” (Kaspar 2013, 
p. 54. Transl. R.B.). Kaspar’s comments on this result is interesting, because 
it clearly shows that the discussion of the problem of justifying self-defence 
also has to be conducted as a debate on political culture; to be more precise, 
on the conflict culture of a society: 
The findings of the Dresden self-defence study also offer a strong argument against a 
positive, general prevention justification for the forceful right of self-defence. The argu-
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ment of “re-establishing the public peace” – substantively somewhat ambiguous and 
indeterminate – seeks to guarantee that the population perceives any punishment 
imposed as a just and reasonable reaction to the offence without this effect being 
seriously amenable to empirical measurement in any one case. The lawgiver is under 
obligation to give normative expression to what it regards as a just and reasonable 
reaction – but always with the goal in mind of taking due account of prevailing 
views in society. If there is any indication that the population would be content with 
a lower level of sanctioning or would regard a complete abandonment of sanctions 
as acceptable, this would have to be looked into in the interest of optimizing the 
protection of basic rights; otherwise there would be a risk of imposing punishment 
without any meaningful preventive effect.
Applying this to self-defence, it would mean that warding off an attack with partic-
ular force cannot be legitimated on the grounds of “defending the law” if the 
population does not expect such a reaction in certain constellations but, on the 
contrary, regards it as excessive and unlawful. The 1962 government bill also inter-
estingly assumed that the right of self-defence was limited “in cases where its exercise 
would go against the legal convictions of the general public” – and precisely this 
appears to be the case for homicide to defend material assets. By contrast, the 
assertion in the same bill that self-defence is “a forceful defensive right rooted since 
time immemorial in the legal convictions of the people” is clearly obsolete in the 
eyes of this general public, as is the assertion based on an antiquated bourgeois 
concept of honour that the party attacked cannot on principle be expected to give 
way because this would constitute “shameful flight.” According to the study men-
tioned, this, too, finds no echo among the population. Overall, what we have here is 
one of the far from rare intersections between criminology and substantive criminal 
law – that have hitherto largely escaped overarching and systematic examination – 
where empirical findings are urgently needed in interpreting and applying substan-
tive criminal law (Kaspar 2013, p. 55 f. Transl. R.B.).
The above quotes show that, by granted a broad right of self-defence, the 
state enforces the legal order against the attacker indirectly through the 
exercise of self-defence by the party attacked. Self-defence, for the person 
against whom it is exercised, thus has de facto the character of a sanction 
whose possible intensity is regulated by prevailing law. The citizen is there-
fore empowered not only to supervise but also to rigorously enforce the legal 
order, albeit in a strictly limited corridor that– as we have seen – is always the 
subject of political debate.
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D. The Plurality of Norm Enforcement Regimes as a Consequence of
Functional Differentiation: The Example of the Professions
I. The Concept of Functional Differentiation
The theory of functional differentiation is a key element of systems theory 
and associated above all with the name of Niklas Luhmann (1984; 1997; 
2000). Whereas in pre-modern societies the main criteria of differentiation 
were status and rank, in the modern world-society functional differentiation is 
the primary differentiation principle; what is meant by this term is outlined by 
André Brodocz:
Functional differentiation means that the perspective of unity under which a differ-
ence between system and environment is established is the function that the out-
differentiated system ... fulfils for the system as a whole ... That is to say that every 
functional system of society has to have “monopolized” performance of the given 
function because its “functional primacy,” i. e., the priority of it own function over 
all other functions, is the basis of its own subsystem formation ... One such func-
tional system is the political system ... The exclusive function of a political system is 
to “provide the capacity for collectively binding decision-making” ... Other func-
tional systems identified by Luhmann and others are the economy, science, law, 
and religion, as well as the mass media, education, medicine, art, social welfare, and 
sport. The functions that the various functional systems perform are thus wide-
ranging. The function of the economic system, for example, is to regulate the dis-
tribution of scarce goods, which combines sustainable provision with current dis-
tribution; the science system finds its function in gaining new knowledge, and the 
legal system seeks to ensure the precautionary stabilization of expectations, which 
can be maintained even in the event of disappointment or conflict (Brodocz 2006, 
p. 509 f. Transl. R.B.).
These social subsystems operate self-referentially; this is the meaning behind 
the talk of autopoietic systems which operate with a function-specific binary 
code (true / false, credit / debit, right / wrong, and so forth). These concepts 
are familiar from every introduction to systems theory and do not require 
detailed discussion here.
The really interesting question, however, is whether these autopoietic 
subsystems can be conceived of as operating in actuality. In her essay on 
“Functional Subsystems in the Theory of Social Differentiation” (1988), 
Renate Mayntz provides a useful explanation. In the process of social differ-
entiation, she identifies three stages of differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung):
The concept of differentiation refers to a process of system formation in which a 
number of stages can be identified analytically without ascertaining whether exist-
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ing functional subsystems have developed through such a process. The lowest stage 
is the single action, action situation, or interaction. The special meaning of action 
must naturally not be idiosyncratic but recognized socially for what it is – religious, 
economic, or military action, a relationship of intimacy or domination, a situation 
of healing or necromancy. In the next stage of differentiation there are special 
functional roles characterized by the continuous performance of an activity that is 
initially marked off only situationally: physician, researcher, actor, priest, etc. 
Finally, in the third stage, correspondingly specialized larger social structures devel-
op, which are oen but not necessarily formal organizations, and which are inter-
linked throughout society to form a special universe of action (Mayntz 1988, p. 20. 
Transl. R.B.).
Really interesting, however, is the question whether the “formation” develop-
ing in the process of social structural consolidation can be characterized in terms 
of a specific mode of conduct. On this question, which administration 
science addresses under the heading of organizational behaviour (see Schup-
pert 1994), Renate Mayntz gives two important answers: in the first place the 
institutions shaping the given subsystem tend to claim a monopoly on their 
function:
Even aer the stage of subsystem formation as defined has been attained, differ-
entiation can vary in extent. Although the fact that a subsystem has primary respon-
sibility for a certain type of action in society is part of the minimum definition of 
the concept, there are marked differences in the degree of monopolization of the 
action concerned (e. g., education, medical treatment, news dissemination) by a 
definable institutional complex. Important for perception of the distinct existence 
of a subsystem by members of society themselves and for this subsystem’s operation 
and political controllability is the extent to which those performing a certain cat-
egory of functional role and/or the relevant formal organizations succeed in impos-
ing the exclusivity of responsibility for a certain service or type of activity ... (Mayntz 
1988, p. 22. Transl. R.B.).
On the other hand, their behaviour reveals a leitmotif, which we shall be 
examining in greater detail, namely the claim to represent interests exter-
nally and to effective internal self-regulation:
What is important for the degree of a subsystem’s differentiation is whether and 
to what extend there are actors who can claim authority for internal self-regulation 
of the subsystem and to represent its interests externally. Although the existence of 
corporate actors is not fundamental to this capacity, it is so in practical terms. 
Corporate actors can also better secure access restrictions, claims to competence, 
and the “threshold of legitimate indifference” ... than an amorphous crowd of func-
tional role-players. ...
Societal subsystems that have attained the three stages of differentiation described 
are generally perceived by the members of society themselves as autonomous and 
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easily distinguishable systems... The delimitation of single functional subsystems in 
the perception of members of society is for its part an important precondition for 
enforcing claims to exclusive responsibility, in particular access conditions or the 
special attention of the political system. To this extent, interaction between sym-
bolic-cognitive processes of definition and social structural differentiation is mutu-
ally reinforcing (Mayntz 1988, p. 22 f. Transl. R.B.).
Having gained a general idea of the theory of functional differentiation, we 
turn to the example of the professions to examine how the differentiation of 
subsystems also leads to the differentiation of norm enforcement regimes.
II. The Role of Professions
1. The Sociology of Professions Perspective
Chapter 2 examined in detail the type of norm ordering specific to profes-
sions, so that a few remarks from the “sociology of professions” viewpoint 
(see Muzio and Kirkpatrick 2011), notably on links with the theory of func-
tional differentiation, will suffice for our present purposes. This having been 
said, the following findings are impressively clear:
Professions (on the broader German concept “Beruf” see Gispen 1988) do 
exactly what Renate Mayntz would expect of them: they monopolize knowl-
edge specific to a profession, they act externally as representatives of interests, 
and internally exercise sometimes very intensive social disciplining. A num-
ber of authors have addressed the subject.
* As an introduction, so to speak, Manfred Mai lists the most important 
ideal-typical characteristics of professions as social and political insti-
tutions:
– A demanding, generally academic training; 
– Close relations with clients, generally marked by great personal trust;
– Far-reaching autonomy in organizing professional matters such as quality con-
trol of the services offered, admission to the profession, training content, and 
remuneration;
– A high social reputation;
– Codified professional ethics addressing the common good;
– Largely monopolistic control of a societal sector of key importance (2008, p. 15. 
Trans. R.B.).
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As this list shows, professions fit almost exactly into the picture of 
social-structurally consolidated formations produced by processes of 
functional differentiation.
* The connection between profession formation and functional differ-
entiation is discussed by profession sociologist Michaela Pfadenhauer. 
With reference to the outstanding position the professions play in the 
social theory of Talcott Parsons (see already the 1939 essay “The Pro-
fessions and Social Structure”), she stresses the conditional relationship 
between autonomy and self-regulation:
The structural functionalist model for explaining the occupational division of 
labour is based on the premise that societies conceived of as systems are subject 
to the progressive outdifferentiation of the functions and services necessary for the 
existence of modern societies. They provide the appropriate professional positions 
and assign individual actors to them who perform specialized services in these 
positions under the guidance of role expectations. Performance is ensured through 
socialization and the concomitant internalization of the normative basis of a posi-
tion and by (primarily positive) sanctions. ...
Optimal performance requires special institutional framework conditions, which, 
although they give professionals a higher degree of “freedom” in the exercise of their 
occupational activity, nevertheless demand a great deal of self-regulation and strong 
orientation on the public interest. Privileges and prestige are, so to speak, the 
rewards that professionals receive in return for self-restraint (Pfadenhauer 2003, 
p. 38 f. Transl. R.B.).
Michaela Pfadenhauer goes on to define professions “as self-regulating 
corporate formations relatively autonomous and subject to internal colle-
gial regulation in training for and exercising their activities” (2003, p. 40). 
As such corporate actors, they are “political collective actors” (2003, 
p. 55) and pursue a professional policy shaped by their action logic. 
With respect to professional standards, this policy asserts an optimum 
of exclusive definitional and interpretative authority (see Mayntz et al. 
1988, p. 27 f.), but this privilege of organized autonomy is granted only 
in return for “the credible promise of self-regulation” (van den Daele 
and Müller-Salomon 1990, p. 22. Transl. R.B.); Pfadenhauer has this to 
say about the link between the claim to autonomy and the claim to regulate:
The claim of professions to self-regulation generally concern admission to the pro-
fession in question, stocks of expertise, and to collegial self-regulation; and the 
manifest themselves in professional strategies, in professional policy. The claim to 
regulation is consequently internal, committing members of the profession to pro-
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fessional standards (scientific and ethical, and in the professional practice), compli-
ance being enforced by formal and informal sanctions. In seeking to ward off
“juridification,” the claim to regulated is, however directed outside the subsystem: 
the principal concern is to reject any form of external control by the state (Pfaden-
hauer 2003, p. 61. Transl. R.B.).
Thus although the wish is to keep the state outside as much as possible, 
the state as an authority for guaranteeing the finely balanced gover-
nance regime of autonomy and self-regulation is indispensable; in this 
sense, Pfadenhauer, with reference to Eliot Freidson (1983; 2001) com-
ments on the subject of “regulated self-regulation”:
Freidson even regards “the state” as a condition for professionalism, since it alone 
can guarantee certain occupations their special status and do so over the long term. 
In this view, the state creates and secures the basis for professionalism – from the 
occupational division of labour to the education and training system, the distribu-
tion of responsibilities and licensing, up to and including the restriction of com-
petition – without invalidating professional autonomy and self-regulation (Pfaden-
hauer 2003, p. 54. Transl. R.B.).
2. Forms of Internal Collegial Regulation
a) From Codes of Professional Conduct to Quality-Assuring 
Governance Regimes
Chapter one discussed normative orderings at length, not least the develop-
ment from canons of professional ethics to so-called codes of conduct. With-
out returning to this at length, one new aspect should be added, namely the 
growing conception of internal professional regulation as professional qual-
ity assurance management (on modern quality assurance law see Reimer 
2010; also Schuppert 2011e). What is at issue – and this is, as it were, the 
price for the grant of autonomy and the durable trust of the clientele – is to 
guarantee a certain level of quality for professional services. 
Franz Reimer illustrates this in the case of accounting law. “There is a qual-
ity-assuring governance regime characterized by an interesting mix of statutory 
and private regulatory components; Section 55 b of the Ordinance for the 
Public Accounting Profession (WiPro) is, so to speak, the basic norm: “The 
accountant shall set the rules that are required for the performance of his or 
her professional duties and shall supervise and enforce their application (qual-
ity assurance system). The quality assurance system shall be documented.”
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It is interesting to see in which regulatory regimes the standards for this 
quality assurance system are to be found, namely not primarily in enacted 
law but, as Reimer shows, in private regulatory regimes of the profession or 
of private standard setting committees:
Reference is taken first to general professional duties such as independence, integ-
rity, confidentiality, and responsibility (Section 43 (1) sent. 1 of the WiPrO), conduct 
befitting the profession (Section 43 (2)), continuing training (Section 43 (2) sent. 4), 
and special professional duties (Section 57 (4) 2 f., 5 in conjunction with the pro-
fessional charter of the Chamber of Public Accountants). In Section 4 (1), the 
Professional Charter imposes “technical rules”; they supplement statutory rules 
and address above all the principles of orderly accounting within the meaning of 
Section 238 (1) sent. 1 of the Commercial Code (HGB), the statements of the 
Accounting Standards Committee of Germany (ASCG), and the accounting stand-
ards, instructions, and comments on accounting and the accounting advice of the 
Institute of Public Auditors in Germany (IDW) (Reimer 2010, p. 367. Transl. R.B.).
Remarkable about this example is that the point of reference for enforcing 
professional standards is no longer a professional concept of honour and a 
professional ethic but the quality of professional services and its assurance.
b) Professional Disciplinary Jurisdiction between Professional Supervision 
and State Jurisdiction
Since governance collectives tend to develop a jurisdiction of their own, 
many liberal professions – such as the law – have long had professional tri-
bunals exercising disciplinary jurisdiction, significantly entitled Ehrengerichte
in German (literally “courts of honour”): not only military honour, as we 
have seen in chapter two, but also professional honour plays an important role 
in guiding conduct and contribute to quality assurance. 
It was therefore obvious to attach such tribunals to the relevant profes-
sional organization, since they ultimately ensure effective professional super-
vision. In his book on the autonomy of the professions, Thomas Emde 
remarks: 
It has already been indicated that the importance and effectiveness of professional 
supervision depend essentially on the existence of disciplinary jurisdiction proper to 
the particular profession. ... organizationally, the systematics of the law pertaining to 
professional associations attach the tribunals to the relevant organizations; they 
exercise professional supervision like these bodies, apply the same norms, and are 
composed of members nominated by the associations. In view of the range and 
density of connections and interrelationships between professional associations and 
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tribunals, it is justified to speak of a complementary functional community. While it 
is the tribunals that render the supervisory activity of professional bodies really 
effective, the same tribunals would be at a loss without the standard-setting and 
standard supervision work undertaken by the professional associations (Emde 1991, 
p. 113 f. Transl. R.B.).
But since the professional tribunals undoubtedly exercise jurisdiction that 
the Basic Law (Article 92) reserves to the state, the only possibility to avoid 
unconstitutionality is to let them “sail under the flag” of state jurisdiction. 
With a markedly critical undertone, Emde notes: 
In spite of everything, however, the Federal Constitutional Court treats professional 
tribunals as elements of the state judicial system. From both the personnel and 
material point of view, the necessary ties between professional tribunals and the 
state are given: the state has the right to choose tribunal members from among 
nominees; the German Judiciary Act applies with binding effect to honorary judges; 
and in the case of tribunals for the legal profession, qualification requirements for 
this profession apply. Although the judiciary has deliberately played down the very 
close functional, organizational, and personnel interdependence between legal, 
medical, and architectural tribunals and the relevant professional associations to 
such a degree that justificatory intent can be suspected, we shall leave it at that. 
Even if professional tribunals had not qualified as state courts within the meaning of 
Article 92 of the Basic Law, the consequence would not have been to integrate them 
into the administration of professional bodies but their unconstitutionality, because 
their material quality as adjudicative institutions is in no doubt. However one 
judges their status and constitutionality, professional tribunals are thus never an 
integral part of the administration of a professional association ... (Emde 1991, 
p. 114. Transl. R.B.).
We, too, do not need to go into the legal status of professional tribunals in any 
greater detail at this point. We are interested rather in their function, which Thomas 
Emde has convincingly described as a “complementary functional community 
between professional associations and professional tribunals.” 
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E. Norm Enforcement as Institutionalized Social Disciplining
Consideration of the social disciplining concept can begin with a decision by 
the Federal Constitutional Court on whether social workers as an occupa-
tional group have a right of refusal to give evidence (Decision of the Second 
Senate of 19 July 1972, BVerfGE 33, 367 – Sozialarbeiter). The court began 
by stating that recognition of the privilege to refuse to answer questions in a 
criminal case requires special justification; in the case of public accountants 
and tax consultants this justification was given, since both professions are 
subject to professional disciplinary supervision.
In the light of the rule-of-law postulate of upholding the well-functioning admin-
istration of criminal justice, granting a privilege of refusal to give evidence on 
professional grounds requires special legitimation before the constitution. From 
this point of view, it is not self-evident that the legislator has granted the accounting 
and tax advisory professions the right of refusal to give evidence. However, it can be 
justified because their professional training, the professional rules to which they are 
subject (Ordinance for the Public Accounting Profession, 24 July 1961 [BGBl. I 
p. 1049] and Tax Advisory Act, 16 August 1961 [BGBl. I p. 1301]), supervision by 
professional associations, and disciplinary supervision by professional tribunals give 
a certain guarantee that they will make no inappropriate use of the privilege to 
refuse to give evidence granted them, that they will invoke it only when essential to 
meet the obligation of professional secrecy and no overriding public interests 
oppose this. Granting the right of refusal to give evidence in criminal cases to 
representatives of the accounting and tax advisory professions is therefore compat-
ible with the principle of the rule of law.
Social workers, by contrast, lack professional social disciplining, so that there is 
no guarantee that they will exercise the right of refusal to testify with 
responsibility:
Furthermore, the legislator has for good reason granted the privilege to refuse 
testimony only to representatives of professions in which – owing to the nature 
of the matter or on grounds of rules of professional conduct considered binding and 
therefore obeyed – fixed standards approved by the community have been developed 
where professional secrecy applies and silence is hence called for. This is appropriate 
because exercise of the right to refuse to give evidence, which depends solely on the 
decision of the witness, would otherwise be subject to chance and arbitrariness. 
However, whereas the conditions for all the professions mentioned under Section 
53 (1) 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are met, for social workers no such 
standards have been set. Although the concept of “social secrecy” has been current 
in the literature for some time, it has yet to be satisfactorily defined. What is to be 
understood by the term is spelled out neither in general professional regulations nor 
laid down with binding effect in a professional code of conduct recognized within 
the social work profession ... Unlike in the occupational groups listed in Section 53 
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(1) 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with the sole exception – albeit for special 
reasons – of midwives, social workers also lack both public-law representative bodies 
and professional tribunals, able to raise confidentiality to the status of a professional 
requirement, to supervise compliance, and to sanction infringements through pro-
fessional disciplinary law.
It is somewhat astonishing that professional disciplining is not only cited but 
also considered a precondition for recognizing the privilege of refusal to give 
evidence; at any rate, the passages quoted rouse our curiosity about what 
historians and social scientists actually understand by social disciplining.
I. The Concept of Social Disciplining
Social disciplining, a concept which has doubtlessly passed its prime, is 
inseparably associated with the name of Gerhard Oestreich, who identified 
it as one of the essential structural characteristics of absolutism (Oestreich 1969). 
Anyone wishing to learn more about the concept cannot avoid the now 
classical 1987 essay by Winfried Schulze in which he explains the origin 
and application of the term and places it in the context of the development 
of the early modern state (Schulze 1987). We, too, refer to this almost 
canonical text; three aspects are particularly interesting for our purposes:
1. Disciplining as Disciplining within a Governance Collective
In the first part of this book we had spoken about governance collectives and 
their normative orders and established that governance collectives generally 
also operate as regulatory collectives. But governance collectives can be 
analysed not only as regulatory collectives but also as what we shall call dis-
ciplinary collectives, in which the internal ordering of a group or a collective is 
ensured by discipline specific to the given collective. Winfried Schulze:
Disciplining in this context does not mean primacy of the state, political, dynastic 
considerations over culture, the economy, religion, or science. It means forming, 
shaping, fitting into the smallest social circle or association; it means enabling 
interaction, simplification of particularities, enhancing the effect through discipline. 
Even guild orderings not only regulated the occupational organization but also the 
not yet distinct public and private lives of their members, the vita civilis. All mem-
bers of a guild were subject to an overall professional order. But when their mem-
bership sphere broadened to encompass greater areas like the city and later the 
country (= the “state”), new ordering problems arose. To resolve these, urban public 
order regulations, dress codes, then corresponding national public order regulations 
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were introduced, initially in consultation with the groups involved but soon mutat-
ing into enacted law as mainly or exclusively bureaucratic orders. The rules on dress 
and morality of the guild statutes found their way into council and princely edicts 
(Schulze 1987, p. 275 Transl. R.B.).
2. Disciplining as Quality Assurance
Under the heading “From Codes of Professional Conduct to Quality-Assuring 
Governance Regimes” we have addressed a certain development in the role of 
professions. Schulze takes up this thought, commenting on quality control 
through discipline:
In the fieenth and sixteenth centuries, the demand for quality work increased 
markedly. For this reason, supervisory institutions such as public authorities, guilds, 
and chambers of handicras had to monitor work more and more carefully. A 
tangible sign was the appearance of examinations as precondition for the guild to 
award the title of master crasman. Disciplining thus also meant enhancing per-
formance, expertise, quality. Control of the product and regulation of the working 
process gradually gave rise to a disciplining of work as such, together with the 
prisons, workhouses, poorhouses, and orphanages, which constituted barracks and 
disciplinary institutions in the economic field (Schulze 1987, p. 275 f. Transl. R.B.).
3. The Churches as Disciplinary Agencies
Among governance collectives whose cohesion was enhanced by discipline, 
the churches occupy a particularly prominent position. Winfried Schulze has 
this to say on the subject:
In the major churches and in sects, the idea of reform was associated from the outset with 
notions of energetic discipline. Luther demanded obedience from the lords and princes 
no less than from the peasants. He rejected self-help and regarded authority and 
obedience as prerequisites for the Christian life. As religious reformers, Zwingli and 
Calvin were also reformers of public order and discipline. In the city states of Zurich 
and Geneva, they established severe and drastic Christian discipline applicable to all, 
which they energetically intensified. The equality of Christians before God was 
practised as equality in Christian discipline. Corresponding to this was the Catholic 
Church with its disciplined school and monastic systems. The revival movements, August 
Hermann Francke’s school curricula, Zinzendorf’s statutes: all had to do with dis-
cipline. But the methodical disciplining of life demanded by Calvinism in particular 
is not to be equated with social disciplining Social disciplining is a secular process, 
supported but not determined by religious disciplining. The church as the agent of the 
hitherto most far-reaching discipline was the most important factor alongside the secular 
agents. In the sixteenth century, the jurisdiction of bishops was transferred to con-
sistories as an element of ecclesiastical power alongside church discipline. The means 
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available for sanctioning serious public nuisance in the congregation were exclusion 
from Holy Communion and public penance; these were disciplinary measures, 
spiritual measures not criminal penalties with legal consequences for the citizen. 
Church discipline intruding into public life was checked by the modern state 
(Schulze 1987, p. 279 f. Transl. R.B.).
II. Social Disciplining at Work: The Example of Church Discipline
This is not the place for a systematic and comprehensive discussion of the 
phenomenon of church discipline; we limit ourselves to four aspects that are 
particularly interesting in connection with the plurality of norm enforcement 
regimes.
1. The Purity of the Congregation as the Goal of 
Reformational Church Discipline
According to Hans-Jürgen Goertz and John H. Leith (1990, p. 176): “The 
Reformation in a broader sense was itself a major effort to restore and 
maintain order and discipline in Christendom.” Order and discipline were 
particularly close to the hearts of the reformers Calvin and Zwingli. They 
sought to impose it in reformational Zurich and Geneva with uncomprom-
ising zeal:
A dense network of morality control descended over the territory of Zurich. Just 
how far it penetrated all areas of life is shown by the Great Morals Mandate (Großes 
Sittenmandat) of 1530/1532. ... The intention underlying the mandate is signalled by 
the fact that the severest sanction was reserved not for general vices but for offences 
committed against the church: they could be punished by excommunication. The 
offender was banished from Zurich. Whoever had committed only a moral offence 
was fined but not excluded. In a vast “popular educational experiment,” the purity of 
the congregation was to be secured to ward off the wrath of God from the new 
reformed polity. The price was high: Zwingli tended to promote rather than prevent 
the political tendency to discipline the citizenry. ...
Church discipline, although a central concern of the church, was in the hands of a 
consistory composed of elders, who were also members of the city council, and 
pastors. In Geneva, the city council had a decisive word to say in appointing the 
presbytery and preachers and thus fulfilled its duty to preserve the purity of the 
Christian polity. This is demonstrated by the Ordonnances ecclésiastiques de Genève
of 1541 ... But the initial impetus for church discipline came from the church, 
which placed the municipal authorities in the service of spiritual government. 
Ultimately it amounted to the same: the polity was subjected to religious, moral, 
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and political / social control in terms of the Christian faith (Leith and Goertz 1990, 
p. 178. Transl. R.B.).
Under the heading “The Christianization of Social Behaviour as Permanent 
Reformation,” Heinrich Richard Schmidt also examines the central role of the 
congregation, which is not only the object of church discipline (intent on pre-
serving its purity and cohesion) but also operates as norm enforcement author-
ity, and, moreover, is constituted in the first place as a corporation by the bonds 
of church discipline. Far more important for the cohesion and purity of the 
congregation proved to be the so-called “choir courts” (“Chorgerichte”) whose 
job as morality courts was not only to ensure “order and discipline” but also 
peace in the congregation and neighbourly cohesion. Schmidt concludes:
Town and village demanded of their inhabitants the same peaceful and neighbourly 
behaviour. At this level of action, the choir court articulated and satisfied the exis-
tential needs of both the urban and rural congregation. Common to churches of the 
Geneva or Zurich type with regard to their social function was that church disci-
pline served the practice of socially disciplined behaviour to maintain the integrity 
of the congregation as a community of the Lord’s Supper. 
The moral courts therefore performed social “services” for the congregation by 
enforcing the social norms of conduct without which it could not survive. Attaining 
salvation and both individual and collective well-being was made dependent on 
socially disciplined behaviour. In a certain sense, the choir court as a “shaping 
apparatus” (Prägeapparatur) as Norbert Elias would put it, performed the function 
of the conscience that reflects on, directs, and guides action. The choir court inter-
preted instrumentally rational action in value-rational terms by referring it to the 
unconditional will of God. Social action becomes worship. The church thus entered 
everyday life, the love of God practised in everyday action as social behaviour 
(Schmidt 1989, p. 161 f. Transl. R.B.).
2. The Jesuits as Disciplinary Teachers
Christian social disciplining takes many forms and uses just as many discipli-
nary agents. The Jesuits played a prominent role in this. In this context we 
leave aside their great success in missionary history (see Schuppert 2014 with 
further references) to examine their achievements as highly effective moral-
educational authorities. Writing about church discipline in early modern 
Europe, Heinz Schilling notes:
In comparing Christian denominations it should be remembered that in the frame-
work of Catholic confessionalization, public church discipline was not the only nor 
even most important or typical form of church control and discipline. The Triden-
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tine Reformation, of which the Jesuits were the most determined and successful 
agents, created a whole spectrum of disciplinary, regulatory, and norm-setting meas-
ures that – differently but no less decisively than Calvinist public congregational 
discipline – influenced the development of modern rational modes of conduct and 
attitudes. The spectrum of these measures ranged from spiritual exercises, general 
educational activities in schools and universities, and morality plays, to the sermon, 
popular catechesis, and confession. The Jesuits have been described as “disciplinary 
teachers” whose “total regimentation (also in other Catholic schools) led to corre-
sponding supervisory measures” Tridentine confraternities, notably the Jesuit sodal-
ities also had a disciplinary impact, as did the modernized pilgrimage. The renewed 
pilgrimages of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries under clerical supervision 
became an “organized and disciplined venture,” a controlled and standardized sacred 
exercise; an innovation which is also essentially to be attributed to the Jesuits 
(Schilling 1994, p. 36 f. Transl. R.B.).
3. Differences between Protestant Calvinist and Roman Catholic 
Church Discipline
In his comparative study of church discipline in early modern Europe, Heinz 
Schilling notes a number of important differences between Protestant Cal-
vinist and Roman Catholic church discipline that concern the entire direc-
tion of disciplining as well as the agents involved:
... [T]he differences cannot be overlooked. There is much to suggest that they had a 
major impact on the history of both mentalities and of society in general. The first 
cardinal difference was in the standard deemed attainable through penance and self-
discipline, revealing differences in the concept of man. Catholic confessors assumed 
that spiritual exercises, general confession, and the internalization of repentance 
could lastingly place a person on the path towards the good and even to veritable 
sanctity; Ignatius of Loyola and the modern practice of penance attributed essen-
tially him offered a prime example. For Calvinist discipline and for Protestantism in 
general, by contrast, the irremediable sinfulness of man was constitutive and control 
and punishment unavoidable for every Christian. There was a Protestant theology of 
sin and penance. There was no theology of sanctity, which in the Catholic variant of 
early modern church discipline played an important role. The second cardinal differ-
ence between Calvinist and Catholic discipline was in the referential context for the 
cleansing from sin. Among Calvinists this was the congregation, specifically the 
congregation in Holy Communion. Penance accordingly had to be public, espe-
cially where the sin was public knowledge, but in the case of particularly grave 
offences even when the “sinner” and the presbyter alone knew about it. The sinful 
member of the congregation was to seek reconciliation “with the congregation” so 
that God’s wrath provoked by his offence did not fall upon the congregation sullied 
by the transgression of the individual. This emphasis on publicness was alien to 
Jesuit concepts of confession; just as the post-Tridentine confession radically cut the 
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link between parish and congregation in favour of a quasi private, non-public and 
subjective interaction between confessor and believer. The post-Tridentine confes-
sion was concerned primarily with the disciplina interna of the sinner ... (Schilling 
1994, p. 38 f. Transl R.B.).
4. Protestant Church Discipline between Church and State
Under the heading of law enforcement as a function of government, we had 
pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that state and church have a 
common regulatory interest in safeguarding the law and enforcing the law 
(constituting an “ordnungspolitischer Interessenverbund” see Zabel 2012, p. 38; 
Brecht and Schwarz 1980). Quite rightly, Martin Brecht therefore asks “Who 
actually disciplined whom?” He also supplies the answer: “State, church, and 
society interrelate” (Brecht 1994, p. 44). At this point we cannot resist recall-
ing one of our favourite concepts, the “co-production of statehood” (Schup-
pert 2009); applying the concept to the present subject, we could speak of 
the “co-production of order and discipline.” Martin Brecht:
The actual means available for church discipline were limited: sermon, personal discussion 
with admonition, interrogation, public penance, and exclusion. The extent to which this 
led to acknowledgement and repentance is only sporadically apparent from the 
records of interrogations. The state participated in church discipline with mandates, 
interrogations, money, and corporal punishment, as well as the pillory, prison, or banish-
ment. These means of the state could generally serve to maintain the Christian moral 
order, but given their external coercive nature, they were largely unsuited for the 
spiritual welfare purposes of church discipline, and, as the oen repeated mandates 
show, were frequently also ineffective. A state-dominated moral discipline should 
therefore perhaps be distinguished more sharply from real church discipline. 
It would doubtless be far from simple to discover whether action was being taken 
against a person as a sinner causing a public nuisance or an offender against the public 
order. At the same time, certain distinctions are possible with respect to the alleged 
offences and their treatment, even though there was a great deal of overlap between 
church and state interests (Brecht 1994, p. 45 f. Transl. R.B.).
We return to the role of the Swiss choir courts. Heinrich Richard Schmidt 
also looked at who the judges were, noting a remarkable continuity that 
suggested the relationship between state and church went beyond the co-
production of order and discipline towards an overlap of identity between the 
state and the church congregation:
The century-long list of names suggests a move-up procedure that itself produced 
internal village elites from among whom the choir court president (Ammann) was 
successively appointed. The period of service was relatively long. Literally the “eld-
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ers” headed the church congregation. The choir court became the “nursery” for the 
local political elite, but they remained committed to its prime and original function 
because they never le the court. As far as the dominant institutional position of 
state and church is concerned, it is almost justified to speak of church predomi-
nance: elders became Ammänner, not vice versa. In staffing, the church permeated 
the state. But these arguments should not be taken too far. A personal union in the 
sense described can at any rate not be captured solely in terms of an “established” or 
“state” church; it could also be expressed in terms of the identity of spiritual and 
political community. Significantly, the new matrimonial court statute of 1533 speaks 
of “our Christian community in town and country.” The concept “Gemeinde” [both 
“community” and “congregation”], to be understood in primarily Christian terms in 
this context, is applied to the totality of the nation. The state is conceived of as an 
overdimensioned church congregation (Schmidt 1989, p. 137. Transl. R.B.).
F. Parallel Orders and Their “Parallel Justice”
The point of departure for our consideration of the plurality of norm 
enforcement regimes remains the empirical thesis that it is in the functional 
logic of a normative order designed to be realized to develop institutional 
arrangements and procedures to enable compliance with and enforcement 
of this normative order. We call such arrangements norm enforcement 
regimes: we posit that such regimes will also be found where so-called 
parallel societies have developed within a majority society. In this connec-
tion, the Hanover criminologist Christian Pfeiffer (quoted here from Wag-
ner 2011, p. 11. Transl. R.B.) asserts that: “it is typical of a parallel society to 
develop its own justice.” The reference is to Islam, and the statement is backed 
by the Berlin juvenile court judge Kirsten Heisig (ibid.): “I feel uneasy when 
control over the law is relinquished and shis onto the streets or into a 
parallel system where an imam or other representative of the Koran decides 
what is to happen.” Before going into detail on whether “parallel orders lead 
to parallel institutions for norm enforcement,” it is advisable to consider the 
appropriateness of the concept “parallel society,” because this semantics 
involves us inevitably in a largely emotional debate on integration.
I. The Minefield of Parallel Society Semantics
To use the term parallel society necessarily provokes contention (on the 
usage of the term see Schiffauer 2008; see also Köster 2009). It is easy to 
accuse the user of avoiding the discriminatory ghettoization concept only to 
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embrace the no less discriminatory concept of parallel society formation 
with the intention – as the subtitle of Köster’s book puts it – of engaging 
in a discourse “to dramatize migration” (see, for example, Lanz 2007). This is 
not our aim, nor do we wish to take a stand without greater expert knowl-
edge in the debate on integration rekindled by the former mayor of the 
Berlin’s Neukölln district Heinz Buschkowski in his book “Neukölln is Every-
where” (2012).
We therefore prefer to speak of parallel orders rather than parallel societies 
in addressing the broader topic of the plurality of normative orderings and 
to underline that our interest is more in the sociology of law field than in 
integration policy. The concept of parallel orders brings us to a study by 
Karsten Fischer (2011), who describes the Augustan principat as a parallel 
order, since, although Augustus formally maintained the republican system 
of government, he de facto established a personalized autocratic system of 
rule. He thus adopted the very strategy his later critic Machiavelli recom-
mends in his Discorsi: 
He who desires or wants to reform the State (Government) of a City, and wishes that 
it may be accepted and capable of maintaining itself to everyone’s satisfaction, it is 
necessary for him at least to retain the shadow of ancient forms, so that it does not 
appear to the people that the institutions have been changed, even though in fact 
the new institutions should be entirely different from the past ones (Machiavelli, 
Discorsi, Book One, Chapter XXV).
Fischer himself comments on this policy of deception with reference to 
Christian Meier (1980, p. 273) and Maria Dettenhofer (2000, p. 215): 
In this manner the “appearance of republic” was lastingly preserved. Machiavelli 
preferred a frank statement to the effect that, on account of the decadence of its 
bearers, the people, the republic ought to be temporarily replaced by an autocracy – 
an ideological argument that Machiavelli adopted from Roman republicanism and 
could also be found in Sallust. Augustus had instead established “a new system for 
the exercise of political power that permanently undermined public institutions 
because it competed with them for competencies and to a certain extend operated 
in parallel to these institutions. Although the basis for this parallel order was the 
same as for the traditional republican order, given his supremacy ..., Augustus could 
use the socio-political basis of the Roman order for pretensions to power incompat-
ible with the republican order in a manner that permanently overrode the factual 
importance of the institutions” (Fischer 2011, p. 49. Transl. R.B.).
We shall go beyond this suggestion of a semantic shi, taking a narrow 
concept of parallel orders as our basis, as defined by someone who really 
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considers talk about parallel societies to be nonsense: the migration scholar 
Klaus J. Bade. In a SPIEGEL ONLINE interview he had this to say:
SPIEGEL ONLINE: The concepts under debate are well-known: multicultural soci-
ety, parallel society, lead culture.
Bade: Those are living corpses that are cropping up again. What’s more, develop-
ment is confused with concept: the outcome of development is that in Germany we 
now have a multicultural society whether we like it or not. Period. The question is 
how we deal with it. Critical minds have long since abandoned the romantic notion 
that multiculti is a kaleidoscopic slide into a cheery paradise. You should never heat 
up cold coffee. We should talk about the “parallel societies” nonsense – but only to 
show that “Little Istanbul” is no different from the “Little Germany” in the nine-
teenth century USA. And at the time the Americans got just as upset about it.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Politicians, including the federal minister of the interior Otto 
Schily, have warned against street and place-name signs in foreign languages. Toler-
ance, says Schily, does not mean tolerating intolerance.
Bade: But social hotspots don’t automatically develop where immigrants gather but 
where migration problems or ethnic problems come up against social problems. In 
Germany there are no parallel societies in the classical sense of the term. A number 
of points have to come together: a monocultural identity; voluntary and conscious social 
withdrawal – in settlement and everyday life, too; far-reaching economic separation, a 
doubling of state institutions. In Germany immigrant districts are mostly ethnically 
mixed, withdrawal is for social reasons, there is no doubling of institutions. Parallel 
societies exist in the minds of people who are afraid of them: I’m scared and believe 
the other guy is the cause. If this simplistic and dangerous talk about parallel 
societies continues, the situation will deteriorate. So this talk isn’t part of the sol-
ution but part of the problem (Sternberg 2004. Transl. R.B.).
Following on from these comments, we will be quite specifically examining 
whether such institutional parallel structures of norm enforcement can be 
pinpointed – not in our minds but in the reality of society.
II. Parallel Conflict Resolution Institutions and Norm Enforcement
1. The Example of Sharia Courts in the United Kingdom
Karsten Fischer drew our attention to the case of sharia courts in the United 
Kingdom. In 2008 there was much controversy about their establishment. 
One prominent contributor was the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan 
Williams, who caused a stir with his assertion that such courts were possibly 
unavoidable. 
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Under the Arbitration Act 1996, several sharia courts had been set up, 
which at the time made legally binding decisions in civil matters and had 
heard more than 100 cases, for example divorce cases. Lawyers issued “grave 
warnings about the dangers of a dual legal system,” and politicians expressed 
concern about the undermining of the British legal system (Edwards 2008).
Three things make this British case particularly interesting. 
* First, it offers a clear instance of regulated self-regulation. The state frame-
work was provided by the Arbitration Act 1996, which regulated not 
only Islamic but also Jewish arbitration tribunals, the “beth din” (on 
their function and scope see The Centre for Social Cohesion 2009). The 
Arbitration Act begins as follows:
General principles
1. The provisions of this Part are founded on the following principles, and shall be
construed accordingly:
(a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an 
impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense;
(b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only 
to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest;
(c) in matters governed by this Part the court1 should not intervene except as 
provided by this Part.
The result was interplay between state jurisdiction and the Muslim 
arbitration tribunal, which had its own rules of procedure. Abul Taher 
describes this institution:
Islamic law has been officially adopted in Britain, with sharia courts given powers to 
rule on Muslim civil cases. The government has quietly sanctioned the powers for 
sharia judges to rule on cases ranging from divorce and financial disputes to those 
involving domestic violence. Rulings issued by a network of five sharia courts are 
enforceable with the full power of the judicial system, through the county courts or 
High Court.
Previously, the rulings of sharia courts in Britain could not be enforced, and 
depended on voluntary compliance among Muslims. [...] Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Sid-
diqi, whose Muslim Arbitration Tribunal runs the courts, said he had taken advant-
age of a clause in the Arbitration Act 1996. Under the act, the sharia courts are 
classified as arbitration tribunals. The rulings of arbitration tribunals are binding in 
law, provided that both parties in the dispute agree to give it the power to rule on 
1 Part IV, Section 105 (1) states: “In this Act the ‘court’ means the High Court or a country 
court.”
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their case. Siddiqi said: “We realised that under the Arbitration Act we can make 
rulings which can be enforced by county and high courts. The act allows disputes to 
be resolved using alternatives like tribunals. This method is called alternative dispute 
resolution, which for Muslims is what the sharia courts are (Taher 2008, p. 2).
* Second, the ground gained by parallel institutions for conflict resolu-
tion thanks to the 1996 Arbitration Act is embedded in a legal and 
religious policy discussion in which not only the Lord Chief Justice 
but above all the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, partici-
pated. The archbishop’s lecture is a remarkable document. With refer-
ence to legal theory and legal philosophy, he made a stand against what 
he sees as the anachronistic jurisdictional monopoly of the state since it is 
incompatible with the realities of a pluralistic society. What is needed in 
a “plural society of overlapping identities” is, he asserts, recognition of 
“supplementary jurisdictions.” He argues that only such recognition can 
lead existing “communities within communities” out of otherwise in-
evitable ghettoization:
But if the reality of society is plural – as many political theorists have pointed out – 
this is a damagingly inadequate account of common life, in which certain kinds of 
affiliation are marginalised or privatised to the extent that what is produced is a 
ghettoised pattern of social life, in which particular sorts of interest and of reasoning 
are tolerated as private matters but never granted legitimacy in public as part of a 
continuing debate about shared goods and priorities (Williams 2008).
He bases his demand for recognition of the separate jurisdictional 
competence of religious communities explicitly on the analogy of 
the self-regulatory autonomy of professions discussed above: Rowan 
Williams:
... I have been arguing that a defence of an unqualified secular legal monopoly in 
terms of the need for a universalist doctrine of human right or dignity is to mis-
understand the circumstances in which that doctrine emerged, and that the essential 
liberating (and religiously informed) vision it represents is not imperilled by a 
loosening of the monopolistic framework. At the moment, as I mentioned at the 
beginning of this lecture, one of the most frequently noted problems in the law in 
this area is the reluctance of a dominant rights-based philosophy to acknowledge the 
liberty of conscientious opting-out from collaboration in procedures or practices that are in 
tension with the demands of particular religious groups: the assumption, in rather 
misleading shorthand, that if a right or liberty is granted there is a corresponding 
duty upon every individual to “activate” this whenever called upon. Earlier on, I 
proposed that the criterion for recognising and collaborating with communal reli-
gious discipline should be connected with whether a communal jurisdiction actively 
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interfered with liberties guaranteed by the wider society in such a way as definitively 
to block access to the exercise of those liberties; clearly the refusal of a religious 
believer to act upon the legal recognition of a right is not, given the plural character 
of society, a denial to anyone inside or outside the community of access to that right. 
The point has been granted in respect of medical professionals who may be asked to 
perform or co-operate in performing abortions – a perfectly reasonable example of 
the law doing what I earlier defined as its job, securing space for those aspects of human 
motivation and behaviour that cannot be finally determined by any corporate or social 
system. It is difficult to see quite why the principle cannot be extended in other areas. 
But it is undeniable that there is pressure from some quarters to insist that consci-
entious disagreement should always be overruled by a monopolistic understanding of 
jurisdiction (Williams 2008).
* Thirdly and finally, just why the United Kingdom but neither France 
nor Germany introduced such far-reaching recognition of parallel 
jurisdictions needs explaining. John R. Bowen (2010) finds such an 
explanation in Britain’s colonial past. Most of the Muslims living in 
the United Kingdom, he argues, came from South Asia and had been 
accustomed since the times of the East India Company to the colonial 
masters practising a policy of legal pluralism, which notably respected 
indigenous and religious law pertaining to the family and personal 
status:
This set of ideas and institutions has carried over into the practices and approaches 
of South Asian Muslims who moved to England. These Muslims brought with them 
ideas and habits about personal status that had been developed under British rule of the 
Indies. They assumed that Muslims worked out matters of marriage and divorce 
among themselves, without the need for state intervention. Islamic scholars creating 
shariah councils in England drew from their own experiences in South Asia. In 
effect they brought colonial ideas of personal status back home to their legal source. ...
The ideas brought to England by South Asians, however, represented a sharp chal-
lenge to English ideas of a uniform English law. If Muslims handled marriage and 
divorce themselves, then the civil courts would, in effect, cede territory to them. 
Yet for some Muslims, doing so flowed from colonial practices. “Why don’t they just 
let us take care of these matters,” said one Pakistani scholar to me in London; “aer 
all, that’s what they did in colonial days.” Understandably, English judges are reti-
cent to take this step. ...
This double set of post-colonial continuities − in treatment of religions and of personal 
status laws − made England a particularly likely place for debates about the possi-
bility of recognizing elements of Islamic family law in a Western legal system. These 
debates arose because of institutional initiatives taken by Muslim public actors 
starting in the 1980s (Bowen 2010, p. 417 f.).
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2. The Second Example: Islamic Conciliation Procedures in Germany
The German example is concerned not with the operation of sharia tribunals 
accepted by the state but with the resolution of conflicts between Muslims 
by a circle of persons – whether lawyers, imams, or heads of households – 
who could be described as arbitrators (Streitschlichter) or justices of the peace
(Friedensrichter). In Judges without Law (Richter ohne Gesetz, 2011), Joachim 
Wagner addresses their activity. The subtitle: “Islamic parallel justice endan-
gers the rule of law” indicates what worries the author. We turn our atten-
tion not to whether this thesis – backed by many of the facts presented by 
Wagner – can really be sustained but to how the trend observed by Wagner 
and others towards internal Islamic conflict resolution bypassing state justice is to 
be explained. The reasons Wagner advances are worth thinking about.
* A first important aspect is the high value placed on compensation – 
above all in financial form – in Islamic law and culture. Such compen-
sation is not negotiated between offender and victim – between indi-
viduals – but (the second important aspect) between the families involved. 
Wagner:
Compensation is a central concept in Islamic criminal law. For Mathias Rohe, 
expert in Islamic law, it is an expression of “a social order that is based on economic 
activity in extended family groups ... without social security ...”
It is astonishing that honour killing and the blood feud have survived in the Muslim 
parallel society here, even though the preconditions have long ceased to apply. In 
countries with no state order, the extended family had to assume the protective function 
of police and justice. And the blood feud played a disciplinary role (Wagner 2011, 
pp. 18, 23 f. Transl. R.B.).
* The key actors in conflict resolution bypassing the state are the families. We 
therefore have to do with what we could call the deindividualization of 
conflicts. Wagner therefore also writes of offender families and victim 
families: 
When a criminal offence has been committed, the families concerned decide from case to 
case whether they can negotiate directly with one another or have to call on an 
arbitrator. The initiative is usually taken by the offender family, because it is in their 
interest to ensure that the son, brother, or cousin escapes punishment. In the event 
of direct contact, the father or oldest brother turns to his counterpart in the victim 
family. Generally this does not work if a suspect is in remand custody or the victim is 
in hospital with severe injuries. Feelings between the families then run so high that 
the offender family engages a neutral arbitrator. The aim of talks is almost always the 
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same: the victim should under no circumstances inform the police, bring no charge, 
and if this has already been done, withdraw it. If the police has already been 
involved, for instance by a charge being brought, the aim is to persuade the victim 
not to testify (Wagner 2011, p. 30 f. Transl. R.B.).
* This having been said, it is not surprising that the concept of honour 
that repeatedly comes up in the discussion on the existence and assess-
ment of so-called parallel societies has family connotations: honour is a 
family matter. Writing about the blood feud, Wagner comments:
In the oriental cultural area there are two aspects to honour: first, public respect for 
a person who complies with traditional rules and ensures that the members of his 
family do likewise, and, second, general esteem earned by achievement and merit.
In Muslim countries, “honour tops the list of virtues, ahead of life, bodily integrity, 
freedom, and wealth.” The concept of honour has survived to this day as a living guide to 
conduct in the diaspora. It is a key to understanding the Muslim parallel society in 
Germany (Wagner 2011, p. 23. Transl. R.B.).
* These passages invite two conclusions. First, extended families must 
really be counted among the governance collectives dealt with in detail 
in the first part. If this is indeed the case and the concept of honour 
plays a central role in the governance collective of the extended fam-
ily,2 it is clear that – because of the role family members play in com-
pliance with norms – the family also has to be considered as a norm-
enforcement institution. The wide-angle lens of our broad investigation 
requires it.
G. Norm Enforcement through Institutionalized Compliance
I. Compliance as a Form of Reflexive Regulation
Environmental protection policy has long offered a laboratory for new reg-
ulatory tools and has attracted the particular interest of an administrative 
jurisprudence concerned with regulation theory (see, for example, Schmidt-
Aßmann and Hoffmann-Riem 2004). Administrative science and practice 
has shown great interest especially in the toolbox of environmental law – 
in section D.I above we had looked at the role of environmental regulation 
2 On the role of the so-called officers’ corps honour see chapter 2 p. 115ff.
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in European law in mobilizing citizens to enforce this law). Gertrude Lübbe-
Wolff (2001) offers a useful overview, which we have oen presented in 
modified form (see Schuppert 2003b, p. 32):
Choice of Tools in Environmental Protection
Choice
Classical Environmental Regulatory Law
Tools for Informal Behavioural Control
• Information, recommendations, warnings
• Agreements of all sorts, especially voluntary agreements
Tools to Regulate Economic Behaviour
• Taxes and charges
• Waste oil tax
• Tax on Leaded petrol
• Effl  uent charge
• Waste transfer charge
• Tradable emission rights
• Environmental liability law
• Organizational tools
Organizational Tools
• Installation of self-regulatory systems
• Primary obligation under regulatory law with 
preventive authorization: prototype Packaging 
Ordinance 
• Factual-economic organizational pressure: prototype 
Eco-Audit
• Primacy of self-regulatory goal attainment: prototype 
Waste Avoidance, Recycling and Disposal Act
• Installation of refl exive institutions
• Appointment of plant environmental offi  cers
• Preparation of waste management plans and balance 
sheets
• Preparation of plans for the prevention of hazardous 
incidents
• Obligations to inform on plant organization
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Within this set of tools, we have always found the reflexive institution inter-
esting, which effects what Matthias Schmidt-Preuß calls reflexive regulation: 
the state, he explains, “exposes private economic subjects to internal informa-
tional, learning, and self-regulatory processes to induce them to contribute to 
the public good on, as it were, their own judgement.” This is brought about 
by self-knowledge, not external regulation (Schmidt-Preuß 1997, p. 192. Transl. 
R.B.). Promoting the public good through reflexive regulation is therefore 
concerned not externally to impose behaviour conducive to the public good 
on the private economy or sanction misconduct but to implant behavioural 
incentives in the organization itself and thus, so to speak, drive a tunnel 
under the boundary between external and internal regulation. 
On the entrepreneurial side, the corresponding concept is compliance. 
Taking the tunnel under the boundary, we can now examine the concept and 
functions of compliance from the perspective of private enterprise. 
II. Concept and Functions of Compliance
1. The Concept of Compliance
It is relatively clear what compliance means:
... [C]ompliance is a self-evidence – the obligation to obey the rules. This universal 
obligation naturally also applies for all organizations in which labour is divided, 
especially legal entities. Compliance merely expresses the responsibility of an organ-
ization to ensure that it (the enterprise or legal person) does not violate the law. 
This may be considered a somewhat euphemistic way to define the legality obliga-
tion, as an element of the risk management obligation under Section 91 of the 
Companies Act or even the external relations requirements under this organiza-
tional obligation (Section 130 of Act on Regulatory Offences). The substance re-
mains the same: namely to structure an organization based on the division of labour in 
such a way that no violation of the law occurs. There is accordingly agreement that the 
board of the company has to organize and manage the enterprise in accordance with 
the law (Spindler 2013, p. 293 f. Transl. R.B.).
Whoever finds this too long-winded might prefer the following definition, 
which addresses criminal compliance (CC), compliance with the rules of 
criminal justice: 
If at first sight, one understands compliance to mean “complying with” (not only 
legal) norms, CC can be understood as the quintessence of the rules, procedures, 
and techniques by means of which business enterprises, in particular, seek to ensure 
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that their employees respect the norms of criminal law and that any violations are 
brought to light and punished (Saliger 2013, p. 263 f. Transl. R.B.).
2. Functions of Compliance
In his study on “Fundamental Questions of Criminal Compliance,” Frank 
Saliger provided an excellent overview of the function of compliance. He 
identifies a main function and a number of subfunctions.
* The main function is the avoidance of all legal liability risks: 
There appears to be agreement about the fundamental or main function of CC, 
namely the avoidance of “criminal liability.” This basic function is in keeping with 
the core definition of CC. However, there is little mention of criminal liability tends 
in criminal law. This is to be explained genetically by the fact that the compliance 
idea in Germany originated in economic law, where it has to do with the more far-
reaching function of avoiding all legal liability risks, and systematically by the nature 
of CC as a sub-instance of the general compliance concept. Leaving aside “criminal 
liability,” the fundamental function of CC can be described as the avoidance of 
punishable violations of norms (Saliger 2013, p. 266. Transl. R.B.).




Saliger has this to say about prevention:
Prevention is ... the most far-reaching function of CC. It implements the basic 
function of CC by setting preventive rules designed to anticipate criminal liability. 
Unlike criminal law, CC is basically prospective rather than retrospective. This 
anticipatory aspect means that the primary purpose of CC is to indicate the safe 
harbour in which the addressee of norms can be sure to avoid liability to prosecu-
tion. This in turn is possible only if the preventive function of CC takes effect far 
ahead of any commission of criminal offences. To this extent, CC cannot afford “to 
enable the enterprise to engage in risky criminal balancing acts.” Its aim is rather, in 
not unproblematic fashion, to forestall criminal offences by the anticipatory pro-
hibition and structuring of conduct (Saliger 2013, p. 267. Transl. R.B.).
* An effective compliance system must investigate and sanction norm 
violations; Saliger:
... [S]etting and implementing preventive CC rules in an enterprise will not produce 
effective compliance if indications that rules are being violated are neither inves-
tigated nor sanctioned internally. CC rules, too, need to be enforced within the 
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enterprise. The investigation and sanctioning of criminal rule violation serves to 
avoid mere “fair-weather,” merely preventive compliance. Investigation is ensured 
primarily by formal CC rules covering internal inquiries. Internal sanctioning can 
be effected by rules under labour and disciplinary law (e. g., warnings, transfers, 
dismissals (Saliger 2013, p. 267 f. Transl. R.B.).
* Finally, Saliger explains the supervisory function of compliance:
There is also consensus on a further function of compliance and CC. It is agreed that 
effective performance of the investigative and sanctioning function of CC is possible 
only if management also has to supervise employees. This supervisory function of 
CC also arises indirectly from Section 130 (1) of the Act on Regulatory Offences. 
The Act punishes violations of the supervisory duties of business proprietors; among 
the required supervisory measures are the appointment, careful selection, and super-
vision of supervisory staff. Although Section 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offences 
has nothing concrete to say about the type and extent of supervision and there is 
thus uncertainty with regard to application of the law, appropriate compliance audit 
programmes or whistle blowing systems are likely to be considered suitable meas-
ures for implementing the supervisory function (Saliger 2013, p. 268. Transl. R.B.).
Having gained an idea of what compliance involves (see Roland Broemel 
2013 for more on the internal order of knowledge in enterprises as a norm 
compliance factor), we now consider compliance as a state law enforcement 
tool – particularly important from the perspective of this chapter.
3. Compliance as a Tool in Self-regulation and the Privatization of 
Law Enforcement
This is the most important and interesting function of compliance: a specific 
regulatory technique of the state, which we have referred to above as reflexive 
regulation, which makes the enterprise itself an agent for avoiding the crim-
inal violation of norms. Frank Saliger:
For law enforcement by the state, compliance is particularly important as a tool of 
self-regulation and the privatization of law enforcement. Certain forms of crime in 
and from companies, businesses, and other subsystems of society have always been 
difficult for state criminal justice systems to access. This structural problem of state 
law enforcement has been further exacerbated in the present day by the inadequate 
material and human resources available to the criminal justice system. To the extent 
that this calls into question classical external regulation through criminal law con-
trol by which individuals are identified and sanctioned by the state, the self-regu-
lation of crime prevention through internal CC programmes, internal inquiries, and 
disciplinary sanctions will grow in importance. This explains the inflation of sectoral 
legal norms with a compliance function.
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For the state, this promotion of the (partial) privatization of criminal prosecution 
has two advantages. First, the state reduces the cost of law enforcement by commit-
ting enterprises to enforce the law through, for example, supervisory systems or 
internal inquiries, and thus assume the cost. Second, it is oen the (interim) find-
ings of such internal investigations that enable state law enforcement in the first 
place or at least facilitate it (Saliger 2013, p. 277 f. Transl. R.B.).
H. Sanction Modes and Criteria not Disciplined by Law: 
Forms and Actors 
I. Imposing Norm-Conforming Behaviour through Thematic 
and Linguistic Taboos: Political Correctness
1. An Introductory Tale
Our story recounts in a nutshell what we need to know about how political 
correctness works. It is taken from the novel The Human Stain by Philip Roth 
(2000), whose protagonist, the professor of classics Coleman Silk, uses an 
allegedly racist expression when calling the roll in his class:
The class consisted of fourteen students. Coleman had taken attendance at the 
beginning of the first several lectures so as to learn their names. As there were still 
two names that failed to elicit a response by the fih week into the semester, Cole-
man, in the sixth week, opened the session by asking “Does anyone know these 
people? Do they exist or are they spooks?”
Later that day he was astonished to be called in by his successor, the new dean of 
faculty, to address the charge of racism brought against him by the two missing 
students, who turned out to be black, and who, though absent, had quickly learned 
of the locution in which he’d publicly raised the question of their absence. Coleman 
told the dean, “I was referring to their possible ectoplasmic character. Isn’t that 
obvious? These two students had not attended a single class. That’s all I knew about 
them. I was using the word in its customary and primary meaning: ‘spook’ as a 
specter or a ghost. I had no idea what color these two students might be. I had 
known perhaps fiy years ago but had wholly forgotten that “spooks” is an invidious 
term sometimes applied to blacks. Otherwise, since I am totally meticulous regard-
ing student sensibilities, I would never have used that word. Consider the context: 
Do they exist or are they spooks? The charge of racism is spurious. It is preposterous. 
My colleagues know it is preposterous and my students know it is preposterous. The 
issue, the only issue, is the nonattendance of these two students and their flagrant 
and inexcusable neglect of work. What’s galling is that the charge is not just false – it 
is spectacularly false.” Having said altogether enough in his defense, considering the 
matter closed, he le for home (Roth 2000, p. 6 f.).
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But the matter was by no means closed. Aer being hauled before the 
college authorities, Silk resigns from his position. In the following passage 
he thinks over what has happened to him and identifies the driving force 
behind events as the typically American, tyrannical and unrelenting propriety:
Appropriate. The current code word for reining in most any deviation from the 
wholesome guidelines and thereby making everybody “comfortable.” Doing not 
what he was being judged to be doing but doing instead, he thought, what was 
deemed suitable by God only knows which of our moral philosophers. ... If he were 
around this place as a professor, he could teach “Appropriate Behaviour in Classical 
Greek Drama,” a course that would be over before it began.
... The college’s architectural marker, the six-sided clock tower of North Hall ... was 
tolling noon as he sat on a bench shadowed by the quadrangle’s most famously age-
gnarled oak, sat and calmly tried to consider the coercions of propriety. The tyranny 
of propriety.It was hard, halfway through 1998, for even him to believe in American 
propriety’s enduring power, and he was the one who considered himself tyrannized: 
the bridle it still is on public rhetoric, the inspiration it provides for personal 
posturing, the persistence just about everywhere of this de-virilizing pulpit virtue-
mongering that H. L. Mencken identified with boobism, that Philip Wylie thought 
of as Momism, that the Europeans unhistorically call American puritanism, that the 
likes of a Ronald Reagan call America’s core virtues, and that maintains widespread 
jurisdiction by masquerading itself as something else – as everything else. As a force, 
propriety is protean, a dominatrix in a thousand disguises, infiltrating, if need be, as 
civic responsibility, WASP dignity, women’s rights, black pride, ethnic allegiance, or 
emotion-laden Jewish ethical sensitivity (Roth 2000, p. 152 f.).
What particularly disturbs him is the gross disproportion between the real 
problems of the century and the luxury of being upset about supposed 
violations of political correctness:
A century of destruction unlike any other in its extremity befalls and blights the 
human race – scores of millions of ordinary people condemned to suffer deprivation 
upon deprivation, atrocity upon atrocity, evil upon evil, half the world or more 
subjected to pathological sadism as social policy, whole societies organized and 
fettered by the fear of violent persecution, the degradation of individual life engi-
neered on a scale unknown throughout history, nations broken and enslaved by 
ideological criminals who rob them of everything, entire populations so demoral-
ized as to be unable to get out of bed in the morning with the minutest desire to 
face the day ... all the terrible touchstones presented by this century, and here they 
are up in arms about Faunia Farley [Silk’s lover]. Here in America either it’s Faunia 
Farley or it’s Monica Lewinsky! The luxury of these lives disquieted so by the 
inappropriate comportment of Clinton and Silk! ... I’m depraved not simply for 
having once said the word “spooks” to a class of white students – and said it, mind 
you, not while standing there reviewing the legacy of slavery, the fulminations of the 
Black Panthers, the metamorphoses of Malcom X, the rhetoric of James Baldwin, or 
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the radio popularity of Amos ‘n’ Andy, but while routinely calling the roll (Roth 
2000, p. 153 f.).
The concern of political correctness to improve the situation of minorities 
and excluded groups by drawing attention to hurtful or otherwise harmful 
categorizations and labels in order to change ideas and attitudes deserves our 
full support. However, activism can easily develop that itself lapses into 
categorization and premature dichotomization, which is counterproductive 
since it intensifies opposition to its basically worthy goal. This is the point 
where political correctness transmutes from a concept of reconciling social 
inequalities into a rallying cry with the opposite effect. Roth’s story reveals 
three key things about the sword of Damocles that unbridled political cor-
rectness suspends over our heads:
* First, disputes on political and social topics are fought out as semantic 
battles: certain things cannot be said at all or at any rate not “like that.” 
“PC campaigns give expression to an unusually strong urge among 
activists to regulate the linguistic and social behaviour of others. Partici-
pants are oen conspicuous for their aggressiveness, obtrusive lack of 
humour, and unwillingness to compromise” (Wimmer 1998, p. 44. 
Transl. R.B.). Political correctness, it can be said, operates as a “creator 
of discursive taboos” (Johnson and Suhr 2003, p. 56); with its tendency 
to stigmatize certain expressions and concepts, political correctness 
belongs in the larger thematic context of political culture as communi-
cation culture (see Schuppert 2008b on communication culture as part 
of political culture).
* The authority that decides what is political correct or not exercises moral 
judgement. In an article in Die Zeit on 22 October 1993, Dieter E. 
Zimmer wrote of a “moral furore” that fires PC and rightly identifies 
this stance as classical friend-foe thinking: 
PC is mercilessly dichotomous: what is not politically correct is incorrect. It admits 
of no grey zone, zigzag profiles are beyond its horizon: whoever abandons the PC 
camp on one point is immediately consigned to the enemy camp. It is accordingly 
thoroughly moral: what is incorrect is not only wrong, it is bad. PC has retained a 
wonderful innocence: it has never realized that the greatest rectitude can sometimes 
only do harm and that sometimes harm must be done to prevent greater harm 
(Zimmer 1993, p. 60. Transl. R.B.).
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* Thirdly and finally, the story of Coleman Silk shows that political 
correctness is clearly difficult to handle, if at all, in terms of the other-
wise very helpful yardstick of proportionality. Just as mercilessly, Zimmer 
censures this “mercilessness” and proneness of PC thinking to immod-
eration: 
Just how reliably and precisely – and mercilessly – PC operates in Germany became 
apparent to everyone when it finished off four writers who had infringed its unwrit-
ten rules; four writers who, each in his manner, had themselves for many years 
contributed to the prestige of PC and who could have expected a certain amount of 
respect, even if only in form of unprejudiced attention, if they ... once erred from 
the straight and narrow.
But overnight they were “given up for lost,” to quote a revealing formulation from 
the PC camp. To put it plainly, they landed on the shitlist of all true political 
believers. Of course, I’m talking about Martin Walser, Wolf Biermann, Botho 
Strauß, and Hans Magnus Enzensberger.
Walser was excommunicated (nice word: inner-community communication with him 
was ended) when, the collapse of the socialist camp having already set in, if not yet 
visibly, he publicly admitted in Die Zeit that he had difficulty inwardly accepting the 
division of Germany in the long run. From then on he was pronounced a “nation-
alist.” The fact that his crazy and dangerously unrealistic wishful thinking suddenly 
came to fruition was naturally somewhat embarrassing for the inquisition. But this 
summer at the latest everything was in order again when he explained that one 
reason for the xenophobic wave of violence possibly lay in the circumstance that 
these children who had “grown up in a society in which everything national was 
excluded or unreservedly criticized.” Anyone in this country who pronounces the 
word “national” without a shudder is immediately branded a nationalist, that is to 
say an advocate of national arrogance and hegemonistic dreams, if such expressions 
still have any meaning at all (which is doubtful).
It was Biermann’s turn when in Die Zeit he declared that the Gulf War was 
unfortunately necessary for Israel’s sake. He has been the devil incarnate ever since, 
before whom every politically upright citizen crosses himself: a warmonger. His 
question about whether and how Israel’s survival could be ensured was mentioned 
only in attacking him personally. Suddenly all he was capable of was playing the 
guitar. The magazine Titanic found it good satire not only to treat him to all sorts of 
epithet from “slimy” to “pig snout” but to plummet the depths of calculated nasti-
ness: “It’s obviously not enough for you that your father was murdered by the 
Nazis” (Zimmer 1993, p. 60. Transl. R.B.).
So much on the story of Coleman Silk. We now cast a brief glance at the 
origins of PC thinking and the shis in the meaning of the concept political 
correctness.
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2. Origin and Shis in Meaning of the Concept Political Correctness
Its origins are easily traced, namely to le-wing liberal university circles in 
America, being popularized by Bernstein in a New York Times article that 
appeared on 28th October 1990 under the heading “The Rising Hegemony 
of the Politically Correct” (Bernstein 1990). Students were concerned about 
how disadvantaged minorities and marginal groups of all sorts were handled 
and – among other things – about the avoidance of hitherto little regarded 
language usage that could be felt to be discriminatory by such minorities and 
groups. Bernstein:
INSTEAD of writing about literary classics and other topics, as they have in the past, 
freshmen at the University of Texas next fall will base their compositions on a packet 
of essays on discrimination, affirmative-action and civil-rights cases. The new pro-
gram, called ‘Writing on Difference’ was voted in by the faculty last month and has 
been praised by many professors for giving the curriculum more relevance to real-
life concerns. But some see it as a stifling example of academic orthodoxy.
“You cannot tell me that students will not be inevitably graded on politically correct 
thinking in these classes,” Alan Gribben, a professor of English, said at the time the 
change was being discussed.
The term ‘politically correct’, with its suggestion of Stalinist orthodoxy, is spoken 
more with irony and disapproval than with reverence. But across the country the 
term p. c., as it is commonly abbreviated, is being heard more and more in debates 
over what should be taught at the universities. There are even initials – p. c. p.  – to 
designate a politically correct person. And though the terms are not used in utter 
seriousness, even by the p. c. p.’s themselves, there is a large body of belief in 
academia and elsewhere that a cluster of opinions about race, ecology, feminism, 
culture and foreign policy defines a kind of ‘correct’ attitude toward the problems of 
the world, a sort of unofficial ideology of the university. Pressure to Conform“ (Bern-
stein 1990, p. 1).
The PC movement was primarily concerned with making a stand against 
what Bernstein called the “trio of thought crimes: sexism, racism and homo-
phobia” (Bernstein 1990). But in pursuing these goals a surplus of intolerance
was clearly produced that found expression not only in the increasing reg-
ulation of language usage but also in the redesign of curricula to conform to 
PC (Kurthen and Losey 1995; Papcke 1995). This necessarily led to a swing of 
the pendulum in the other direction: the concept of political correctness
increasingly became a rallying cry for the American right (Auer 2002) to 
pillory what they regarded as the unjustified dominance of American East-
Coast liberalism. This shi in the meaning of the term makes it advisable to 
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distinguish between two usages. We quote the informative German Wikipe-
dia article on “Politische Korrektheit:”
– Firstly, the concept has been a succinct and well-known slogan in the context of 
the notably North American, Australian, and European societal tendency since 
the later twentieth century to defend the interests of minorities more strongly 
and to avoid discrimination, particularly in language usage, that had in the past 
been accepted or simple not recognized. To state that something is “not politi-
cally correct” or “politically incorrect” is to assert that a norm has been violated, 
that an utterance (or action) contravenes general moral norms or even that a taboo 
has been broken.
– The second context is the rejection of a societal norm or critique felt to be a 
restriction on liberty or censorship, whether against exaggeration in the avoid-
ance of “negative” concepts on the grounds that showing excessive consideration 
stifles the expression of facts or truths. This criticism of alleged “political correct-
ness” as a battle cry against exaggerated consideration or political opponents is 
also in use as a political slogan (Wikipedia 2015. Transl. R.B.).
Aer this brief overview, we turn to a type of actor who plays an important 
role in creating and enforcing social norms: the so-called moral entrepre-
neur.
II. Moral Entrepreneurs as Key Actors in the Creation 
and Enforcement of Social Norms 
1. Concept and Forms
In his major essay “The Market for Social Norms,” Robert C. Ellickson 
distinguishes three types of actor in the field of control: the norm maker or 
norm entrepreneur, the enforcer, and the member of the audience, the dividing 
line between norm makers and norm enforcers being difficult to draw 
(Ellickson 2001). Norm formation processes – and their later enforcement 
– is initiated by norm entrepreneurs, whom Ellickson also calls change 
agents, and who thus constitute the most important group of actors. A 
major example of successful change agents, according to Ellickson, are the 
black religious leaders like Martin Luther King who played an important 
role in the American civil rights movement:
These factors help explain the prominence of black religious leaders in the civil rights 
movement. Because they were black, they had much to gain from dismantling racial 
segregation. Because they were religious leaders, they were ideally positioned to 
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receive early esteem from members of their immediate social groups (that is, mem-
bers of their congregations), and relatively immune to social opprobrium, economic 
retaliation, and physical violence on the part of racist whites (Ellickson 2001, p. 12).
One variety of norm entrepreneur is the moral entrepreneur, a term coined by 
Howard Becker (1973). Ellickson mentions it briefly (Ellickson 2001, p. 9), 
but we had hitherto not found it elsewhere. Under this heading, the “Krim-
pedia” website offers an article that defines the moral entrepreneur as fol-
lows:
The ... moral entrepreneur is a person who is dissatisfied with existing rules and wishes to 
see them changed so that everyone else is also obliged to “do what he considers to be 
right.” If successful, the relevant rules of behaviour will be declared binding by legal 
enactment. Whoever behaves differently then becomes an “outsider” displaying 
“deviant behaviour” and is therefore also subject to sanctioning. Moral entrepre-
neurs thus “produce” not only rules but also – indirectly – deviation and crime 
(Krimpedia 2008).
Leaving aside the criminal sociology context, this concept is useful because it 
captures what is particularly problematic about the relationship between 
sanction modes and criteria not disciplined or difficult to discipline by 
law: the aura of moral superiority surrounding norm entrepreneurs and 
the unconditionality of their pretensions. These “moral change agents” there-
fore need closer examination. 
2. Norm Formation Processes and Communication Processes 
and Change Agents as their Managers
Already in the introductory chapter of this book we had pointed to the key 
importance of the communicative dimension of law formation and enforce-
ment processes, and thus to the definition of legal spaces. The change agents
Ellickson describes bring us back to this issue, being prime examples of 
actors that know how to use the political and societal stages as effective 
and oen highly professionalized communicators to create or change norms. 
Ellickson identifies three categories of change agent: self-motivated leaders, 
norm entrepreneurs, and opinion leaders, who on closer consideration are 
endowed all three with high communicative competence:
* Ellickson describes the ideal candidate for self-motivated leadership:
To illustrate: A charismatic person faces lower costs of working for social change. A 
lessening of smoke especially benefits persons with emphysema or other lung dis-
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ease. Therefore a charismatic person suffering from emphysema would be an ideal 
candidate to become a self-motivated leader of an antismoking campaign (Ellickson 
2001, p. 14).
* Also interesting is how Ellickson defines the qualities of norm entrepre-
neurs and opinion leaders; personal charisma and communicative com-
petence are useful for both: 
For the remaining two types of change agents – norm entrepreneurs and opinion 
leaders – external rewards provide an essential carrot. Although leaders of both types 
are likely to garner some tangible benefits from a norm change, they also need 
esteem to cover their full costs of supplying a new norm. Norm entrepreneurs 
are specialists who campaign to change particular norms, whereas opinion leaders 
are generalists. Ward Connerly, Martin Luther King, Jr., Catharine MacKinnon, 
Joseph McCarthy, and Carry Nation are norm entrepreneurs. Jimmy Carter, Walter 
Cronkite, Doris Kearns Goodwin, and Billy Graham are opinion leaders. Both types 
tend to be endowed with personal attributes, such as charisma and skill in commu-
nication, that reduce their costs of serving in these capacities (Ellickson 2001, p. 15).
* It is up to opinion leaders to give or deny their blessing to the efforts of 
norm entrepreneurs and self-motivated leaders. Ellickson:
Unlike a self-motivated leader and a norm entrepreneur, an opinion leader is not at 
the forefront of norm change but instead is located one position back from the front 
... An opinion leader evaluates the initiatives of these other change agents (the true 
catalysts) and then decides which of their causes to endorse. Opinion leaders there-
fore play a pivotal role in determining whether change agents succeed in triggering 
a cascade toward a new norm ...
A successful opinion leader tends to have two exceptional characteristics. The first is 
an usually high level of social intelligence, which helps the opinion leader anticipate 
better than most which social innovations will end up attracting bandwagon sup-
port. An adept opinion leader, for example, may be aware that many have been 
disguising their true opinions about the merits of current norms ... Opinion leaders 
involved in the Velvet Revolutions in Eastern Europe, for instance, best sensed that 
support for communism was less genuine than it seemed. Second, an opinion leader 
is likely to be a person to whom other members of the group are unusually prone to 
defer in order to avoid being socially out of step. An opinion leader may have earned 
this trust through prior accomplishments in the arena of norm enforcement and 
change. A village elder is a generic example. The costs of supplying a new norm fall 
when someone expects to be followed (Ellickson 2001, p. 16).
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I. The Multiplicity of Sanction Modes as a Selection Problem: 
From Regulatory Choice to Choice of Sanctions
In the preceding six sections we have had ample opportunity to examine the 
wide range of sanction systems and sanction modes – not only in the sense of 
different norm-enforcement techniques but also and above all as forms of 
social control; for governance collectives are not only regulatory collectives 
(see chapter one), they are always also what Benno Zabel has called “control 
and orientation systems” (Zabel 2012, p. 19).
The multiplicity of norm enforcement regimes really becomes apparent 
only when one considers the multiplicity of normative orderings – not only 
state-made law and its legally elaborated sanction system but also and above 
all social norms and the associated social sanctions (on forms and sanctioning 
logic see Ellickson 1991, 2001; Posner and Rasmusen 1999). Here, too, 
capturing and analysing the diversity of norm enforcement regimes requires 
a wide-angle lens. Two things need to be considered: first, the range of sanc-
tion types and how they relate functionally to the various normative order-
ings; second, the diversity of sanction types has to be examined as a selection 
problem. We shall be considering a number of examples of the advantages 
and disadvantages of certain sanction modes: in other words, specific “sanc-
tion costs.” 
We begin with the multiplicity of sanction types (I.) and the need to 
choose between them (II.).
I. The Multiplicity of Sanction Types
In Richard A. Posner and Eric B. Rasmusen’s article on “Creating and 
Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions” (1999), we find a 
useful overview of sanction types:
A norm is a social rule that does not depend on government for either promulgation 
or enforcement. Examples range from table manners and the rules of grammar to 
country club regulations and standard business practice. Norms may be independ-
ent of laws, as in the examples just given, or may overlap them; there are norms 
against stealing and lying, but also laws against these behaviors. The two kinds of 
rule reinforce each other through differences in the mode of creation, the definition 
of the offense, the procedure for administering punishment, and the punishments 
themselves. Laws are promulgated by public institutions, such as legislatures, regu-
latory agencies, and courts, aer well-defined deliberative procedures, and are 
enforced by the police power of the state, which ultimately means by threat of 
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violence. Norms are not necessarily promulgated at all. If they are, it is not by the 
state. Oen a norm will result from (and crystallize) the gradual emergence of a 
consensus. Norms are enforced by internalized values, by refusals to interact with 
the offender, by disapproval of his actions, and sometimes by private violence (Pos-
ner and Rasmusen 1999, p. 369 f.).
Posner and Rasmusen identify six types of sanction, which we assign to the 
norm enforcement regimes discussed in this and preceding chapters:
Sanction type* Example
Automatic sanctions:
The violator’s action carries its own 
penalty because of its not being 
coordinated with the actions of others. 
Failure to comply with DIN standards 
leads to the incompatibility of products 
and falling profi ts for the producer.
Guilt:
The violator feels bad about his 
violation as a result of his education 
and upbringing, quite apart 
from external consequences. 
Feelings of guilt about failing to meet 
the demands of military courage or 
religious tenets.
Shame:
The violator feels that his action has 
lowered himself either in his own 
eyes or in the eyes of other people. 
The contempt that an offi  cer or the 
member of another profession suff ers 
if he violates his profession’s code of 
honour.
Informational sanctions:
The violator’s action conveys 
information about himself that he 
would rather others not know. 
A breach of the etiquette of a social 
class shows someone up as not 
belonging to it.
Bilateral costly sanctions:
The violator is punished by the actions 
of and at the expense of just one other 
person, whose identity is specifi ed by 
the norm. 
Exercise of the right of self-defence 
to protect individual assets or 
the legal order as a whole.
Multilateral costly sanctions:
The violator is punished by the actions 
and at the expense of many other 
people. 
Loss of a fi rm’s reputation among its 
stakeholders if it violates legal or non-
legal standards.
* This column quotes from Posner and Rasmusen 1999, p. 371 f.
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What is interesting about this overview is that it lists either self-imposed 
sanctions – as in the case of shame and feelings of guilt – or social sanctions 
such as disapproval or social exclusion either by those directly affected or by 
the so-called social environment; there is no mention of sanctioning by the 
state. Interestingly, the types of sanction listed are by no means exclusive but 
rather – which is likely to be the rule – cumulative: “A norm can be enforced 
by more than one sanction – indeed, by all six. A drunk driver weaves along 
the road and crashes into a bus, killing a child. He has wrecked his car, he 
feels guilty, he knows that all his neighbors look down on him, his employer 
discovers that he is an alcoholic, the child’s parents condemn him, and he is 
ostracized by the entire community” (Posner and Rasmusen 1999, p. 372).
Another author who uses a wide-angle lens is Robert C. Ellickson. In his 
article “The Market for Social Norms” (2001) he discusses representatives 
of the law and economics school like Eric Posner (see above) and Richard 
McAdams (1997), whom he describes as “new norms scholars,” defining their 
common approach as follows:
Although the new norms scholars differ on many points, they generally share a 
common conception of norms and a common methodological approach. They 
regard a social norm as a rule governing an individual’s behavior that third parties 
other than state agents diffusely enforce by means of social sanctions. A person who 
violates a norm risks becoming the target of punishments such as negative gossip and 
ostracism. Conversely, someone who honors a norm may reap informal rewards such 
as enhanced esteem and greater future opportunities for beneficial exchanges. A 
person who has internalized a norm as a result of socialization enforces the norm 
against himself, perhaps by feeling guilt aer violating it or a warm glow aer 
complying with it (especially if the norm is burdensome to honor). A norm can 
exist even if no one has internalized it, however, so long as third parties provide an 
adequate level of informal enforcement (Ellickson 2001, p. 3).
Interesting about this passage is the strong emphasis on the informality of 
social sanctions: we are thus dealing with the full spectrum of sanction sys-
tems comprising a formal and a much bigger informal sector. This informal 
sector largely escapes legal regulation (on the relationship between formal 
and informal statehood see Schuppert 2011b); it is difficult to channel 
legally, and its effects are oen difficult to predict. We discuss this under 
the heading of political correctness.
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II. From Regulatory Choice to Choice of Sanctions
1. Choice of Sanctions
Politics is about choices. On this basis, we have repeatedly proposed (Schuppert 
1994; 2003a; 2011c) distinguishing between three choice situations in the 
field of political action: instrumental choice, institutional choice, and regulatory 
choice.
Whereas instrumental choice is about different control tools – classical 
regulatory law, prohibitions and requirements, recommendations and warn-
ings, economic incentives – and institutional choice is about various institu-
tional arrangements – from public-law institution to private limited com-
pany – regulatory choice is about different types of regulation – enacted law or 
codes of conduct – and different domains of regulation – state regulation or 
private self-regulation.
Transferring the choice of regulation type to the closely related level of 
sanction modes, we can with Richard A. Posner and Eric B. Rasmusen (1999) 
speak of a choice of sanctions, a concept they introduce as follows:
Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are 
created or modified. The sanctions for the violation of a norm can be categorized as 
automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral costly, and multilateral costly. The 
choice of sanction is related to problems in creating and modifying norms. We use 
our analysis of the creation, modification, and enforcement of norms to analyse the 
scope of feasible government action either to promote desirable norms or to repress 
undesirable ones. We conclude that the difficulty of predicting the effect of such 
action limits its feasible scope (Posner and Rasmusen 1999, p. 369).
Taking up the concept of choice of sanctions, we consider two choice situa-
tions. 
2. Choice of Sanctions “At Work”: Two Examples
a) Financial Penalties or Social Sanctions: The Power of Disapproval
An article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung of 16 January 2013 drew attention to 
this example: under the heading “The Power of Disapproval. Social Sanc-
tions are Stronger than Fines” the author writes: 
How can a smoker be induced to light up outside the pub rather than inside? And 
how can someone be persuaded not to discard rubbish in the street or park in a no 
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parking zone? The answer is simple: through prohibitions backed by fines. But 
however effective this pattern is, it has its limits: as soon as no checks are to be 
feared and therefore no fines, the impact of the prohibition weakens. Psychologists 
Rob Nelissen and Laetitia Mulder from the Dutch University of Tilburg report that 
social disapproval has a more long-lasting effect than financial penalties. If conduct 
is frowned on socially, people keep to a ban even when they are not under obser-
vation ...
The scientists had their test persons take part in a game that rewarded selfish con-
duct in some participants. However, for the group result – test subjects were re-
warded with money – it was important that the majority of participants cooperate. 
One third of test persons could be punished by fining for acting parasitically: the 
degree of cooperation in this group was particularly high. In another group it was 
possible to condemn egoists socially in the circle. This, too, encouraged cooperative 
behaviour, if not as strongly. In a control group, participants played with no threat 
of sanctioning and ultimately came to be dominated by egoism. When on a pretext 
the psychologists withdrew the possibilities for sanctioning from the game, coop-
eration in the financial penalty group collapsed within a short space of time. If good 
behaviour had previously been achieved through the threat of social disapproval, by 
contrast, the test persons remained cooperative.
Psychologists Nelissen and Mulder argue that financial penalties tend to encourage 
cost-benefit analysis. And when no fine threatened, this calculation clearly favoured 
selfish behaviour. Or the penalty was even treated as buying the right to violate a 
norm. A meanwhile notorious study on the behaviour of parents examined, for 
example, whether a fine would induce them to be punctual in fetching their off-
spring from the kindergarten. The contrary was the case. Parents regarded the fine as 
a fee for the right to ignore the closing time of the kindergarten. In the long run, 
public social disapproval would probably have been more effective in disciplining 
parents (Herrmann 2013. Transl. R.B.).
The article by Rob M. A. Nelissen and Laetitia B. Mulder (2013) referred to 
in the newspaper report is well worth consideration. The issue they address is 
how voluntary compliance with norms can best be ensured if – which in 
practical life is likely to be the rule – the regular sanction system of “pro-
hibition backed by financial penalty” does not work all the time; our authors 
are worried that the fine as a sanction leads people to behave in society 
purely in terms of costs and benefits, an effect that could be countered by 
tangible social disapproval:
Voluntary norm compliance is an important issue because sanctioning systems are 
rarely perfect. Frequently, norm violations will go unnoticed. If people only comply 
with norms when otherwise facing punishment, a sanctioning system is only as 
effective as its execution. In spite of their norm-enforcing ability, several studies 
suggest that sanctions actually undermine voluntary norm compliance. Imposing 
a sanction may cause people to frame a previously ethical decision (Is it acceptable to 
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do this?) in business terms (Is it cost-efficient to do this?), which may even result in 
less compliance ... Moreover, sanctions may negatively affect trust. Under a sanction-
ing system people ascribe others’ norm compliance to the prospect of punishment 
upon violation, rather than to a desire to cooperate. Consequently, when the sanc-
tioning system is removed, levels of cooperation tend to drop ....
These ‘dark sides’ of sanctions (i. e., the adoption of an economic decision frame 
driven by external incentives rather than mutual trust) will impair norm compliance 
under conditions of imperfect execution; that is, when norm violations are not 
consistently punished. In the present study, however, we explore the possibility that 
these drawbacks are an artifact of sanctions usually being modeled as financial 
punishment. We investigated whether the drop in voluntary norm compliance that 
is commonly observed aer the removal of a (financial) sanctioning system is atte-
nuated in case a social instead of a financial sanctioning system is implemented and 
subsequently removed. In a social sanctioning system the only form of punishment 
consists of the mere expression of disapproval with a particular kind of conduct. In 
the present study the removal of a social sanctioning system is achieved by termi-
nating the possibility for participants to express their disapproval of each other’s 
behavior aer each round of contributions in a social dilemma game (Nelissen and 
Mulder 2013, p. 71 f.).
The experiments conducted by our authors invite the conclusion that social 
disapproval is a more effective type of sanction than financial penalties if 
those required to comply with rules cannot be permanently kept under 
surveillance:
We conclude that, compared to financial sanctions, social sanctions are more likely 
to elicit voluntary norm compliance even if people’s behavior cannot be consistently 
monitored and their norm violations therefore may go unpunished from time to 
time as is oen the case in real life. In other words, social sanctioning systems are 
more lenient than financial sanctioning systems to inevitable flaws in their execu-
tion. As already stated, we do not claim that people will voluntarily comply with 
norms indefinitely if violations remain unpunished. When people do not disap-
prove each other’s non-cooperation any more, the norm will ultimately vanish. 
Although exact statistics on the proportion of an individual’s norm violations that 
go unnoticed are lacking, extended non-punishment seems unlikely. The observed 
resilience of a social sanctioning system should thus be sufficient to buffer incidental 
slips of vigilance. Clearly this has important implications for public policy. Our 
results suggest that successful norm induction requires public communication of social 
(dis)approval, not only because it increases the salience and thus the effectiveness of 
norms in guiding behavior ..., but also because it makes them stick even if people are 
not consistently punished for their violations (Nelissen and Mulder 2013, p. 78).
If this is indeed the case, we ought to take a closer look at this so effective 
type of sanction and clarify its functional logic. Nelissen and Mulder:
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In everyday interactions social rather than financial punishment is the default. 
Expressing disapproval or contempt, gossip, peer pressure, and teasing are informal, 
non-institutionalized means to punish norm violations. Indeed, social disapproval of 
non-cooperation ..., but also social approval of cooperation ... boosts cooperation in 
social dilemmas just like financial punishment does. Ultimately social sanctions hint 
at the possibility of social exclusion, which probably accounts for their impact ... 
Studies demonstrate that experiencing ostracism has severe consequences ... and 
shares the same neural substrate as physical pain ... Some even argue that the threat 
of ostracism is the key mechanism underlying the development of social norms ... 
(Nelissen and Mulder 2013, p. 72).
This teaches us that social disapproval is no joke: it is informal and therefore 
not disciplined by law, it can hit people hard and in extreme cases lead to 
social exclusion without appeal. We shall be coming back to this.
b) Order without Law: The Effectiveness of Governance by Reputation
Robert C. Ellickson’s ground-breaking study on dispute settlement mecha-
nisms among farmers in Shasta County under the significant heading of 
“Law without Order” (Ellickson 1991) shows how effectively governance 
by reputation (see Schuppert 2010, p. 90ff.) can substitute for legally bind-
ing regulation, which generally takes the form of enacted law. However, we 
turn to two other examples that we have already considered elsewhere.
* The first is that of Jewish diamond merchants in the New York Diamond 
Dealers Club (DDC), who trade in accordance with rules they set 
themselves under the supervision of the Club, which provides regular 
information about the business practices of its members, thus influenc-
ing their reputation and – in the event of repeated and significant loss 
of reputation – threatening them with exclusion. Barak D. Richman 
writes of “reputation-based enforcement” (2006) of the self-given rules, 
what can be in more general terms be called governance by reputation. 
To put it simply, such a mode of governance presupposes two things: a 
functioning exchange of information about the business practices of 
certain people (mostly merchants) and the existence of a social group 
or a social network for which the reputation of its members is impor-
tant; we shall call such social groups reputation communities.
* The second example is a case study by Lothar Rieth and Melanie 
Zimmer (2004) on the conduct of transnational corporation in crisis 
areas – Shell in Nigeria and BP in Colombia – and their contribution 
Jurisdictional Communities and their Specific Jurisdictional Cultures 259
to conflict prevention. The authors come to the conclusion that 
changes in behaviour are apparent where the pressure of publicity 
produced by NGOs is so great that a change in corporate behaviour 
in the sense of assuming “corporate security responsibility” (Wolf et al. 
2007) seems advisable owing to company reputation sensibilities. 
Rieth and Zimmer explain how this reputation mechanism works:
One factor that can contribute to the level of pressure exerted by NGOs on the 
behaviour of corporations is the reputation of these corporations. The reputation of 
the company is oen reduced to or equated with the brand name. However, repu-
tation is a more comprehensive, relational concept that points to the relationship 
between a corporation and various groups, so-called stakeholders. The stakeholders 
of a company are its customers, employees, investors, business partners, govern-
ments, international organizations, local communities, and not least NGOs. 
Through its reputation, a corporation seeks to demonstrate to its stakeholders reli-
ability and dependability as interactional partner. It is thus constantly under pres-
sure to present an image to stakeholders that corresponds to the expectations they 
have of the company and their conception of it in order to gain or improve a 
positive reputation. A positive reputation facilitates interaction between a corpora-
tion and its stakeholders (Rieth and Zimmer 2004, p. 94 f. Transl. R.B.).
J. Concluding Remarks
Having intensively measured the World of Rules over the past three chapters, 
discovering one plurality aer another, it is time to pause and take stock. 
Without exaggerating, we can claim to have gained a far-reaching idea 
of how the universe of rules is constituted. We have made the acquaintance 
of a wide range of regulatory regimes from divine law to local tribal law 
and the code of honour of the Prussian officer corps; we have observed all 
sorts of norm producers at their work of setting rules, taking a particular 
interest in what semi-autonomous socio-legal fields they inhabit. Finally, 
we have sorted through a broad array of norm enforcement regimes, from 
patrimonial jurisdiction in manorial societies to forms of political correct-
ness. 
All this plurality naturally raises the question of how it is to be dealt with. 
Various disciplines offer answers, such as the theory of legal pluralism, but 
above all classical sociology of law and legal theory. Common to all these 
approaches is that they raise the question of what is really to be understood 
by “law.” There is no eluding this question of the “right” concept of law, or at 
260 Chapter Four
least not for someone who, like the present author, has been socialized in the 
discipline of jurisprudence. The next chapter will accordingly be devoted to 
finding the right concept of law. The reader is cordially invited to join in the 
search. 
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Chapter Five
In Search of the “Right” Concept of Law
The plurality discovered in the course of the last four chapters suggests that it 
will be far from easy to define “law” precisely and draw a reliable distinction 
between what is law and what is not. A sharp dividing line can perhaps not 
be drawn anyway, so that other ways will be needed to adequately address 
plural normative orderings with differing “degrees of hardness,” plural sour-
ces of law and norm producers, and plural norm enforcement regimes. The 
second part of the chapter will consider how to tackle this problem.
The first problem to reflect upon, however, is whether scholarly disci-
plines that have long inquired into what counts as law can help in distin-
guishing between law and non-law. Two come into question: the sociology 
of law and the theory of legal pluralism. We start with legal sociology.
What we can already do in our search for the right concept of law is to 
exclude two options that lead nowhere and examine how legal sociologists 
can help.
A. Putting Legal Sociology to the Test
We call on three well-known representatives of the sociology of law to testify 
on what counts as law.
I. Eugen Ehrlich or How Bukovina Developed from
a Remote Region in the Austro-Hungarian Empire
into a Virtual Mecca for Legal Sociologists
Our foray begins with Eugen Ehrlich, generally regarded as the founder of 
German legal sociology (see Raiser 2009, p. 71ff.). A brief look at his origins 
will throw light on his lasting importance and function as the progenitor of 
legal pluralism.
Eugen Ehrlich was born in Chernivtsi in the Duchy of Bukovina, then a 
border region of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which in 1919 was assigned 
to Romania and is now part of Ukraine. In 1910 Ehrlich – meanwhile 
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professor of Roman law – established a “Seminar for Living Law” because he 
saw it as the task of jurisprudence to consider the whole of living law instead 
of limiting itself to what can be enforced by coercive legal powers of the 
state. With regard to Bukovina he noted:
A traditional legal scholar would doubtless claim that all these nations had only a 
single system of law, one and the same system: Austrian law applicable throughout 
Austria. But even a casual glance shows that each of these tribes obeys quite different 
legal norms in all the legal relations of daily life (Ehrlich 1967, p. 43. Transl. R.B.).
Ehrlich’s observations turned the politically insignificant Duchy of Bukovina 
into a virtual Mecca for legal sociology. His image of a legally plural Bukovina 
was taken up and intensified by Guntner Teubner in an essay entitled: 
“Global Bukovina: The Emergence of a Transnational Legal Pluralism” 
(“Globale Bukowina: Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen Rechtspluralismus”) 
– the geographical term Bukovina came to stand for legal pluralism. And
in “Law without State?” (“Recht ohne Staat?”), Stefan Kadelbach und Klaus
Günther, mentioned Bukovina no fewer than three times in listing the best-
known phenomena of legal pluralism:
* Private law without the state within a state: Bukovina
* Societal law without law in the state: exotic Bukovina
* Law without the state outside the state: global Bukovina
As Raiser rightly remarks (2009, p. 74), the traditional concept of law, which
refers to enacted or statutory law, is inadequate for Ehrlich’s research pro-
gramme. He identifies three types of law: societal law, jurists’ law, and state
law, the first being the really relevant type. The hard core of societal law is
the law of societal associations, that is to say, the totality of norms that regulate
the internal ordering of these associations. In 1913 Ehrlich wrote:
The internal order of human associations is not only the original but even today the more 
fundamental form of law. The legal rule (Rechtssatz) developed only much later, and to 
this day is largely derived from the internal ordering of associations. To explain the 
development and nature of law, the ordering of associations therefore has to be 
investigated. All attempts to gain clarity about the law have hitherto failed because 
they set out not from the ordering of associations but from legal rules.
The internal ordering of associations is determined by legal norms. The legal norm 
(Rechtsnorm) is not to be confused with the legal rule (Rechtssatz). The legal rule is 
the universally binding, chance version of a legal provision in a statute or book of 
law. A legal norm, by contrast, is a legal directive that is valid in specific, perhaps 
quite small associations, even if not put into words. As soon as there are legal rules 
in a society that have actually come into effect, they also produce legal norms; but in 
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every society there are far more legal norms than there are legal rules, because there 
is far more law for individual circumstances than for all similar circumstances, and 
also more law than contemporary jurists, who seek to put in in words, have realized. 
Every modern legal historian knows how little of the law applicable in their own 
time is contained in the Twelve Tables or in the Lex Salica; but things are no 
different with modern legal codes. In past centuries, all legal norms that determined 
the internal order of associations were based on the traditions, the contracts, and the 
statutes of corporations, and still today they are largely to be found there (Ehrlich 
1989, p. 43 f. Transl. R.B.).
Whether the norms of this associational law are obeyed by association mem-
bers is not an arbitrary matter: there are such things as normative societal 
constraints. Ehrlich explains:
We all therefore live in the midst of innumerable, more or less established, but also 
at times quite loose communities, and our human fate depends mainly on the 
position we manage to attain within them. Clearly, reciprocity plays a role. Com-
munities would be quite unable to offer every single member something if every 
individual gave nothing in return. And in fact, all these communities, however 
organized – whether they go by the name of mother country, home town, place 
of residence, religious community, trading corporation, or clientele – all demand 
something in return for what they do for us, and the societal norms that prevail in 
the given community are nothing other that the generally applicable outcome of the 
demands they make of the individual. Whoever has to rely on the support of those 
about him – and who does not? – is well advised to bow at least largely to their 
norms. Anyone who fails to do so must expect his conduct to damage his ties with 
his circle; whoever is stubborn in his resistance, who himself loosens existing ties 
with his fellows, will find himself gradually abandoned, avoided, excluded. It is in 
societal associations that we find the source of the constraining power of all societal norms, 
of law as of propriety, morality, religion, honour, decency, good taste, fashion – at 
least as far as outward compliance is concerned (Ehrlich 1989, p. 65. Transl. R.B.).
As far as the demand for compliance is concerned, this binding regulatory 
regime is a force to be reckoned with. According the Ehrlich, there are many 
associations in society that take action just as energetically as the coercive 
association “state”. He comments on “the power of societal normative con-
straints”:
People therefore act in accordance with the law primarily because societal circum-
stances oblige them to do so. In this connection legal norms are not to be distin-
guished from other norms. The state is not the only coercive association; there are 
innumerable such groupings in society that can act far more energetically than the 
state. One of the strongest among them is still the family. In ever growing measure, 
modern legislation refuses to enforce judgement in matters concerning the conjugal 
community. But were the entire family law of the state to be repealed, families 
would certainly not be much different than they are today; fortunately family law 
In Search of the “Right” Concept of Law 265
seldom requires coercive action by the state. The worker, the employee, the civil 
servant, the officer; they all perform their contractual and professional duties, if not 
from a sense of duty then because they want to keep their position and perhaps even 
gain a better one. The physician, the lawyer, the tradesman, the merchant are all 
concerned to satisfy and expand their clientele, and also to consolidate their stand-
ing by scrupulously fulfilling their contracts. The last thing they think of is penalties 
and enforcement of judgement (Ehrlich 1989, p. 65 f. Transl. R.B.).
Although Ehrlich assumes that legal norms in society are oen also enforced 
through social constraints, this is not the most important aspect of his con-
cept of law. As we have seen, he defines every rule as a legal norm that, as a 
prescription for desirable behaviour, determines the actual conduct of an 
individual within an association – and thus within a regulatory collective. At 
a very early date, Ehrlich accordingly severed the traditional conceptual 
connection between law and the state, introducing a sociological concept 
of law based on the observation of regulated behaviour. As we shall see, not 
all his successors in legal sociology followed him in his radical, de-statized 
understanding of law.
II. Theodor Geiger or From Embryonic and Incomplete Law 
to the Hardening of Social Norms
The second great German legal sociologist to consider in this context is 
Theodor Geiger. Thomas Raiser has this to say about him:
Theodor Geiger, born in Munich is 1891, started life as a lawyer, but immediately 
aer the First World War turned to journalism and adult education and engaged in 
empirical sociological studies, obtaining a chair in sociology at the Technical Uni-
versity of Brunswick in 1928. Emigrating to Denmark in 1933, he taught at the 
University of Aarhus from 1938 until his death in 1952. His copious oeuvre, to some 
extent in Danish, covered broad areas of theoretical sociology and empirical social 
research. His “Preliminary Studies on a Sociology of Law,” (“Vorstudien zu einer 
Soziologie des Rechts”) which appeared in 1947, contains the essence of his legal 
sociology, and constitutes the most important work in his later research (Raiser 
2009, p. 107. Transl. R.B.).
This work strikes the basic chord of Geiger’s sociology of law from the 
outset, namely that law can be defined as an ordering structure of a group, 
but that not every group order deserves to be described as law:
Law is an ordering structure that exists within an integrant of society (“group”). This tells 
us little and that in very general terms. Not every social ordering is law. It would be 
at least unusual to describe certain ordering phenomena such as the statutes of a 
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society or the practices of a particular social class as law. What particular properties 
does a social ordering structure therefore require to justify calling it law? What 
particular sorts of group can a legal order be ascribed to? – There is clearly a specific 
relationship between “law,” “state,” and “enacted law” (Geiger 1987, p. 6. Transl. 
R.B.).
Law is “per se” group law, but rules can be called law only if they are made by 
the state or recognized as such by the state. The decisive passage is probably 
the following:
The legal system is never the sole ordering structure prevailing within a differenti-
ated society. Morality and convention also play a major role. We call this phenom-
enon the pluralism of the social ordering structure. From the perspective of the dualistic 
conceptual model of “state and society,” “state” and “free society” are two social 
structures shared by the personal substratum “population.” The legal order is then 
classified as belonging to (if not identical with) the statist form of life , whereas 
morality is associated with “free society” as a whole – with single groupings and circles 
within free society naturally having their own particular ordering structures. The legal 
order is thus distinguished by definition in two directions from other ordering 
structures. Firstly, in terms of differentiation between integrants of society [Gesell-
schasintegrate], the law being treated as the ordering structure of a particular inte-
grant, the citizenry of the state (Staatsvolk); secondly, in morphological terms, in so 
far as other non-law ordering structures exist alongside the law within the nation 
(within the society governed by law) (Geiger 1987, p. 117 f. Transl. R.B.).
There is thus a pluralism of social ordering structures, within which, however, it 
is possible to advance from the “lower division of morality” to the “premier 
league of law,” a process that is to be seen as follows:
Once again this is a question of genetics: What causes this differentiation of the ordering 
structure? If we set out from the hypothesis that the overall organization of society 
has developed under a central power and hence that the legal system has formed 
endogenously within an existing but hitherto decentralized society of the same sub-
stratum, it must be assumed that, at a given point in time, a society existed that was 
ordered solely in terms of morality. Crystallization around a central power within a 
society also leads to the “judicialization” of parts, but only parts, of the previously 
prevailing ordering structure, whereas other social and economic matters continue 
to be regulated by spontaneous morality. The regulation of certain matters is thus 
elevated to the legal sphere, while that of others is not (Geiger 1987, p. 118. Transl. R.B.).
Geiger adopts a decidedly processual perspective, leading him elsewhere to 
speak of embryonic law – for instance among “primitive peoples” – or of 
unfinished law:
One thing needs to be stressed from the outset: there is no clear dividing line 
between legal and other orders in the sense that every concrete ordering phenom-
enon can be defined as either law or non-law. Not least, this is because law in our 
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understanding is the product of societal development. If law develops out of a preced-
ing, pre-legal ordering structure, transitional states are to be expected in which the prevail-
ing order is “not yet quite law” but “no longer merely” what had preceded law. And since 
law has a number of characteristic properties, it can be that this or that property will 
“still be lacking” here or there. We can expect to find a core surrounded by phe-
nomena that are doubtless legal in the full sense of term and concept, ringed by 
other phenomena that are more or less but not fully and completely law. I call this 
unfinished law (Geiger 1987, p. 87. Transl. R.B.).
In effect, however, this processual perspective does not stop Geiger from 
insisting that the state and law are coupled, and that other governance 
collectives (which he calls “integrants of society,” Gesellschas-Integrate) – 
although equipped with an ordering structure of their own – must, if not 
attributable to the state, be relegated to the status of non-law. He concludes:
The state ranks first among the notions associated with the idea of (positive) law. 
Law is conceived of as a social order “applicable to the citizenry of the state (Staats-
volk),” which, if not established by the state, is nevertheless guaranteed by it. How-
ever, certain autonomous administrative entities, such as municipalities, set rules 
that we treat as legal norms in the strict sense of the term; but they do so by virtue of 
empowerment by the state. There is ecclesiastical law – but it is either state law 
relating to religious societies or it is a system carried by the church itself and 
described as law precisely because the church is a state-like organization – a state 
within a state or above states. ...
On the basis of the conceptual connection between law and state, we can now attempt 
to identify the characteristics that distinguish the law from other social systems. It 
should be noted that this coupling with the “state” points in two directions. First, it 
assigns the law to a particular type of ordering integrant of society, if by state we under-
stand an organized manifold of persons belonging together, the “national citizenry” 
(“Staatsvolk”). Second, it implies a special structural form of legal activity in so far 
as the state is conceived of in impersonal terms as an apparatus of power working 
through institutions (Geiger 1987, p. 87 f. Transl. R.B.).
In Geiger we have a classical proponent of the law = state formula. Although 
recognizing normative orders as law-like or protolegal, he cannot accept as 
law what does not derive directly or indirectly from the state. However, he 
offers no convincing argument why this should be the case. And, as the 
preceding chapters have shown, there is also much to suggest that non-state 
normative orderings should be treated as law if only because, except for their 
authorship, they oen do not differ in any way from state law. 
As we shall see, Manfred Rehbinder takes a somewhat more differentiated 
approach to the issue.
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III. Manfred Rehbinder 
The third author to be considered is the Zurich legal sociologist Manfred 
Rehbinder, to whom we owe what is probably the leading textbook on the 
sociology of law (2009). His work shows a peculiar tension between his 
concern with the regulatory collective and its given normative order – in 
this regard he thinks as a sociologist – and his concern with the state and its 
legal personnel – here he thinks as legal scientist. He is at heart a sociologist 
but the consequences of adopting a sociological stance bring him to submit 
to disciplining by the legal sociologist in him and finally to come out in 
favour of unison between the state and the law.
1. Regulatory Collectives and Their Own (Sociological) Legal Order
Rehbinder’s point of departure in determining “what law is” is a sociological 
conception of law that recalls that of Ehrlich. However, he differentiates 
more strongly in terms of how precisely one establishes what constitutes 
law in a regulatory collective. For instance, he cites three paths towards the 
empirical investigation of law:
In total, three ways have been proposed for investigating law empirically:
1. Identifying norms regarded as binding for the life of a group, and which for this 
reason guide the behaviour of addressees (legal consciousness = ideal patterns of 
behaviour),
2. Identifying patterns of behaviour in the actual lives of groups (legally relevant 
social life = actual patterns of behaviour),
3. Identifying patterns of behaviour by which legal personnel react in certain social 
situations (action by legal personnel) (Rehbinder 2009, p. 36. Transl. R.B.).
He then asserts that many societal associations have legal orders of their own 
in a sociological sense, especially organizations that have their own discipli-
nary law:
Not only the state but also other societal associations have organizations that con-
cern themselves specifically with applying and enforcing norms, e. g., the church, 
the military, the civil service, the universities; in brief, all groupings that have a 
special “disciplinary law,” as well as clubs, political parties, industrial associations 
and interest groups, etc. All these groups can have their own organizational appa-
ratus for supervising compliance with their specific group order. In the sociological 
sense, they all have their own legal orders (Rehbinder 2009, p. 39. Transl. R.B.).
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2. A Regulatory Collective can well have its own Normative Order –
but this does not yet make it a Legal Order
Rehbinder avoids taking the decisive step; although he concedes that a given 
group ordering is a legal order in the sociological sense, he asserts that this does 
not allow us to speak of a legal order in the real sense of the term, because 
such an order can be maintained and enforced only by the state and its 
professionalized legal personnel. The crunch comes with the question 
whether legal pluralism can actually exist. Rehbinder denies it explicitly, 
even though he again emphasizes that group orders also have an autono-
mous coercive apparatus and that from a functional point of view they do 
not differ from the state legal order. He cites Karl N. Llewellyn and his study 
on the law of the Cheyenne Indians, the “Cheyenne Way” (Llewellyn and 
Hoebel 1941):
But it was Karl N. Llewellyn (1893–1962), who with his classic study on the Chey-
enne Indians, which he published in 1941 in collaboration with anthropologist E. 
Adamson Hoebel, established the idea of law in sub-groups of society independent 
of the law of overall society, and thus the notion of a plurality of legal systems. 
Looking not at society as a whole but at the individual sub-groups within it, he 
argues that completely and fundamentally different legal systems can be found in 
these smaller entities, and that all generalization at the overall societal level about 
what constitutes the family or a particular type of association is risky. In every society, 
the overall picture of the law includes not only that pertaining to the whole but also 
subordinate or coordinate legal arrangements pertaining to smaller actors (Rehbinder 
2009, p. 41. Transl. R.B.). 
But this does not prevent Rehbinder from denying such group orderings the 
status of legal orders. He advances what we could call a “gang-of-thieves” argu-
ment:
However, this consideration of smaller actors does not necessarily lead to a pluralistic 
concept of law. Even if we ascribe the same character to the coercive apparatus of 
the sub-groups as to the legal personnel of overall society, there is nevertheless 
terminological consensus on reserving the term “law” for a means of overall society 
for exercising social control in order to avoid, for example, having to declare legal 
the coercion exercised by gangsters. The background is not necessarily, as Pospišil ... 
claims, a moral value judgement that seeks to exclude the investigation of criminal 
gangs from investigation of the law. For organized crime has a major impact on the 
effectiveness of law and is accordingly a subject for jurisprudential (criminological) 
inquiry. But if misunderstandings are to be avoided, the organizational and behav-
ioural rules of societal sub-groups, if they are not (even if only by virtue of a 
reference provision) an integral part of the law of society as a whole, cannot be 
described as law despite their legal character in the sociological sense. A state judge 
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ruling on the Mafia could otherwise be accused of perverting the course of justice (Reh-
binder 2009, p. 41. Transl. R.B.).
In the end, Rehbinder remains rooted in a statist concept of law, surprisingly 
evident in his comments on the mainstream German line of argument:
Within the legal system of the Federal Republic, this development is apparent in the 
stress placed on the state’s monopoly of law and in the harmonization of lawmaking 
and the administration of justice. The theory of this monopoly attributes the 
grounds for the validity of all law to the state and reserves to the state the enforce-
ment of legal norms by direct coercion. Although the law produced by associations 
(associational law, ecclesiastical law, collective bargaining law, standard business 
terms) does not from a genetic point of view arise outside the state, its legal nature 
now derives from the circumstance that in certain areas the state grants associations 
lawmaking autonomy. The state is therefore entitled to monitor non-state lawmaking 
(the competence competence of the state legal personnel). It does so increasingly 
through legislation of its own, which limits the freedom of non-state authorities 
(e. g., competition and consumer law), and through the limited review of legal 
norms set outside the state and of the rulings of associational courts (professional 
and arbitration tribunals). This prevents the legal order from breaking down into 
completely autonomous particular systems (Rehbinder 2009, p. 74. Transl. R.B.).
IV. Taking Stock: A Dualistic Concept of Law – 
An Unsatisfying Heritage 
The floor has been given at such great length to representatives of legal 
sociology because their arguments show it is one thing to describe and 
analyse the efficacy of non-state normative orders and quite another to upset 
the apple cart of a statist concept of law and define such behaviour-control-
ling normative orderings as “law.” In effect, this amounts to proposing a 
dualistic concept of law, namely a distinction between state-made or at least 
state-recognized law on the one hand and law in a “merely” sociological sense
on the other. Although not yet solving the definitional problem, this at least 
files the issue away under two scholarly headings, dogmatic jurisprudence 
for state law and legal sociology for law in the sociological sense. This cannot 
be the last word on the matter for a legal science that in our view ought to be 
understood as a science of regulation. 
There is therefore no option but to continue the search for the “right” 
concept of law, now calling legal pluralism theory to the stand, which some 
consider the “key concept in a postmodern view of law” (de Sousa Santos 
1987, p. 297).
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B. Legal Pluralism: What Does the Concept Really Achieve?
A brief review of the impressive career experienced by the legal pluralism
concept is needed.
I. The Theory of Legal Pluralism Enters the Scene
The appearance on stage of this theory was particularly loudly applauded by 
two groups in the audience. Those who put the case for a decline in the 
importance of the state or even its withering away, are, so to speak, natural 
fans of legal pluralism; the obvious equation is loss of importance for the state 
= loss of importance for state law. And this is indeed conceivable, as Stefan 
Kadelbach and Klaus Günther remark:
For those who see the state withering away, the legal pluralism perspective is intui-
tively plausible. They turn their attention to possible surrogates for state legislation, 
which they find in private self-regulation, norm production by supranational and 
international organizations, or in public-private hybrid norm-setting. The multitude 
of norm producers who have come into being in the course of time fit easily, it 
seems, into a new picture replacing the homogeneous will of the state by the 
fragmentation of society and its law. State law applying within or outside the state 
would fit into this picture, along with international law, the lex mercatoria of 
international trade, and the corporate governance standards of multinational com-
panies, not to mention more weakly standardized agreements or procedures 
between governments or between governments and private enterprises, and also 
the norm-setting activities of many non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
functional differentiation of world society can be described and possibly even 
explained in legal theoretical terms (Kadelbach and Günther 2011, p. 14. Transl. 
R.B.).
Not only those sceptical about the state “come out” as proponents of a 
pluralist concept of law: we could also count “friends of globalization” 
ruminating on a non-state world order among the exponents of legal plural-
ism theory. In his much cited essay on “Global Bukovina,” Gunther Teubner 
declares:
Global law can be interpreted only in terms of a theory of legal pluralism and a 
corresponding pluralistic theory of legal sources. Only recently, the theory of legal 
pluralism has undergone a successful change, shiing the focus from the law of 
colonial societies to the legal forms of various ethnic, cultural, and religious com-
munities within the modern nation state. Today the focus needs to shi once more – 
from the law of groups to the law of discourses. Similarly, the juristic theory of legal 
sources needs to turn its attention to novel, “spontaneous” processes of lawmaking, 
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which – independently of law made nationally or transnationally – have developed 
in various areas of world society (Teubner 1996, p. 257. Transl. R.B.).
The popularity of the legal pluralism theory is ground enough to cast a brief 
glance at the three waves of attention that the phenomenon of normative 
plurality has attracted and which Marc Hertogh identifies in his essay on 
“What is Non-state Law?” (2007). The first wave, referred to in the literature 
as “classic legal pluralism,” is a product of colonialism, a form of rule in 
which the legal ideas of the colonial powers confront the lived legal struc-
tures of colonized societies. Hertogh:
The first wave of attention for non-state law is set against the background of colo-
nialism. In Africa, Asia, the Pacific and elsewhere, the colonizer was confronted with 
a situation of local rules and customs without the presence of a Western-style central 
state. “Social scientists (primarily anthropologists) were interested in how these 
people maintained social order without European law” ... This focus on non-state 
law is associated with ‘classic legal pluralism’ and typically looks at the intersections 
of indigenous and European law ... Although there was some information available 
on customary and religious laws in law reports and administrative minutes of the 
colonial powers, studies specifically conducted on the laws and cultures of pre-
industrial societies did not generally much appear before the early years of the 
20th century ... (Hertogh 2007, p. 4).
Sally Engle Merry (1988) has coined the term “legal pluralism at home” for 
the second wave of attention, pointing out that normative plurality is not 
per se an exotic phenomenon, something to be found only in remote corners 
of the world and among strange peoples, but also at home, for instance in 
dealing with “immigrant groups and cultural minorities”: 
Beginning in the late 1970s, a new wave of attention for non-state [law, G. F. S.] is 
developing as well. Typical for this second wave is that more and more sociolegal 
scholars become interested in applying the concept of legal pluralism to noncolon-
ized societies, particularly to the advanced industrial countries of Europe and the 
United States. This development is sometimes referred to as “new legal pluralism” or 
“legal pluralism at home” ... This constitutes an important shi in the study of non-
state law. It means that in contexts in which the dominance of a central legal system 
is unambiguous, “this [approach] worries about missing what else is going on; the 
extent to which other forms of regulation outside law constitute law” (Hertogh 
2007, p. 7).
The third wave of attention, which has had a durable impact, can be called 
the globalization wave: legal pluralism developing into global legal pluralism
(Berman 2009; Michaels 2009). Here, too, we quote Marc Hertogh, who not 
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only describes this third wave but also names the authors most important in 
fostering this attention:
The third, and most recent, wave of attention for non-state law is related to global-
ization. In general terms, this refers to the “movement diffusion and expansion [of 
trade, culture, and consumption], from a local level and with local implications, to 
levels and implications that are worldwide, or, more usually, that transcend national 
borders in some way” ... A growing number of authors claim that these develop-
ments also have profound legal implications: “Globalization reminds us that the 
state is constrained not only by other states and supranational organizations, but 
also by non-state organizations (e. g. NGOs), communities (e. g. religious groups), 
and powerful private players (e. g. multinational corporations). All these actors, in 
one way or another, play roles in the globalizing world that were traditionally 
reserved to the state. One of these roles might be the role of lawmaker.” It is argued 
that, aer ‘classic’ and ‘new’ legal pluralism, these developments should be inter-
preted in terms of ‘global legal pluralism’ ... Similar to the Austro-Hungarian 
empire of the early twentieth century, in which Eugen Ehrlich identified many 
different social associations with their own legal order, the present social and legal 
context can be understood as a ‘Global Bukovina’ ... The study of this “global law 
without a state” or “post-Westphalian conception of law” ... focuses primarily on two 
fields: (i) the development of international merchant law; and (ii) human rights law 
(Hertogh 2007, p. 14). 
This third wave has a particularly strong impact on the part the state plays in 
law; it is only with the globalization wave, which led to global legal plural-
ism, that Eugen Ehrlich’s concern – the decoupling of state and law – really 
takes on serious dimensions and topples the state from the pedestal of legal 
centralism. This is at any rate the view taken by Marc Hertogh: 
The socio-legal literature is characterized by three waves of attention for non-state 
law, which highlight important changes in law and in society. First and foremost, 
however, they illustrate the changing role of the state. One of the most significant 
characteristics of colonialism was the powerful presence of the (foreign) national 
state. This undisputed presence of the state continued during the second wave of 
attention, albeit – of course – with important legal, political, and social differences. 
The third wave of globalization is, however, significantly different from its two 
predecessors. Here, as illustrated by the examples of the new lex mercatoria, Internet 
law and human rights law, the national state only plays a minor role or has dis-
appeared altogether. Moreover, these latest examples of non-state law are no longer 
connected with marginalized tribal societies, immigrant groups or cultural minor-
ities, but with large multinational businesses and powerful non-governmental 
organizations.
This raises all sorts of important questions about law, about the role of the state 
legislature, but also about the future of legal studies. Writing in the early twentieth 
century, Ehrlich argued that the legal scholars of his day seriously impoverished the 
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science of law because they confined their attention to the national state. Today, in 
the rapidly changing ‘Global Bukovina’ of the twenty-first century, Ehrlich’s plea for 
a decoupling of law from the state has still lost little of its relevance and a “liberation 
from these shackles” seems more appropriate than ever (Hertogh 2007, p. 27).
In brief, the inevitable impression is that the previous predominance of the 
state-centric concept of law has long since begun to erode and that the 
future belongs to legal pluralism. This can and shall be questioned.
II. The Troubled Concept of Legal Pluralism
Under this heading, Brian Tamanaha (2008) reveals in almost sympathetic 
vein the theoretical weaknesses of the concept of legal pluralism, rightly 
complaining “that legal pluralists cannot agree on the fundamental issue: 
what is law?” Tamanaha gives expression to his scepticism in describing the 
wide-angle lens employed by legal pluralists: 
John Griffiths, whose 1986 article “What is Legal Pluralism” is the seminal piece in 
the field, set forth the concept of law that is adopted by most legal pluralists ... Aer 
considering and dismissing several alternatives as inadequate, Griffiths argued that 
Sally Falk Moore’s concept of the “semi-autonomous social field”1 – social fields that 
have the capacity to produce and enforce rules – is the best way to identify and 
delimit law for the purposes of legal pluralism. There are many rule-generating fields 
in society, hence there are many legal orders in society, including the family, cor-
porations, factories, sports leagues, and indeed just about any social arena with 
social regulation. In another important and oen cited early theoretical exploration 
of legal pluralism, published in 1983, Merc Galanter asserted: “By indigenous law I 
refer not to some diffuse folk consciousness, but to concrete patterns of social 
ordering to be found in a variety on institutional settings – universities, sports 
leagues, housing developments, hospitals” (Tamanaha 2008, p. 30).
Tamanaha then cites one of the most prominent proponents of legal plural-
ism to show how much this theory is at a loss when it comes to answering 
the question “What is law?”:
The problem with this approach, as Sally Engle Merry noted almost 20 years ago, is 
that “calling all forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law confounds 
the analysis”. Merry asked: “Where do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves 
simply describing social life?” Galanter was aware of this difficulty at the very outset: 
“Social life is full of regulations. Indeed it is a vast web of overlapping and reinforc-
ing regulation. How then can we distinguish ‘indigenous law’ from social life 
1 See chapter three (“legal spaces”).
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generally?” Legal pluralists have struggled valiantly but unsuccessfully to overcome 
this problem. In an article canvassing almost twenty years of debate over the con-
ceptual underpinnings of legal pluralism, Gordon Woodman, the longtime co-
Editor of the Journal of Legal Pluralism, conceded that legal pluralists are unable 
to identify a clear line to separate legal from non-legal normative orders. “The 
conclusion,” Woodman observed, “must be that law covers a continuum which runs 
from the clearest form of state law through to the vaguest forms of informal social 
control.” Similarly, John Griffiths asserted that “all social control is more or less 
legal”. Consistent with this view, a recent theorist on legal pluralism suggested that 
law can be found in “day-to-day human encounters such as interacting with strang-
ers on a public street, waiting in lines, and communicating with subordinates or 
superiors...”. Nothing prohibits legal pluralists from viewing law in this extraordi-
narily expansive, idiosyncratic way, although common sense protests against it. 
When understood in these terms, just about every form of norm governed social 
interaction is law. Hence, we are swimming – or drowning – in legal pluralism 
(Tamanaha 2008, p. 30 f.).
Since it cannot be our intention to swim let alone drown in the waters of 
legal pluralism, we turn to a seemingly simple example that promises to get 
us further: the rules of the game.
C. The Difficulty of Drawing a Line between Law and Non-Law: 
The Seemingly Simple Example of Rules of the Game 
At first glance, rules of the game appear to be a clear case of non-law; aer 
all, Section 762 (1) 1 of the Civil Code unequivocally distances itself from 
gaming and betting: “No obligation is established by gaming and betting.” 
This is a clear statement that leaves no room for doubt. However, if norms 
are regarded as the broader concept for regulations with varying degrees of 
binding force, things look somewhat different. Von Arnauld draws our atten-
tion to the following quote from Max Weber:
First of all, the “norm” as such – that is to say: the rules of the game – can be made 
the object of purely theoretical considerations. ... They may lead to practical value 
judgements, as for instance when a “skat congress” ... discusses whether it is not 
appropriate, in the perspective of the (“pleasure”) “values” governing the game of 
skat, to immediately introduce the rule that, henceforth, a “grand” [contract] shall 
outrank a “null ouvert” [contract]. This is a question concerning skat policy. Or, 
alternatively, they may be dogmatic and ask whether, for instance, a particular kind 
of bidding “would” not “have as its natural consequence” a particular rank ordering 
of those games. This would be a question falling under the general theory of the laws 
of skat, viewed in the perspective of “natural law”. Other matters belong to the 
domain of the jurisprudence of skat, as for instance the question whether a game 
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is deemed “lost” when the player has “played the wrong card”, and any question as to 
whether a player has in a concrete game played “correctly” (i. e. in conformity with 
the norm) or “incorrectly”. On the other hand, the question why a player has played 
“incorrectly” in a concrete game (deliberately?, unintentionally? etc.) has a purely 
empirical – and more particularly: a “historical” – character (Weber 2012, p. 212).
In his article on the “Normativity of Rules of the Game” (“Normativität von 
Spielregeln”) Andreas von Arnauld has been moved by the undeniably nor-
mative nature of rules of the game to take a somewhat closer look at the 
normative status of rules of the game and how they resemble other behav-
iour-controlling rules. He discovers astonishingly many parallels, included the 
fact the rules of the game normativize the rule-governed behaviour of a 
group of players:
Now the concept of “norm” is not monopolized by the law: we find it in many 
different contexts, in connection with human action, in practical philosophy and in 
sociology. If one approaches all these norms in terms of their (intended) mode of 
operation, they take on the aspect of action-guiding propositions: by means of (at least 
linguistic) directives they seek to steer behaviour in a desired direction. The parallels 
are clear between legal norms imposing behaviour in keeping with a given proposi-
tion within the legal order and rules of the game, which call for regulated behaviour 
governed by this set of rules. If one looks at rules of the law and rules of the game 
“from without,” further commonalities are apparent: legal norms are mostly codi-
fied; they are subject to societal change only up to a point, since they are normally 
set by a special act of creation; the creation of legal norms is not the work of society 
as a whole but is assigned to certain functionaries; unlike general societal reactions 
to breaches of norms, the sanctions entailed by the violation of legal norms are 
institutionalized. Similar observations are to be made, mutatis mutandis, in games: 
the rules of a game, too, are oen codified and go back to a special act of creation 
(viz. the rules drawn up by the inventor of the game); breaches can be sanctioned, 
and disqualification counts as exclusion from the playing community (Arnauld 
2003, p. 17 f. Transl. R.B.).
Like legal norms, rules of the game also apply in general to a general circle of 
addressees that forms wherever and whenever the game is played:
Rules of the game, too, are in the first place general in the sense that they are to be 
respected by all players and not only particular ones. They are also general in the 
sense that that they apply to recurrent game situations and thus cover a multiplicity 
of cases over time – provided that the rules of the game are not changed during play. 
This corresponds with the players’ belief that a breach of the rules, at least if dis-
covered, will be to their disadvantage; even in games there is “general habit of 
obedience.” ... This brings out the autonomous nature of the game, whose “sover-
eign” is the playing community as such, which sets its own rules. Parallels to the 
popular sovereignty (see Article 20 (2) 1 of the Basic Law “All public authority 
emanates from the people”) are quite obvious (Arnauld 2003, p. 20 f. Transl. R.B.).
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A further parallel is that rules of the game, like legal norms, are strongly 
binding: 
It will be obvious that rules of the game are binding in the same fashion as legal 
norms. But the parallels go beyond this: like the law, the rule-governed game is 
based on the fundamental assumption that all participants are willing to keep to the 
rules. To this extent we can even say that rules of the game are just as binding as legal 
norms. If the rules are generally disregarded, the game will collapse. The fact that this 
has no consequences for society worth mentioning may initially throw doubt on 
this observation; but pacta sunt servanda is an equally essential dictum for (rule-
governed) games and for the law. Taken in isolation, however, a single rule in a game 
is mostly not considered to be as binding as a legal rule. This is due first to the lower 
degree of social necessity to which the system-specific opinio necessitas refers, and 
second to the role of the player as “lord of the game,” hence to the possibility of 
changing the rules at any time without any intervention by constitutional institu-
tions. If we take into account that, compared with the legally determined social 
system, a game is considerably smaller and less complex, and that the existence of 
the individual rule of the game is in greater “danger” than that of the individual 
legal norm, we can speak of the “micro-normativity” of rules of the game; but their 
mode of operation is “genuinely” normative. Rules of the game are at the very least 
not normative in the legal sense because they do not form part of the legal system. 
The basis on which to compare legal rules and rules of the game norms is therefore 
lacking (Arnauld 2003, p. 35 f. Transl. R.B.).
Andreas von Arnauld’s comments on the normative status of rules of the 
game are extremely helpful; they point to the criteria that could be impor-
tant in classifying a regulatory regime as law or non-law. These criteria are 
the following:
* Do the rules have general application?
* Do they have a clearly identifiable source, a “rule-maker”?
* Are the rules codified?
* Is there a specific procedure to be followed in changing them?
* How high is the degree of compliance with them?
* Are sanctions provided for in the event of the rules being breached? If so, 
what sanctions?
This is a good place to start, and we shall be expanding this catalogue of 
criteria below.
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D. Capturing Transitions: A Key Methodological Challenge
As we shall see, categorial oppositions and conceptual dichotomies can 
adequately convey the nature neither of the state nor of the law. As Patrick 
Glenn has put it, what we need is a “degree-theoretic” approach (Glenn 
2013, p. 273), that is to say, thinking in transitions rather than in dichoto-
mies: the key methodological challenge is to convey such transitions. Three 
examples show why this is so. 
I. The Need to Overcome Thinking in Categorial Dichotomies: 
Three Examples 
1. The Questionable Distinction between Premodernity and Modernity
This was a subheading in an article by historian Steffen Patzhold examining 
whether it still makes sense in history to assume a dichotomous divide 
between premodernity and modernity. He sees this question as closely con-
nected to the other standard problem of medieval studies: whether medieval 
rule can be described in terms of the state (Patzold 2012). He has this to say 
on the question of “Predmodernity versus Modernity?”: 
Fundamental categories that the social sciences have used to describe modernity are 
clearly losing their self-evidence in the course of recent changes in statehood. ... This 
has also led to reassessment of what a state can be. The discussion in German 
medieval studies lags behind this more recent development: it is still marked by 
the criteria established in the nineteenth century – and against which, in the 1930s, 
New Constitutional History took up arms. But the current political science debate 
on the state no longer argues only about the “modern state” à la Jellinek or Weber or 
“no state at all.” Things are no longer only black and white – there is a broad and 
subtle spectrum of grey tones, from the deep anthracite of Somalia to the fresh ash grey 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (Patzold 2012, p. 420. Transl. R.B.).
Discovery of such a broad spectrum of grey tones invalidates thinking in 
dichotomies: 
To bring it to a point: we ourselves no longer have the “modern state” with full 
sovereignty and a full monopoly of authority; but this does not mean that we have 
relapsed into “premodernity.” The dichotomy of “modern” / state versus “premo-
dern” / non-state thus loses plausibility. For medievalists this is a spectacular situa-
tion: we have to describe the political orders of the Middle Ages no longer in 
analogy to the “modern state,” as Georg Waitz and others have done since the 
nineteenth century, and as Hubert Mordek has done recently in his study of the 
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Capitulary of 779. But, unlike Otto Brunner in the 1930s, we need no longer 
describe them as other, premodern, non-state. Our own world knows a broad 
spectrum of possibilities for and limits to political organization for establishing 
certainty. Instead of squeezing history into two big drawers, we can compare polit-
ical orderings in broad diachrony without losing sight of historical differences in the 
process. This allows us to develop a new, more differentiated typology beyond the 
dichotomy of premodernity and modernity (Patzold 2012, p. 420 f. Transl. R.B.).
Aer these preliminaries, he turns to the question whether the governance 
structures of the Middle Ages can be compared with those in fragile states; 
an extremely interesting question the present author has looked into with 
Stefan Esders in “Modern Governance in the Middle Ages or Medieval Gov-
ernance in Modernity?” (“Modernes Regieren im Mittelalter oder mittelalter-
liches Regieren in der Moderne?”) (Esders and Schuppert 2015).
In concrete terms, this means, for example, that we need no longer discuss whether 
the territory dominated by Charlemagne around 778 was a state (or only an empire) 
or not. Instead, we can ask about grey tones as we know them in the here and now. 
We can, for instance, investigate parallels and differences between Charlemagne’s 
empire and fragile states: Charlemagne organized his power from the mid-790s 
essentially from a single centre, namely Aachen. In some regions his influence 
was weak or absent. What medievalists call “nobility” or the “imperial aristocracy” 
were an interesting parallel to present-day warlords: aristocrats operated on the 
periphery as warlords for their own account – and nevertheless accepted offices 
and titles from the court. As in current fragile states, we see in the late 770s in 
Central and Western Europe the political importance of clan structures, the meshing 
of religion and politics, on the periphery omnipresent and persistent, low-intensity 
violent conflict. It should be noted: this is not to assert that Afghanistan or Somalia 
are premodern or even medieval. It is a matter or comparing political orderings 
beyond this duality of epochs in order to achieve a new typology (Patzold 2012, 
p. 421. Transl. R.B.).
Instead of thinking in terms of “black” and “white,” Pathold plausibly rec-
ommends studying the “grey tones” in the search for a typology of gover-
nance regimes. 
2. The Questionable Distinction between Public and Private 
We have been addressing the distinction between public and private since 
my habilitation thesis, which was concerned with the phenomenon of sat-
ellites of the administrative system (Schuppert 1981), independently of the 
question whether a particular satellite was organized under public law – 
either as institution or corporation – or under private law as association, 
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private limited company, or whatever. From the administration-science per-
spective this study adopted, the question of the public status of certain 
administration satellites could be addressed not in terms of dichotomous 
oppositions but in terms of gradation or scaling:
The literature has less to offer [than with respect to “discovering” the public sphere] 
on the question of how the public sphere is to be delimited as exactly as possible in 
concrete and functional terms. In effect, this is not surprising: the problem lies 
precisely in defining the point at which an organization leaves or enters the sphere 
of pure privateness or the sphere of public administration. This is a problem that 
cannot be resolved and would, moreover, be misunderstood if we were to replace 
the public-law / private-law dichotomy by the trichotomy of public-law, public, and 
private. To the extent that this would sustain traditional thinking in spheres – with a 
new dimension added, it represents a small but not decisive step forward. A problem 
area of fuzzy transitions can be handled only by a method of classification that 
includes such transitions and can also capture the circumstance that organizations 
can and actually do develop in one direction or another (e. g., by broadening their 
goals as in the case of civic action groups or trade unions). In other words, only a 
methodological approach that considers the extent of the publicness of an organ-
ization as a question of gradation or scaling will get us further (Schuppert 1981, 
p. 92. Transl. R.B.).
In keeping with this approach, we have attempted to produce a scaling table 
(following Schuppert 1981, p. 98; the arrows show that organizations in the 
state / public sector can also grow into or out of it): 

































































































































































































































































































































































The question of distinguishing between public and private, however, 
arises not only in administrative organization but also, for example, with 
regard to whether private and public spaces can be distinguished; this is by 
no means an arbitrary question: application of the “appropriate” legal regime 
will depend on the answer: private law or public law. In “Basic Rights in 
Privatized Public Spaces” (“Grundrechte in privatisierten öffentlichen Räume”, 
2007) Jens Kersten and Florian Meinel consider the example of railway 
stations and airports:
The spatial structure of the public sphere is changing. The political debate on the 
“public space” is lively: some see a crisis, the “demise of the public space” while 
others evoke its “renaissance.” There is, however, far-reaching consensus on the 
hybridization of public and private spaces: the dividing line between private and public 
space is becoming blurred. In cities and their surroundings, semi-private and semi-
public spaces are coming into being: private spaces are opening up to the general 
public. For example shopping malls are taking on business district functions. By 
contrast, previously genuinely public spaces have been privatized: not only inner 
cities but also railway stations and airports are changing their social functions in the 
course of the material privatization of public sector tasks. Railway stations, in 
particular, are becoming consumer temples, “malls and urban entertainment centres 
with rail access.”
In this new world of urban governance, not only spatial functions overlap but also 
the once conceptually separate legal regimes of public and private spaces. Thus 
private means and public ends meet in public-private partnerships. They make it 
easy to cut through the ties and restrictions of public regulatory and road traffic law 
by using the flexible tools of house rules and restraining orders to prevent jeopard-
izing the attractiveness of such models through the stricter rules of public law. 
However, if restraining orders become a key regulatory tool in the public space, 
this indicates that the functional hybridization of public and private spaces entails 
convergence between the different regulatory regimes (Kersten and Meinel 2007, 
p. 1127. Transl. R.B.).
The separation of public and private is made completely obsolete by the 
Internet, whose social networks have led to the development of a genuine 
novelty, so-called personal public spheres (Schmidt 2009); the phenomenon of 
digitalized blogs are a particularly striking example (see Schuppert 2015). 
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3. The Questionable Distinction between State and Non-State 
a) From State to Varieties of Statehood
Some time ago the concept of statehood began to gain in popularity, prob-
ably because it frees us from the predicament of having to opt for “state” or 
“non-state”; in “State as a Process” (“Staat als Prozess”) I noted under of the 
heading “State of Statehood”: 
These observations on the semantic decoupling of law and the state necessarily bring 
a parallel process to our attention, namely the increasing use of the term “state-
hood” instead of or alongside that of “state”. This usage oen appears to be unthink-
ing, or at least without decided views on why the one term is to be used rather than 
the other. ...
And we must admit that we have also failed to define a sufficiently clear distinction 
between the concepts state and statehood.
But there are lessons to be learned from the “semantic shi” from the constitutional 
state to constitutional statehood. The most important lesson would seem to be that 
the terms state and statehood should not be use synonymously, but that statehood 
can be applied to structures – “étatique ou non-étatique” – that are either not states 
in the legal sense of the word or which only partly or deficiently provide what we 
normally associate with the concept of state and the type of services that we expect 
from a state in the modern, Western sense. What the statehood concept thus permits 
is to enter the whole motley world of “varieties of statehood,” to study the various 
“configurations of statehood,” and not to limit oneself to the narrow perspective of the 
state as defined by the OECD (Schuppert 2010, p. 127 f. Transl. R.B.).
In their ground-breaking article on “The Return of Leviathan: The History 
and Methodology of Comparing Late Antiquity and Early Modern State-
hood” (“Der wiederkehrende Leviathan: Zur Geschichte und Methode des Ver-
gleich spätantiker und frühneuzeitlicher Staatlichkeit” Eich et al. 2009), Peter 
Eich, Sebastian Schmidt-Hofner and Christian Wieland argue in precisely 
this vein. The key concepts of this article and of the volume edited by the 
authors under the title Der wiederkehrende Leviathan are “statehood and state 
formation.” They are concerned not with the end product ‘state’ but with 
“processes of institutional stabilization and consolidation” (Eich et al. 2009, 
p. 13) and with the development of state structures:
There can be no doubt that the existence of modern statehood cannot be adequately 
described if the history of premodern state formation is ignored, and that, when 
describing developments, preliminary phases, climaxes, and processes of decline as 
such have to be identified and explicitly named. However, precisely this categoriza-
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tion of early modern times as “prehistory” always runs the risk of overlooking 
phenomena that do not point in the direction of modern statehood or – with 
foreknowledge of what is to come – of treating them as anachronistic. One way 
out of this “teleology trap” is to compare early modern state structures with con-
temporary but geographically and culturally remote state structures such as those of 
the Ottoman Empire, India, or China; another is to compare these structures with 
chronologically remote ones such as that of the Roman Empire in Late Antiquity. 
With the help of such comparisons, awareness of the historicity of one’s own 
perspective is sharpened. The perspective shaped by the “modern state” of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, too, is precisely this: a vantage point, and conse-
quently needs to be relativized (Eich et al. 2009, p. 16. Transl. R.B.).
There is hardly any mention of the state as such, but of statehood, state 
formations, or state structures; if the state concept is not or cannot be 
avoided, it is used only as an extremely capacious conceptual umbrella under 
which “variable historical political communities” can shelter. 
b) From the State via Governmental Structures to Governance
Another possibility for escaping the categorial trap of “state or non-state” is 
to use the governance concept. The charm of the governance approach is 
that it always presents itself as “free from state,” as we have already discussed 
in the first chapter of this book – a concept that does not replace the state, 
but one that relativizes it, being essentially concerned with interaction 
between state and non-state governance actors. The key concepts of the 
governance approach are regulatory structures and governance regimes 
(see Schuppert 2005b), which brings us directly to the article by Peter Eich 
et al., which is about power structures and institutional concentrations. This 
approaches us to the governance concept.
Christoph H. F. Meyer can be said to have made the connection. He 
concludes his review essay “The Dispute about the State in the Early Middle 
Ages” (“Zum Streit um den Staat im frühen Mittelalter”) as follows:
[R]eservations about the state concept are quite understandable – at least to the 
extent that the literature is concerned with early Medieval law per se. If, however, 
one considers individual sources, the fundamental certainties evaporate. ... There are 
also findings that do not fit the overall picture. What about societies like that of the 
West Goths, in which a social enforcement mechanism like the feud played no 
special role? Obviously, under these circumstances one can come to quite different 
conclusions about statehood on the Iberian Peninsula, for instance, in Carolingian 
Friesland, and in Carolingian Northern Italy.
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This consideration raises the question of more extensive perspectives. In the con-
clusion to his overview of the research ... Rudolf Schieffer makes a distinction that is 
simple but worthy of consideration: “The question of the existence and quality of 
state theoretical concepts is to be kept separate from examination of the structure 
and efficiency of the apparatus of power.” If we leave aside terms and concepts, 
knowledge and ideas and focus on the second point, the possibility of differentiation 
becomes apparent, and thus the question of “more-or-less” rather than “either-or”. 
Such a perspective would not only have the advantage of allowing the epochs 
preceding and following the Carolingian period to be taken more strongly into 
account. More justice could then perhaps be done to the institutional achievements 
of the Early Middle Ages in comparison to a prepotent second millennium. This 
path touches not least on the sort of fundamental questions raised in the dispute 
about the state in the Early Middle Ages” (Meyer 2010, p. 174, Transl. R.B.).
A recent quite explicit commitment to the governance concept by historian 
Christoph Lundgreen is to be found in “State Discourses in Rome? State-
hood as Analytic Category for the Roman Republic” (“Staatsdiskurse in Rom? 
Staatlichkeit als analytische Kategorie für die Römische Republik,” Lundgreen 
2014):
That the state is under discussion cannot be disputed, that its role and “nature” are 
again being discussed and measured is evidenced not least by the work of two 
collaborative research centres: “Governance in Spaces of Limited Statehood” (SFB 
700 in Berlin) and “Transformations of the State” (SFB 597 in Bremen). Worth 
mentioning are two lines of debate: the discussion on governance and the talk 
about statehood. According to Renate Mayntz, governance is “the totality of all 
coexisting forms of collective regulation of societal matters from institutionalized 
civil-society self-regulation and various forms of collaboration between state and 
private actors to the sovereign action of state actors.” This broad definition of the 
concept is important: governance is not to be seen, according to Schuppert, as a 
concept that ignores the state but one that relativizes it, a concept that seeks to avoid 
the risk of adopting too narrow a view that comes with all state-centricity and whose 
added value lies in the processuality and dynamism of the perspective (Lundgreen 
2014, p. 28 f. Transl. R.B.).
Shortly aerwards, he adds, under the heading “Once Again: ‘State’ for 
(Ancient) Historians?”:
What are the conclusions to be drawn from this sketch? The modern debate shows 
in all clarity that, although it makes sense to understand “state” as a product of 
history, it should not be seen as an epoch-bound phenomenon. Statehood should, 
furthermore, be seen first ... as a process and not as a state. Movements within this 
process should, second, not be coupled with the figure of thought of rise and fall or 
other teleological concepts but be treated analytically as weaker or more intensive 
statehood (with specific advantages and disadvantages). If, moreover, political sci-
ence sees varying statehood as characteristic of the present day and comparative 
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history as typical of the nineteenth century, the strict “state / non-state” dichtomy 
ought to be abandoned in analysing Antiquity, as well – Odysseus in Ithaka and 
Rome under Diocletian could thus be presented with greater differentiation (Lund-
green 2014, p. 34 f. Transl. R.B.).
4. An Interim Conclusion
The three examples discussed – modernity or premodernity, public or pri-
vate, state or non-state – demonstrate that, given a complex reality, thinking 
in categorial oppositions and dichotomies can tell us little about the state, at 
least not if the subject is tackled, as in this book, analytically rather than 
normatively. Empirically saturated analysis must take an interest in the grey 
tones and not in black and white; in our experience this is where things 
happen, where transformations of statehood become visible in the shiing of 
sectors and the dissolution of familiar boundaries. We therefore need a 
methodical approach that is “degree-theoretical” and allows for transitions, 
scaling, and gradation. 
II. The Need for a Sliding Scale Approach
1. Thinking in Gradations and Transitions: More than an Expedient
If this book and particularly this chapter so urgently advocate thinking in 
gradations and transitions, it is not as a stopgap solution when and where 
oppositions and dichotomies get us no further. This is illustrated by Markus 
Meumann’s and Ralf Pröve’s discussion about the ideal type of absolutism 
and the embarrassment among historians when ideal type and researched 
governmental practices diverge:
If we ... renounce establishing an ideal type in favour of a more open, phenomeno-
logically oriented heuristics, we soon realize that by no means did Europe consist 
solely of states under monarchical rule as was still assumed in the nineteenth 
century. Suddenly we discover a varying landscape of differently constituted polities, 
which included not only the Western and Northern European monarchies (such as 
England, France, Spain and Denmark) but also republics like the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, urban governments (Venice and Genoa), and aristocratic regimes 
(Poland), as well as the Old Empire. The problem posed by a seemingly inevitable 
dualistic approach naturally also arises when conceptually classifying divergent find-
ings about the “internal” exercise of authority: that is to say, about participation in 
or collaboration with government by estates, the commitment of the ruler to nat-
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ural law, the failure of regulation to take effect “on the ground,” local resistance, etc. 
Research committed to the “absolutism” paradigm has yet to find a better solution 
than filing these phenomena away under the heading “the non-absolutist in abso-
lutism” – a pretty helpless reaction in the 1960s by Gerhard Oestreich to research 
findings on the subject (Meumann and Pröve 2004, p. 29. Transl. R.B.).
What we want to show with this example is that thinking in gradations and 
transitions should not come to bear only when black-and-white categorial 
pictures fail to capture a situation; this approach should be adopted from the 
outset to ensure the realistic analysis of the realities of state and law, be it 
examining varying degrees of “étatisation” (Chevallier 1999) or rules with 
varying “degrees of binding force and de facto binding effect” (Röhl 2007 
with reference to international standard setting). 
2. From Binary Logic to Cosmopolitan Logics? 
In The Cosmopolitan State, H. Patrick Glenn, who like the present author 
pleads in favour of thinking in gradations and transitions, calls for classical 
binary logic in “cosmopolitan thought” to be superseded by “cosmopolitan 
logics” (2013, p. 295ff.). Although the debate on the right methodological 
approach is in our view not a problem of confrontation between different 
logics, his basic concern is highly relevant to the issue under discussion. 
He has this to say about binary logic:
From the law of identity are logically drawn the two further “laws of thought”: the 
law of non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. Given A, which is radically 
distinct from not-A, the two cannot be affirmed at the same time, or overlap, so we 
cannot have A and not-A: Not [A and not-A], since this would be contradictory, 
affirming at the same time a proposition and its negation. Given the law of identity 
and the law of non-contradiction, what we therefore must have, and which is where 
many current legal problems arise, is A or not-A, which is the law of the excluded 
middle. There is no middle ground between contradictory positions. Why must we 
have a logical rule for A and not-A? It flows from the principal of radical separation 
or identity. Since A exists, independently of that which is not-A, the boundary of 
not-A begins precisely where the boundary of A ends and there can be no middle 
ground between them. Not-A is galactic in character and devours any possible 
middle ground. As recently put, you either have $3.75 to buy a latte or you do 
not (Glenn 2013, p. 262).
This binary logic also has its heroes, whom Glenn refers to as “notorious 
dichotomizers”; in his list he includes Jean Bodin with his sovereignty 
theory, Thomas Hobbes with his opposition between “amoral anarchy or 
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Leviathan” and – in the legal field – Hans Kelsen with his legal-philosophical 
basic norm theory.
This classical binary theory, according to Glenn, cannot capture present-
day realities: 
There has recently been a “many valued turn” in logic, accompanied by develop-
ment of “new” logics. It is a turn away from classical or binary logic and towards 
recognition that the world is a more complex place than that contemplated by 
Plato’s methodology of divisio. It has come about because classical logic was inher-
ently vulnerable as a general intellectual instrument. It inevitably came to be chal-
lenged, ontologically, logically, and legally (Glenn 2013, p. 265).
A “multi-valued world” needs a “multivalent logic”.  The “turn” to multiva-
lent logics mentioned by Glenn is in fact not as new as all that. As long ago 
as 1920, the Polish philosopher and logician Jan Łukasiewicz formalized a 
first multivalent logical calculus and knowledge in this field has since made 
progress (Gottwald 2015). However, that this insight had not everywhere 
reached the social sciences is clear. Glenn’s comments are therefore all the 
more informative and useful for us: 
The essential characteristic of multivalent logic is that it is “degree-theoretic” in replac-
ing a binary option with one that tolerates degrees, usually expressed as degrees of 
truth (as in the statement “there is some truth in that”). Where different and contra-
dictory laws are seen in conflict under classical logic, a multivalent logic would 
admit assessment of relative degrees of applicability and more nuanced means of 
choice ... (Glenn 2013, p. 267).
He then cites a number of authors he considers to be on the right track: 
Michael Taggart has decided that contemporary administrative law in New Zealand 
is no longer well served by dichotomies that have prevailed in the past – appeal /
review, merits / legality, process / substance, discretion / law, law / policy, fact / law – 
and that they should be replaced with a “sliding scale or rainbow” of possibilities of 
review, from correctness review at one end of the rainbow to non-justiciability at the 
other. Moreover, as in a rainbow, colors or internal categories ‘imperceptibly blur or 
merge into one another’; there are no ‘jolts’. Joseph Singer has written of the need 
to create ‘a middle path’ based on reviving the notion of ‘practical reason’, and in a 
construction of a law of peace or lex pacificatoria Christine Bell has written of the 
need to straddle binary distinctions and to develop ‘constructive ambiguity’. Binary 
distinction in the law of citizenship have been particularly criticized and Neil 
Walker has expressed dissatisfaction with the “dichotomizing language of member-
ship,” arguing for denizenship as an “in-between concept, one that challenges the 
series of binary oppositions ... that reflect the political imaginary of the Westphalian 
system of states.” Linda Bosniak deliberately uses a notion of “alien citizenship” to 
accommodate an “ascending scale” of the rights of aliens who gradually augment 
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their identification with a local society. Nick Barber writes of the dichotomy of 
citizen or subject but prefers to think of them “as poles on a spectrum rather than as 
hermetically sealed categories” (Glenn 2013, p. 270 f.).
These samples of Glenn’s thinking should suffice to show his intentions. If 
we want capture the realities of a transnationalizing world, we need a sliding 
scale approach. We fully endorse this finding; but whether new logics are 
called for remains to be seen. 
3. Thinking in Terms of Scaling Calls for Plausible Scaling Criteria
The primary example is again the state: innumerable authors have con-
cerned themselves with the question of what attributes a political commun-
ity has to display to be able to describe itself as a state. There is an out-
standing overview in the introduction to “Studying the State” by Walter 
Scheidel in The Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East and 
Mediterranean (2013), to which we refer the reader. Instead, we turn once 
again to the historian Christoph Lundgreen, to his outline of a habilitation 
project on “Statehood in the (Early) Greek World,” which he has kindly 
made available. 
The first paragraph is concerned with escaping the “state or non-state” 
trap through use of the statehood concept, which opens up new perspectives 
for historians:
The question of what counts as a state is pursued by historians and archaeologists, 
political scientists and lawyers. In recent times, the latter have been debating the 
role and conception of the EU as well as the phenomenon of “failing” and “failed” 
states around the world. The resulting categorization problems have led to reassess-
ment of the concept of sovereignty and concepts of Staatsvolk, Staatgebiet, and 
Staatsgewalt – state citizenry, state territory, and state authority – which have formed 
a classical triad since Max Weber (and Jellinek). Despite all conceptualization diffi-
culties, this offers a major opportunity for addressing so-called premodernity. His-
torians can ask old questions quite differently if, as in more recent governance 
research, a teleological (and mostly positively connotated) line of development by 
all political entities towards the state of Western prenance is superseded by the 
notion of “the state as a process” and the dichotomy of “state or non-state” replaced 
by the concept of “statehood,” which is concerned (only) with the gradual imposition 
of key monopolies. In concrete terms, the efficacious notions of the “state as a 
universally accepted organizational stage for every human community” (inter al. 
Eduard Meyer) like that of the “state as a genuine product of early modernity” (inter 
al. Christian Meier following Carl Schmitt) are both overcome or queried anew 
(Lundgreen, p. 1. Transl. R.B.).
290 Chapter Five
Lundgreen consequently wishes to examine the different dimensions of 
statehood, and proposes nine indicators that can help define statehood: 
III. Dimensions of Statehood
a) From an external perspective (de facto statehood / measured by: decision-making 
power, organizational power, legitimation capacity)
b) From an internal perspective (own perception, symbolic side, “identity)”
1. Taxes / charges / duties
2. Civil rights
3. Military service
4. Political institutions / legislation /administration of justice
5. Mintage
6. Educational / burial regulations
7. Colonization
8. Monumental buildings and public space
9. Cultural and religious festivals (Lundgreen, p. 3. Transl. R.B.).
This is a fascinating approach and fully in line with the proposed procedure 
for examining the field of “law or non-law.” With this encouragement, we 
turn to the development of definitional and transitional criteria in the World 
of Rules. 
E. Developing Gradation and Transitional Criteria in the World of 
Rules: “If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like 
a duck, then it probably is a duck.”2
Thinking about what indicators invite us to treat systems of rules as law will 
facilitate orientation in the World of Rules. The focus is therefore not on 
clear cases recognized by sources of law theory, such as state-made law, 
customary law, and divine law, but rules whose normative status is uncer-
tain: Should they be regarded as law, and if so, what sort of law? This second 
question, too, needs to be answered: it is not a matter of simply rounding 
out the domain of state law with selected cases, only to file away the rest 
under the capacious heading “law in the sociological sense,” but, within the 
legal universe, to distinguish various types of law that stand in varying 
proximity to state-made law. In order to define this proximity more exactly, 
powerful indicators need to be developed, a task the present author has 
2 This pithy aphorism introduces a study by Andreas Engert on private norm-setting power 
(2014, p. 301).
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addressed under the headings “What is good governance?” and “What are 
failing states?” (see Schuppert 2010).
When developing indicators, it clearly makes little sense simply to collect 
them, list and number them: a more systematic approach is called for from 
the outset. The first step is therefore to consider what should count as law 
from three different points of view: the perspective of the addressees of regu-
lation, the perspective of rule-setting authorities, and what can be called the 
functional perspective, since it is concerned with functional similarities 
between various types of regulation. Following Paul Schiff Berman’s pro-
posal “to treat as law that which people view as law,” we turn first to the 
perspective of the addressees of regulation.
I. The Perspective of the Addressees of Regulation 
1. Why Non-State Law is Obeyed 
Law made by the state is legally binding; it demands general obedience from 
all members of the community of law. But why should the addressees of 
non-state rules obey them and – to go by actual behaviour (high compliance 
rates) – treat them as law? Examining “standards” as a type of regulation, 
Oliver Lepsius (2007) identifies three reasons for compliance: 
* first, the binding force of standards can result from societal or eco-
nomic power concentration, producing what we shall call factually 
compulsory compliance:
We comply with standards that fail to convince us for reasons of social conformity: 
because others comply with them, because we want to stay in business, because we 
want to be present in certain markets; in brief because we otherwise risk social or 
economic disadvantages. This form of binding force can also be regarded as classic: 
action governed by private law has always been shaped by the power relations 
prevailing in society, which lead to factual heteronomous obligation (Lepsius 2007, 
p. 366. Transl. R.B.).
* Second, there is what we shall call avoidance strategy behaviour: non-
state rules are obeyed because, if the ordering and control effects 
expected of them do not materialize, the state is likely to take legal 
steps to enforce compliance. Lepsius:
However, this presupposes that standards can be made part of the legal order by 
formal transformation. ... Thus the legally enforceable application of standards need 
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not result from abstract-general validity in a legal order; it can just as well be the 
consequence of case-by-case reception in the course of a differentiated process of law 
concretization as regards institutions and competence (Lepsius 2007, p. 365. Transl. 
R.B.).
* Thirdly and finally, self-commitment to standards can be due to a belief 
in their rationality:
One submits to standards because they are developed in a neutral, rational proce-
dure directed by experts and taking diverse interests into account. The decisive factor 
is the detailed design of the institutions that develop standards and of the proce-
dures that they employ. Does the procedure used to set standards satisfy the demand 
for neutrality, interest plurality, and representativeness? Is standard development 
based on the participation of the interested parties or on the specialist knowledge 
of experts? 
The literature on standard setting rightly insists on such aspects, which, however, are 
difficult to generalize. Not infrequently, standardization organizations rely on the 
principles of administrative procedural law – such as the American Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) – to generate faith in procedural neutrality as a precondition 
for the binding force of standards. ... Röhl, too, stresses that the structural demands 
made of international standard setting are also consequences of the democracy 
principle, so that standard-setting procedures are demanded that compare well with 
national norm-making procedures in transparency, in the account taken of interests, 
and in the use of made of expertise. Standardization organizations borrow tools and 
provisions from state lawmaking to generate faith in the legitimacy of the results 
they produce, which leads in turn to self-commitment (Lepsius 2007, p. 365 f. 
Transl. R.B.).
Particularly interesting is naturally the third point. The ‘standards poultry’ 
clearly assert their membership of the world of ducks by borrowing tools and 
provisions from state lawmaking. Harm Schepel (2005) calls this strategy for 
promoting the legitimacy of standards “normative borrowing between the pub-
lic and private spheres” (Schepel 2005, p. 6); and, as we saw in chapter 3, the 
processes of producing standards do indeed resemble the process of produc-
ing state law in many points. 
2. Heteronomy as Proof of Relatedness 
In his groundbreaking and convincing study of the standardization of mar-
ket rules as a form of heteronomy, Andreas Engert (2014) has identified the 
heteronomy of non-state rules obtaining from the perspective of addressees 
of regulation as a criterion for establishing that they relate to law: 
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The following inquiry is primarily concerned with gaining theoretical / conceptual 
knowledge. The aim is to show why rules made by private parties can under certain 
circumstances be called “norms,” even if they are not legal norms within the meaning 
of the theory of legal sources ... The decisive characteristic of a norm is considered to 
be heteronomy, that is to say, the binding effect of the rule on outsiders unable to 
influence its content. Heteronomy can result from directives under state-made law. 
But – the key thesis – it can also arise from the need to standardize rules. The economic 
theory of network effects helps explain that the mere dissemination of a rule can 
impose a certain constraint to use the same arrangement in private autonomous 
transactions. Heteronomy can thus also arise from supra-individual market practices. In 
addition, private institutions can influence norm-formation and thus exercise pri-
vate norm-setting power. The heteronomous effect of private norms gives rise to a 
common interest in the given ambience. Private norms hence resemble state-made 
law, for instance dispositive enacted law (Engert 2014, p. 303. Transl. R.B.).
To keep this from remaining too abstract, Engert presents three examples, of 
which the following is particularly relevant for our purposes (the other two 
are the rules of the German Corporate Governance Code and the interna-
tional accounting standards):
A well-known example of a transnational regulatory regime is the rules of the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a worldwide organization 
of banks, service-providers, and demanders for over the counter (OTC) derivatives. 
Regardless of the financial crisis, risks continue to be traded in these markets on a 
massive scale. The ISDA rules are standard provisions for derivatives contracts. The 
kernel is a master agreement on uniform rules for all derivatives transactions gov-
erned by the law of obligations concluded between the contracting parties. It con-
tains provisions on, inter alia, performance modalities, the consequences of default 
in performance, and clearing and netting. Apart from the master agreement, the 
ISDA rules include contractual documents on credit guarantees, as well as defini-
tions of individual derivatives describing the risks traded. The ISDA estimates that 
90% of all OTC derivatives contracts worldwide are concluded on the basis of their 
rules (Engert 2014, p. 304 f. Transl. R.B.).
If the addressees of regulation feel that such regimes are heteronomous law, 
this is, as Engert explains, because of so-called network effects: 
A network effect is when the utility of an asset depends not only on its properties 
but also on how many other demanders opt for the same or a compatible asset. An 
obvious example of network effects is telephony: a telephone on its own is useless; 
its utility arises only and grows with the connection of other people to the same 
telephone network (Engert 2014, p. 310. Transl. R.B.).
There are direct and indirect network effects:
Direct network effects arise only when the decision in favour of an arrangement 
commits the given market participant for future transactions in relation to different 
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market participants – at least in the sense that using any other arrangement would 
be more costly (Engert 2014, p. 311. Transl. R.B.). 
Still more interesting are indirect network effects, which arise when market 
participants use certain rules because it allows them to participate in tried 
and tested collective regulatory knowledge:
An arrangement that has been long tested and tried in the market also offers a 
strong guarantee of correctness. It can store practical legal experience when the 
original events have long since been forgotten. For individuals it can therefore be 
wiser to trust blindly in collective regulatory knowledge accumulated over decades 
than to check things out themselves. This offers a parallel to state-made laws, on 
whose adequacy the parties oen also have to rely blindly. It will therefore prove 
difficult to dissuade market participants from repeatedly using differentiated, tried 
and tested arrangements (Engert 2014, p. 316. Transl. R.B.).
In sum, standards seem indeed to belong to the family of ducks. 
II. The Perspective of Rule-Setting Authorities
In this field, too, we have chosen two examples. We shall be taking a look at 
two rule-setting authorities with a marked will to make “law” for their 
domain that is binding on their members. 
1. Sports Associations as Rule-Setters
Whether the rules of competitive sport count as law is not very easy to say, 
but there are two very good reasons to believe it is so.
As far as the legal situation in Germany is concerned, associational law in 
the field of sport can hardly be denied the status of law, since the bridges of 
both contract law and associational law lead to the same result. In chapter 3 
we had seen what Klaus Vieweg had to say and here, too, we cite his cogent 
treatment of the subject. 
Since Vieweg sees his work as a study in judicial facts, he rightly places 
great emphasis on the interests of associations and their self-conception. 
Over and again, he underlines that internal sports associations in particular 
regard themselves as autonomous lawmaking and enforcing authorities:
International sports associations naturally do not determine what legal status their 
rules, sanctions, and other decisions will have in a particular state. This is not 
surprising, for most such associations seal themselves off from the law of the state, largely 
ignoring its very existence. They are satisfied with their de facto autonomy in setting and 
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applying rules, which are imposed not only on their national member associations 
but also on clubs, athletes, and officials, as well as on external persons. From their 
point of view, setting and applying norms amounts to making and enforcing law 
(Vieweg 1990, p. 122. Transl. R.B.).
In brief, we could say that sports associations are rule-making authorities 
with a marked will to make law, which finds expression, for instance, in the 
fact that they used the language and concepts of state lawmaking and have 
also established their own systems of jurisdiction. 
2. The Catholic Church as a Church of Law
Perusal of the literature on the self-conception of the Catholic Church 
reveals that three things are constantly evoked as if in abiding harmony: 
divine foundation, the Church as an idiosyncratic institution and its legal con-
stitution. It is interesting to leave the formulation of this state of affairs to a 
non-Catholic observer. The Protestant theologian Friedrich Wilhelm Graf 
has listed everything that is for him particularly Catholic; here an excerpt: 
Roman Catholicism thinks quite differently about the Church than the various 
Protestantisms. The Roman Church is a legal institution, which considers itself to be 
grounded directly in divine law (lex divina), and to the present day has claimed nor-
mative ethical authority vis-à-vis state and society ... (Graf 2008, p. 137. Transl. R.B.).
But that is not all. In the form of the “Codex Iuris Canonici” the Catholic 
Church has its own legal order, which is understood as a necessary compo-
nent of the identity of the institution “church.” The Catholic author Joseph 
Listl comments:
The Church is ... not a merely external and, as it were, purely additive assembly of 
two per se heterogeneous elements: it is essentially and therefore necessarily both a 
community of salvation and a legally constituted society. ... 
Although canon law by its very nature is spiritual law in the service of the Church 
and its mission of preaching the Word of God, the fact that the Church is also a 
hierarchically organized societal association means that, from a phenomenological 
point of view, canon law has a structure similar to that of state law. This means that, as 
Hans Barion has rightly noted, the provisions of the Codex Iuris Canonici have 
exactly the same authority for Catholics – not associational but sovereign, not 
requiring recognition but given – as the provisions of state law for the citizens of 
the state (Listl 1991, p. 459 f. Transl. R.B.).
In short, sports associations like the Catholic Church are governance collec-
tives, characterized firstly by a marked will to regulate themselves and which 
296 Chapter Five
regard the rules set autonomously or semi-autonomously in their respective 
domains to be binding law for their members.
III. The Function-Oriented Perspective 
1. Functional Equivalence 
We can speak of functional equivalence where non-state regulation substitutes 
for state-made law because the state cannot or does not wish to regulate 
matters itself and therefore does not act as lawmaker. This can, as in the case 
of transnational rule-setting, be simply because the state lacks the relevant 
regulatory competence or because it leaves it to private organizations and /or 
civil society to regulate certain matters that require specific expertise and 
epistemic authority. Three examples illustrate this. 
a) Filling the Regulatory Gap I: 
Private Normative Orderings as Placeholders for State-Made Law 
The formulation “private normative orderings as placeholders for state-made 
law” is taken from the study by Nils Ipsen on private normative orderings as 
transnational law. He has this to say:
Society is in constant development. In its lawmaking, the state cannot keep pace 
with this development. ... It is therefore only natural that new developments in 
society or technology are not immediately regulated by the state, so that a legal lag
occurs. Private normative orderings can close this gap; but in some cases only 
temporarily (Ipsen 2009, p. 211. Transl. R.B.).
A good example of such a placeholder function for private normative orders 
is the so-called Takeover Code, a set of rules elaborated by the Exchange 
Expert Commission, and which to a large extent was incorporated in the 
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act of 1st January 2002. 
It is also interesting to see what Steffen Augsberg has to say about the 
qualifications of the norm-setting body involved. He notes that prevailing 
opinion sees the Exchange Expert Commission as a purely private organization, 
while calling this point-blank assignment to the private-informal sector into 
question, since the commission is something of a “mongrel”:
The code was drawn up by the Exchange Expert Commission, an institution 
attached to but not part of the Federal Ministry of Finance, whose job it is to advise 
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the Federal Government on legal matters concerning the capital and the stock 
markets. The lack of any reference to the Federal Government or the Federal Min-
istry of Finance stands in the way of classifying the code as informal administrative 
recommendation from government and ministry; every announcement or report on 
the Takeover Code names only the Exchange Expert Commission as author. It is 
therefore the general and apparently undisputed view that the Takeover Code is 
grounded exclusively in private law. In contrast, it should be remembered that 
membership in the Commission depends on nomination by the Federal Ministry 
of Finance. In its function, the Exchange Expert Commission resembles the expert 
bodies in what Weber called “collegial” administration. It does not act on its own 
initiative but “on the request” of the Federal Government. Although in the absence 
of any corresponding legal basis it does not exercise the powers of a public authority, 
its eminent position calls for investing the informal level with greater legitimacy and 
also rules to be set on organization (especially membership) and procedures (Augs-
berg 2003, p. 280. Transl. R.B.).
Be that as it may, this hybrid norm-setting body issued the Takeover Code, 
which, as we have seen, was superseded by the Securities Acquisition and 
Takeover Act, since the Federal Government considered it suitable and right 
to have the pending EU Directive transposed not into an informal code but 
into statute law, which, however, largely incorporated the provisions of the 
code. The adoption of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act thus 
illustrates “a normative regulatory technique by which the preexisting self-regu-
latory mechanisms are appropriated by the state and transposed into statute law” 
(Augsberg 2003, p. 289. Transl. R.B.). 
b) Filling the Regulatory Gap II: 
Standard Terms of Contract 
In the introductory chapter we addressed this topic under the heading of the 
gradual decoupling of state and law; we shall therefore be brief. According 
to Tilman Röder, such standard terms of contract, used above all in insur-
ance and transport, owe their rapid spread to two main factors: the need 
for standardization in sectors strongly integrated in the global economy, and 
the lack of legislative regulation, which produced a regulatory gap economic 
actors had to fill. Thus, according to Röder, standardized contractual ele-
ments perform “essentially different functions from those of individual 
agreements between two contracting parties. Their purposes were in-house 
rationalization, the exercise of economic power, the systematic displacement of 
state regulation; and they provided room for permanently updating law. Only 
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on the basis of standard form contracts could the more and more complex 
cooperation, investment, and exchange relations be handled that developed 
in doing business” (Röder 2006, p. 320 f. Transl. R.B.).
With this in mind, there can be no doubt that these standardization 
practices have to do with a process of norm-formation. Standard contracts steer 
the behaviour of the market player, who is guided by them and relies on 
them. What is agreed under them is regarded as the authoritative regulatory 
regime, which substitutes for, further develops, or even circumvents existing 
statutory law. We are therefore dealing with a type of rule-setting which 
recalls “legislative processes rather than contractual practices in industry” 
(Röder 2006, p. 319. Transl. R.B.).
2. Type and Intensity of Regulatory Intervention
a) Type of Regulatory Collective 
It is obvious that the intensity of regulatory intervention depends very much 
on what type of regulatory collective is intervening. It clearly makes a great 
deal of difference whether one joins a voluntary association to pursue a 
hobby and socialize – such as an angling or mountaineering club – or enters 
a “total institution” in the sociological sense of the term such as a prison, 
monastery or boarding school (Goffman 1961, p. 1ff.).
Of particular interest in this connection are collectives that depend on 
and demand a high degree of identification on the part of members with 
“their” institution or community. We have already discussed this in Chap-
ter 2 under the heading of community-forming normative orders. A con-
temporary example throws light on the link between community and regu-
latory intensity.
An article from the Süddeutsche Zeitung, headed “In the Kingdom of 
Equality” (“Im Reich der Gleichen,” Ulrich 2014) on a fundamental Christian 
community founded in Tuscany aer the Second World War by the Cath-
olic priest Don Zeno, which seeks to present an alternative to capitalist 
meritocratic society. Ulrich describes the underlying concept of community 
as follows: 
Welcome to Nomadelfia, a community without fences or walls, which wishes to be 
neither unworldly nor fully of this world. A microstate whose constitution is the 
Gospel and whose driving force is not competition and consumption but brotherli-
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ness. An alternative concept to global capitalism, a microcosm in which there is no 
unemployment, no pension scheme, no grades or failing at school, no family names, 
no money, no private property, no careers, and no shops – but also no perfume, no 
new brand-name clothes, no family vacations, little privacy, and hardly any room for 
individuality. All have to contribute to the life of the community in accordance with 
their abilities, all are provided for in keeping with their needs; a van drives through 
the village distributing toothbrushes, soap, pasta, milk, bread, wine, and olive oil; 
and 80 per cent of produce is grown locally. No-one is alone, no-one has to feel 
superfluous. “Neither servant nor master” is the motto of Nomadelfia, where every-
one takes a turn at the heavy work, and even the president has to muck out the 
stable (Ulrich 2014, p. 11. R.B.).
The point that interests us, however is that such close community life has to 
be organized and regulated. On the subject of organization we read:
If one asks the president of Nomadelfia why his post exists at all in this community 
of equals and how obedience is to be reconciled with brotherliness, he answers: 
“Every community life needs a minimum of organization.” That is why he has taken 
on the job. That is why there is a sort of minister of finance and judge to handle 
disputes. They are all elected by the assembly of Nomadelfians. And there is also a 
priest to watch over the heritage of Don Zeno, who has a right of veto over all 
decisions. He recently vetoed the cultivation of a poisonous African plant to pro-
duce biofuel. This just had to be accepted. Francesco, as the president is called, sits at 
a wooden desk in a cool, bare office under neon lighting. From here he leads the 
small community in collaboration with a board. They decide who has to do what: 
take care of the children, run the school, work in the fields, the workshops, or the 
offices (Ulrich 2014, p. 12. Transl. R.B.).
Above all, rules are needed. The communication expert Sefora Sbaraglea 
reports on her childhood in the community: 
An education in the big group had many advantages, she said. You never felt lonely. 
And there were no “mammoni,” no mummy’s boys in Nomadelfia. Later, as a 
student in Rome, she managed far better with being away from home than her 
fellow students from classical families. However, things were not all rosy in her 
youth. “We children from Nomadelfia felt we were different from the others, and 
not in a positive sense. As an adolescent you always want to be like the others.” And 
there were the many rules and prohibitions of the community, starting with television. 
“Oen I didn’t understand why I wasn’t allowed to do something.” Pubescent youth 
rebels in Nomadelfia just as it does everywhere. “Perhaps more strongly because here 
there are more rules” (Ulrich 2014, p. 12. Transl. R.B.).
This Tuscan excursion is instructive. It shows that community life in such 
social utopias is extremely needful of regulation and that such a regulatory 
regime addresses the whole human being and not only individuals in a partic-
ular social or professional role. This brings us to the next point. 
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b) The Object of Regulatory Intervention: 
The Social Role, the Whole Human Being, the Human Being 
Robbed of Dignity 
Here too, brevity is called for, as much of the subject matter has been already 
discussed. As we have seen in detail in chapters 2 and 4, occupational law 
arrangements, in particular, affect people only or primarily in their social 
roles as members of a certain profession (summary May 2008). Such occupa-
tional law used to go by the name of “Standesrecht” in German and was once 
closely associated with the concept of honour, whereas nowadays it is under-
stood more and more as a tool of professional quality assurance (see also 
Schuppert 2011e). Religious communities, by contrast, tend to address the 
faithful not in a given social role but to make their entire conduct of life
the object of regulation, including rules and prohibitions on dress and food. 
We need not go into that here. 
From the point of view of regulatory intensity, rules need to be mentioned 
that treat people solely as exploitable labour and rob them of their dignity 
with incredible determination and severity. A much discussed example, slav-
ery, will suffice to illustrate this.
Sven Beckert has written a fascinating book on the cotton industry as a 
prime example of globalizing capitalism (Beckert 2014). Under the heading 
“privatized violence and the slave trade” he describes the beginnings of the 
industrial revolution: European states supported merchants and settlers in 
their search for new sources of wealth, but asserted their own sovereignty 
over foreign territories and people in remote areas only weakly. Privatized 
violence (oen legitimized by royal warrant), aiming at the dispossession of 
land and labour, characterized this phase of capitalism. At its heart was 
slavery (Beckert 2014, p. 51).
As the economic backbone of cotton-produced industrial capitalism, slav-
ery was a legally recognized and well-developed institution, which enable the 
violent supervision and boundless exploitation of forcibly recruited work 
slaves. Indeed, slavery was as indispensable for the new cotton empire as 
good climatic conditions (Beckert 2014, p. 100).
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c) Differences in the Degree of Regulation 
That various sets of norms show differences in the degree of regulation is 
a phenomenon familiar from national legal systems. In administration 
science, for instance, it is usual to distinguish between conditional program-
ming, which operates with clear “if-then” propositions and final program-
ming, which works only with targets (see Schuppert 2000). Whereas crim-
inal and fiscal laws require precisely formulated definitions, laws regulating 
economic affairs generally cannot manage without so-called indeterminate 
legal concepts, since the complexity and dynamics of the regulatory area 
would otherwise be unmanageable. This is all well-known and need not 
be repeated. We have therefore looked for an appropriate example else-
where, and have found an extremely instructive one in Islamic law, which 
also provides a bridge to the next point in our study, the sanction system.
As Mathias Rohe writes (Rohe 2009, p. 7), “Islamic law shows varying 
degrees of regulatory density even at its core.” Family law and the law of 
succession, as well as religious rules and prohibitions are regulated partic-
ularly thoroughly. However, caution is called for with respect to the use of 
our “concept of law”:
In its broadest sense, the sharia covers all religious and legal norms, the norm-setting 
mechanisms and interpretational rules of Islam, and thus also the rules on prayer, 
fasting, and the prohibition of certain foods and beverages such as pork and alcohol, 
the pilgrimage to Mecca, as well as contractual law, family law, and the law of 
succession. The corresponding concept of regulation (h. ukm, pl. ah. kām) also means 
both legal arrangement / regulation / regime and religious obligation. Thus translat-
ing “sharia” by “Islamic law” is a simplification. In substance it would be quite 
wrong to assume identity with the usual concept of law. “Law” lives essentially from 
its secular peacemaking function, and in fulfilling this it also makes use where 
necessary of the coercive authority of the state. What is thus characteristic of law 
is its enforceability here on earth. This applies to mutual relations between people 
and other legal subjects and their relations with the institutions of the legal system, 
nowadays principally the state and its subdivisions.
Compliance with religious rules, by contrast, can be enforced here on earth not 
through law but at best through social pressure; and contravention otherwise gen-
erally has consequences only in the hereaer. This changes only if religious rules are 
enforced by secular means at the behest of those in power. The essential difference 
therefore lies not in any claim to binding force – both religious and legal rules are 
regarded as binding – but above all in the sanction system (Rohe 2009, p. 9. Transl. 
R.B.).
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But it is not only this varying density of regulation that characterizes the 
Islamic normative order. It is also marked by a considerable measure of 
ambiguity: Islamic law is to be discovered “less in specific provisions than 
through the theory of legal sources and adjudication (us.ūl al-fiqh)” (Rohe 
2009, p. 6. Transl. R.B.). There is therefore oen no certainty as to the law:
‘Before the courts and on the high seas we are in the hands of God’ is therefore more 
likely to apply to Islamic law than to many European legal systems. A Muslim jurist 
will at any rate not object to the dictum. In applying the law, the notion dear to the 
philosophy of law that there is only one right decision is generally at odds with 
reality even where those on the bench have the best of wills and greatest compe-
tence. Judicial experience shows that the difficulty of ascertaining the facts of a case 
and the room for interpretation offered by many norms allows a certain range of 
possibilities in finding the ‘right’ tenable decision. The more limited the possibilities 
are for establishing the relevant facts and the less clear the normative situation is, the 
greater this range will be (Rohe 2009, p. 7. Transl. R.B.).
For this phenomenon, Thomas Bauer (2011a; 2011b) has coined the term 
ambiguity tolerance, which is one of the characteristics and benefits of the 
Islamic normative world:
Differences of opinion are inherent in the system of traditional Islamic law. Within 
religious norms, too, normative plurality is assumed. Precisely this ambiguity of 
Islamic law ensures flexibility. The plurality of norms facilitates the adaptation of 
religiously grounded law to changing everyday life (Bauer 2011b, p. 175. Transl. 
R.B.). 
At this point we will do no more than note the importance of the existence 
of a specific sanction system for determining the “hardness” of a normative 
system. Since we have devoted an entire chapter to the plurality of norm 
enforcement regimes, we refer the reader to that chapter. 
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F. Interim Appraisal and Summary 
I. Interim Appraisal: Overview of Indicators
Listing the indicators identified so far in context and weighting them sub-
jectively (* = low; **** = high) produces the following overall picture:
This table is not a subsumption machine, where inputting a certain body of 
norms produces the only correct answer. It is rather to be seen as a first step 
towards clarifying what criteria need to be used for locating a body of norms 
on a continuum:
Overview of Indicators
Indicators Counts as LAW
Addressee perspective 
– Extent of acceptance of non-state rules 
– Voluntariness of compliance with rules 





– Intensity of lawmaking will 
– Claimed auton omous or semi-autonomous regulatory power not 
seriously questioned by third parties
– Self-assessment of own rule-setting as lawmaking 






– Functional equivalence: fi lling the regulatory gap 
→ Private normative orderings as placeholders for state law; 
standard terms of contract as substitute for enacted law; 
transnational regulatory networks as substitute for lacking state 
regulatory competence 
– Type and intensity of regulatory intervention
→ Type of regulatory collective 
→ Object of regulatory intervention: social role, whole human 
being, human being robbed of dignity 
→ Diff erences in the degree of regulation 







The distribution of points is merely a suggestion on how indicators could be 
weighted.
However, it is up to the reader to test the usefulness of the table; we have 
tried it out on three example and are more than satisfied with the clarity of 
the results. The three candidates are the following:
* Standards practised and generally complied with on the market, such 
as the those mentioned by Andreas Engert (2014): the rules of the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and the inter-
national accounting standards (independently of their later “promo-
tion” to legal norms of Union law): they not only look like ducks, they are 
ducks. 
* Associational law such as the rules of international sports associations or 
the standard terms of contract in the insurance and transport indus-
tries examined by Tilmann Röder (2006): they not only look like ducks, 
they are ducks.
* The general principles of the “lex mercatoria”: at least at present, their 
score does not justify classifying them as “law”: they are “ducks” propa-
gated by certain institutions, nothing more. 
So far so good.
What still needs to be done is to draw the appropriate conclusions for 
legal theory. 
II. Conclusions: Summary
In the light of these considerations, we must plea for a broad concept of law 
that goes beyond state-made law, which nonetheless remains a particularly 
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If we exclude from the law concept bodies of norms that are purely social 
norms, such as certain rules of etiquette or social conventions, we are le 
with the norms “likely” to be law we have been examining the whole time. 
Our overview table is intended to help investigate the justification of this 
“likelihood.”
Should it turn out that certain bodies of norms work in practice as law – 
functional equivalence – and are experienced as heteronomous legal norms by 
the addressees, then from an empirical point of view we have no problem 
with seeing them as law. They are manifestations of law different from state-
made or customary law, but count as law in the sense of maxims with 
binding force that control behaviour – the addressee perspective – and order 
certain areas of life through rules. 
Over and above this general conclusion and the oversight table, the reader 
is owed a definition:
Rules should count as law:
* If they can be clearly attributable to a rule-making authority (rule-setter) 
* If the rule-making authority intends them to be law: intentional lawmak-
ing (® use of the language and concepts of state-made law) 
* If they are more or less universally obeyed by the addressees
* If the addressees experience them as law, and specifically as heteronomous 
law
* If they substitute for state-made law and fill a regulatory gap
* If they display a certain regulatory density and certainty 
* And if they are backed by a sanction system of their own.
We believe that such an empirical, indeed empirically saturated concept of 
law (Duve 2012) gets us further than merely distinguishing between state-
made law to be seen as ‘law proper’ and all other bodies of norms that look 
as if they could be law to be regarded as ‘law in the sociological sense.’ This 
also challenges legal science to gain an understanding of itself as a science of 
regulation – naturally with state-made law as the principle field of study.
This brings to an end our search for the “right” concept of law, in the 
hope that the reader has been convince that only a broad concept of law 
embracing various types of law can do justice to the complex and dynamic 
World of Rules. 
What still needs to be done is to examine in greater detail a little regarded 
aspect of governance collectives as regulatory collectives. As we shall be 
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seeing in the final chapter of this book, communities of law are also com-
munities with specific ideas about justice, and can therefore be understood 
as communities of justice. We shall be looking at what this means. 





I. Summary 1: Revisiting the Four Key Concepts of Chapter 1
Chapter one introduced four key concepts that were to accompany us over 
the course of this book:
* Multinormativity
* Governance
* Science of regulation
* Law as communication.
Looking back over chapters two to five will show whether or not this
accompaniment has “worked” and the four concepts have proved a feasible
conceptual framework for surveying the World of Rules. We believe it to be
the case.
* It is quite obvious for multinormativity, which runs like a thread
though the entire book. Adopting the multinormativity perspective
leads us to consider not only the “usual suspects” presented as evidence
of normative multiplicity, but also and precisely such regulatory
regimes as the codes of honour of officers and thieves (“thieves in
the law”). These examples examined in chapter two demonstrate with
particular clarity the key link between the plurality of regulatory col-
lectives and the plurality of normative orders.
The plurality of what we have called “norm producers” – the focal
topic of chapter three – ushered different, comparatively “more mod-
ern” members of the World of Rules on stage, namely the world of
standards and the world of codes of conduct, two realms increasingly
flanking the world of state law. Since the entire book is really about
normative plurality, no further evidence is really needed to underline
the central importance of the key concept multinormativity.
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* The governance perspective, whose usefulness the present author has 
repeatedly lauded, most recently in “Globalization as Governance His-
tory” (“Globalisierung als Governance-Geschichte,” 2014), has also proved 
extraordinarily helpful in writing this book. This is particularly true for 
the ordering and systematizing force of two central governance con-
cepts: regulatory structures and regulatory regimes.
Regulatory structures is an especially useful concept where the clear 
typology of state law no longer adequately captures the diversity of 
normative orderings. This is particularly true for fields in which the 
gradual decoupling of state and law – dealt with in chapter one – is 
strongly evident, for instance in normative orderings usually referred 
to by such familiar acronyms as:
– www – the regulatory structures of the Internet
– ISO – the regulatory structures of international standardization
– IOC – the regulatory structures of international sport.
These and many other examples show the need for a concept that goes 
beyond the familiar pattern of primary and secondary legislation, and 
unfurls an umbrella under which novel and different sorts of regula-
tion find a place that are to some extent “wild,” which, in other words, 
develop without supervision by some sort of lawmaker. Secondly, the 
concept of regulatory structures draws attention to the institutional 
component of rule-making and rule-enforcement, because under the 
conditions of changing statehood, control through the law operates 
increasingly in the form of structural control (Schuppert 2004a), which 
steers the the behaviour of chiefly non-state actors not by settling all 
particulars but by providing a framework for doing so (regulated self-
regulation).
Governance regimes are task-related institutional arrangements that need 
not be legally binding in nature. The concept of regulatory regimes has 
been used above all in connection with the multiplicity of norm enforce-
ment regimes examined in chapter four. However, it has proved indispen-
sable where – for instance with the Internet – different types of regu-
lation meet to constitute a regulatory regime in their functional inter-
play.
* If these comments on the key concepts of multinormativity and gov-
ernance are even halfway right, they suggest that a new understanding 
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of legal science is needed for our times: the development of classical 
legal science into a science of regulation. If describing and analysing the 
World of Rules calls for a wide-angle lens, only a science of regulation 
can ensure the necessary keenness of vision. To be quite clear from the 
outset, this is not an appeal for the abdication of classical jurisprudence 
and its dogmatic competence. But the field of vision needs to be broad-
ening to capture the plurality of regulation types and regulatory 
regimes in their distinctness and interaction. Our concern is therefore 
not the “everyday” solution of legal problems, for which practice-ori-
ented legal science remains indispensable: we are interested in the 
conditions for law in a more and more differentiating and globalizing 
world. The development of legal sociology into a sociology of regula-
tion – a project Max Weber would surely have welcomed – is accord-
ingly indispensable. 
We have not been alone in propagating a science of regulation. The 
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, as we recently 
learned, has long been discussing an understanding of legal science 
as a science of normativity, presenting our project in different termino-
logical guise, one perhaps one more acceptable to the legal science 
community. We shall see.
* The key concept law as communication is not as easy as multinorma-
tivity and governance to ascribe to specific areas and regulatory 
regimes. Communication about the law is a more omnipresent phe-
nomenon, although more frequently background music than resound-
ing trumpet solo. Application of the law always involves a multiplicity 
of interpreters of the law, whether in collegial judicial panels or the 
successive stages of appeal in the courts, or in dialogue between courts 
and legal science, which comments on and critically accompanies their 
rulings. However, there are areas of law production, application, and 
enforcement in which the communicative dimension of law is partic-
ularly prominent. As Thomas Duve has shown, for example, local law is 
made, handed down, and developed communicatively. The cooperative 
state, which oen seeks cooperation with the addressees of its norms, 
uses the tool of the legislative deal, the phenomenon of negotiated law 
(e. g., nuclear phase-out). 
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And in law enforcement – for instance with regard to environmental 
and climate protection – it is quite usual to discuss the acceptability 
and feasibility of conditions in advance with the parties affected.
So much for the key concepts introduced in chapter one. Another field also 
needs to be considered: the justice discourses omnipresent in a pluralistic 
society. We shall be looking at them in depth in concluding this chapter.
II. Summary 2: The Close Link between Community Formation 
and Rule-Setting
One leitmotiv is particularly prominent throughout this book: the link 
between community formation and rule-setting. Four observations and find-
ings justify this emphasis.
* The double perspective of legal sociology and group sociology reveals 
that in most cases rule-formation is group-specific rule-formation: 
groups give themselves rules to stabilize themselves internally while 
marking themselves off externally. As chapter five has shown at length, 
the representatives of classical legal sociology are almost unanimous in 
the view that law has always primarily come into being as group law
and that it is legal or factual group pressure that ensures compliance 
with these group-specific rules. The example of “thieves in the law” 
considered in chapter two demonstrates the vital importance of group 
membership and group solidarity: in more general terms we can speak 
of the community-stabilizing function of rules regarded as binding by 
members. This is also why, in the parlance of governance research, we 
speak of governance collectives and regulatory collectives, since accord-
ing to our observations every collective constituted in group form has 
what we could call a regulatory gene.
* But it is not only a matter of the community-stabilizing function of 
rule-formation. Rules also have a constitutive function for communities.
This can be demonstrated particularly well by two examples: specific 
personal governance collectives and their constitutive notions of hon-
our (a prime example being the group-specific honour of the officers 
corps); and community-constitutive normative orderings such as reli-
gious orders (a prime example being the oen highly elaborate rules of 
religious orders or of missionary societies such as the Basel Mission).
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* Recalling the apt expression “encased in belongingness,” this raises the
somewhat communitarian question of how much community people
really need. The ubiquitous rule-making in which people indulge sug-
gests that, at least in their capacity as members of groups, social circles
(Simmel) or social figurations (Elias), they need not only institutions,
as Arnold Gehlen remarks, but also – which oen amounts to the same
– rules.
* This brings us to the fourth and final point of this second summary:
the observation that there are many communities that see themselves
decidedly as communities of law, communities governed by law. This is the 
case – as Paolo Prodi has shown – both for the urban communities
that emerged from from “sworn associations / coniurationes” (Schwur-
einungen) and for the Catholic Church, which had always understood
itself to be a church governed by law.
So much on the link between community formation and rule-making.
What is still missing from this review of pluralities, however, is a look at 
the justice dimension of every normative ordering, since – it would seem – 
no normative order can manage without evoking the topos of justice in its 
particular justificatory narrative (see Forst 2013). But if this is so, the ques-
tion is whether the World of Rules is also characterized by plural notions of 
justice, and whether the plurality of legal communities must be seen in 
conjunction with a plurality of what we shall call communities of justice. 
It makes sense to turn to this question in concluding this book because 
considering examples of justice discourses will once again underline the 
importance of the key concept “law as communication.”
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B. Outlook: From Plural Communities of Justice 
to Plural Types of Justice
The aim of the following reflections is relatively modest: to consider whether 
it makes sense to distinguish not only – as in chapter 2 – between different 
normative orders, each with its own justificatory narrative, but also between 
variants of justice and injustice as elements in communication about law. 
The second aim, taking the actor perspective, is to discover who are, or feel 
themselves to be, affected by various types of injustice, and what they con-
sequently demand of justice in their critique of society.
The objective can therefore not be to contribute to the highly bifurcated 
debate on theories of justice (see Ladwig 2011 and the Gosepath 2008). The 
reader is therefore referred to the relevant literature in legal and political 
philosophy only where it is pertinent to our “lesser” topic: types of justice 
and communities of justice.
I. The Plurality of Injustice and its Mirror Image: 
The Plurality of Claims to Justice
Bernd Rüthers and Christian Fischer point out in their textbook on legal 
theory that there are “many injustices” (Rüthers and Fischer 2010, p. 25). The 
various types of injustice incompatible with our notions of justice of whatever 
provenance clearly show this. Iris Marion Young addresses the subject in 
Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990): setting out from typical injustice 
situations, she identifies five “types of injustice.” Her approach is carried by 
the conviction, which we fully share, that the dominant role played by 
distributive justice in justice discourse risks eclipsing other types of justice 
and consequently other types of injustice. To counteract this, she chooses as 
point of departure not ideal conceptions of justice but two societal phenom-
ena that generally lead to certain forms of injustice, namely injustice not 
towards individuals so much as towards groups. These two phenomena are 
oppression and dominance.
While these constraints [through oppression and dominance] include distributive 
patterns, they also involve matters which cannot easily be assimilated to the logic of 
distribution: decisionmaking procedures, division of labor, and culture. ... 
In this chapter I offer some explication of the concept of oppression as I understand 
its use by new social movements in the United States since the 1960s. My starting 
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point is reflection on the conditions of the groups said by these movements to be 
oppressed: among others women, Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Span-
ish-speaking Americans, American Indians, Jews, lesbians, gay men, Arabs, Asians, 
old people, working-class people, and the physically and mentally disabled. I aim to 
systematize the meaning of the concept of oppression as used by these diverse 
political movements, and to provide normative argument to clarify the wrongs 
the term names (Young 2011, p. 39 f.).
Young lists the following five types of oppression and domination:
* Classical Exploitation
According to Young, there are three varieties of “classical exploitation”: since the 
Marxist conception of exploitation (no. 1) is too narrow, exploitation on grounds of
gender (No. 2) and exploitation on grounds of race (No. 3) are included. But these
varieties of oppression are only the most obvious. More dangerous are the following
manifestations of unjust oppression: 
* Marginalization
Marginalization is perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression. A whole cate-
gory of people is expelled from useful participation in social life and thus potentially 
subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermination. ... [E]ven when 
material deprivation is somewhat mitigated by the welfare state, marginalization is 
unjust because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and 
recognized ways (Young 2011, p. 53 f.).
* Powerlessness
Powerlessness also designates a position in the division of labor and the concomitant
social position that allows persons little opportunity to develop and exercise skills. ...
This powerless status is perhaps best described negatively: the powerless lack the 
authority, status, and sense of self that professionals tend to have (Young 2011, 
p. 56 f.).
* Cultural Imperialism
Exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness all refer to relations of power and 
oppression that occur by virtue of the social division of labor – who works for 
whom, who does not work, and how the content of work defines one institutional 
position relative to others. These three categories refer to structural and institutional 
relations that delimit people’s material lives, including but not restricted to the 
resources they have access to and the concrete opportunities they have or do not 
have to develop and exercise their capacities. ... [T]heorists of movements of group 
liberation, notably feminist and Black liberation theorists, have also given promi-
nence to a rather different form of oppression, which ... I shall call cultural impe-
rialism. To experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant
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meanings of a society render the particular perspective on one’s own group invisible 
at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other (Young 
2011, p. 58 f.).
* Violence
Finally, many groups suffer the oppression of systematic violence. Members of some 
groups live with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks on 
their persons or property, which have no motive but to damage, humiliate, or 
destroy the person. ... What makes violence a phenomenon of social injustice, 
and not merely an individual moral wrong, is its systemic character, its existence 
as a social practice. 
Violence is systemic because it is directed at members of a group simply because 
they are members of that group. Any woman, for example, has a reason to fear rape. 
Regardless of what a Black man has done to escape the oppressions of marginality or 
powerlessness, he lives knowing he is subject to attack or harassment. The oppres-
sion of violence consists not only in direct victimization, but in the daily knowledge 
shared by all members of oppressed groups that they are liable to violation, solely on 
account of their group identity. Just living under such a threat of attack on oneself 
or family or friends deprives the oppressed of freedom and dignity, and needlessly 
expends their energy (Young 2011, p. 61 f.).
We have gone into these five variations of oppression in relative depth 
because they show two things very clearly: the conceptualization of justice 
as distributive justice is far too narrow, and the people who experience 
oppression do so not as singular individuals but as members of a specific 
group. As Iris Marion Young puts it in “Five Faces of Oppression” (Young 
1990, p. 39 f.) it is about “oppression as a structural concept” and “the con-
cept of a social group.” This brings us back to the group-sociology approach 
that plays such an important role in chapters two and five of this book.
II. Communities of Justice and their Conceptions of Justice
1. The Community-Boundedness of Notions of Justice
The reader is invited at this point to return to chapter two, where gover-
nance collectives were examined above all as regulatory collectives. The point 
of departure was the thesis that, without exception, governance collectives 
give themselves rules to consolidate their internal cohesion and to mark 
themselves off externally. Generally speaking, governance collectives are 
also communication communities, since collective identity is generated and 
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perpetuated first and foremost through communication (see Schuppert 
2015). But governance collectives are not only regulatory and communica-
tion communities, they are also what we could call justice communities, in 
the sense that “the self-conception of specific communities is important in 
grounding norms of justice” (Gertenbach et al. 2010, p. 120. Transl. R.B.). 
In our view, which we share with such authors as Michael Sandel (1982) and 
Charles Taylor (1989), there is a direct link between “the question of the role 
of the social context ... in the self-conception of society members on the one 
hand and the grounding of norms of justice on the other” (Gertenbach et al. 
2010, p. 125. Transl. R.B.). In what follows we pursue the thesis that notions 
of justice – we are not speaking about an established concept of justice – are 
community-determined ideas and values; that justice as we understand it is 
therefore always context-dependent justice. A typology of types of justice dem-
onstrates this.
2. Plural Types of Justice – An Attempt at a Typology
A first attempt to distinguish between different types of justice could take 
the following form:
* Distributive justice




* Reconciliatory and compensatory justice
To begin with distributive justice: there are two reasons not to go into any 
detail here on this variety of justice. First, the concept so dominates all 
expositions of justice theory that yet another thumbnail sketch would be 
superfluous. Second, the discourse on the criteria of distributive justice is 
above all a global one (Hinsch 2001; Rogge 2001); this means that it is a 
discourse about criteria for universal validity (see Gosepath 2001, p. 153ff.). 
An unstructured global arena is too vast a framework for the majority of 
discourses on justice: what is needed for purposive debate on justice is a 
common structural and institutional framework.
[I]t is not geographical ties that make a group of people into common subjects of 
justice but their mutual admission to a common structural or institutional frame-
work; this framework provides the basic rules that guide their social interaction and 
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shape their mutual life opportunities in the form of advantages and disadvantages 
(Fraser 2007, p. 361. Transl. R.B.).
Aer these preliminaries, we turn to the range of generally group-specific 
types of justice:
a) Procedural Justice
Since a generally accepted substantive definition of justice is lacking and 
indeed impossible for democracy-theoretical reasons, it seems obvious that 
the justice problem needs to be proceduralized. However, proceduralization is 
not to be understood only as an emergency exit in a compensatory, instru-
mental sense, but – as social-psychology studies have shown (Bierbrauer 
1982) – also has the charm of increasing the acceptance of distributive decisions 
where the people involved feel the procedures used to be fair and reasonable. 
Recognition of this functional link has triggered broadly based research in 
the United States into procedural justice and in Germany to a marked up-
grading of the procedure concept (Lerche et al. 1984); Klaus Röhl:
In the United States, far-reaching empirical research has developed on “procedural 
justice.” Studies have shown that the people involved and observers alike judge 
procedures, regardless of their outcome, as more or less just or fair, and that this 
assessment is of considerable importance for the question of whether the outcome is 
accepted as just or not. In Europe, the perspective of proceduralization has been 
elaborated in the sociological discussion on “reflexive law,” and here as in the USA, 
“procedural justice” has become an important topos in legal philosophy. It is 
asserted that modern society lacks any objective or generally agreed yardstick for 
the just distribution of life opportunities and risks. It oen seems easier to reach 
agreement on procedure than on distribution itself. As a consequence, material 
distributive criteria are elaborated only during proceedings; or completely replaced 
by procedures. Last not least, jurisprudence has discovered the “added value” of 
procedures. One need only recall the buzzword “protecting basic rights through 
procedure” (Röhl 1993, p. 1 f. Transl. R.B.).
In determining what constitutes just procedure in the eyes of the parties 
involved, procedural justice research offers two approaches: the self-interest 
model and the group value model.
The self-interest model, propagated principally by Thibaut and Walker 
(1975), assumes the existence of the utility-maximizing individual, familiar 
under the label “homo oeconomicus,” who faces conflict management pro-
cedures in which a third party – a judge and/or jury – settles the conflict; so 
that the egoistic utility maximizer has little scope for influencing the out-
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come of proceedings. The obvious strategy is therefore – as Astrid Epp 
explains Thibaut and Walker’s argument – to exert as much influence as 
possible on decision-making proceedings (Epp 1998, p. 28ff.). This model 
grounds in ideal-typical notions about American and Continental European 
legal procedure; the American model under which the parties have consid-
erable control over proceedings is “naturally” given preference over the 
European model. Astrid App comments:
At the heart of studies ... was a comparison of two types of legal procedure: the 
adversary model and the inquisitorial model. The adversary model, the “prototype” 
of American legal procedure, gives parties much of the control over the course of 
proceedings with respect to the presentation of evidence, the calling of witnesses, 
and discovery of facts. Moreover, the opposing parties decide themselves when fact-
finding is concluded. The inquisitorial model is closer to Continental European 
legal procedure in the field of public law, under which the court or administrative 
authority has sole control over proceedings and also decides when to conclude 
examination of the facts of the case. The decisive difference between the two types 
of legal procedure lies in the level of influence that parties have on proceedings. 
The results of this comparison, which shows a marked preference for the adversary 
model, leads to an instrumental view of what constitutes fair proceedings; proceed-
ings are accordingly fair if the parties are given the opportunity to assert their 
interests to at least some extent (Epp 1998, p. 29 f. Transl. R.B.).
As the name of this model indicates – and this is the decisive point – it is a 
question of the values that play a role in assessing the adequacy of the pro-
cedure: group values or community-specific values. The parties to the pro-
ceedings who are to be treated justly are thus not atomistic individuals but 
individuals who are members of a specific group or community. In “Intrinsic 
Versus Community-Based Justice Models: When Does Group Membership 
Matter?” Tom R. Tyler and E. Allan Lind (1990) clearly state that:
Group-value theory draws on findings from the literature on group identification 
effects in its attempt to explain when and why people are concerned with procedural 
justice. Group-value theory argues that people are concerned about the fairness of 
procedures not only because they care about the outcome of those procedures. They 
also view procedures as one of the most important defining features of groups and 
societies: procedures are seen as a manifestation of the group’s underlying values. 
How a person is treated under a given procedure is thought to be indicative of the 
person’s status within the group, and people regard receiving unfair treatment as 
threatening to their status within the group or society. Because group-value theory 
views group-related variables as especially powerful determinants of procedural jus-
tice concerns, it predicts that group membership and a sense of community will be 
crucial variables in justice-related attitudes and behavior (Tyler and Lind 1990, p. 87).
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Some have had serious reservations about this group value theory (Epp 1998, 
p. 36 f.), and “group” does indeed remain a vague concept; however, what is 
important for our purposes is only to clarify within procedural justice the 
shaping force of community-specific notions of justice and the importance 
of respecting them in the given procedures. We shall be dealing with this in 
greater detail when looking at recognitional justice. 
b) Recognitional Justice
aa) From the Struggle for Recognition to the Status Injury of Social Groups
With regard to recognitional justice, Axel Honneth’s important contribu-
tion to the subject in The Struggle for Recognition (Kampf um Anerkennung, 
1994) immediately comes to mind. Rainer Forst sums up Honneth’s line of 
argument as follows:
Honneth’s interpretation of the struggle for recognition ... is the most comprehen-
sive attempt to distinguish between different stages of reciprocal recognition that 
develop in a dialectic of interchanges about the mutual recognition claims for 
autonomy and individuality. These stages correspond – in positive regard – to differ-
ent self-relationships and – in negative regard – to differing experiences of the denial 
of recognition, which in the struggle for recognition of equal rights and unique 
individuality drive each stage attained to go beyond itself. From this perspective, it is 
possible to distinguish between the following stages: love, mutual recognition as 
legal person, and the solidary recognition of individuality on which the self-con-
fidence, self-respect, and self-esteem (or self-overestimation) of persons build (Forst 
1996, p. 416 f. Transl. R.B.).
Honneth, like Charles Taylor (1989), is primarily concerned with the de-
mand for reciprocal recognition among individuals, that is to say with rec-
ognition as a prerequisite for what Nancy Fraser calls self-realization (Fraser 
1998). With Nancy Fraser, we consider this problem of granted or denied 
recognition outside the narrow context of personal self-realization, treating 
it as a justice issue involving above all the recognition or non-recognition of 
social groups. Nancy Fraser: 
On the first question [‘Is recognition really a matter of justice, or is it a matter of self-
realization?’], two major theorists, Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, understand 
recognition as a matter of self-realization. Unlike them, however, I consider it an 
issue of justice. Thus, one should not answer the question “what’s wrong with 
misrespect?” by saying that it constitutes an impediment to the self-realization of 
the oppressed. One should say, rather, that it is unjust that some individuals and 
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groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction simply as a con-
sequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose construction they 
have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive characteristics or 
the distinctive characteristics assigned to them (Fraser 1998, p. 3).
This approach, according to Nancy Fraser, has two main advantages. On the 
one hand, it becomes clear that a lack of recognition is really a problem of 
participative justice: 
What makes misrecognition morally wrong, on my view, is that it denies some 
individuals and groups the possibility of participating on a par with others in social 
interaction. The norm of participatory parity is nonsectarian in the required sense. It 
appeals to a conception of justice that can be accepted by people with divergent 
views of the good life, provided that they agree to abide by fair terms of interaction 
under conditions of value pluralism (Fraser 1998, p. 3).
On the other hand, it becomes clear that the “misrecognition” – for example 
of Blacks, women, Latinos, or homosexuals, is less a problem of individual 
misrecognition than a question of misrecognition of individuals as members 
of a given social, ethnic, or religious group. Fraser aptly calls this status 
injury:
Treating recognition as a matter of justice has a second advantage as well. It con-
ceives misrecognition as a status injury whose locus is social relations, not individual 
psychology. To be misrecognized, on this view, is not simply to be thought ill of, 
looked down on, or devalued in others’ conscious attitudes or mental beliefs. It is 
rather to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented 
from participating as a peer in social life as a consequence of institutionalized 
patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect 
or esteem. This approach avoids difficulties that arise when misrecognition is under-
stood psychologically. When misrecognition is identified with internal distortions in 
the structure of self- consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short step to blaming 
the victim. Conversely, when misrecognition is equated with prejudice in the minds 
of the oppressors, overcoming it seems to require policing their beliefs, an approach 
that is authoritarian. On the justice view, in contrast, misrecognition is a matter of 
externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments to some people’s standing 
as a full member of society. As such arrangements are morally indefensible whether 
or not they distort the subjectivity of the oppressed (Fraser 1998, p. 3 f.).
bb) The Struggle for Recognition as a Struggle for Respect of Collective Identity
As a rule, the struggle for recognition is preceded by experience of misre-
cognition for the individual or collective identity. But what exactly is to be 
understood by identity? 
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Identity, according to Hartmut Rosa, is “the specific individual relation of 
social subjects to themselves and the world. It is not about the external 
identifiability of a person but about his or her self-image and self-conception, 
i. e., about a person’s lived and only partly reflected-upon question ‘Who 
am I?’ Collective identity can similarly be described as the answer to the 
question ‘Who are we?’ (as cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group) 
(Rosa 2007, p. 47. Transl. R.B.). 
Thus an individual and a collective “sense of identity that provides ori-
entation” can be distinguished (ibid, p. 49). But the two are not unrelated: 
they interact. Harmut Rosa:
Whereas individual identity addresses the question ‘Who am I?’ collective identity is 
concerned with ‘Who are we?’ a question that arises and is expressed in joint 
practice. The process by which individual identity emerges from collective identity 
to then shape the latter in return, is a key subject of dispute in the “battle for the 
self” between liberals and communitarians ... The “we” of the collective self-deter-
mination process varies with categories of identity: we “Catholics,” “men,” “stu-
dents,” “environmentalists,” “ravers,” “Europeans,” and so forth: the categorial build-
ing blocks of individual identity always relate to collectives, which are actually or 
supposedly connected by common experience, practices, language, notions of the 
Good, etc. At the same time, however, such groups are clearly not to be understood 
as “super-subjects”: every allegation of unity is potentially ideological and normative 
in nature, or suppresses or denies differences; every possible definition of “being a 
Christian,” for instance, excludes deviating self-conceptions. The concept of collec-
tive identity is accordingly controversial in the social sciences ... It should, however, 
be remembered that individual identity formation is not only a process of identify-
ing the particular individual, a process of personal identification, but always one 
that ascribes a social identity to that individual (“you are a women,” “a Jew,” “gay”). 
Individuals and groups are therefore always obliged to engage in dialogistic (and 
conflictual) clarification of collective identity: What does it mean to be a woman, a 
Jew, a gay? The result is the struggle in identity politics for the recognition of 
minorities, which has gathered momentum in the political debate since the 1990s 
in democratic countries. Authors who incline towards communitarian-republican 
positions also argue that a discursively open self-understanding about who we are 
and want to be is a precondition for policy-making in democratic polities ... (Rosa 
2007, p. 51 f. Transl. R.B.).
Caroline Emcke (2000) distinguishes two – oen overlapping – ideal types of 
collective identity: “intended, self-identified collective identities and ways of 
life” (type I), and the “unintended, subjectivizing construction of collective 
identities” (type II) in which identity is ascribed – willy-nilly – from without. 
She sees the two types of collective identity as generating different demands 
for recognition:
322 Chapter Six
Type I cultural collectives want to be recognized in this identity. Individual members 
accordingly want to be recognized as belonging to it. The recognition relationship 
these groups aspire to is confirmation of their identity and legal protection for their 
practices and convictions. They wish to be recognized as equal members of society in 
their capacity as individuals and as members of a distinct group. In this case, 
recognition consists in affirmation of cultural difference in conjunction with accept-
ance of parity as morally responsible individuals entitled to cooperate and partic-
ipate on an equal footing in a culturally differentiated society (Emcke 2000, p. 320. 
Transl. R.B.).
Things are different in the case of ascribed, heteronomous collective identi-
ties:
Type II collective identities, by contrast, do not wish to be recognized as “what they 
are”: “what they are” is the ambivalent product of acquired offensive description and 
assessment and rebellion against an alien, humiliating identity and life situation. 
To recognize the members of such groups in their cultural distinctiveness in the 
above sense would merely reproduce the experience of misrecognition that had 
contributed to forming their identity, and continues to confirm individual persons 
in identitary contexts with which they do not wish to identify. If a recognition 
relationship requires recognition of the constitutive connection between identity 
and the “responsive behaviour of the Other,” the members of type II collective 
identities must be recognized differently than members of type I collective identi-
ties. No positive, substantive definition is needed of “who they are.” Wendy Brown 
fears that the recognition of injured identity serves only to stabilize this unwanted 
identity, thus driving members to “voluntary” commitment to their own subjection 
(“assujetissement”). 
The danger can be avoided by not recognizing members in the sense of “confirm-
ing” their identity as “what they are” but in what has been done to them. To this end, 
this study attempts to define the various forms of moral injury and social exclusion 
(Emcke 2000, p. 321 f. Transl. R.B.).
We shall be coming back to the recognition of injustice done under the 
heading “reconciliatory and compensatory justice.” 
c) Participative Justice
Nancy Fraser points out that recognitional justice is closely related to so-
called participative justice. It nevertheless makes sense to treat it under a 
separate heading for two reasons. First, the concept of participative justice 
takes us into the broad field of participation in democratic decision-making 
processes, and in this context to the much discussed phenomenon of falling 
voter turnout and the still unsolved problem of how social selectivity can be 
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avoided in civic participation, a selectivity that has been discussed in depth 
by Johanna Klatt and Frank Walter (2011) under the heading: “Superfluous 
in Civil Society?” (“Entbehrliche der Bürgergesellscha?”). Second, the concept 
of participative justice leads us to another interesting strand in the justice 
discourse, namely the so-called capability approach developed above all by 
Amarty Sen (1993) and Martha Nussbaum (2000).
In the current justice discourse, the former chairman of the Council of 
the Evangelical Church in Germany, Wolfgang Huber, published an article 
on “Just Participation” (“Gerechte Teilhabe,” Huber 2015) that captures the 
general mood of the present debate. Under the heading “From Distributive 
Justice to Participative Justice,” he argues in three steps:
First he discusses what is to be understood by “social justice,” addressing 
the function of distributive justice:
[Social justice] is associated with the sort of guarantees the political order gives 
individuals to ensure a life under fair conditions. The mitigation of serious social 
differences comes into focus. Distributive justice comes onto the agenda. The state is 
called upon to overcome social discrepancies, close the gap between rich and poor, 
and save people from poverty. Some see this as a bottomless pit. Major questions 
arise: Who are the intended beneficiaries of distribution by the caring state? All 
citizens or all human beings? Both refugees and the established population? Both 
young and old? Talk about the “boat being full” or a “Methuselah plot” paint the 
shibboleth of the overburdened state on the wall. A population under pressure ask 
themselves when the strain of high taxes and charges will be lied. When will the 
demands of the distributive state transmute into restrictions on the freedom of those 
up front called upon to pay? This, too, is a matter of justice. The people affected 
must at least be convinced that their money is well invested.
However, Huber continues, distributive measures alone will not bring jus-
tice:
Distribution is indispensable to alleviate the consequences of poverty and give 
people a halfway acceptable standard of living. But overcoming poverty requires 
more than that. In the long run, the state will manage to preserve its citizens from 
poverty only if it succeeds in activating them. Taking care of their immediate needs 
cannot suffice; this depends on enough people being in a position to care for 
themselves and others. Distribution alone brings no justice; it presupposes that 
enough people can contribute to the national product by their own efforts. A society 
can muster the strength for solidarity only if it gives the citizenry opportunities for 
active participation.
Because redistribution alone does not suffice, it is necessary to move from 
distributive to participative justice:
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The step from distributive justice to participative justice is therefore necessary. 
Participation is as important as distribution, enablement as important as securing 
the necessities of life. If we are to understand justice as a community virtue, then it 
must be above all an activating justice that enables people to make use of their gis 
and to contribute to the life of the community. Whoever wishes to escape the 
revolving door effect of the welfare state must open the way to social participation 
and prevent it from immediately slamming shut again (Huber 2015, p. 7. Transl. 
R.B.).
Aer considering these three frequently discussed types of justice, we con-
clude our tour d’horizon with two further varieties of justice that demonstrate 
particularly clearly the community-boundedness of notions of justice and 
the link between collective identity and claims for justice.
d) Retributive Justice
aa) An Introductory Tale
In “Revenge, Compensation, and Punishment: An Overview” (“Rache, Wie-
dergutmachung und Strafe: ein Überblick”), one of the two authors gives the 
following account set in Somalia: 
In the early 1990s, when an international force was in Somalia in the context of the 
UNOSOM Operation, a Somali boy once got into the Bundeswehr camp in Beled 
Weyn and was shot dead by the guards. The local elders insisted that the boy had 
been unarmed and had had no evil intentions. They demanded blood money from 
the Germans. The weregild for a boy or man among Somalis was one hundred 
camels. The Germans refused to pay on the grounds that the boy had entered the 
camp without authorization and that the soldier who had fired the lethal shot had 
acted in keeping with regulations and therefore bore no guilt for what had hap-
pened. Payment of blood money amounted to a confession of guilt and was there-
fore out of the question. 
In an interview with me, the broadcaster Westdeutsche Rundfunk wanted to learn 
who was in the right. I explained that blood money had nothing to do with a 
confession of guilt in the moral sense. In the event of killing or injury through 
accident, with or without gross negligence, compensation was also claimed. To pay 
weregild is therefore not dishonourable, and no face is lost. ... The Germans would 
therefore have to admit to no more than a simple misunderstanding and would 
have cut a good figure by expressing their regret over the loss of a human life and 
their willingness to provide compensation. And the hundred camels? Wouldn’t that 
have exceeded the defence budget? They would probably never have had to be paid, 
for there is room for negotiation or discursive strategies. One could have pointed 
out that the Germans prefer economic activities other than camel breeding and 
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therefore have no camels. In converting the compensation to be paid into monetary 
terms, there would have been a great deal of leeway for reduction. I could imagine 
at $ 100 per camel, a total of $ 10,000 would have been a good, round, symbolically 
acceptable sum (Schlee and Turner 2008a, p. 49ff. Transl. R.B.).
Whether one finds the proposed solution convincing or not is beside the 
point. However, it does away with a number of obvious misunderstandings.
* Since the retribution concept oen has an archaic aertaste, it should 
be made clear that – with the exception of the blood feud – it rarely 
involves excessive violence. 
* Claims for compensation relate not to guilt but to the consequences of 
an act that constitute an injury of legal interests; the amount can – not 
unlike penance – be established on the basis of a scale of rates. 
* Compensation is essentially negotiable and offsettable. 
This tale having disposed of the bloodthirsty and archaic reputation of the 
retribution concept, we turn briefly to the functional logic of the principle 
of retribution; aer all, the great legal theorist Hans Kelsen asserted that 
retribution was the key, essential characteristic of justice (Kelsen 1941, 1953).
bb) The Functional Logic of the Retribution Principle
In “Operational Contexts of the Retribution Principle in Conflict Resolu-
tion” (“Wirkungskontexte des Vergeltungsprinzips in der Konfliktregulierung”, 
2008b) Bertram Turner and Günther Schlee identify three aspects important 
for the functional logic of the retribution principle.
* The first is the principle of reciprocity:
The point of departure for modern social-scientific research on retribution rules is 
realization of the fundamental importance of the principle of reciprocity, of balanc-
ing performance and counter-performance, action and reaction. Retribution is a 
part of this.
Reciprocity is thus the really fundamental axiom. Actors evoke human interaction 
in every conceivable constellation. In various social fields and contexts of action, it 
assumes specific form. The balanced or symmetrical exchange of gis in the form of 
strongly formalized exchanges of presents and economic forms of cooperation are 
an expression of this. The ethical norm requires one to “do as one would be done 
by”.  This is oen called the golden rule, an expression of mutual respect that pro-
vides a basis for modern human rights (Schlee and Turner 2008b, p. 7 f. Transl. 
R.B.).
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* The second characteristic of retribution is the proportionality of injus-
tice and compensation, a relationship that is open to legal regulation:
Retribution is grounded in the proportionality of injustice and compensation – 
which presupposes the fundamental social equality / equivalence of actors – and 
not a proportionality of reaction that weighs up differences and takes account of 
differences in rank. This tension is to be found throughout the sources and contrib-
utes to the diversity to be found in the concrete application of the retribution idea.
Since the earliest old-oriental and biblical times, the sources show a consistent 
tendency towards strict regulation of retributive practices. However, the rules do 
not indicate whether they apply to a prior state of unregulated retribution. By far 
the most frequent matters requiring settlement are determining who is party to a 
conflict, the legitimate aims of retribution, and the compensation due for precisely 
defined violations of norms (Schlee and Turner 2008b, p. 12. Transl. R.B.). 
* The third aspect important for the logic of the retribution principle is 
that assertion of retribution claims and their execution are a matter 
for the collective to which the injured party or victim belongs or 
belonged; to exercise retribution is a matter for the given solidary 
community.
In societies without central political authorities or acephalous societies, responsibil-
ity for deviance is, at least largely, conceived of as a collective capacity. What is more, 
disputes are not settled in anarchy or by bowing to the right of the stronger. 
Conflicts confront groups or constellations of groups of solidary members in nego-
tiations on potential courses of action ranging from escalation to compromise, and 
who have to keep public opinion in mind; to take into account what the views of 
the majority of society not involved in the conflict (Schlee and Turner 2008b, p. 25. 
Transl. R.B.).
3. Reconciliatory and Compensatory Justice 
This heading points to a specific case of historical injustice concerned pri-
marily not with claims to justice of persons or groups who have suffered or 
are suffering this injustice themselves but with claims of later generations 
who demand amends or compensation for injustice done to earlier gener-
ations. This is the topic addressed by Lukas H. Meyer in “Historical Justice” 
(“Historische Gerechtigkeit,” 2005), to which we shall be referring in what 
follows. Meyer is concerned with a variety of intergenerational justice, not 
with single individuals but with ethnic and /or social groups seeking justice. 
The two groups or communities Meyer looks at are the Sami (Lapps) and the 
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Sinti and Roma, groups that have played a prominent role in a recent 
migration debate in Germany (in early 2014).
Meyer outlines the collective identity of the Sami as follows:
The Sami see themselves as a particular ethnic group and wish to retain their 
identity. As a group they have certain objective characteristics, namely their own 
language, common descent, and a common material and intellectual culture. Their 
traditional way of life differs from that of the surrounding population in both socio-
cultural and socio-economic regard. The Sami have experienced and are menaced by 
considerable discrimination and policies that undermine their traditional way of 
life. In effect, the Sami have always found themselves in an economically and 
socially subordinate position, namely as non-dominant minority in the national 
societies in which they live. The surrounding population regard the Sami as indig-
enous and treat them as such in law and administration. At least in comparison with 
other indigenous peoples, the Sami have recently been quite successful in attaining a 
certain measure of internal self-determination or autonomy. In Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden they have been able to establish elected representative bodies, the Sami 
parliaments (Meyer 2005, p. 142 f. Transl. R.B.).
Things are somewhat different for the Sinti and Roma: 
The majority of the Roma population in Europe lives in Central and Eastern Europe 
and in the Balkans. Except in Spain, the Roma have never constituted a notable 
section of the population. However, they are considered a significant minority in 
most Central and Eastern European countries. In Western Europe, the Roma and 
Sinti have developed a form of service-oriented nomadism as a way of life and 
survival strategy. In Central and Eastern Europe, the Roma have frequently been 
incorporated in the local labour market, which has meant abandoning their noma-
dic way of life and gathering in large Roma ghettos. 
The Roma lay claim neither to a particular cultural affinity with a given territory nor 
to historical continuity on the basis of descent from earlier inhabitants of the 
countries in which they live. They do not assert any territorial claims. They differ 
from other minorities and national minorities in that they have no homeland or 
“mother country.” The fact that they lack a “Romanistan” has frequently led to the 
Roma being denied the status of a “people,” a “nation,” or even a “minority.” The 
concepts “people” and “nation” are closely associated with that of a home country. 
Even the concept “minority” is understood as requiring a connection with a certain 
territory or mother country. Only recently have a number of European countries 
come to recognize the Roma as a legitimate minority. 
There can be no doubt that they are a cultural and ethnic minority. The Roma see 
themselves as a distinct ethnic and cultural group. As groups they display certain 
objective characteristics. They are of common descent and share a culture. They have 
their own language, a specific organizational structure, their own legal system, their 
own literature, music and special customs. How the Roma see their own identity is 
strongly influenced by their historical experience of the worst forms of exploitation, 
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discriminatory politics, and forced assimilation, and continuous defencelessness 
against these and other violations of their rights (Meyer 2005, p. 143 f. Transl. R.B.).
Now that we have more of an idea about the groups involved, we turn to 
two aspects Meyer addresses that are important for our discussion.
* The first point is that the groups that derive claims from historical 
injustices done to earlier generations can be understood as communities 
of remembrance; the ties that establish the common collective identity 
are ties of memory. Meyer:
Living members of transgenerational groups assert claims in their capacity as 
descendants of the victims of historical injustice. Being an indirect victim is consid-
ered relevant for justifying specific claims for restitution and compensation. ... 
People can have a sense of togetherness on the basis of shared experience. If this 
is indeed the case, such experience is oen one of extraordinary if not traumatic 
nature. Now it is important that it is the significance given to the event and not the 
event itself that can create a remembrance community. Collective remembrance is 
not to be understood as a collection of individual memories but rather as a social 
practice of articulating and maintaining the “reality of the past.” Oen it is the 
narrative itself, the continuous articulation of the asserted “reality of the past” that 
forms and shapes a community. Active, shared commemoration regarded as impor-
tant for the self-definition of the community is needed. This community is defined 
by the personal importance of remembrance and not by personal testimony to past 
events. The relevant collective remembrance relates to the shared understanding of 
the heritage regarded as binding.
Even if remembrance communities do not have to be grounded in a history of 
suffering, there are some very convincing examples of the supportive force innate 
in the shared remembrance of oppression. More perhaps than anything else, living 
commemoration of suffering creates solidarity. The remembrance of oppression and 
suffering serves to unify the community because of its particular emotional strength 
and because self-definition as a victim permits the dividing line between “us” and 
“them” to be clearly drawn (Meyer 2005, p. 137 f. Transl. R.B.).
* The second important point has to do with the content and objectives 
of the demands made, which range from symbolic justice to material 
compensation:
It is always a matter of fulfilling historical duties and realizing the corresponding 
claims. Sometimes symbolic justice has priority for (indirect) victims, who may 
demand, for instance, that the still dominant group admits its guilt. In other cases, 
it is about redistributing power and material compensation. In still other cases, 
(indirect) victims see their low status as a particular ethnic and cultural group 
and their attitude towards the surrounding, still dominant population as consequen-
ces of the historical injustice suffered. They may demand that their just claim to 
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autonomy and special rights to representation in decision-making and advisory 
bodies be recognized. Moreover, the group can find themselves illegitimately denied 
access to their historical territory or denied the exercise of political sovereignty over 
this territory. The members of the group can call for territorial concessions, for 
cultural and political autonomy, or for the right to self-determination by secession 
(Meyer 2005, p. 140. Transl. R.B.).
This brings us to the end of our journey through the various types of 
injustice and to the end of our exploration of the World of Rules. Our 
expedition concludes with confidence that we have gained at least some 
understanding of the diversity and multiple facets of the World of Rules. 
Many readers will not have agreed with every twist and turn we have taken; 
yet this book is the outcome of long and not always straightforward cogi-
tation, reflecting what has preoccupied the author for many years. He wishes 
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